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Introduction
In this book, 12 African scholars examine constitution-building in nine
African jurisdictions. The chapters emanate from the International Confe-
rence on Constitution-Building in Africa, hosted by the Community Law
Centre on 6 September 2013 at the University of the Western Cape
(UWC). The Conference was part of the African Human Rights Moot
Court, convened by the UWC Law Faculty in collaboration with the Uni-
versity of Pretoria’s Centre for Human Rights. The Conference was atten-
ded by more than 250 participants from across the continent who engaged
with close to 30 papers in four working groups. Eleven chapters were
selected for inclusion in this book.
These chapters contain a range of narratives located in five themes, na-
mely the process of constitution-making; designing the structure of the
state; the judiciary and constitutionalism; limiting executive power; and
sustainable constitutionalism. What follows is an overview of the selected




The process towards the adoption of a constitution is determined by the
context in which the constitution is written. It navigates such issues as po-
litical engagement, keeping politically agreed timelines, ensuring the in-
clusion of a variety of constituencies and groups, the use of domestic and
foreign technical expertise, and ensuring legitimacy and public awareness.
This book examines examples of constitution-making processes around
the continent and how they attempt(ed) to accommodate the many inte-
rests at play.
As such, the chapters offer a range of different constitution-making nar-
ratives. In Zimbabwe, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) provided for
a parliamentary select committee, co-chaired by the three main political
parties, to lead the drafting of a constitutional text. The process included
public hearings and a referendum. In the case of Malawi, all of its five
constitutional review projects were initiated by the presidential appoint-
ment of a constitutional review commission or technical drafting commit-
tee. The drafting of the country’s 1966 Constitution took place primarily
under the auspices of the ruling Malawi Congress Party; the 1995 constitu-
tional review process was led by a National Consultative Council and con-
sisted of various consultative processes. While this review was markedly
more inclusive, it still lacked legitimacy. The making of Kenya’s 2010
Constitution was, by all accounts, impressive in its inclusivity. With the
horrors of the 2007/2008 post-election violence engraved in collective me-
mory, and the experience of the impressive consultation, led by the Ghai
Commission, still fresh in mind, Kenya’s Constitution was drafted on the
basis of extensive consultation.
Zembe and Masunda examine the detail of Zimbabwe’s constitution-
making process, including the political structure and consultation procedu-
res that were used. The authors do so against the backdrop of the import-
ant but difficult balance that had to be struck between facilitating the broa-
dest possible participation and securing a political settlement to end con-
flict. They argue that Zimbabwe’s Constitution Select Committee
(COPAC), tasked with driving the drafting of the Constitution, was always
ill-suited to strike that balance. Zembe and Masunda challenge the
COPAC process as being strikingly partisan, statist and incapable of facili-
tating participation. For example, they point to the absence of predeter-
mined rules of engagement within COPAC. They question the credibility
of the outcome of the referendum, and substantiate this by referring to par-
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ticipation numbers, inadequate dissemination of the Bill, scant consultati-
on and the illegitimate use of unscientific surveys.
Negotiations towards peace are never conducted between friends. Zem-
be and Masunda argue that, even so, the COPAC process lacked the requi-
red level of basic trust between the three partners. They describe violence
and hostilities, interference by security agencies, donor pull-out and public
condemnation by political principals, submitting that this undermined the
credibility of the process and its outcome. Ultimately, they argue, the 2013
Constitution is an elite-negotiated settlement reflecting the views of politi-
cal parties and power-holders, a contention the authors support by pointing
to specific provisions that bear testimony to the overwhelming influence
of partisan politics and the views of the incumbent president on the consti-
tutional text.
Writing from the basis of the Malawian experience, Chilemba echoes
these sentiments when he remarks that a constitution will have been made
by ‘a majority’ but must have served ‘diverse interests’ rather than only
those of powerful elites. He links the difficulties in limiting the power of
the Malawian presidency to the constitution-making processes that led to
the 1966 and 1995 Constitution. The process towards the 1966 Constituti-
on served only the interests of the ruling party, ‘interests which included
the desire to avoid division and create a unified, one-party state led by a
hegemonic president’; the process towards the 1995 Constitution, while
decidedly more open and inclusive, was nevertheless rushed and lacking
in legitimacy.
Masengu’s chapter provides insight into five constitutional review pro-
cesses in Zambia, including the one that was initiated in 2011 but which
has subsequently been stalled. She focuses on the manner in which com-
munities were consulted, giving a detailed account of how women have
been consistently under-represented both in constitutional review bodies
and petitions made to constitution-making processes. She acknowledges
that representation is but one element of effective participation, yet makes
the compelling point that being outnumbered even before the process
begins does little to dispel the patriarchal attitudes that continue to prejudi-
ce women in Zambia.
Masengu takes the argument further by linking this exclusionary proce-
dure to substantive failures. She discusses four major themes regularly
highlighted by women’s groups in Zambia: the problematic exceptions to
the anti-discrimination clause; the absence of reproductive rights in the
Constitution; the uncertainty surrounding the status of customary law; and
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gender discrimination in citizenship rules. Masengu shows how well-craf-
ted proposals that were thoroughly canvassed with communities and wo-
men’s groups often met with a dismissive response from the government.
Her chapter, complete with practical recommendations such as ensuring
that there are female chairpersons or facilitators in consultation sessions,
serves as a stark reminder of the importance of having a truly inclusive
constitution-building process that emphasises substantive equality be-
tween men and women.
Musumba’s argument is located in Kenya’s experience of constitution-
making. She argues for ‘pre-promulgation scenario-building’ and calls for
the constitution-making process to be lifted out of, on the one hand, the
sterility of the art of legal drafting, and, on the other, the exclusive empha-
sis on aspiration. By devoting more time and effort to the feasibility of im-
plementing the suggested provisions, critical ruptures in constitution-buil-
ding can be avoided, particularly in the early, delicate stages. She main-
tains that the process should include a practical assessment of the feasibili-
ty of each clause, based on the construction of scenarios.
For example, she discusses the legal dispute concerning the eligibility
of William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta to stand for presidential election, a
dispute which turned upon the leadership and integrity clauses in the Con-
stitution. The Supreme Court’s ultimate reduction of these requirements to
an absence of a criminal conviction, she argues, could have been avoided
had greater care been taken to subject this provision to such a scenario-
building exercise.
Structuring the state
Almost all constitution-building processes tend to raise questions about
using multi-level government structures to respond to imperatives for
peace, development and democracy.
Dersso, writing about the Kenyan Constitution, attributes Kenya’s pro-
blems in part to a fervent commitment to centralisation and a correspon-
ding repudiation of aspirations for decentralisation. He finds the introduc-
tion of county government ‘potentially one of the most transformative
changes in the organisation and distribution of government power’.
Muchadenyika in turn examines how devolution featured in the process
leading to the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. He discusses various forms
of decentralisation and their benefits for development and deepening de-
2
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mocracy, but also warns against possible setbacks such as rising inequali-
ty, macroeconomic instability and the risk of local capture.
The author compares the viewpoints on devolution of the three main
political actors assigned by the Global Agreement to negotiate the consti-
tution, namely ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-N. The public debate on de-
volution was largely based on misinformation, he argues. His conclusion
is that the constitutional text left the devolution theme largely ‘unfinis-
hed’, despite having provided a promising starting point. The Zimbabwean
Parliament thus faces the task of leading the local government reforms and
dealing with critical themes such as the allocation of functions, the finan-
cing of local governments, and intergovernmental relations. However,
with the Constitution providing little guidance and parliament controlled
by a party fiercely opposed to devolution, the outcome is uncertain.
Constitutional drafting often takes places in a context of strife between
groups defined by religious, ethnic or other cultural differences; further
complexity is added by the difficulty of accommodating minorities in rep-
resentative democratic systems. This theme is taken up by Mahadew, who
discusses a number of mechanisms for ensuring minority representation,
such as communal rolls, reserved seats and mixed or mandated candidate
lists. In particular, he examines the best-loser principle which has been in-
cluded in the Constitution of Mauritius. This system operates in addition
to Mauritius’s multi-member constituency system, and is an ingenious me-
chanism for distributing eight reserved parliamentary seats among Hindu,
Muslim, Sino-Mauritian and a General Population category. Any form of
specific electoral treatment of religious, ethnic or culturally defined
groups requires these groups to be identified in one way or another and da-
ta on communal affiliation to be collected.
Mahadew’s chapter demonstrates that the precise method of identifying
groups will always attract contention. The Mauritian case is no exception,
as opposition to this electoral mechanism persists and the courts, politici-
ans and international community appear divided on its merits. Mahadew’s
message is to look beyond the system’s obvious inadequacies (such as the
use of dated census statistics) and appreciate the contribution which, he ar-
gues, it has made to inclusive politics, stability and prosperity in Mauriti-
us.
Constitution-building in Africa: introductory remarks
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The judiciary and constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is a precondition for successful constitution-building.
Adherence to the rule of law and recognition of the primacy of the consti-
tution are key ingredients for the successful implementation of a constitu-
tion. Two chapters examine the role of the judiciary in this regard. Mugye-
nyi examines the role of the judiciary in Kenya’s efforts to build and sus-
tain the momentum of the 2010 Constitution, while Sermet examines its
role in creating transitional constitutional law during times of immediate
constitutional crisis.
Efforts at transforming the Kenyan judiciary are shaped by the latter’s
history, and in Kenya that history is a problematic one, as explained by
both Mugyenyi and Musumba; at the same time, Kenya needs judicial ac-
tivism during this delicate state of constitution-building. Mugyenyi descri-
bes various attempts, before 2010, to undermine the judiciary and takes
note of its persistently high levels of corruption, observing that, prior to
the 2010 Constitution, the judiciary in essence had been ‘designed to fail’.
She commends the constitutional elements which seek to change that de-
sign, these including improved arrangements concerning tenure and finan-
cial autonomy, judicial vetting and the insistence on bringing progressive
judges onto the bench. Despite the recent difficulties described by Mugye-
nyi, the prospects remain good for Kenya’s judiciary to emerge as the
country’s key guarantor of constitutionalism.
It is in times of major political crisis leading to ‘regime change’ that the
limits of constitutionalism are tested most severely. Notwithstanding the
unequivocal condemnation of ‘unconstitutional change’ in the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the continent continues
to be confronted with revolutionary changes and coups d’état. Sermet dis-
cusses the concept of transitional constitutional law and focuses on the
judge-made variety of it. He examines two comparable incidents in the
Comores and Madagascar in which courts acted outside of the prescripts
of the constitutional text yet did do in order to preserve constitutional or-
der in response to acute constitutional crises. His examination of the-
se ‘acutely paradoxical’ scenarios leave one bewildered as to whether the-
se courts advanced or frustrated constitutionalism. He locates his examina-
tion in a distinction between ‘controlled transgression’, with the actions of
the court in the Comores as an example, and ‘uncontrolled transgression’,
which occurred in Madagascar.
3
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In the Comores example, the Court accepted as a fait accompli that the
executive would remain in power unconstitutionally. Instead of ruling to
nullify the executive’s authority (which could have deepened the crisis), it
prescribed an interim regime and thus produced constitutional stan-
dards ‘out of nothing’. In Madagascar, the uncontrolled transgression of
the Court was triggered by a presidential regulation that clearly went
beyond what was constitutionally permitted. The Court ruled that the im-
permissibility could be ignored on the grounds of the ‘acknowledgment of
circumstances’ and justified by ‘the principle of the continuity of the Sta-
te’. It proceeded to issue a broad principle of legality, confirming that key
tenets of the constitutional state remained.
It is clear that the courts in these examples felt forced to let facts tri-
umph over law. They constructed their own prerogative to proclaim an in-
terim constitutional order when faced by the prospect of constitutiona-
lism’s total oblivion. Sermet notes the undeniable difficulty in accepting
this, but also makes a plea to engage with and understand the problems
that arise when the law encounters its limits and is powerless to counter
political disorder. He posits the judge’s actions as a last line of defence in
a crisis before the onset of arbitrary power. Perhaps one may take solace
in the self-cleansing ability of the interim order in Madagascar: the Court
later used this exact same set of transitional legal provisions to disqualify
the three major contenders in a presidential election, thereby signalling
that the utility of the transitional constitutional law went beyond averting
immediate crisis.
Limiting executive power
Chilemba identifies the phenomenon of the powerful presidents as a major
obstacle to constitutionalism in Africa. In particular, he discusses the
powers allocated by the Malawian Constitution to the presidency. A series
of presidential prerogatives – including powers over parliament and the ju-
diciary, powers to appoint and dismiss, criminal provisions to protect the
presidency, and dangerous ‘residual’ presidential powers – combine to
produce what he terms a ‘hegemonic presidency’. He acknowledges the
complicated interplay between laws that were not designed to create an
imperial president but were used as such, and presents a number of exam-
ples of how presidents abused constitutional provisions to entrench their
hegemony. He also points to the Bill of Rights and the courts as instituti-
4
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ons that succeeded in limiting executive power, but while he commends
the courts for acting as a bulwark against the imperial president, he be-
moans the fact that the law itself seems to radiate little normative value.
Assefa’s chapter about Ethiopia’s parliamentary system contains an im-
portant lesson about constitutional texts: critical omissions, such as those
on the removal of members of Ethiopia’s national executive, are not with-
out consequence. They may very well have contributed to the executive
predominance that characterises Ethiopian politics. However, Assefa loca-
tes his assessment of the origins of executive predominance mainly in the
ruling party’s doctrine of ‘democratic centralism’: state institutions that
command levers of power are seen as tools for achieving the party’s eco-
nomic and political goals rather than as a manifestation of the limits pla-
ced on state power. Furthermore, party loyalty in parliament is not prima-
rily about maintaining stability in government but about adherence to the
sacred order that is party discipline.
Assefa argues that this threatens liberal notions of the ‘will of the peop-
le’ as expressed through democratically elected assemblies. He substantia-
tes his assessment by pointing out, for instance, that Ethiopia’s House of
Public Representatives does not seem to control its own operations: the
executive operations necessarily take precedence or priority. His chapter
also shows that when constitutional controls over executive law-making
are weak and the principle of legality does not hold sway, parliament is
marginalised and national executives become imbued with seemingly un-
fettered powers to make laws.
Assefa reviews a range of constitutional options to limit executive do-
minance, options drawn from democracies that have had more time to de-
velop them, and argues that there is a need to debate Ethiopia’s electoral
system and consider moving from the first-past-the-post system to propor-
tional representation.
Sustainable constitutionalism
Dersso and Nabukenya discuss the ingredients that promote or frustrate
the ability of a constitution to absorb the inevitable tension in complex
African societies and keep a country on a sustainable trajectory towards
peace and the realisation of human rights.
Dersso emphasises the distinction between decreeing a new constitu-
tional order and achieving a complete break from the politics of old. The
5
Jaap de Visser, Nico Steytler, Derek Powell, Ebenezer Durojaye
16
first is a matter of constitutional quality and is relatively easily achieved;
the second places requirements on the conduct of actors and is infinitely
more difficult to accomplish. He concludes that, with the passage into law
of its 2010 Constitution, Kenya succeeded in doing the first, that is, creat-
ing just institutions. He notes, for example, the genuine attempts that have
been made to restore the judiciary and electoral management bodies
through the creation of credible procedures to appoint and regulate them.
However, until Kenya addresses issues such as the political manipulation
of ethnicity and the widespread corruption among the country’s elite, the
2010 Constitution remains, for all intents and purposes, unimplemented.
He points to a number of developments that signal positive change, but is
adamant that it is too early to tell whether Kenya is living up to the promi-
se contained in its landmark 2010 constitutional text.
Nabukenya engages with the concept of constitutional stability by ex-
amining Uganda, a country which has had four constitutions since inde-
pendence. The fact that its current one has been amended more than 120
times raises questions about the point at which amendments cease to revi-
talise a constitution and begin to tarnish its very legitimacy. Nabukenya
argues that, in Uganda, the amendments were informed by an incapacity to
govern in accordance with the Constitution, and as such he presents the
Ugandan tale as one of constitutional instability. He points to a range of
factors that may, in varying degrees, apply to other post-independence sta-
tes on the continent. These include colonial history, ethnicity, economic
structure, manipulation by international actors and the behaviour and ideo-
logy of incumbents.
He also identifies design features that have bedevilled constitutionalism
in Uganda. Uganda’s constitutional ambivalence towards multiparty de-
mocracy has left it bereft of well-functioning parties that contribute to sta-
bility and policy-making. Nabukenya submits as well that the absence of
real constraints on executive authority, majoritarian politics, unresolved
tension about federalism and decentralisation, and uncertainty about the
role and status of traditional leadership are fault lines in the Constitution
which prevent it from bringing about constitutional stability. In so doing,
he raises important questions about the durability of constitutions that are
grounded in international human-rights norms but out of sync with the
cultural mores of their societies.
Constitution-building in Africa: introductory remarks
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Conclusion
The chapters above are testimony to the abundance of critical thought and
argument on the continent about issues relating to constitutionalism. With-
out fail, the authors celebrate the wave of constitutional reform sweeping
over Africa and its potential to build more inclusive, resilient African sta-
tes that are accountable to citizens and responsive to human rights. With-
out fail, too, they are vigorous in criticising undemocratic or unrealistic
constitution-making processes, the autocratic behaviour of executives, the
exclusion of marginalised groups, undue foreign interference and violati-
ons of basic tenets of constitutionalism such as separation of powers and
respect for human rights.
The continent is propelling itself into a seemingly accelerating pro-
gramme of constitutional reform, along with all the attendant challenges
and pitfalls. At the same time, the margin of error is small and the time for
learning short, given that popular demand for democratisation is growing
and the need for home-grown solutions is urgent. It is hoped, then, that
this book makes a useful contribution to constitutionalism in Africa.
 
The Editors
Cape Town, November 2014
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Abstract
This chapter assesses whether the Select Parliamentary Committee
(COPAC) constitution of Zimbabwe is truly democratic or simply a further
amendment to the existing Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zim-
babwe. The Zimbabwean people are striving to establish a multiparty con-
stitutional democracy as a permanent solution to the nation’s longstan-
ding problems in governance evidenced in violence during elections, dis-
puted election results, allegations of illegitimate and corrupt governance,
economic decay, unemployment and social unrest. Zimbabweans have be-
en clear in their demand for a democratic constitution capable of produ-
cing a legitimate elected government through a peaceful and credible
electoral process. Under the guidance of the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), and in the after-
math of violent and disputed elections in 2008, three rival political parties
entered into a pact dubbed the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 15
September 2008. The parties agreed to end political violence; alter the
Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe through amendment
19; form an Inclusive Presidential Government; and create a new consti-
tution. On 12 April 2009 a 25-member select parliamentary committee
(COPAC) was appointed comprising representatives of the three political
parties in the legislature. The largely partisan COPAC constitution-ma-
king process took four years, instead of the planned eighteen months, to
produce a draft constitution that was put to a referendum on 16 March
2013.
19
This chapter assesses whether the COPAC constitution-making process
was democratically run and whether the draft constitution reflects Zim-
babweans' demands for peace, fundamental human rights, credible multi-
party elections, legitimate government, and economic reconstruction and
development. Already the GPA parties have disagreed sharply on such is-
sues as security sector reforms, an elections roadmap, the registration of
voters and preparation of the voters' roll. How democratic, then, is Zim-
babwe's current constitution?
Introduction
Constitutional reform has swept over Africa from the late 1980s to the
present as a product of democratisation. Since 1975 almost 200 constitu-
tions appeared in countries at risk of intra-state violence, including Zim-
babwe.1 Presently, the national and international perceptions are that Zim-
babwe has a new people-driven constitution that became effective and op-
erational as a new governance charter on 22 May 2013, the date on which
the document was given presidential assent. The constitutional develop-
ment that produced the new national governance document originated
from the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by three competing
political parties on 15 September 2008.2
The need for constitutional reform in Zimbabwe emerged from prob-
lems in economic, social, and foreign policy that had their roots in British
colonial rule, which ended officially when the country gained full inde-
pendence on 18 April 1980. Internal and external pressures on the inde-
pendent African state, both of which were a result of increasing intra-state
conflict and state decay, can be cited as reasons behind this need for con-
stitutional reform.3 For the past 33 years of independence, Zimbabweans
have experienced increasing problems of poor state governance, violent
electoral conflicts, alleged governmental illegitimacy and corruption, dis-
1
1 Widner J ‘Constitution writing and conflict resolution’ (2007) 94 The Common-
wealth Journal of International Affairs 505-18.
2 Given this origin, in this chapter the new constitution will be referred to as the GPA
Constitution of Zimbabwe.
3 Berman BJ ‘Ethnic politics and the making and unmaking of constitutions in Afri-
ca’ (2011) 43 Canadian Journal of African Studies 441-61.
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regard for human rights and the rule of law, economic collapse, unemploy-
ment, social disintegration, and international isolation.
As a response to these crises, the people of Zimbabwe in the recent past
began to call for a new people-driven constitution as a permanent solution
to the nation’s problems. By means of a democratic constitution, Zimbab-
weans hoped to ensure peace, observance of fundamental human rights,
credible democratic elections, the formation of legitimate government,
rule of law, and economic reconstruction and development. It is important
to stress that Zimbabweans have been vocal and unequivocal in demand-
ing what they branded as ‘a people-driven democratic constitution’.
During the past three decades there has been an increasing demand in
Zimbabwe for the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions
and for meaningful popular participation in democratic processes, that is,
for constitutionalism.4
This chapter provides an analytical assessment of the GPA constitution-
making process with a view to determining whether the country now has a
new people-driven constitution, as is claimed to be the case by those who
were in control of the process. The chapter begins by identifying the legal
instruments and structures of the constitution-making process. This is fol-
lowed by a critical analysis of the process and the contents of the constitu-
tion.
Genesis of the GPA Constitution in Zimbabwe
Under the amended Lancaster House colonial constitution of Zimbabwe,
elections took place between 29 March and 27 June 2008 for president,
senators, members of the House of Assembly, and councillors of local au-
thorities. The elections were marred by intimidation, beatings, arrests, ab-
ductions, torture, murder, rape, arson and the displacement of people. The
election results were withheld by the electoral commission for six weeks,
and the public perception was that they were manipulated in order to force
the electorate into a presidential run-off election, given that the published
results did not show a winner by a clear majority.
2
4 Kamba WJ ‘Constitutionalism in Zimbabwe’ (2006) (unpublished inaugural paper,
Africa University).
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Due to the intensity and magnitude of the violence that characterised
the run-off election, one of the candidates, Morgan Tsvangirai of the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was forced to flee and sought
refuge in Botswana. On returning to Zimbabwe, he found refuge in the
Dutch foreign embassy before withdrawing his candidature in the light of
the violence directed against him and his supporters. The remaining candi-
date, Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF), was declared the winner and sworn into office as presi-
dent on 29 June 2008. His five-year term ended on 29 June 2013. The in-
ternational community rejected the results of the June 2008 run-off elec-
tions as undemocratic.
In the aftermath of these elections, and under the tutelage of the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU),
the three political parties that had competed in the elections and obtained
seats in parliament, entered into a pact dubbed the Global Political Agree-
ment (GPA) on 15 September 2008. The parties agreed to: end political
violence in Zimbabwe; alter the Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of
Zimbabwe through Amendment 19; form one combined Inclusive Govern-
ment (IG); and write a new constitution for the country. Thus, the GPA
Constitution in Zimbabwe was born out of article 6 of the agreement of 15
September 2008 between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. The
GPA was witnessed by the SADC Facilitator and its implementation was
guaranteed and underwritten by the Facilitator, SADC and the AU.5
The GPA constitution-making process was largely controlled by party
executives, as shall be outlined below. Scholars disagree as to which is the
best approach in constitution-making processes. Those in favour of partic-
ipatory constitution-making recommend it as the route to follow in build-
ing constitutional legitimacy in highly challenging cases of democratisa-
tion.6 However, this model has its critics, who counter that participatory
approaches can be counter-productive and wasteful of resources as there is
a lengthy period required for mass participation; in some cases, partici-
pants are ordinary people with little understanding of constitutional issues
and can be easily frustrated or manipulated by their leaders. In the case of
Zimbabwe, the GPA leaders created the impression that the process was to
5 Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs Global Political Agreement
(2008) Harare, section 22.6. [Hereafter GPA.].
6 Moehler DC ‘Participation and support for the Constitution of Uganda’ (2006) 44
The Journal of Modern African Studies 275-308.
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be participatory, but the reality is that the outcome was privately negotiat-
ed by the GPA parties and its formulation no different to that of its prede-
cessor, the Lancaster House Colonial Constitution, which some scholars
label as merely a compromise between competing interests.7
Constitutional Amendment 19
Although the GPA was a treaty between political parties, it was to be im-
plemented through state structures. The parties unconditionally agreed8
that the necessary constitutional amendments would be passed through
parliament, with presidential assent to pave way for the implementation of
the agreement. Consequently, the GPA parliament amended the Lancaster
House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe by consensus through the Con-
stitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 19 of 2008.
Section 115: Schedule 8, clause 20.1.6(1) of the amended Constitution
stated that there shall be a president, which office shall continue to be oc-
cupied by President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, and clause 20.1.6(3) stated
that there shall be a prime minister, which office shall be occupied by Mr
Morgan Tsvangirai. Other provisions of Schedule 8 name the three politi-
cal parties in the GPA as ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and MDC-M. The material
effect of the Amendment 19 was to put two names of individuals and three
names of political parties in the Constitution, as indicated in section 115,
thereby converting the document into a personal and partisan private con-
stitution. As a result, the Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zim-
babwe lost its public status.
On 11 February 2009, the presidential government inaugurated after the
2008 elections, and supported by the GPA of 15 September 2008 and
Amendment 19, appointed an Inclusive Government (IG) that comprised
vice-presidents, a prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers and
deputy ministers drawn from members of the three political parties in the
GPA. The IG undertook to produce a new people-driven constitution dur-
ing its term of office from 29 June 2008 to 29 June 2013. It is important to
highlight the fact that the IG governed the country using the Lancaster
House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe as amended, together with its
3
7 Sachikonye L ‘Constitutionalism, the electoral system and challenges for
governance and stability’ (2004) 4 Africa Journal on Conflict Resolution 171-95.
8 GPA section 24(1).
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subsidiary laws, organs, structures, and institutions. This was the institu-
tionalised political power that produced the GPA Constitution in Zimbab-
we.
GPA Constitution parliamentary select committee
Article 6: 6.1(a) of the GPA states, ‘The Parties hereby agree that they
shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament composed of representatives
of the Parties ... .’ In accordance with this provision, on 12 April 2009 the
Speaker of House of Assembly of the GPA parliament appointed 25 mem-
bers of parliament, representing the three political parties, to form the
Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) with a mandate to
spearhead the writing of a new constitution for Zimbabwe.9 According to
section 6.1(a) of the GPA, COPAC’s tasks included: setting up sub-com-
mittees chaired by and composed of members of parliament and represen-
tatives of civil society, as deemed necessary to assist the Select Committee
in performing its mandate; holding public hearings and consultations on
constitution-making; convening an All Stakeholders Conference to consult
stakeholders on their representation in the sub-committees; tabling the
draft constitution at a second All Stakeholders Conference; and reporting
to parliament on the Select Committee’s recommendations for the content
of a new constitution. The planned timeline for the COPAC constitution-
making process was 18 months, but the process took four years to com-
plete.
Considering that the COPAC constitution-making process fell under the
jurisdiction of the Minister of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs,
COPAC can be viewed as a departmental project. However, COPAC did
not have an instrument of governance that regulated its operations. In June
2013, COPAC reported to the GPA parliament that all its deliberations
and decisions were by consensus – which suggests compromises – and
that no voting took place to decide any issue.10 An important observation
to note is that, as much as many scholars and practitioners champion par-
ticipatory constitution-making, there are others who favour elite-negotiat-
4
9 Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee Final Report (2013) Harare:
COPAC. [Hereafter COPAC Final Report, 2013.].
10 COPAC Final Report, 2013.
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ed settlements. The latter approach is exactly the one adopted in Zimbab-
we.
Instruments of the GPA constitution-making process
The GPA constitution-making process was based on two legal instru-
ments, one contractual and the other constitutional. The two legal instru-
ments were the sources of power and regulations that guided the imple-
mentation of the constitution-making process. The contractual legal instru-
ment used in the constitution-making process is the GPA of 15 September
2008 that was signed by the presidents of the three political parties and
witnessed by the SADC Facilitator, Thabo Mbeki, the then president of
South Africa. The implementation of the GPA agreement was underwrit-
ten by the SADC Facilitator and AU in terms of section 22.6 of the pact.
The constitutional legal instrument that provided the framework within
which the GPA constitution-making process was undertaken is the Lan-
caster House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe as amended by Amend-
ment 19 (discussed in section 3).
Structures of the GPA constitution-making process
Based on the contractual and constitutional legal instruments detailed in
section 5 above, the following organisational structures were used in the
GPA constitution-making process.
Principals to the GPA
The three presidents of the political parties, namely Robert Mugabe of
ZANU-PF, Morgan Tsvangirai of MDC-T, and Arthur Mutambara of
MDC-M, who had signed the GPA of 15 September 2008 as principals on
behalf of their organisations, constituted the top governance structure of
the GPA constitution-making process. The three principals also held top
cabinet posts in the IG, which controlled the entire constitution-making
process. Robert Mugabe was the President, Head of State and Comman-
der-in-chief of the Defence Forces. Morgan Tsvangirai was the Prime Mi-
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Management Committee
The Principals of the GPA appointed a Management Committee to give
policy and strategic direction to the constitution-making process. The
Management Committee also served as a deadlock-breaking mechanism.
The Committee was made up of two negotiators from each of the three
GPA political parties, the Minister of Constitutional and Parliamentary
Affairs, and the three co-chairpersons of COPAC.
GPA political parties
As mentioned, the political partners to the GPA were ZANU-PF, the
Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai faction (MDC-T) and the
Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara faction (MDC-M). The
parties agreed to operate by consensus. These were the parties which had
participated in the sham 2008 elections and obtained seats in parliament.
The same parties had been involved previously in a bloody conflict in
March 2007 at an aborted Save Zimbabwe Campaign prayer meeting held
at the Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfield, a suburb of Harare. That violent
event, in which leaders of the MDC-T, MDC-M, and civil society organi-
sations were assaulted by the police and one opposition activist, Gift Tan-
dare, shot dead, shook the world and led SADC to intervene in Zimbab-
we’s political crisis. Throughout the GPA constitution-making process the
three parties’ top decision-making organs met separately on several occa-
sions to determine party positions on issues arising from the implementa-
tion of the process.
Cabinet of the Inclusive Government
In the IG, the cabinet provided collective executive power and authority
over the GPA constitution-making process. All cabinet ministers were






Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs
The Ministry provided supervisory and administrative oversight over the
GPA constitution-making process inasmuch as the business of making a
constitution fell under the executive function and mandate of the Minister.
The minister was a member of one of the three GPA parties.
GPA parliament
On 12 April 2009, parliament appointed COPAC from its members to
spearhead the constitution-making process. After the referendum on 16
March 2013, the final draft GPA constitution was presented to both houses
of parliament through a constitutional bill referred to as Constitutional
Amendment Number 20. It was passed by the House of Assembly on 8
May 2013 and by the Senate on 14 May 2013. All parliamentarians were
members of the three political parties in the GPA agreement.
COPAC
As mentioned, COPAC was appointed by the House of Assembly in April
2009 to drive the GPA constitution-making process. The Select Commit-
tee comprised 25 MPs from the three political parties in the GPA and one
representative of the Traditional Chiefs Council, who was also a ZANU-
PF party member with a seat in parliament. COPAC created five standing
subcommittees made up of its members: Budget and Finance; Human Re-
sources; Stakeholders; Information and Publicity; and Legal. In December
2009 COPAC appointed its own secretariat of 24 employees and estab-
lished a head office in Harare. Its activities were conducted in an ad hoc
manner based on policy directives from the GPA principals. In the analy-
sis below, it will be observed that a direct effect of the latter structural
weakness was that the three political parties ended up monopolising the
process to the exclusion of other parties, such as the Democratic Party,
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First All Stakeholders Conference
The First All Stakeholders Conference, which was attended by 4,000 indi-
viduals drawn mainly from the GPA parties and their affiliate civil society
organisations, was held on 21 July 2009. The conference produced discus-
sion topics in the following thematic areas:
• founding principles of the constitution;
• separation of powers of the state;
• systems of government;
• executive organs of the state, public service commission, police and
defence;
• elections, transitional mechanisms and independent commissions;
• citizenship and a bill of rights;
• land and natural resources;
• public finance and management;
• media;




• war veterans/freedom fighters;
• local languages, arts and culture;
• women and gender; and
• religion.11
The 17 thematic areas became the basis upon which the COPAC outreach
consultation was done. The First All Stakeholders Conference also in-
structed COPAC to ensure that in all its processes GPA political parties
constituted 30 per cent and their affiliate civil society organisations 70 per
cent, following the principle of equal representation of men and women in
all COPAC organs.
6.8




Seventy outreach teams were set up by COPAC to conduct outreach exer-
cises in the 10 provinces of the country. Each team was made up of 16
members, comprising three team leaders, six ordinary team members,
three rapporteurs, three drivers and one technician. A group questionnaire
of 26 questions, referred to as ‘Talking Points’, was developed from the
17 thematic areas. The Talking Points questions were used to collect
group responses from 1,118,760 individual participants who attended the
4,943 meetings held in 1,950 local authority council wards countrywide.
Thematic committees
Thematic committees were formed to analyse the data emerging from out-
reach consultations. Each committee had a total of 425 members, made up
of 30 per cent members of parliament and 70 per cent members of affiliate
civil society organisations. The analysed data were compiled into National
Statistical Reports Versions One and Two. Version One used a quantita-
tive descriptive statistical analysis based on frequency percentages relating
to the 1,950 wards nationally. Version Two used both quantitative and
qualitative analysis of data based on provincial outcomes. In the prepara-
tion of the Draft GPA Constitution, greater importance was attached to
quantitative than qualitative data. The COPAC constitution-making pro-
cess outreach programme was not scientific.12
Principal drafters
COPAC set up a committee of three lawyers to draft the constitution. To
guide this drafting exercise, the principal drafters were given a document
entitled Drafting Instruments and made up of the following sections: List
of Proposed Constitutional Issues; Revised Gap Filling on Identified Is-
sues; and Constitutional Principles. COPAC extracted what it deemed to
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and Two before developing the other two documents on Constitutional
Principles and Gap Filling.
Drafting Committee
The three political parties in the GPA appointed a Drafting Committee to
assist the principal drafters in producing a draft constitution. The Drafting
Committee comprised five nominees from each political party represented
in parliament and two others nominated by the Traditional Chiefs Council.
Co-Chairpersons’ Forum
The Co-Chairpersons’ Forum, made up of six members, two from each
GPA party, was appointed to review the Preliminary Draft Constitution,
which resulted in fresh instructions being issued to the principal drafters.
A second Draft Constitution, which was produced in April 2012, triggered
some disagreements among the parties, causing the Management Commit-
tee to intervene. After the Management Committee’s intervention, a third
Draft Constitution was produced on 18 July 2012. That is the COPAC
Draft Constitution that was taken to the Second All Stakeholders Confer-
ence held in October 2012.
Second All Stakeholders Conference
The conference was held from 21-23 October 2012 and attended by 1,400
representatives from the GPA political parties and their affiliate civil soci-
ety organisations. The Second All Stakeholders Conference received re-
ports on the constitution-making process from COPAC. The reports com-
prised the two versions of the National Statistical Report, Drafting Instru-
ments, and the Draft Constitution. Although the conference made recom-
mendations and changes to the Draft Constitution, participants disagreed








On 25 November 2012 the principals to the GPA appointed a committee
of seven members to resolve the deadlock. This committee consisted of
three cabinet ministers (one from each GPA political party) and three co-
chairpersons of COPAC, with the Minister of Constitutional and Parlia-
mentary Affairs acting as convener and chair. The committee met with the
principals on 17 January 2013 and resolved the disagreements. The third
Draft Constitution that was produced on 18 July 2012 was changed,
paving the way to the production of the fourth and Final Draft Constitu-
tion on 31 January 2013.
Referendum
A referendum on the final GPA Draft Constitution was conducted on 16
March 2013. A total of 3,316,082 individuals took part in it. Most of the
voters had not seen the draft constitution but did so at the instigation of the
GPA parties. There were 3,079,966 votes in favour of the draft constitu-
tion, 179,489 votes against, and 56,627 spoiled ballots. Zimbabwe has a
population of about 13 million people and approximately 4 million live in
the diaspora. Those who live in the diaspora were not allowed to vote in
the referendum. Only 1,118,760 individuals were consulted on the consti-
tution during the outreach phase, through 4,943 partisan group meetings
countrywide (section 6.9 above). All the GPA political parties who cam-
paigned for the ‘yes’ vote made vigorous use of state machinery and insti-
tutions, including public media; those who campaigned for a ‘no’ vote
were not given free space to do so.
In view of the above, the credibility of the ‘yes’ vote is questionable,
more so given that the referendum was also a self-serving exercise by the
three GPA parties. The people were not given adequate time to read the
Draft Constitution. In addition, COPAC produced insufficient copies of
the document due to financial constraints. Only 70,000 copies were print-
ed for distribution countrywide. The visually impaired were literally ex-
cluded as they got only 200 braille copies, much to the chagrin of the
League of the Blind, which has a membership of over 100,000.
It has been noted that in most constitution-making processes in Africa,
an overwhelming majority of the populace never see the constitution and
6.15
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never have the opportunity to study and understand it.13 At the beginning
of the constitution-making exercise, the vigilance of civil society during
this stage was crucial for a legitimately democratic constitution to be
drafted and adopted.14 In contrast, civil society organisations such as the
National Constitutional Assembly, the International Socialist Organisation
and the Democracy Institute, among others, which clamoured for more
copies of the draft and more time to be given to the people to analyse the
draft, were demonised and denied adequate media space to voice their
concerns.
After the referendum, the Draft Constitution was presented to parlia-
ment, which consisted only of members from the GPA political parties.
State President
Following the passing of the Constitutional Bill by both houses of parlia-
ment, on 22 May 2013 the state president assented by signing the Bill into
the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 Act of 2013. The
State President was also a GPA principal and the president of one of the
three political parties, ZANU-PF.
Financiers
The GPA constitution-making process was funded by donors and the IG
of Zimbabwe through a ‘basket fund’ jointly managed by the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP), the Zimbabwe Institute (ZI),
UNICEF, the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), and the GPA
IG of Zimbabwe. A total of US$51.9 million was used for the constitu-
tion-making process, with a contribution of US$23.2 million from donors
and US$28.7 million from the IG.
6.17
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Analysis of the GPA constitution-making structures
Political violence
The consummation of the GPA of 15 September 2008 was preceded by
two major episodes of violent conflict between ZANU-PF and the two
MDC formations. As previously mentioned, the first major clash occurred
when leaders of the MDC formations and civil society organisations were
brutally attacked and assaulted by the police on 11 March 2007 at a dis-
rupted prayer meeting organised in Harare by the Save Zimbabwe Cam-
paign. A member of the MDC-T, Gift Tandare, was shot and killed on the
spot by the police. The bloody event attracted international attention and
condemnation. In the region, the event triggered external intervention by
SADC in Zimbabwe’s political crisis. The SADC intervention was man-
dated by a resolution of the regional body’s Summit held in Dar es Salam,
Tanzania on 29 March 2007. The AU supported the intervention. The sec-
ond major class took place during the 2008 elections. Section 2 above cov-
ers the nature of the violence witnessed.
In the aftermath of the bloody and violent sham elections, the GPA of
15 September 2008 was consummated by the three parties under the aus-
pices of the SADC external intervention initiative of 29 March 2007.
These two major acts of violence created the conditions under which the
GPA agreement was entered into, but the parties were never socially rec-
onciled; inwardly, they remained hostile towards each other. This point is
confirmed by the fact that violence and hostilities pervaded all structures
of the GPA constitution-making process.
The initial meeting of the First All Stakeholders Conference was vio-
lently disrupted by rowdy ZANU-PF war veteran on 13 July 2009.15 In
2010 one of the vice presidents of ZANU-PF, John Nkomo, baldly stated,
‘We can’t sit at the same table with the enemy [MDC] and pretend to be
friends when we are not.’16
The GPA COPAC constitutional public-outreach meetings in Harare
were abandoned after violence and chaos rocked the proceedings when
ZANU-PF youths chased away MDC-T supporters from the gatherings.
One person was killed in the attack. In Chitungwiza, the constitutional
7
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public-outreach consultation programme was aborted after a gun was
drawn during disagreements at the start of the meeting.17 The Zimbabwe
Independent reported that the army and other state security agents ter-
rorised villagers during the public consultation programme.18 This was
echoed by similar media coverage across the country that pointed to the
military’s heavy involvement in the constitution-making process.
Intimidation and coaching of respondents
Throughout the implementation of the GPA constitution-making process,
media reports indicated that people were being intimidated, threatened and
sometimes beaten for voicing their thoughts on the constitution during the
COPAC public consultation programme. In Bikita, the leader of the War
Veterans Association was alleged to have established a base in the area for
disrupting COPAC meetings and threatening villagers against saying any-
thing opposed to the ZANU-PF at these events.19
In addition, the media reported instances where GPA political parties
competed among themselves by coaching their members on what to say in
the public constitutional consultation process.20 In some cases, only one
person was appointed and authorised by the party to speak as the respon-
dent representing a group of members at an outreach consultation gather-
ing.
It was also reported that COPAC data collected in the constitution-mak-
ing outreach disappeared because when it was erased from computers by
security officials who objected to people’s opinions on the constitution.21
It was said, too, that the UNDP had ditched the COPAC constitution-mak-
ing process by withdrawing funding, amounting to US$2 million, for Sec-
ond All Stakeholders Conference because the event would be marred by
violence. ‘The UNDP could not sink US$2 million into violence,’ the re-
port concluded.22
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In the same vein, the leader of the MDC-T, Morgan Tsvangirai, pub-
licly declared that the GPA constitutional outreach consultation pro-
gramme had ‘failed to pass the test of legitimacy, credibility and people-
drivenness’ due to the violence and intimidation that had characterised
it.23
Partisan character
All the legal instruments and organisational structures of the GPA consti-
tution-making process were established, managed, controlled and gov-
erned by members of the three political parties to the exclusion of other
political parties, civil society organisations and individual stakeholders in
Zimbabwe. The entire COPAC constitution-making process was strikingly
partisan: only the coached views of these mutually hostile parties were
collected, after which these views were edited by the party principals and
their subordinate constitution-making structures before a draft constitution
was produced.
It may be observed that one of the reasons why neither the ZANU-PF
nor MDC-T obtained an outright majority in the 2008 elections was that
Simba Makoni of Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn party garnered 8.3 per cent of
the vote. Nevertheless, he was conspicuously absent from the GPA pro-
cesses. Several other political parties and civil society organisations that
dominate the Zimbabwean political space were also excluded from the
constitutional reform process.
Analysis of the GPA constitution-making process
Definition of terms and methodology
Although COPAC’s operating motto was ‘ensuring a people-driven con-
stitution’, the GPA constitution-making process did not provide opera-
tional definitions of the terms ‘people’, ‘constitution’, and ‘people-driven’.
The only flimsy reference made in this regard was a description, unelabo-
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key concepts used but not defined in the constitution-making process
were: constitution-making, constitution-writing, process, constitution-ma-
king process, consultation, outreach, public, public consultation, public
hearing, participation, All Stakeholders, democratic, and inclusive.
COPAC’s constitution-making process was hence an inquiry that, lack-
ing defined terminology, groped about in conceptual darkness. Definitions
of key operating terms and concepts would have provided a framework of
theoretical principles for guiding the implementation of the GPA constitu-
tion-making process, data collection, analysis and interpretation of empiri-
cal findings in an objective way. COPAC took an unscientific dive into a
crucially important human inquiry without the necessary preparation. The
absence of contextual meanings for the terms used in the exercise makes it
difficult or impossible to establish the truth of the results of COPAC’s
constitution-making process, raising the possibility that its stated target of
‘ensuring a people-driven constitution’ by a wide margin.
Regarding data collection, the GPA’s terms of reference to COPAC
stated that the latter was ‘to hold such public hearings and such consulta-
tions as it may deem necessary’, thereby giving unlimited discretionary
power to the Select Committee in how it chose to operate in the absence of
a prescribed research methodology. The lack of clearly-specified data-col-
lection methods, data-collecting instruments and a framework within
which to analyse the data, compromised COPAC’s constitution-making
process.
The implementers of the constitution-making process struggled to
achieve their goals. For instance, COPAC crafted its group questionnaire
instrument for data collection using 26 Talking Points which it derived
from the 17 thematic areas; these in turn had been derived from the delib-
erations of the First All Stakeholders Conference, deliberations that were
marred initially by serious disturbances. The data gathered by outreach
teams from 1,118,760 individual participants were analysed by 17 The-
matic Committees, each with 425 members, after which information was
extracted for the Constitutional Principles, Constitutional Issues, and Gap
Filling (see section 6.11 above).
Another major problem linked to the lack of a clear methodology was
the question of how to measure, analyse and interpret quantitative and
qualitative data. In all its official reports from the constitution-making pro-
cess, COPAC openly admitted its process was not scientific. As it stated in
its Final Report of June 2013 to parliament,
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[g]iven the fact that this was not a scientific study, the Select Committee re-
solved that both the statistics (quantitative) and qualitative outcomes must be
taken into account in deciding what would eventually go into the Constituti-
on. The interpretation of these statistics therefore had to take into account the-
se limitations in methodology. Whilst a high frequency was a general guide
that in itself was not the sole determinant of the importance of an issue
enough to find its way into the new Constitution.
The absence of a theoretical framework covering the operational definition
of key terms and methodology of collecting data resulted in too many ad
hoc structures and committees being created in an adaptive, sometimes
contradictory, manner, thereby eroding the credibility of the GPA consti-
tution-making process and its outcome. The process simply did not have a
people-driven constitution-making model firmly in mind, even though
such models are not hard to come by: the researchers Zembe and Sanjee-
vaiah, for instance, have developed precisely this, a people-driven consti-
tution-making process model for Zimbabwe.24
If the purpose of COPAC’s constitution-building were for the Zimbab-
wean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves,
then the GPA process missed the target due to the absence of a guiding
theory and methodological framework capable of achieving this objective.
Ownership of the GPA constitution-making process
Constitution-making is itself a major part of constitutionalism and an im-
portant means of promoting consensus among the people.25 In this regard,
a preamble in article 6 of the GPA document clearly states ‘that the pro-
cess of making this constitution must be owned and driven by the people
and must be inclusive and democratic’. While the COPAC constitution-
making process was born out of this article, the people were not consulted,
neither prior to nor after the GPA, for their input in determining the shape
this process would take. The determination of the process was instead an
elite-driven initiative that side-lined the grassroots. Given the nature of its
8.2
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origins, the GPA constitution-making process was not owned and driven
by the people of Zimbabwe because the process did not come from them.
To this, it may be counter-argued that although the COPAC constitu-
tion-making process was founded by the GPA, the people of Zimbabwe
did have the opportunity later to buy into it and gain ownership and con-
trol. Such an argument is quickly dismissed by considering how the struc-
tures and instruments of the GPA constitution-making process (see sec-
tions 5 and 6 above) were implemented. The Common Issues Platform
(CIP) makes a strong point in its submission of issues and observations on
Zimbabwe’s political crisis to the SADC Facilitator in July 2012 that the
‘COPAC constitution-making process has failed to be an inclusive arena
for open popular people participation as the secretive, and often violent,
process is serving partisan political power designs and electoral agendas
of the three parties in the GPA/GNU’.
The ownership of the GPA constitution-making process remained firm-
ly in the hands of the partners to the agreement from conception to conclu-
sion, as is shown clearly by the empirical evidence presented above and
elaborated upon immediately below.
Control of the GPA constitution-making process
Inside and outside of government, then, the presidents of the three GPA
parties were in exclusive control of the COPAC constitution-making pro-
cess from beginning to end. Inside government, the GPA principals had
executive power and authority over these processes by means of the fol-
lowing legal instrument and structures:
• the Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe, as amended;
• the cabinet of the Inclusive Government;
• the Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs;
• parliament;
• government finance; and
• COPAC.
Outside government, they controlled these constitution-making legal in-
struments and structures:
• the GPA of 15 September 2008;
• the top decision-making bodies of their respective political parties;




• the Management Committee;
• Co-Chairpersons of COPAC;
• the Drafting Committee;
• the First All Stakeholders Conference;
• the Second All Stakeholders Conference; and
• donor financiers.
Even though the COPAC constitution-making process exhibited political
polarisation, confusion, disagreement and impasse, in the final analysis the
GPA principals’ wishes prevailed because they had contractual control of
the process emanating from the provisions of the GPA agreement and con-
stitutional and legal statutes.
Analysis of the GPA Constitution in Zimbabwe
Nature and status of the GPA Constitution
The main heading of the constitutional document is ‘Constitution of Zim-
babwe Amendment (No. 20)’ while the short title is ‘The Constitution of
Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013’, indicating that it is an Act
enacted by the President and the Parliament of Zimbabwe to repeal and
substitute the Constitution of Zimbabwe. In actual fact, the Constitution of
Zimbabwe which is being repealed and substituted is the Lancaster House
Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe.
Two issues arise from the document’s title. First, whereas the GPA
Constitution is entitled, ‘Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20)
Act, 2013’, that of the Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zimbab-
we is simply termed ‘Constitution of Zimbabwe’. The former is an amend-
ment, the latter an original. Secondly, the GPA Constitution is an Act of
the President and the Parliament; the Lancaster House Colonial Constitu-
tion of Zimbabwe is not an Act.
There is a fundamental difference between an amendment and the origi-
nal statute. An amendment document alters or changes the content of a
prior document, while an original is a new, self-standing and non-deriva-
tive entity. Another fundamental difference is that between an Act of the
President and the Parliament, and a constitution. If the institutions of the
President and the Parliament are elected according to a constitution, then it
is not possible that they can create a constitution; instead, the furthest ex-
tent to which these two constitutional institutions can go is that of amend-
9
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ing the constitution from which they are created, provided it is permissible
to do so in terms of that constitution itself. It appears, indeed, that this is
what the President and the Parliament of Zimbabwe did: they simply
amended an old constitution.
It is the Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe that was
amended by the GPA Constitution. Additional evidence of the above ob-
servation is contained in the Sixth Schedule of the GPA Constitution. Ac-
cording to section 1 of the Schedule, the term ‘former Constitution’ means
the Constitution of Zimbabwe that came into operation on the 18 April
1980, as subsequently amended. The definition of ‘former Constitution’
sanitises a colonial document that the people of Zimbabwe seek to discard.
Another observation in support of the amendment status of the GPA
Constitution is contained in sections 4, 9 and 10 of the Sixth Schedule.
Section 4 says that subject to this Schedule, the former Constitution is re-
pealed with effect from the effective date. Section 9 states that the govern-
ment constituted under this Constitution is in all respects the successor to
the former Government of Zimbabwe. Section 10 stresses that subject to
this Schedule, all existing laws continue in force but must be construed in
conformity with this Constitution.
Considering the implications of the empirical evidence given above as
to the nature and status of the GPA Constitution in Zimbabwe, it seems an
inescapable conclusion that the Constitution is not a new people-driven
democratic governance charter but a mere amendment number 20 to the
existing Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe. Conse-
quently, the national and international perception that there is a new peo-
ple-driven democratic constitution in Zimbabwe must be dismissed as in-
correct: no such thing exists in legal reality.
In a multiparty constitutional democracy, the constitution can only le-
gitimately come from the collective free will and action of the people. It is
the people who create a constitution, and through it, establish institutions
of government like the President and the Parliament. It cannot be vice ver-
sa. The President and the Parliament can certainly not create the people
and a people-driven constitution. Unfortunately, this was not the case in
the constitution-making process in Zimbabwe. The non-participatory ap-
proaches generally adopted by African constitutions have led to a number
Wurayayi Zembe
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of contradictions and limitations that ultimately impact adversely on the
management of democratic systems.26
Sources of ideas in the GPA Constitution
Two major sources of ideas that went into the GPA Constitution in Zim-
babwe are, on the one hand, the Lancaster House Colonial constitution of
Zimbabwe, as amended, along with all its subsidiary laws, and on the oth-
er, the principals of the GPA and their political parties. Point 9.1 above re-
vealed ample evidence that the GPA Constitution is an amendment to an
existing constitution.
Regarding the GPA principals and political parties, their views entered
the GPA Constitution through the implementation of the COPAC constitu-
tion-making process. After collecting data from their largely partisan com-
bined membership of 1,118,760 individuals in an outreach exercise, the in-
formation was collated and filter-treated through a maze of convoluted ad
hoc and partisan negotiating structures. The GPA constitution-making pro-
cess, in other words, was one based on secretive bargaining and compro-
mise. What the GPA principals wanted, prevailed; what prevailed in par-
ticular was what the state president wanted, given that executive power,
authority and control is vested in his office.
In terms of the Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe, as
amended, under which the GPA Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment
(No.20) Act, 2013 was enacted, the President named as Robert Gabriel
Mugabe27 was the Head of State and Head of Government and Comman-
der-in-Chief of the Defence Forces28. The executive authority of Zimbab-
we was vested in the President, who exercised the authority directly or
through the Cabinet, a Vice President, a Minister or a Deputy Minister.29
Section 27(1) of the former constitution was replicated in section 89 of
the GPA Constitution, which states that the President is the Head of State
and Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces.
Section 31H of the former constitution was also replicated in section 88(2)
9.2
26 Ihonvbere JO ‘How to make an undemocratic constitution: The Nigerian example’
(2000) 21 Third World Quarterly 343-66.
27 Section 115: schedule 8: section 20.1.6(1).
28 Section 27(1).
29 Section 31H.
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of the GPA Constitution, according to which the executive authority of
Zimbabwe vests in the President, who exercises it, subject to this Consti-
tution, through the Cabinet. However, surely the Cabinet is made up of the
President, Vice Presidents and Ministers, while Deputy Ministers are ap-
pointed by the President and fall under the executive authority of Minis-
ters?
Further evidence that the ideas of individual principals of the GPA went
into the GPA Constitution is found in section 14(1) of the Sixth Schedule,
which states that ‘[n]otwithstanding section 92 [of the Constitution], in the
first election and any presidential election within ten years after the first
election, candidates for election as President do not nominate persons in
terms of that section to stand for election as Vice Presidents’. Section 92
of the GPA Constitution states that every candidate for election as Presi-
dent must nominate two persons to stand for election jointly as running
mates and designated as first and second Vice President. It is the interests
of the incumbent State President that dictated the idea of suspending the
operation of the running-mates clause in elections for ten years. Clearly,
the idea did not come from the people consulted.
Another issue in the GPA Constitution clearly dictated by the GPA po-
litical parties concerns the death sentence for men aged 21 to 70 years.30
This is an open violation of the fundamental rights to life, equality before
the law, human dignity, personal security and freedom from torture. Con-
sidering that newly-born males will inevitably enter the prescribed age
group at some point in their lives, one wonders what sort of a constitution
it is that conspires to murder its male citizens when they turn 21-70 years.
A further consequence of this brutal provision is that it is discriminatory to
boot: despite committing similar crimes, women and other male age
groups will not suffer the death sentence.
It can be concluded that that the ideas used to amend the Lancaster
House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe through the GPA Constitution
certainly did not come from the collective thinking of all Zimbabweans.31
In this regard, the GPA Constitution failed to meet the expectations of the
people of Zimbabwe to achieve, through a people-driven democratic con-
stitution, peace and security, fundamental human rights, rule of law, credi-
30 Section 48(c).
31 COPAC Final Report, 2013 section 7.3.
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ble multiparty elections, legitimate governance, employment, economic
reconstruction and social development.
Ownership of the GPA Constitution
Axiomatic to this chapter is the belief that process-ownership predeter-
mines content and product-ownership. From the analysis given of the
GPA constitution-making process and the resultant constitution, it follows
that the people of Zimbabwe do not own the current constitutional order
governing their country. They neither made the Lancaster House Colonial
Constitution of Zimbabwe nor the GPA Constitution of Zimbabwe
Amendment No. 20 Act of 2013. The GPA constitutional order is owned
jointly by the three political parties that made it, and severally by the prin-
cipals and presidents of those organisations. The GPA Constitution is a
privatised and partisan document that cannot serve as an instrument for
good public management and governance of a multiparty constitutional
democracy.
Constitutional disagreements among GPA political parties
Soon after the enactment of the GPA Constitution on 22 May 2013, sharp
disagreements arose among the GPA political parties about security-sector
reform, an elections roadmap, media reforms, and voter registration and
preparation of the voters’ roll. In view of the fact that Section 10 of the
Sixth Schedule in the GPA Constitution states that, subject to this sche-
dule, all existing laws continue in force but must be construed in confor-
mity with the new Constitution, there has also been disagreement about
the scrapping or amendment of statutes. This disputed legislation includes
the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act; Electoral Act; Public
Order and Security Act; Access to Information and Protection of Privacy
Act; Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act; Political Parties Fi-
nance Act; Broadcasting Services Act; Defence Act; Police Act; and Pris-
ons Act.
The disagreements were exacerbated when the state president set the
date for the next general elections as 31 July 2013. Using the same powers
of decree, he amended the Electoral Act through the enactment of four
statutory instruments. Parliament was dissolved by operation of law on 29
9.3
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June 2013, and until the general elections the president would rule the
country by decree in terms of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Mea-
sures) Act.
The president’s announcement of the election date followed a Constitu-
tional Court ruling that the elections were to be held on the date specified.
The Southern Eye carried a front-page report that, on the day of the ruling,
the Court would be hearing six cases, including one involving demands by
SADC that the date of elections be moved to 14 August 2013.32 The Court
decided, however, to postpone this hearing in order to consolidate issues
raised by the applicants. Meanwhile, the nomination court sat on 28 June
2013 and received candidates contesting the harmonised presidential, par-
liamentary, and local council elections. More petitions were filed at the
Constitutional Court to have the election date postponed and the president-
ial proclamation annulled. However, on 4 July 2013 the Constitutional
Court ruled that the elections would be held on 31 July 2013 according to
the electoral law, thereby dismissing all challenges opposing the procla-
mation of the elections date. The Herald reported that at a launch of his
party’s Manifesto on 5 July 2013, Mugabe as president of ZANU-PF
threatened to quit the SADC if the regional body interfered with the July
31 2013 elections in Zimbabwe.33
At the time of writing, political violence in Zimbabwe had not stopped.
More arrests of political opponents, human rights activists, and journalists
were being witnessed. Top security-sector officials were increasingly issu-
ing public threats that if their party lost the elections planned for 31 July
2013, they would resort to violence as they had in June 2008. The indica-
tions on the ground were that, once again, the nation was at risk of another
disputed election, an election which, because of the flawed constitution-
making process, was set to be vigorously contested. Constitutionalism en-
sures the electorate has the necessary confidence in the state and govern-
ment, confidence which fosters political stability and constructive conflict-
management. Had its constitutional process been people-driven rather than
selfishly partisan, Zimbabwe could have found the elusive path to demo-
cratic governance.
32 The Southern Eye 26 June 26 2013.




From the above assessment and analysis of the GPA constitution-making
process, it can be concluded that Zimbabwe does not have a new people-
driven democratic constitution. The history of constitutionalism and con-
stitutional democracy in Africa is not a particularly happy one, and Zim-
babwe’s case is no different.34 By and large the GPA Constitution is an
amendment of the Lancaster House Colonial Constitution of Zimbabwe,
and it is a misnomer to call an amendment ‘a new people-driven constitu-
tion’. There is an urgent need to embark on a genuine people-driven
democratic constitution-making process if further social, economic, politi-
cal, and constitutional disorder and instability, as recently experienced in
Egypt, is to be avoided. In doing so, the following recommendations from
the Commonwealth best practice guidelines of constitution-making35
should be considered:
• Government must adopt credible constitution-making; that is, a process
that constructively engages the majority of the population.
• Government should assist and empower civil society groups to effec-
tively participate in the constitution-making process and in the promo-
tion of constitutionalism.
• The public should be informed at every reasonable stage about the pro-
gress of the constitutional process.
• Mechanisms used for adopting or ratifying constitutions should be
credible and truly representative of the peoples’ views.
Zembe speaks tellingly of the norms Zimbabwe should adopt in the event
of meaningful constitution-building in the future:
The rule of law is a value of society that must come from the people as ow-
ners of political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights. The source of the
law is the people. For the law to be legitimate, the citizens, who will become
subjects of their own law, should participate in its evolution. The law should
not be used to deny people their rights and freedoms. Citizens should enjoy
even more freedoms. The law must lead to social, economic, and political de-
velopment. In other words, the rule of law based on the legality and practice
11
34 Fombad CM ‘Challenges to constitutionalism and constitutional rights in Africa
and the enabling role of potential parties: Lessons and perspectives from Southern
Africa’ (2007) 55 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1-45.
35 Widner J ‘Constitution writing and conflict resolution’ (2007) 94 The Common-
wealth Journal of International Affairs 505-18.
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of constitutional law should lead to human development where all citizens are
free to actualise their full potential in the fulfilment of their human needs. The
principle of constitutional rule of law should create peace and prevent vio-
lence in society. The concept works well in a system of government where
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Abstract
Zambia is one of the few countries in the world that can boast four consti-
tutional reform processes (with a fifth having recently been concluded) in
a period of only 49 years, the length of time which (at writing) has elapsed
since the country gained independence. These processes were highly con-
tested and resulted in three constitutions that were not especially favoura-
ble towards certain women’s rights. This chapter examines women’s par-
ticipation and representation in Zambia’s constitutional processes. It tra-
ces women’s role in constitution-making, and considers whether the in-
crease in their participation and representation has led to an advance-
ment of their rights. This question is raised because previous constitutions
ignored various rights for which women advocated, with women’s move-
ments contending that constitutional processes were driven by patriarchal
attitudes aiming to maintain male domination. Four rights have been
selected for discussion in this chapter, and it is argued that the failure to
include them has resulted in procedures that fail to accommodate the
needs of more than half of the population. The first draft Constitution cur-
rently under consideration addresses many of the concerns raised by wo-
men, but it could be derailed if other interests are placed ahead of wo-
men’s rights. As such, this chapter recommends a number of potential
measures which could ensure that more women are incorporated in the
constitutional process.
Introduction
Zambia is a landlocked country with an estimated population of 13.5 mil-
lion people. It has been relatively peaceful since gaining independence
from Britain in 1964, so it is somewhat ironic that at present Zambia is un-
1
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dergoing its fifth constitutional process. It has had three constitutions, with
two major amendments in 1969 and 1996.1 Every constitutional process
has emphasised the need to have a constitution that stands the test of time,
or as a former vice president put it, to have ‘a constitution … which is per-
tinent to the aspirations of our people’.2 The content of such a constitution
is largely determined by the process of drafting, considering and adopting
it, because process crucially shapes and/or protects the content.3
It has been correctly observed that:
[a] constitution is not an ordinary piece of legislation. It is the person’s sover-
eign and inalienable right to determine the form of governance for their coun-
try by giving to themselves a constitution of their own making.4
While this sovereign and inalienable right requires that all sectors of socie-
ty be included in the process, especially those who were side-lined in the
past, one of Zambia’s biggest challenges has been securing the effective
participation of women. Deeply patriarchal and conservative, Zambia has
often sacrificed women’s rights on the altar of national decisions.5 This
chapter focuses on two indicators of this sacrifice, namely citizens’ parti-
cipation and representation, in an attempt to illustrate how a constitutional
process in a democratic state has side-lined an important part of its citizen-
ry.
The chapter commences with an overview of how Zambia’s constitutio-
nal processes have been conducted between the immediate post-indepen-
dence period and the present, after which it analyses women’s representa-
tion and participation therein. Representation is examined through an in-
vestigation of the number of women who have been appointed as commis-
sioners and been part of national consultations. Citizens’ participation is
1 Ndulo M & Beyani C As Tedious as a Twice-Told Tale: The Struggle for a Legiti-
mate and Democratic Constitution In Zambia (2011).
2 Former Vice President Mainza Chona at the 2nd Reading of the Zambian Constitu-
tional Bill, 1973.
3 Mwale S Constitutional Review: The Zambian Search for an Ideal Constitution (pa-
per presented at the 10th African Forum for Catholic Social Teachings Working
Group Meeting on 2 May 2006, Nairobi, available at http://www.jctr.org.zm/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=99 (accessed 15 August
2013).
4 Mungomba Constitutional Commission Mungomba Constitutional Commission Re-
view Report (2005) 493.
5 While this is not peculiar to Zambia alone, it does inform the argument made in this
chapter.
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addressed by considering how many women have made submissions to the
previous four commissions and how wide the consultation process was.
Thereafter, four women’s concerns are identified and used to gauge if any
positive outcomes arose from participation, further to which the draft Con-
stitution is briefly analysed to determine whether it provides any relief in
respect of these concerns. The chapter concludes by recommending a
number of possible measures to ensure better inclusivity of women.
A history of Zambia’s constitutional processes
In order to trace the role of women in the constitution-making process, one
needs to understand the form that Zambia’s constitutional processes have
taken. These involve the appointment of a Constitutional Review Com-
mission (herein referred to as CRC) by a sitting president. The power to
appoint a CRC is vested in the Inquiries Act 45 of 1967, and has been
used on four separate occasions to appoint a commission intended to can-
vas the country for people’s views about what should be included in the
constitution.
The first such occasion was in 1972, when then President Kenneth
Kaunda appointed a commission chaired by his vice president Mainza
Chona and known popularly as the Chona Commission.6 The views the
CRC sought were mainly concerned with constitutional changes that
would facilitate the workings of the ruling United National Independence
Party (UNIP) and government and bring about a one-party state. Subse-
quently, the 1973 Constitution was adopted.7
The second occasion was in 1990, when years of discontent with the
one-party state had prompted call for changes. Kaunda appointed another
CRC,8 led by Professor Patrick Mvunga and known as the Mvunga Com-
mission. One of its most important Terms of Reference (TORs) was the
examination and determination of a system of political pluralism9 that
would ensure a government strong enough to rule the Zambian nation and
2
6 National Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party-Participatory Democra-
cy in Zambia, gazetted under Statutory Instrument No. 46 of 1972.
7 The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, Cap 1 of 1973.
8 Gazetted under Statutory Instrument No. 135 of 1990.
9 Multiparty elections were held under a new Constitution on 31 October 1991.
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secure the personal liberties of the people.10 This process led to the 1991
Constitution,11 and with political pluralism came winds of change: the
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) governed henceforth.12
Fredrick Chiluba was appointed as President, and he, too, in 1995 ap-
pointed a third CRC known as the Mwanakwatwe Commission.13 This
was the first commission that, among other TORs, specifically included
the need to entrench and promote legal and institutional protection of fun-
damental human rights.14 The result was the 1996 Amendment to the 1991
Constitution.15
Seven years later, Chiluba’s successor, President Patrick Levy Mwana-
wasa, appointed another CRC in 2003. Known as the Mungomba Com-
mission,16 it was intended to garner opinions on a constitution that would
exalt, effectively entrench and promote legal and institutional protection
of fundamental human rights and, most importantly, stand the test of
time.17 A novel inclusion in the TORs was the requirement for the CRC to
investigate the extent to which gender equality should be addressed in the
Zambian Constitution.18 The constitutional changes were never implemen-
ted as they failed to meet parliamentary approval.
In November 2011 the newly elected President, Michal Sata, announ-
ced that, unlike the case in previous instances, he was appointing a Tech-
nical Drafting Committee.19 He stated that the Technical Committee was
appointed to draft a constitution20 that would provide the structures ne-
10 Constitution Commission Report of the Constitution Commission (1991) available
at http://www.unza.zm/zamlii/const/1991/act91.htm (accessed 5 August 2013) 4.
11 The Constitution of Zambia, Act No. 1 of 1991.
12 Gisela Geisler, who has written extensively on women in southern Africa, credits
these winds of change with having created a need in women for greater political
representation.
13 Chaired by John Mwanakatwe Esq, gazetted under Statutory Instrument No. 151
of 1993 as amended by Statutory Instrument No. 173 of 1993.
14 Report of the Mwanakatwe Constitution Commsision, Inquiries Act, Cap 181 at 4.
15 The Constitution of Zambia, Act No. 1 of 1991.
16 Chaired by Willie Mungomba Esq, under Statutory Instrument No. 40 of 2003.
17 As stated in the introduction of the Mungomba Commission Report of 2005.
18 Pg xxvi of the Mungomba Commission Report of 2005.
19 The Committee was appointed on 16 November 2011 but was beset with contro-
versy when various prominent Zambians declined to be part of it.
20 The appointment of the Committee has been highly contested in itself. Critics ar-
gue that there is no legal basis for its appointment and that the process is thus di-
singenuous.
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cessary to ensure constitutional democracy21 and the development of a
constitutional culture to underpin Zambia’s political system. One of the
Technical Committee’s TORs has been to draft a constitution that establis-
hes a democratic system of government guaranteeing gender equality,
gender equity and affirmative action.22 The history of the women’s enga-
gement with these processes, however, tells a different story.
Constitutional review bodies: Whom do they represent?
Representation often entails serving as a symbol for, or illustration of, a
certain theme or group. While it is true that ‘representivity’ is only a ne-
cessary though by no means sufficient condition for effective public parti-
cipation,23 it exerts a strong influence on the efficacy of the process. The
CRCs were appointed to facilitate public involvement in the constitutional
processes, and as such effective participation has always been touted as an
important objective of theirs.24
Nevertheless, in the first CRC, the Chona Commission of 1972, the
twenty-person delegation had only one female.25 The Mvunga Commissi-
on of 1991 was nineteen-persons strong,26 but boasted just three women,27
even though Zambia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discri-
mination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1985.28 The preamble to the CE-
DAW states that ‘state parties to the convention are convinced that the full
and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and the
cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal
3
21 This is despite the fact that renowned academics like Dr Chaloka Beyani and Dr
Muna Ndulo declined a role on the committee. They said there should be no more
review commissions to collect the public’s views on the future constitution for
Zambia as these had been canvassed adequately in several previous commissions.
22 Item (c) ii of the TORs, available at http://zambianconstiution.org/terms-of-referen
ce-.html (accessed 10 July 2013).
23 Jayal NG From Representation to Participation: Women in Local Government
(paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Equal Participation of Women
and Men in Decision-Making Processes, with Particular Emphasis on Political
Participation and Leadership, October 2005) 3. [Hereafter Jayal (2005).].
24 Present in all CRC reports.
25 Mrs Lily Monze, editor the parliamentary debates.
26 Excluding two secretaries, who were both male.
27 Ms Celestina L Kabalu, Ms Bernadette Sikanyika and Ms Any Kabwe.
28 Adopted by Resolution 34/180 of the General Assembly in 1979.
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terms with men in all fields’.29 Given the developmental importance atta-
ched to women’s participation, the CRC should have included more wo-
men in keeping with the obligations contained in the CEDAW. The subse-
quent Mwanakwatwe Commission of 1993, although larger in size with 21
members, only had four women,30 while the Mungomba Commission of
2003 had but eight women among its 42 commissioners,31 this is despite
the fact that one of the TORs was to investigate the extent to which gender
equality should be addressed in the constitution.
The Mungomba Commission was unique, however, in that whereas
other draft constitutions depended on the government’s response,32 it initi-
ally held some hope of being adopted by a Constituent Assembly.33 In Ju-
ly 2007, following an inter-party dialogue,34 it was resolved instead that a
National Constitutional Conference (NCC) rather than a Constituent As-
sembly would adopt the constitution.35 The NCC was tasked as a forum
for the examination, debate and adoption of proposals to alter the Consti-
tution as contained in the draft Constitution submitted by Mungomba
CRC.36 Comprised of 495 members drawn from all sectors of Zambian so-
ciety ranging from women’s organisations and the youth to professional
bodies and the judiciary,37 the NCC had merely 131 women, which equa-
ted to 26 per cent of the members of the conference.
29 Text of CEDAW available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/eco
nvention.htm (accessed 12 July 2013).
30 Chieftainess Chiyaba, Ms Beatrice Chileshe, Mrs Hilary Mulenga Fyfe and Mrs
Lucy Banda Sichone.
31 Chiefteness Nkoehsya Mukambo II, Ms Rosemerry Chimpape, Ms Rosemery C
Banda, Ms Joyce Namonde, Ms Charity Mwanza, Mrs Nellie B.K.Mutti, Mrs Hil-
ary M Fyfe and Ms Lauren M Sikanyege.
32 The Inquiries Act allows the government the power to reject or accept people’s re-
commendations and make any modifications that it desires through a document
called the government ‘White Paper’.
33 This followed pressure from civil society groups under the broad umbrella of the
Oasis Forum after a stalemate of two years.
34 Mbao M ‘The politics of constitution-making in Zambia: Where does the constitu-
ent power lie?’ in Fombad C and Murray C (eds) Fostering Constitutionalism in
Africa (2010) 87-117.
35 Established under the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) Act 19 of 2007.
36 Part II clause 3 of the NCC Act.
37 Composition of members available at http://www.ncczambia.org/members.php
(accessed 11 July 2013).
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The poor female representation in NCC and CRCs was not a reflection
of any passivity on the part of women; instead it expressed the nature of
Zambia’s patriarchal culture, one which affects all spheres of society, in-
cluding politics. The inclusion of women in any political process was con-
sidered a privilege and not a right that women could claim, despite the nu-
merous attempts that had been made to fight for it. Commissioners on the
NCC and CRCs were appointed purely at the discretion of the President,
with the result that the bodies were dominated by men, notwithstanding
efforts by women’s groups to be engaged in the process.38 It is also worth
mentioning that between 1991 and 1996 when two of the CRCs were ap-
pointed, only 10 per cent of parliamentarians were women – further evi-
dence of the lack of opportunities afforded to them. This situation was ma-
nifest not only in the representation women had in the constitutional re-
view bodies but in the participation afforded to them.
Citizens’ participation
People’s participation in a constitution-making process from inception to
completion is a prerequisite of any democratic institution, community or
society.39 In Kenya, participation was considered so critical that the Con-
stitution of Kenyan Review Act was amended to reflect an agreement pla-
cing people’s participation at the centre of the review process.40 The Ke-
nyan Constitution41 is arguably one of the best in the world, and the em-
phasis placed on participation has played a large role in this.
Until recently, the same has not been true of the Zambian process, whe-
re there has been a historical and continuing lack of civil education about
constitution-making.42 Women’s rights activists and women’s organisati-
4
38 The Zambian National Women’s Lobby group was created in 1991 to identify
ways of integrating women into all spheres, including political spheres such as
constitutional reviewing bodies.
39 Mwale S ‘Conflicting interests in constitution process’ (2005) 6(7) The Challenge
Magazine.
40 International IDEA Democracy-building & Conflict Management (DCM) The
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, the Constitution Review Process in
Kenya: Issues and Questions for Public Hearings (March 2002) 8.
41 The Constitution of Kenya Review Act 2010.
42 The current process has distributed the draft Constitution in all major languages
and has had wide media coverage to facilitate this.
Tabeth Masengu
54
ons have taken it upon themselves to mobilise women in order to educate
them and ensure that their views are heard.43 Regarding the 1972 process,
it could be argued that it was a sham because it was focused on entren-
ching one-party rule and thus negated the values of democracy. However,
the other processes which followed it should certainly have been different
in their accommodation of women and their interests.
In 1991, a total of 576 petitioners from across the country made oral
submissions before the Mvunga Commission, of whom only 35 – or just
6.7 per cent – were women. The Mwanakatwe Commission (of 1993) re-
ceived 969 oral submissions. Of these, 108 were from women,44 amoun-
ting to 10.84 per cent of the total. This was a small improvement on the
previous CRC, but it could be due less to changing attitudes than to the
fact that the Mwanakatwe Commission canvassed more cities than its pre-
decessor.
While the Mungomba Report did not disaggregate petitioners by gen-
der, the Commission did hold public sittings in all 150 constituencies,
with a total of 12,647 petitioners making submissions.45 With representati-
on of only 26 per cent at the NCC that followed the Mungomba Commis-
sion process, women were outnumbered even before the adoption process
began. Of the ten committees that were formed, women were the majority
only in the Disciplinary Committee and General Purposes Committee.46
By contrast, there were fewer of them in more influential committees such
as the Human Rights, Democratic Governance and Public Finance com-
mittees, an arrangement indicative of an attitude that women should be ex-
cluded from areas of key decision-making.
The Zambian government has not at any time funded civic education
specifically targeting previously advantaged groups, among them women.
Over the years, despite various conferences organised by civil society on
the subject of participation, there has been no admission from government
43 Sara Longwe was first contracted by a donor agency to do so in 2007; organisati-
ons such as WILDAF, NGOCC and ZARD have also been involved.
44 The largest number were from the town of Zambezi, which had 33 submissions
from women.
45 Matibini P (2008) Constitution-making process: The case of Zambia. Special Edi-
tion Zambian Law Journal, 1(17).
46 Six women were in the Disciplinary Committee and five in the General Purposes
Committee, which both had 13 members in total.
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about the importance of educating women.47 Women have tried at nume-
rous times to fight for better inclusion, and frustration with their exclusion
led to the Citizens’ Convention in March 1996.48 Spearheaded by wo-
men’s organisations, it sought to develop an alternative to the govern-
ment’s processes; the outcome is what is referred to as the ‘Green Pa-
per’.49 Simutyani believes that the legacy of previous constitutions under-
mined vertical accountability by limiting public participation in the design
and approval of the Constitution.50 Such an observation is especially perti-
nent for women, because the limitations on their participation further ent-
renched the existing attitudes that disadvantaged them.
These attitudes came to the fore when a member of a leading women’s
organisation described receiving hostile treatment51 at a district conventi-
on in Lusaka in September 2012. She said:
Whenever I spoke regarding the importance of ensuring that women were
protected and recipients of equality, they would boo. They kept interrupting
me and had to be cautioned by one of the chairpersons, who luckily is a well-
known lawyer.52
She believes this treatment was permitted because the facilitators, chair-
persons and other organisers were men. She was appalled at the backlash
she experienced, expressing concern for women who are not activists and
wish to have their voices heard.
The environment posed an impediment to women both in its immediate
context and wider socio-political ramifications, because women’s partici-
pation empowers them to engage with their subordination within the larger
47 The role of constitutional education has been left to ZARD, YWCA, WILS,
WILDAF and WID-NCDP.
48 The convention was an initiative begun in October 1995 by a number of NGOs
and church organisations.
49 The ‘Green Paper’ was an alternative to the government White Paper. It purpose
was to raise awareness and mobilise public resistance to the government’s failure
to consult properly at a national level.
50 Simutyani N ‘The politics of constitutional reform in Zambia: From executive do-
minance to public participation?’ in Chirwa D and Nizjink L (eds) Accountable
Government in Africa: Perspectives from Public Law and Political Studies (2012)
33.
51 This included booing and noisemaking whenever she tried to speak.




social framework of patriarchal gender relations.53 Jayal notes that effec-
tive participation cannot be legislated. It involves the creation of a politi-
cal, social and cultural environment in which women acquire the awaren-
ess, information-base and confidence to articulate their concerns; partici-
pation requires, furthermore, an institutional environment which is recepti-
ve and responsive to this articulation.54 Such a response has been lacking
in the Zambian constitutional process, as will be evidenced by the discus-
sion below of four selected themes.
Key issues raised by women and the outcomes
Discrimination
Article 25(1) of Zambia’s Constitution of 1973 stated that that ‘subject to
provision in clauses (4), (5) and 7 no law shall make any provision that is
discriminatory either of itself or in its effect’. Article 25(3) described dis-
criminatory treatment as that which treats people different according to a
range of factors such as race, tribe and creed; however, it made no menti-
on of sex or gender. Recounting her experience of making constitutional
submissions, Sarah Longwe observes that ‘the realisation of the gaps in
the Constitution happened in the 1980s where it was noticed that the pro-
hibition on discrimination in the 1973 Constitution did not include, gender
or marital status’.55
A number of petitioners expressed similar views before the Mvunga
Commission.56 These concerns were adopted by the Commission, with the
result that gender and marital status were reflected in its draft constitution
of grounds of prohibited discrimination. However, the final 1991 Consti-
tution contained exemptions under the discrimination clause, including
marriage. Article 23(1) of the Zambia Constitutional Act of 1991 contai-
5
5.1
53 Jayal (2005) 3.
54 Jayal (2005) 10.
55 Audio interview with Sara Longwe, recorded on 23 September 2013. Having suf-
fered gender-based discrimination herself, she successfully sued the Intercontinen-
tal Hotel for barring her from entering the premises unaccompanied because she
was a woman. See Sara Longwe v International Hotels 1992/HP/765; [1993] 4
LRC 221.
56 Mvunga Constitution Commission Mvunga Constitution Commission Review Re-
port (1991) 60.
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ned the same exemption clause as article 25(1) in the 1973 Constitution.
Similarly, in line with article 25(4)(c) of the 1973 Constitution, article
23(4)(c) of the 1991 Constitution added:
Clause (1) shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes provision … (c)
with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on
death or other matters of personal law … .
This was a major setback for women, and during the 1996 review process,
they hoped that things would be different this time.57 With an increase in
submissions from women,58 the Mwanakatwe Commission made substan-
tive and progressive recommendations which included, inter alia, wide-
ning the scope of the Bill of Rights to include women’s rights.59 Unfortu-
nately, an expanded Bill of Rights was not a government priority. While
the White Paper60 noted the criticisms that had been made of the existing
Bill of Rights, it rejected most of the recommendations. The 1996 process
provided merely an amendment to the 1991 Constitution, with the key
changes affecting only the preamble, qualifications for presidential candi-
dates, and the limit on the term of presidential office.61
The Mungomba report highlighted article 23(4)(c) of the 1991 Consti-
tution as a major limitation in the Bill of Rights.62 However, when the
NCC produced its draft after having considered the Mungomba recom-
mendations, it still retained this contested article. The justification for this
from the NCC was that the discrimination clause needed to state grounds
where discrimination could be included. It sought the inclusion of a positi-
ve discrimination caveat, which is a common feature in popular constituti-
ons globally. However, it sought this inclusion without making further
provision for a declaration that identifies certain grounds of discrimination
that will automatically be declared unfair until proven otherwise. This type
of declaration can be found in article 9(5) of the South African constituti-
57 Views expressed by Sara Longwe.
58 Ten-comma-four per cent of of oral submissions were from women, and at least
ten associations affiliated specifically with women made written submissions.
59 Petitioners believed, among other things, that anti-discrimination clauses were not
sufficiently addressed and that women and children’s rights had not been given
sufficient emphasis.
60 The White Paper: Government Reaction to the Mwanakatwe Commission (Go-
vernment Paper No. 1 of 1995).
61 It also rejected, inter alia, the recommendation that the Constitution be adoped by
a Constituent Assembly and National Referendum.
62 Mungomba Commission Report of 2005 11.
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on,63 which contains listed grounds, including marital status, that are
deemed to be are unfair unless it is established to the contrary that they are
fair. Providing presumed unfair grounds of discrimination in a constitution
ensures that abhorrent forms of discrimination have to meet very high cri-
teria before they are permissible.
2 Marriage and citizenship
Article 8(1) of the 1973 Constitution stated that the following persons
would be entitled to apply to the Citizenship Board:
(b) any woman who has is or has been married to a citizen of Zambia and
has been ordinarily resident in Zambia for a continuous period …
(c) any person who –
(i) has attained the age of twenty-one years or is a woman who is or has
been married …
This article specifically excluded men who were married to Zambian wo-
men from attaining citizenship, thus prejudicing foreign nationals marry-
ing Zambian women but not foreign nationals marrying Zambian men. Ar-
ticle 8(1)(b) resulted in Zambian women being deprived of the prospect of
having their foreign spouse claim citizenship.
The issue of citizenship and foreign spouses also arose in the case of
Attorney General v Unity Dow64 where the Botswana court held that sec-
tions 4 and 5 of the Citizenship Act of 1994 discriminated against the app-
licant who was a woman. It was held that the sections denied her children
the right to be citizens because she had married a foreigner, and this was
judged as unconstitutional because it interfered with her dignity. Before
the Mvunga Commission in 1991, petitioners expressed concerns about ar-
ticle 8(1)(b), stating that it was discriminatory not to give men who mar-
ried Zambian women the choice to take up their wives’ citizenship.65
5.
63 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
64 (2001) AHRLR 99 (BwCA 1992).
65 Sara Longwe v International Hotels 1992/HP/765; [1993] 4 LRC 221.
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When the 1991 Constitution was promulgated, it thus stated in article 6
that citizenship could be attained by:
1. Any person who –
a) has attained the age of twenty-one years or is or has been married to
a citizen of Zambia; and
b) has been ordinarily resident in Zambia for a continuous period of
not less than ten years immediately preceding that person's applica-
tion for registration; [or]
c) is a woman who has been married to a citizen of Zambia for a peri-
od of more than three years preceding 24th July, 1988 … .
The contentious clause had been removed, allowing foreign men the opti-
on of taking up their wives’ citizenship if they (the men) met the require-
ments; however, foreign women were still provided an additional advanta-
ge by article 6(1)(c). Unsurprisingly, during the 1995 Constitutional re-
view process article 6(1)(c) was a major obstacle, and hence the Mwan-
akatwe Commission recommended that marriage should be removed as a
grounds entitling a person to apply for citizenship.66 The efforts of women
paid off and were visible in the 1996 Constitutional Amendment when ar-
ticle 6 (1)(c) of the 1991 Constitution was removed, thus eliminating a
clause that benefited Zambian men married to foreign spouses but not
Zambian women.
Customary law
Regarded as a system of law practised in the community and based on its
own values and norms, customary law evolves and develops from genera-
tion to generation to meet changing needs.67 Among the various tribes in
Zambia, it has been responsible for customary divorce and inheritance
practices; bride wealth; widow inheritance (levirate); and dehumanising
rituals pertaining to widows, early childhood marriage and polygamy.68
5.3
66 Mwanakatwe Commission Mwanakatwe Commission Review Report (1996)
41-42.
67 Modjadji Florah Mayelane v Mphephu Maria Ngwenyama and another (2013)
ZACC 14, 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC).
68 Trip AM ‘Women’s movements, customary law, and land rights in Africa: The
case of Uganda’ (2004) 7 African Studies Quarterly 7.
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These practices have continued to subordinate women because, as Banda
notes, in Africa women are largely excluded from this norm-making pro-
cess, leading to the charge that customary law is gendered and marginali-
ses the female voice.69
The 1973 Constitution provided exemptions to customary legal prac-
tices, stating that the prohibition of discrimination would not apply: ‘for
the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe of cust-
omary law …’. Submissions to the Mvunga Commission included the
need to reinforce the law of inheritance to protect the surviving spouse and
child after a husband is deceased. This was so because the death of a hus-
band often led to what is known as ‘property-grabbing’ in which the relati-
ves of the deceased would take everything, leaving the wife and children
with nothing. Mwenda et al. have argued that because formal wills do not
exist in African customary law, claims of intestate succession are often
open to manipulation and abuse by members of the deceased’s family.70
This is not uncommon in Zambia, and, consequently, during the Mwan-
akatwe process in 1995 petitioners expressed their desire for a cultural po-
licy that promoted the best values in people’s traditional heritage but also
adopted positive measures when it came to customs and practices deemed
harmful to women.71
Ironically, the Marriages Act 34 of 2002 recognised the harm that wi-
dow inheritance (levirate) was causing, stating that a sibling wishing to
marry or ‘inherit’ his brother's widow cannot elect a valid statutory mar-
riage if he is already married. However, it is not applicable if the man's
first marriage is under African customary law and he intends to marry his
brother's widow under customary law as well.72 This leaves no recourse
for women who are married under African customary law, resulting in
their continued oppression. The Mungomba Commission therefore drafted
a constitution that eliminated all the anti-discrimination exclusions pre-
viously found in article 23. Article 40 of the Mungomba draft stated that:
69 Banda F ‘Women, law and human rights in southern Africa (2006) 32 Journal of
Southern African Studies 13-27.
70 Mwenda M, Mumba F and Mvula-Mwenda J ‘Property-grabbing under African
customary law: Repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience, yet a
troubling reality’ (2005) 37(4) George Washington International Law Review
949-967.
71 Mwanakatwe Commission Mwanakatwe Commission Review Report (1996) 39.
72 The Marriages Act 34 of 2002.
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Every person has the right not to be discriminated against, directly or indirect-
ly, on any grounds including race, sex, pregnancy, health, marital, ethnic, tri-
bal, social or economic status, origin, colour, age, disability, religion, consci-
ence, belief, culture, language or birth. 73
An anti-discrimination clause with no exemptions was a fresh develop-
ment. Furthermore, inserting ethnicity and culture as grounds of discrimi-
nation recognised that women and children bore the brunt of ethnic or cul-
tural practices that violated their rights.74 At the NCC, however, it was de-
cided that the words ‘on any grounds including’ opened the provision to
varying interpretations,75 and it was recommended that articles 23 (3) and
(4) of the 1996 constitution be included, thereby reverting matters to the
previous position. With a 26 per cent minority, women were outnumbered
and out-voted on what over the years had been a critical aspect of wo-
men’s struggles in Zambia.
Reproductive health rights
Bodily integrity includes women’s intrinsic right to have control and auto-
nomy with respect to their bodies, which entails, inter alia, the right to ma-
ke choices about sexual and reproductive health.76 A woman’s livelihood
and status has long been tied to her ability to reproduce and the notion,
perhaps, that, because she procreates, her body is not her own. In Zambia
a woman’s body, and what she does with it, has been a site of contestati-
on.77 Reproductive health rights were absent in the 1973 Constitution, the
closest reference to it appearing in article 13(a),78 which stated that every
person in Zambia, subject to the limitations in article 4, has the right to
security of person.
5.4
73 Mungomba Draft Commision Report.
74 Virginity-testing and initiation into womanhood is also practised.
75 Initial Report of the National Constitutional Conference (2010) 197.
76 Mathur K ‘Body as site, body as space bodily integrity and women’s empower-
ment in India’ (June 2007), working paper of the Institute of Development Studies
available at http://www.idsj.org/Paper_148.pdf (accessed 30 July 2013).
77 This is so despite the fact that Zambia is a signatory to numerous regional and in-
ternational conventions, including the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.
78 Under Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
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In 1991, before the Mvunga Commission, petitioners raised rights such
as the rights of the unborn child, the rights of parents to decide freely the
number of children they should have, and the right to information on fami-
ly-planning methods.79 The Commission recommended that the latter be
recognised explicitly in the Constitution.80 In addition, it recommended
that the Constitution should explicitly provide for the recognition of the
right to life of the unborn child from conception, subject to medical con-
siderations affecting both mother and child.81
The government’s response was to accept the recommendation about
the rights of the unborn child without condition, but to accept the rights
regarding family planning and the number of children on the condition
that they were inserted in the Constitution’s preamble rather than in its
main text.82 The reason was that the government did not want women de-
ciding when and how to have children, hence its emphasis that the right
should be placed in the preamble. However, the notion of allowing a wo-
man freedom in matters regarding the termination of pregnancies was a
matter that needed to be controlled; as such, it was allowed into the main
body and introduced by way of a new section under the right to life83 in
the 1991 Constitution84. Article 12 (2) stated that:
No person shall deprive an unborn child of life by termination of pregnancy
except in accordance with the conditions laid down by an Act of Parliament
for that purpose. 85
The inclusion of this clause was a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
it was a positive sign for the pro-life groups which had sought protection
of the unborn child. On the other, it was considered a setback for those
who sought to protect fully a woman’s decision to make choices about her
79 Religious groups argued that the rights of the unborn child should be enshrined
and that abortion should not be sanctioned as ameans of family planning.
80 Mvunga Constitution Commission Mvunga Constitution Commission Review Re-
port (1991) 12.
81 Mvunga Constitution Commission Mvunga Constitution Commission Review Re-
port (1991) 18.
82 The White Paper: Government Reaction to the Mvunga Commission Report (Go-
vernment Paper No. 2 of 1991).
83 Previously article 14 of the 1973 Constitution and now article 12 in the 1991 Con-
stitution.
84 Constitution Act of Zambia, Act No. 1 of 1991.
85 The Act referred to is the Termination of Pregnancy Act 13 of 1972, amended in
1994.
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body, including having an elective abortion.86 There was no mention of re-
productive rights and health outside the termination-of-life clause, leaving
women very disappointed. Years later, before the Mwanakwatwe Com-
mission held in 1995, women reiterated their wish to have access to infor-
mation, education on family planning, and be consulted on issues that af-
fect them. The Commission recommended granting the rights of access to
education and information on family planning to women in order to en-
hance their good health.
The response from the government was simply to reject the recommen-
dation by stating that the necessary provisions were contained in the Mar-
riages Act Cap 211 and article 11 of the 1991 Constitution.87 Yet a review
of both of these finds no mention of the right to access education and in-
formation on reproductive health rights; indeed, nine years later the Mun-
gomba Commission made the same recommendations about reproductive
health rights,88 underscoring the fact that the rights were never mentioned.
As stated previously, the recommendations and the Mungomba Commissi-
on draft were later abandoned.
The proposed Constitution: What hope does it hold?
The first draft Constitution89 was translated into seven major languages90
as well as transcribed into braille for the visually impaired.91 It was distri-
buted around the country in print and audio format for comments before
6
86 The Non-Governmental Organizations Coordinating Council (NGOCC) conside-
red it a claw-back clause.
87 Government Paper No. 1 of 1995 ‘Summary of the Recommendations of the
Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review Commission and Government Reaction to the
Report’ 36.
88 Report of Constitutional Review Commission, available at http://www.ncczambia.
org/media/final_report_of_the_constitution_review_commission.pdf (accessed 26
August 2013) 142.
89 First Draft Report of the Technical Committee on Drafting The Zambian Constitu-
tion, available at http://zambianconstitution.org/images/downloads/draft%20report
%20%20of%20the%20technical%20committee.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013).
90 Bemba, Kaonde, Lozi, Lunda, Luvale, Nyanja and Tonga.
91 Technical Committee on Drafting the Zambian Constitution ‘Update on the consti-
tution-making process’ available at http://zambianconstitution.org/component/cont
ent/article/35-press-release/85-update-on-the-constitution-making-process.html
(accessed 14 August 2013).
Tabeth Masengu
64
provincial and national conventions facilitated by the Technical Commit-
tee on Drafting the Zambian Constitution (herein the TCDZC).92 While
the Committee has not released official information regarding the total
number of people who participated, reports from various sources indicate
that women have again been outnumbered by men.93 In addition, the
TCDZC itself is dominated by men, with only four of its 16 members, ex-
cluding the Secretary, being women.
The First Draft Constitution was then debated at provincial and national
consultations held from the November of 2012 to April 2013. For ease of
reference, the following table summarises the four thematic areas of con-
cern to women discussed above.
Identified
Concern




1. Women and men have the right to equal
treatment, including the right to equal
opportunities in cultural, political, eco-
nomic and social activities.
2. Women and men are entitled to be ac-
corded the same dignity and respect of
the person.
3. Women and men have an equal right to
inherit, have access to, own, use, admin-
ister and control land and other proper-
ty.
4. Women and men have equal rights in
the marriage, during the marriage and at
the dissolution of the marriage.
This draft article was accepted at pro-
vincial and national conventions. The
submission was rejected that the





Notwithstanding clause (1), a person who
is, or was, married to a citizen for a period
of not less than three years shall be entitled
to apply to the Citizenship Board of Zam-
bia, to be registered as a citizen, in such
The provincial resolutions wanted the
period of marriage in article 16(3) to
be increased to at least five to ten
years to prevent marriages of conve-
nience.
92 Submissions from the diaspora were welcomed, with the author making submissi-
ons in collaboration with various Zambians in Cape Town.
93 These are the views of women’s groups that were allowed to attend the conventi-
ons.
94 Report of The National Convention held at Mulungushi International Conference
Centre Lusaka from 10th to 17th April 2013 , ‘Consolidated National Convention
Resolutions’ available at http://zambianconstitution.org/downloads/Consolidated%
20%20Provincial%20and%20National%20Conventions%20Resolutions.pdf
(accessed 14 August 2013).




First draft Constitution Resolutions from Conventions
manner as may be prescribed by or under an
Act of Parliament.95
The national convention resolved not
only to increase the period of marria-
ge to ten years but to remove the
term ‘who was married’, making the
clause inoperable for those foreigners
no longer married to Zambians.
Customary law Article 51(5) :
Any law, culture, custom or tradition that
undermines the dignity, welfare, interest or
status of women or men is prohibited.96
The resolutions of both the provincial
and national conventions included an
acceptance of article 51(5) and a re-
jection of proposed amendments to




(1) A person has, subject to clauses (2) and
(3), the right to life, which begins at con-
ception.97
Article 52:
Without limiting any right or freedom gua-
ranteed under the Bill of Rights, women
have the right to:
reproductive health, including family plan-
ning and access to related information and
education.
At the provincial and national con-
ventions it was resolved that article
28(1) should be left unamended be-
cause it was felt that any danger to
the health of the mother is catered for
in clause (2), which authorises termi-
nation of life under any other law.98
The provincial and national resolu-
tions unanimously accepted the in-
clusion of article 52 (a) into the con-
stitution, thereby recognising the
need to ensure that women have
power over their reproductive deci-
sions.
While these articles were progressive, they nevertheless merely reiterated
what the Mungomba Commission had recommended in 2003. The respon-
ses from the provincial and national conventions, though commendable,
demonstrated that marriage and citizenship continued to be sensitive to-
pics. In addition, it was of great importance that the TDCZC highlighted
an element of discrimination that is often ignored. It noted that the Consti-
tution assumes equality of the sexes without regard to the reality of the in-
equalities created by the socio-cultural and economic constructs of the so-
ciety.99 These constructs permeate women’s lives so deeply that the
TDCZC was most likely alluding to the need to address discrimination by
achieving substantive equality between the genders.
95 The reference is to requirements that must be made in clause (2), which states age,
and clause (4), regarding diplomats.
96 Draft Constitution of Zambia at pg 30.
97 Clauses (2) and (3) relate to deprivation life as authorised by the Constitution and
any other law which includes conviction on a capital offence.
98 Draft Constitution of Zambia at pg 14.
99 First draft Constitution report at pg 48.
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The TCDZC also highlighted that any customary law which is not in-
consistent with the Constitution shall form part of the laws of Zambia,100
thus promoting the supremacy of the Constitution in all matters. This was
welcome relief for organisations such as Women for Change, which belie-
ve that women have suffered indiscriminately due to the conflict arising
from the application of customary and statutory law in a dual legal sys-
tem.101
Finally, the rationale for article 28(1) was the view that the right to life
is inherent in all human beings and nobody should be deprived of life arbi-
trarily. Article 52 was included because the TCDZC felt that, apart from
those aimed at gender equality, the Constitution needed to provide additio-
nal measures that would uplift the status of women.102 The TDCZC then
used responses from the national conventions as input into the final Con-
stitution.
By this time103 the process was already a year overdue. It emerged, mo-
reover, that the final draft Constitution would not be put to a national refe-
rendum as promised earlier.104 After an announcement in October 2013
from the TDCZC that the final Constitution was ready for printing, the
process was stalled yet again.105 The Constitution was handed to President
Sata only in December 2013, and thereafter uncertainty grew that the text
would be tampered with, concerns fuelled by the fact that the initial road-
map said the draft Constitution would be issued to the public and govern-
ment simultaneously. Then the president said it should not be released to
the public at all: amid reports that the government was going to retreat
from its promises, protests took place and civil society urged the govern-
ment to honour its commitments.106
100 First draft of the Constitution, Article 7(c).
101 First Draft Report of the Technical Committee on Drafting The Zambian Consti-
tution, available at http://zambianconstitution.org/images/downloads/draft%20rep
ort%20%20of%20the%20technical%20committee.pdf (accessed 14 August
2013).
102 First Draft of the Constitution at pg 49.
103 The conventions were meant to have been held in April 2012.
104 The initial roadmap from the government planned a National Referendum for Ju-
ne 2012.
105 This was caused by the government’s insistence that only ten copies should be
printed and all of them should go to the president.
106 They were widely reported in Zambian press.
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A notable protest was the impressive public rally held in January 2014
at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka to demand the release of the
final Constitution and a timeline for its enactment. A consortium of civil
society groupings called for a prayer rally to press for the release of the
draft constitution to the public.107 Though it was dismissed by the authori-
ties as unnecessary, the rally served as a reminder that, after many failed
initiatives, Zambian citizens would not meekly accept a process that side-
lines public participation because it is convenient for the government to do
so.
In February 2014 two media outlets leaked the final Constitution.108
There was no response from the government indicating that the document
was inaccurate, so for the purposes of this discussion it is worth noting
how the leaked Constitution affects women. With regard to article 51(1),
men and women have the right to equal treatment and opportunities, but
there is a notable omission of the phrase ‘in cultural, political, economic
and social activities’. In view of this omission, the article is left open to
the interpretation that women are entitled to equal treatment only in cer-
tain domains rather than others. Furthermore, article 51 no longer contains
the subsection, ‘Women and men are entitled to be accorded the same di-
gnity and respect of the person.’ The convention resolutions opted for the
use of the word ‘similar’ instead of ‘same’ in this subsection, which con-
firms just how problematic the idea of equality still is in Zambia. The
TDZC’s complete removal of the subsection is worrying because it im-
plies that the dignity of women cannot be put on par with that of men and
enshrined in the Constitution.
In respect of the citizenship clause, article 16 of the final Constitution is
a welcome relief for women as it does not discriminate against foreign
spouses married to Zambian women. Article 16(3) of the draft Constituti-
on was retained, meaning that any person currently or previously married
to a Zambian citizen – regardless of that citizen’s gender – can apply for
citizenship after five years.109 That being said, the customary law article
has been dealt a huge blow. The entire subsection referring to the prohibi-
tion of any custom, law or tradition that undermines the dignity, welfare or
107 Geloo Z ‘Trying to bury Zambia’s new constitution’ OSISA 16 January 2014
available at http://www.osisa.org/law/blog/trying-bury-zambias-new-constitution
(accessed 26 May 2014).
108 The Zambian Watchdog and Lusaka Times.
109 It is now under article 16(2) of the leaked final Constitution.
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interest of any person has been deleted, with no alternative provided. This
is so in spite of the repeated submissions that were made (as discussed ear-
lier) to highlight the ways in which women suffer from conflicts relating
to the application of customary law.110
It is worth noting that article 1 of the final Constitution declares that the
Constitution is the supreme law and that ‘any customary law and customa-
ry practice that is inconsistent with its provisions is void to the extent of
the inconsistency’. If a constitutional-law challenge to a customary prac-
tice is made relying on this article, the outcome will depend on how the
court chooses to interpret the phrase ‘void to the extent of its inconsisten-
cy’. Leaving this thorny issue up to the court will not sit well with many
gender activists, given that a specific article referring to customary law
would have provided a definitive position. With no specific article in the
Constitution relating to dignity and self-worth, the exclusion of the custo-
mary-law article amounts to an egregious omission of a much-needed con-
stitutional shield for women.
In closing, two aspects of reproductive health rights have also undergo-
ne slight changes. Article 28 still states that life begins at conception, but,
remarkably, removes the clause that permits the intentional deprivation of
life to the extent as authorised by the Constitution or any other law. Pro-
life advocates relied on this clause to allay fears that women would be de-
nied elective terminations even if their lives were in danger. Thus, its ab-
sence may lead to more controversy and debate as to whether women have
the right to make decisions about their bodies; worse yet, it could deny
them the right to terminate a pregnancy as prescribed by the Termination
of Pregnancy Act.
The right to reproductive health, including family planning, has been
moved from article 52 and falls under the rubric of the equality of both
genders in article 51. There is no article specifically for women’s rights;111
in fact, article 51 now says that ‘women and men’ have the right to repro-
ductive health services and family planning. It is well known that women
and men have different reproductive needs and that in Zambia family-
planning methods are practised almost solely by women. Moreover, it has
been proven time and time again that women are discriminated against on
the basis of their gender; as such, the specific reference made to their re-
110 Submissions in each process have included complaints about customary law.
111 Article 52 of the first draft Constitution applied to women only.
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productive needs in the first draft Constitution was a sign of progress and
goodwill. One is left wondering what the intention of this new phrasing is
and whether it is a stratagem for subverting the demand for substantive
equality.
Recommendations
In the light of the fact that Zambia has endured many constitutional pro-
cesses, it is hoped that in future there will be no need for another one. Fai-
ling this, it is recommended that future constitutional processes strive for a
more inclusive working procedure. First, any future commissions or com-
mittees need to reflect Zambia’s gender demographics. A number of astute
women in different fields hold a variety of leadership positions, and their
participation would enrich any constitutional commission; there is thus no
reason why future commissions or committees should have anything less
than 50 per cent representation by women. Secondly, a concerted effort is
needed to ensure that widespread civil education about the opportunities
for marginalised groups, including women, to make submissions directly
to the commission.112 Educating women in rural and urban areas in this re-
gard should not be left to non-profit organisations alone but be financed
and administered by the government.
Although the recent constitutional process involved district, provincial
and national consultations, these were facilitated and chaired mostly be
men.113 It is suggested that there should be a quota for female participation
at conventions; this should include ensuring that at least one female facili-
tator and chairperson is present at each convention. Such an intervention
would provide a more welcoming environment for female participants and
help to prevent situations such as those described earlier, in which a fema-
le speaker was booed and interrupted. Lastly, the adoption of a constituti-
on by a Constituent Assembly is key to ensuring not only vertical accoun-
tability114 but also an outcome inclusive of women’s needs.
7
112 The recent process was widely advertised, but there was no concerted effort to
encourage people to make submissions outside of the conventions.
113 Reports from attendees indicate that men controlled the processes; official ac-
counts of the conventions confirm that there is merit to this complaint.
114 Beyani and Ndulo argue that previous processes have been executive-driven, thus




A wave of constitutional reform is sweeping over Africa, one which ack-
nowledges that democracy is strengthened when people gather to delibera-
te collectively on issues of common concern. In Zambia, this acknowledg-
ment is made on paper, but the reality is that women and their concerns
have not been of the greatest priority. The processes in Zambian history,
from the establishment of the CRCs to the responses by the government,
have not made a concerted effort to engage genuinely with equality, inclu-
siveness and the needs of more than half of the population. What has been
the rule instead is a top-down approach that selectively chooses what
rights it deems important for women and rejects those it finds objectio-
nable.
In addition, executive interference in the processes has frustrated citi-
zens who desire a solid, participatory system. Despite women being outn-
umbered at the conventions, it is heartening that most of the resolutions
from the conventions in response to the first-draft Constitution have app-
reciated the massive challenges that women face. Deep-seated patriarchal
practices have been led to women being under-represented both on com-
missions and as petitioners making submissions to these bodies; in gene-
ral, too, women have played a limited role in Zambia’s first-ever partici-
patory constitutional body, the NCC.
There is no doubt that women know what they need: they have said re-
peatedly that discrimination, inequality, harmful customary practices and
the absence of reproductive-health knowledge have no place in the Zam-
bia in which they wish to live and raise future generations. If the leaked
Constitution is anything to go by, then, of the four themes discussed in
this chapter, only the citizenship clause would have entirely met the wis-
hes of the women’s movement. Moreover, at the time of writing the presi-
dent had been saying that Zambia does not need a new Constitution,115 or
at any rate not until 2016 at the earliest,116 pronouncements which suggest
there is no guarantee that these changes will come into effect anytime so-
on. Hence, the question that remains is whether the needs that women
8
Told Tale: The Struggle for a Legitimate and Democratic Constitution In Zambia
(2011).
115 These statements, along with those of his minister of justice, were reported in lo-
cal media.
116 The next presidential and national elections were scheduled to be held in 2016.
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have worked so hard to articulate will be met in this constitutional process
– or, should it fail, in any other future one.
As the country awaits the final Constitution from the government, it is
hoped that this time women’s hopes will not be crushed by a White Paper
or parliamentary vote. It is also hoped that this will indeed be a Constituti-
on that stands the test of time and ensures the absolute entrenchment of
women’s rights, not just as a vision but as a lived reality.
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Abstract
Whilst the participatory constitution-making and revision exercises under-
taken by African states with such gusto in recent decades have aimed to
address contentious issues that threaten stability, it has become clear that
these exercises in themselves are often part of the problem. This is evident
in the fact that countries have faced challenges in interpreting and imple-
menting their constitutions after promulgation. In some cases, the consti-
tutional texts are fraught with shortcomings such as inconsistencies and
contradictions that prevent the intentions of the public from being reali-
sed. The contestation that arises from varying interpretations of the con-
stitutional text, along with the failure to implement the consitution in the
ways expected by sections of the public, has led to tension and, in certain
instances, to the affected persons waging resistance against the state.
This chapter proposes that where scenarios are built around the arti-
cles of a constitution before its promulgation, an intelligent process of in-
quiry bringing together relevant experts in theory and practice could si-
gnificantly reduce the dissonance in expectations experienced later on by
different sectors of the public. This proposal is developed by means of a
case study of Kenya in which three illustrative issues are reviewed, each
of which turns around the interpretation and implementation of various
clauses of the constitution. What the study suggests is that much of the en-
suing confusion could have been avoided if scenario-building had been
made a formal step in the constitution-making process. For comparative
purposes, selected provisions of the constitutions of Uganda and South-Af-
rica are considered.
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‘The people made the Constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the
creature of their will, and lives only by their will’ – John Marshall, Chief
Justice of the USA (1801-1835).1
Introduction
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The truth of this adage has been
amply demonstrated in Kenya, a country grappling with significant in-
congruities arising from the interpretation and implementation of its Con-
stitution of 2010. Promulgated on 27 August 2010 after an arduous consti-
tution-making process that took more than two decades, the Constitution
since then has elicited joy and frustration in equal measure.
This chapter seeks to highlight the complexities of modern constitution-
making processes, complexities evidenced by the challenges that have ari-
sen post-promulgation in the interpretation and implementation of Ke-
nya’s constitution. These challenges relate, inter alia, to the dissonance be-
tween the expectations of the governed and governors, as well as to the
varying expectations different social classes had of the constitutional re-
view process. Inconsistencies and contradictions in the text of the Consti-
tution have also caused complications in that they obscure the intended
meaning of various articles when these are read on their own or together
with other elements of the same document. Ultimately, the state has been
left unable to implement the Constitution in line with the expectations of
interested parties among the citizenry.
There is no doubt that constitution-making can be highly polarising.
This reality reflects Okoth-Ogendo’s view that constitutions are akin to
power maps which, in their making, draw on past experiences and future
aspirations: constitution-making is an eminently political act in which
choices are made as to which concerns appear on the map, and hence it
can hardly be regarded as a simple reproduction of basic principles parti-
cular societies have endorsed and operationalised.2
1
1 See the Marshall Cases: Cohens v Virginia 1821, cited in ‘American history from
revolution to reconstruction and beyond’ available at http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/docu
ments/1801-1825/marshall-cases-cohens-v-virginia-1821.php (accessed 14 June
2013).
2 Okoth-Ogendo HWO ‘Constitutions without constitutionalism: Reflections on an
African political paradox’ in Shivji GI (ed) State and Constitutionalism: An African
Debate on Democracy (1991) 3-25.
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Thus, where the body mandated with overseeing the constitution-ma-
king or amendment exercise does not take care to ensure that the power
map is equitably apportioned and that competing concerns are well balan-
ced, a danger exists that the emergent constitutional document will be un-
workable or ineffective in two respects. At one level, the emergent consti-
tution could fail to engender a sense of ownership among large and/or in-
fluential sectors of the population whose buy-in is needed for it to work.
At another level, poor drafting of constitution can result in inconsistencies,
contradictions and ineffectual clauses. Whatever the case, such a constitu-
tion is open to unending contestation inside and outside the courts both by
citizens and the state as they seek to have different clauses discussed, de-
bated, interpreted and enforced.
The consequences of unremitting contestation can be far-reaching if
they are not managed within the stable framework of a democratic culture
characterised by tolerance and a robust judiciary – factors considered ne-
cessary to guarantee a working constitutional order. Tushnet defines the
latter as the legal regime through which political authority is expressed;
more specifically, a constitutional order is
a reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation’s fundamental
decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide those
decisions … . These institutions and principles provide the structure within
which ordinary political contention occurs. 3
Against this conceptual backdrop, the present chapter explores the idea of
scenario-building with reference to its use as a tool for promoting the via-
bility of newly made or comprehensively revised constitutions, the nature
of the challenges facing the implementation of Kenya’s Constitution of
2010, further to which it also considers examples from international expe-
rience; whilst the subject matter is relatively new and lacks a developed
body of literature, every effort has been made to refer to relevant extant
scholarship.
The faltering of recent constitution-making and amendment exercises
Once the drive for post-colonial African states to re-invent themselves be-
gan in the 1980s, it was just a matter of time before individual countries
2
3 See Tushnet M The New Constitutional Order (2003) 1.
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decided to overhaul their constitutions entirely or make radical amend-
ments to particular sections of them. According to Oloka-Onyango, new
winds blowing across Africa saw a revival of popular and elite interest in
governance, statecraft and constitutionalism; this revival led to a surge of
constitution-making and inaugurated what he calls ‘the epoch of the re-
birth of constitutionalism’.4
Indeed, constitution-making exercises such as those in Ghana (1992),
Uganda (1995), Eritrea (1997), South Africa (1996) and Kenya (2010)
have brought about major changes in the nature of these states and tilted
the former balance of power. One undeniably important outcome of post-
independence constitutional reform in Africa has been the expansion of
political space for the public to engage with processes of national
governance.
Ihonvbere sees this wave of constitutional reform as predicated on the
adoption of a different type of constitutionalism suited to Africa, a conti-
nent he describes as rife with debate about the obstacles impeding full rea-
lisation of human rights, gender, minority groups and the rule of law and
the question of how to overcome them. In essence, the debate concerns
struggles for constitutional reform, with the focus being on the long-mar-
ginalised masses who are articulating their aspirations and demanding that
the rights they seek be incorporated into new constitutions. For Ihonvbere,
these struggles amount to agitation for a new constitutionalism, ‘a process
for developing, presenting, adopting and utilizing a political compact that
defines not only power relations between political communities and con-
stituencies, but also defines the rights, duties, and obligations of citizens in
any society’.5 Today, the new constitutionalism is an integral part of con-
stitutional reform occurring within African political processes.
4 In the same breath, Oloka-Onyango muses about the direction these winds are ta-
king Africa – towards political nirvana or back to repression and autocracy? He
wonders whether the efforts to address the gnawing questions of marginalisation,
discrimination, or exclusion are genuine in motivation or simply another ruse for re-
configuring the state to ensure the hegemony of a leadership principally concerned
with self-preservation. Will the experiments in constitutional engineering – built, it
it is hoped, on sustainable foundations – outlast their political and legal architects?
See Oloka-Onyango’s comments in the Introduction to Oloka-Onyango J (ed) Con-
stitutionalism in Africa: Creating Opportunities, Facing Challenges (2001) 1.
5 See the Preface to Ihonvbere JO Towards a New Constitutionalism in Africa (2000)
Centre for Democracy & Development, Occasional Paper Series No. 4.
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In this regard, the Centre for Democracy and Development observes:
At every level on the continent, the idea has taken root that the Leviathans of
Africa must no longer function as virtual democracies but must be refashio-
ned to reflect the realities of their multifaceted societies. This has been reflec-
ted in the constitutional Conferences in Benin, Mali, Togo, Niger, the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, and Cameroon in the early 1990s, in the suc-
cessful constitutional arrangement of South Africa, and in the process-based
constitutional commissions in Uganda and Eritrea … Today, the struggle for
constitutional reform in Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Nigeria typifies the
second liberation/independence struggle in the continent. The struggle has be-
en led predominantly by civil society in Africa, since the political parties have
proved either incapable or unwilling to push for constitutions that will promo-
te just and equitable societies, being instead distracted by a chance to exercise
power.6
Commenting likewise on Africa’s democratic re-awakening and the con-
stitutional reviews it has entrained, Akibá notes that while these reviews
have been enthusiastically received and taken as signs that Africa is in the
throes of political renaissance, ‘reversals in the momentum of political re-
form have also occurred in a few countries, suggesting uncertainties and
contradictions in the future of democratic consolidation’.7 Indeed, though
many post-colonial African countries have undergone such a renaissance,
one expressed mainly through elaborate constitution-making or amend-
ment exercises, a number of them have not seen lift-off in achieving the
political, governance and administrative regimes that were envisaged as
the outcome, notwithstanding that these processes, by and large, were
people-driven, people-centred and participatory.8
For many people, the objective of the constitution-making or amend-
ment exercises was to remedy various historical injustices relating to, inter
6 See Centre for Democracy and Development The Zimbabwe Constitutional Refer-
endum: Report of the Centre for Democracy & Development Observer Mission
from 12-13 February (2000) 33-34.
7 Akibá O (ed) Constitutionalism and Society in Africa (2004) 3.
8 For instance, Eritrea adopted its constitution in 1997, one which had been drafted
through a participatory process involving Eritrean citizens as outlined in Proclama-
tion No. 37/1993. Indeed, before its adoption, public debate on the draft constituti-
on had taken two years, but delays in implementation prevented the public to a si-
gnificant degree from enjoying its otherwise progressive provisions. See Bereket
HS ‘Constitution making in Eritrea: A process-driven approach’ in Miller EL (ed)
Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making
(2010).
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alia, land access and land rights among the excluded;9 discrimination on
grounds such as gender,10 disability, ethnic origin and religious faith; and
the systematic marginalisation of communities from the mainstream deve-
lopmental agenda11. In this chapter it is argued that the key reasons why
so many countries have failed to achieve ‘lift-off’ include: deliberate or in-
advertent structural weaknesses in the constitutions; misplaced expectati-
ons by citizens; and the covert motives of hegemonic authorities or ruling
political classes.
The making of Kenya’s Constitution of 2010
Kenya’s journey towards constitutional reform conforms to the general
trends outlined in the preceding section. Briefly, the popular clamour for
reform in Kenya was occasioned by radical amendments to the country’s
independence constitution, amendments which had the deleterious effect
of altering the balance of power between the executive, legislature and ju-
diciary. As a result, individual rights and freedoms were constricted and
various groupings in Kenyan society faced acute marginalisation. In addi-
tion, the poor governance that began with the founding president, Jomo
Kenyatta, and his successor, Daniel Moi, continued to flourish through a
3
9 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, seeks to address, among other things, historical
injustices and the emotive land question. Its Chapter Five deals with land and na-
tural resources, establishes the National Land Commission and requires the parlia-
ment to enact land laws to ensure equitable access to, and use of, land and mineral
resources.
10 The 1995 Constitution of Uganda, for instance, addressed various concerns of the
Ugandan people, including the rights of the child, gender issues, the rights of the
disabled, and the environment. As a result of the explicit recognition of gender
equality under the Constitution, Uganda is among the countries with the highest
number of female members of parliament in the world.
11 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, entrenches inclusivity in governance by requi-
ring the consideration of marginalised communities and regional balance in state
appointments. This requirement necessarily ensures that persons from such com-
munities have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in state governance,
which historically has been the preserve of dominant ethnic groups. In addition,
the Constitution requires affirmative action to ensure the inclusion marginalised
persons in electoral politics. In this regard, article 100 states, ‘Parliament shall en-
act legislation to promote the representation in Parliament of (a) women; (b) per-




succession of authoritarian regimes.12 For instance, repressive laws and
detention without trial were frequently used to curb perceived political
dissent, and it is clear that, as in the case under Kenyatta, certain constitu-
tional amendments were made in Moi’s personal interest.13 Moreover, ju-
dicial independence was further eroded, and, given that an inflexible en-
vironment deterred judges from making decisions contrary to what the go-
vernment wished, brought with it alarming consequences for the protec-
tion of human rights.
Against this background, the struggle for increased democratisation that
started in 1991 began to show signs of progress in 2000 with the enact-
ment of legislation to review the Constitution and the appointment of the
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), led by Professor
Yash Pal Ghai. The CKRC’s primary directive was to ensure a compre-
hensive review of the Constitution ‘by the people of Kenya’: in carrying
out its mandate, the Commission was required to ensure that the review
process accommodated the diversity of the Kenyan people, taking into ac-
count ‘socio-economic status, race, ethnicity, gender, religious faith, age,
occupation, learning, persons with disabilities and the disadvantaged’.14
12 The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) states that if Kenyatta’s tenure
was characterised by the willy-nilly making and un-making of laws, including the
strong-arm use of the apparatus of government, Moi’s tenure definitely surpassed
it in this respect. For one, Moi had at his disposal the constitutional and other de-
vices created during Kenyatta’s tenure. In principle, disturbing constitutional
amendments passed during the Moi era followed the same pattern and were under-
taken for similar reasons as those under the Kenyatta regime. See Kenya Human
Rights Commission ‘Independence without freedom: Legitimization of repressive
laws and practices in Kenya’ in Kibwana K (ed) Constitutional Law and Politics
in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya (1998) 132.
13 For instance, in 1979 a constitutional amendment was passed to the effect that if
civil servants wanted to be elected as MPs, they had to resign from office six
months before the nomination date. This amendment sought to circumvent the ear-
lier position during Kenyatta’s reign in which civil servants were forbidden from
engaging in politics. Interestingly, the amendment was motivated more by the de-
sire to enable Charles Njonjo, the then Attorney General and a confidant of the
newly-elected President Moi, to contest the by-elections of the Kikuyu Constituen-
cy. The sitting MP, Amos Ng’ang’a, had ‘conveniently’ resigned. Njonjo won the
by-election and was appointed the Minister for Constitutional Affairs. See Korwa
GA and Munyae IM ‘Human rights abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi
1978-2001’ 5(1) African Studies Quarterly 1.
14 The Kenya Constitution Review Commission The Final Report of the Constitution
of Kenya Review Commission (2005) 9.
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Having devised its internal procedures, the CKRC took steps to prepare
Kenyans for participation in the review, sparing no effort in establishing
an elaborate national infrastructure to facilitate the stimulation, discussion
and collection of citizens’ views.15 Given that the country historically did
not have a culture in which direct civic consultation had taken root, the
process designed by the CKRC to get feedback from Kenyans about the
constitution they wanted was without doubt unprecedented in its openness
and participatory manner. Clearly, the Ghai Commission had set out to
reach Kenyans where they were and engage with their diversity.
However, for reasons that fall outside the scope of this chapter, Kenya’s
constitution-making process was interrupted from time to time, with the
result that eventually it was overseen by two other individuals as well. En-
suring that the process was participatory and people-centred nevertheless
remained a key feature of the subsequent Commission led by Abida Ali
Aroni (2004) as well as the Committee of Experts led by Nzamba Kitonga
(2009); the latter completed the work begun by the Ghai Commission and
paved the way for the adoption of the Constitution through a national refe-
rendum held on 4 August 2010.
The case for scenario-building as a means of pre-testing constitutions
The salient argument in this chapter is that constitution-making and
amendment processes would, as a matter of course, benefit from thorough
and systematic scenario-building exercises bringing together experts in
both theory and practice before the promulgation stage. The purpose of
these exercises would be to test each constitutional article along the logi-
4
15 Immense resources were expended in view of the importance attached to making
sure that the process was as participatory and people-led as possible. This included
establishing documentation centres in every district to inform the public about re-
form-related issues. Among the materials provided were records of conferences,
workshop reports and proceedings of the Commission. District coordination ma-
chinery was set up in all administrative districts, as were Constituency Constitutio-
nal Forums. Information from the Commission and participating organisations was
disseminated as well in the print and electronic media. See generally the Report of
the Ghai Commission, Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission,
Volume 2, The Draft Bill to Amend the Constitution. Available at http://
www.mlgi.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-country/kenya/consti-
tution/Ghai%20Draft.pdf (accessed 15 June 2013).
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cal path of its eventual interpretation and implementation in order to deter-
mine the strength and feasibility of the right conferred, the reasonableness
of the obligation conferred, the precise responsibility to be borne by re-
spective parties, and the role that relevant institutions have to play.
It is submitted that – through such a formal exercise of interrogating
each and every article of a constitution in the light of existing problems,
reviewing the courts’ litigation experience of the issues canvassed by the
articles, conducting other relevant research, and posing devil’s-advocate
questions – a number of challenges that could arise post-promulgation can
be resolved ahead of time or be considerably ameliorated.
While legal expertise would be essential to these scenario-building ex-
ercises, it is inarguable that experts should also be drawn from other disci-
plines, given that constitutions legislate on a range of matters. For instan-
ce, historians and political scientists would be able to point out the imprac-
ticality of certain clauses of the proposed constitution on the basis of their
knowledge of a particular society’s development and of the groups of
which that society is comprised. Historical factors might render clauses in
the constitution inapplicable as drafted; alternatively, where a clause is
mandatory, knowledge of history would provide a basis for addressing be-
forehand the contingencies on which its application depends. Clearly, a
constitution that articulates equality for all would occasion injustice to
groups of persons who have been marginalised historically if it did not in-
clude affirmative action measures to remedy the situation.
Scenario-building would be incomplete without considering how each
clause of the proposed constitution would affect an individual or group of
persons, how the individual or group would appropriate a right or benefit
conferred, and how, if aggrieved, he, she or they would go about seeking a
remedy from the courts. For instance, if the right to a fair trial is captured
in the bill of rights of a proposed constitution, it is essential that it be tes-
ted and reviewed in practical terms. Based on the relevant provisions, a
hypothetical scenario would be developed from the point at which an indi-
vidual who has committed the crime of theft is arrested and placed in cus-
tody, arraigned in court and brought to trial, with the scenario progressing
to the point at which the magistrate or judge makes the final pronounce-
ment and the matter is either terminated in the first instance or goes on to
appeal. In a similar fashion, another scenario could be reviewed in which
an individual is accused of acts of terrorism.
Through such an exercise, one incorporating experts in theory and prac-
tice from institutions like the police service, prisons, judiciary, political
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parties, civil society and the relevant ministry, it is possible to weigh up
the strengths and weaknesses of various issues. For instance, one could as-
sess, among other things, whether the right to a fair trial – considered with
regard to the availability of bail pending trial – applies equally in all offen-
ces; whether in all cases it is possible to arraign an accused person before
the courts within 24 hours of arrest (if the law provides so); whether the
public views all offences in the same way in terms of the consideration
that should be given to different categories of accused persons; and whe-
ther the state possesses the wherewithal in terms of human and other re-
sources to ensure that the right is upheld throughout.
By interrogating the right in this manner, a number of issues could
emerge: the state might not have the means to ensure all aspects of the
right to fair trial and at all times; likewise, it might not be desirable to treat
all offenders equally in availing them of bail pending trial; in practice, it
might be impossible to arraign all offenders in court within 24 hours of ar-
rest, given the exigencies and constraints under which the state operates;
and the public’s view of how the right should be implemented may vary
according to the nature of the offence.
In view of the knowledge generated by the scenario-building exercise,
it would be expected that the relevant article of the constitution is couched
in terms that make it available in such a way as to eliminate or reduce
bottlenecks in its implementation. Rights or benefits that are expected to
be enforced immediately upon promulgation would be clearly identified;
similarly, those that depend on other exigencies having come into force
would also be clearly stated.
It is argued that the mandatory incorporation of pre-promulgation sce-
nario-building into constitution-making and amendment exercises is a
measure that would serve to strengthen the efficacy and viability of new
constitutions in achieving the desired goals; by the same token, the role of
the courts in resolving post-promulgation contestation cannot be overem-
phasised.
Post-promulgation challenges to Kenya’s 2010 Constitution
Whilst Kenya’s Constitution of 2010 has been hailed by many as a pro-
gressive document, its contradictions and inconsistencies have also been
highlighted, especially the potential they hold for reversing certain of the




the Constitution is a document ahead of its time and out of alignment with
the beliefs, traditions and political proclivities of the people who participa-
ted in making it. Indeed, since its promulgation, a number of significant
anomalies that affect implementation have been detected; many of these, it
is submitted, could have been avoided at the constitution-making stage.
The review of the following three cases highlights some of the anomalies
that were keenly debated nationally, regionally and internationally.
The first and most glaring anomaly concerns the interpretation of Chap-
ter Six of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which deals with the themes of
leadership and integrity, and describes, inter alia, the responsibilities of
leadership and states:
73. (1) Authority assigned to a State officer – (a) is a public trust to be exerci-
sed in a manner that (i) is consistent with the purposes and objects of this
Constitution; (ii) demonstrates respect for the people; (iii) brings honour to
the nation and dignity to the office; and (iv) promotes public confidence in
the integrity of the office …. (2) The guiding principles of leadership and in-
tegrity include (a) selection on the basis of personal integrity, competence and
suitability, or election in free and fair elections …16
Several cases arose in connection with the interpretation and implementa-
tion of Chapter Six. However, the one that attracted the most attention in-
volved an acrimonious debate before the general elections of March 2013
about whether the duo of the president, Uhuru Kenyatta, and his deputy,
William Ruto, was eligible to stand for re-election to these positions. The
question arose because they were facing charges of crimes against huma-
nity17 before the International Criminal Court18 at The Hague.
16 The Constitution of Kenya is available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/index.php?
id=741 (accessed 14 June 2013).
17 Mr Kenyatta is charged with the crimes against humanity of murder, deportation
or forcible transfer, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts; Mr Ruto is accused
of being criminally responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for the crimes against
humanity of murder , deportation or forcible transfer of population and persecuti-
on. For further information, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/Situations
%20and%20Cases/Situations/Situation%20ICC%200109/Pages/situation%20inde
x.aspx (accessed 16 June 2013).
18 The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 1998 by the Rome Sta-
tute as the first permanent and treaty-based institution to help end impunity and
punish the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community. The ICC is an independent international institution with its seat at the
Hague in the Netherlands.
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The debate split the country, with one section of it adamant that the
men were ineligible to do so in view of the clear provisions of Chapter
Six; the other section argued that, the charges against them notwithstan-
ding, they were indeed eligible, given the equally compelling provisions in
the Constitution concerning to the right to a fair hearing. In this regard, ar-
ticle 50 of the Constitution of Kenya was cited:
(1) Every person has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the
application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body. (2) Every ac-
cused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right – (a) to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved … (e) to have the trial begin
and conclude without unreasonable delay … .
The provisions of article 50, coupled with the fact that the two men had
not been convicted and sentenced by the ICC or any other court of law for
the offences of which they were accused (and even if they had been, had
not exhausted any available appellate processes),19 persuaded the High
Court in International Centre for Policy and Conflict & 5 Others v Attor-
ney General & 4 Others20 to rule in their favour. In its ruling, the Court
said that, in the absence of the duo having been convicted of an offence by
19 The qualifications and disqualifications applicable for election as a member of
parliament are spelt out in article 99 of the Constitution of Kenya; of relevance in
this case are sub-articles 2(h) and 3, which state: ‘99. (2) A person is disqualified
from being elected a member of Parliament if the person (g) is subject to a sen-
tence of imprisonment of at least six months, as at the date of registration as a can-
didate, or at the date of election; or (h) is found, in accordance with any law, to
have misused or abused a State office or public office or in any way to have con-
travened Chapter Six … . (3) A person is not disqualified under clause (2) unless
all possibility of appeal or review of the relevant sentence or decision has been ex-
hausted.’.
20 High Court at Nairobi Petition No. 552 of 2012 [Coram – M Msagha, L Kimaru, H
A Omondi, P Nyamweya, GK Kimondo JJ]. The specific issues for determination
in this case were, among others: ‘1. Whether the 3rd and 4th Respondents were
qualified to offer their candidature for the office of President and Deputy President
respectively. 2. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to determine matters rela-
ting to the qualification or disqualification of a person who had been duly nomina-
ted to contest the position of President of the Republic of Kenya. 3. Whether the
nomination of 3rd and 4th Respondent to contest the offices of president and vice
president respectively was in violation of the Constitution on account of the Inter-
national Criminal Court charges under the Rome Statute. 4. Whether the ICC and
the Kenyan courts could simultaneously adjudicate over the same matter … .’.
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a court of law prior to the elections,21 and, moreover, there being no law
which had been enacted to enable enforcement of the provisions of Chap-
ter Six,22 there was no bar to the two candidatures. The effect of the for-
mer element of the ruling was to raise the threshold required to invoke the
provisions of Chapter Six to that required in proving a criminal offence,
namely, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This development thus negated
the essence of Chapter Six’s prescriptions on leadership and integrity,
which are not based on the strict evidentiary requirements of criminal tri-
als.
The second major anomaly in the interpretation and implementation of
the Constitution concerns its much-fought-for affirmative action provisi-
ons to facilitate women’s access to appointive and elective positions. The
case at issue was debated thoroughly by the public and had high visibility
in the media. Briefly, whilst the method for achieving the 47 seats reser-
ved for women in the National Assembly in terms of article 97(1)(b) of the
Constitution was clear, what was less clear was the method for achieving
(as per article 27(8)) the surplus required to ensure that not more than two-
thirds of either sex dominated the National Assembly and Senate.
More precisely, there was confusion about the proper reading of the re-
levant constitutional articles regarding the electoral process insofar as sa-
tisfying the requirements of the mandatory affirmative action measures in
21 The Judges stated at Point No.8: ‘It had neither been alleged, nor had any evidence
been placed before the High Court, that the 3rd and 4th Respondents have been
subjected to any trial by any local court or the ICC that had led to imprisonment
for more than 6 months. The confirmation of charges at the ICC might have for-
med the basis for commencement of the trial against the 3rd and 4th Respondents.
The end result however, could not be presumed, neither was there sufficient evi-
dence that at the end of it all, a conviction might have be arrived at.’ See Interna-
tional Centre for Policy and Conflict & 5 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others,
High Court at Nairobi Petition No. 552 of 2012.
22 The Judges stated at Point 6: ‘An inquiry into the integrity of a candidate for State
office whether appointed or elected, was an essential requirement for the enforce-
ment of Chapter Six of the Constitution. The nature and procedures of such in-
quiry was for Parliament to decide by way of legislation enacted pursuant to Arti-
cle 80 of the Constitution. The relevant legislation in this respect includes the
Leadership and Integrity Act 2012, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
Act 2011, the IEBC Act 2011, the Public Officer Ethics Act 2003 and the Political
Parties Act 2011. These Acts provide mechanisms under which inquiry may be
made concerning the integrity of the person who aspires to public office.’ See In-
ternational Centre for Policy and Conflict & 5 Others v Attorney General & 4
Others, High Court at Nairobi Petition No. 552 of 2012.
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the Constitution was concerned. Article 81(b) prescribes the nature of Ke-
nya’s electoral process and states that ‘the electoral system shall comply
with the following principles: (b) not more than two-thirds of the members
of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender’. This provision is in
tandem with the requirements of article 27(8), which says that ‘the State
shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that
not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies
shall be of the same gender.’ However, articles 9723 and 9824 of the Con-
stitution, which make provision for the composition of the National As-
sembly and Senate, respectively, have a fixed allocation of seats for the
various members comprising these bodies.
Thus, a dilemma arose from the inconsistencies between, on the one
hand, the strict constitutional provisions making prescriptions about the
electoral process as regards the composition of the National Assembly and
Senate, and, on the other, the provisions that make particular reference to
the affirmative action measures required by article 27(8). Notably, this
contradiction did not arise with respect to the county assemblies, whose
composition – as prescribed under article 17725 – includes a mechanism
23 Article 97 provides that: ‘(1)The National Assembly consists of – (a) two hundred
and ninety members, each elected by the registered voters of single member con-
stituencies; (b) forty-seven women, each elected by the registered voters of the
counties, each county constituting a single member constituency; (c) twelve mem-
bers nominated by parliamentary political parties according to their proportion of
members of the National Assembly in accordance with Article 90, to represent
special interests including the youth, persons with disabilities and workers; and (d)
the Speaker, who is an ex officio member. (2) Nothing in this Article shall be con-
strued as excluding any person from contesting an election under clause (1) (a).’.
24 Article 98 provides that: ‘(1) The Senate consists of – (a) forty-seven members
each elected by the registered voters of the counties, each county constituting a
single member constituency; (b) sixteen women members who shall be nominated
by political parties according to their proportion of members of the Senate elected
under clause (a) in accordance with Article 90;(c) two members, being one man
and one woman, representing the youth; (d) two members, being one man and one
woman, representing persons with disabilities; and (e) the Speaker, who shall be
an ex officio member. (2) The members referred to in clause (1) (c) and (d) shall
be elected in accordance with Article 90. (3) Nothing in this Article shall be con-
strued as excluding any person from contesting an election under clause (1) (a).’.
25 Article 177 provides that: ‘(1) A county assembly consists of – (a) members elec-
ted by the registered voters of the wards, each ward constituting a single member
constituency, on the same day as a general election of Members of Parliament,
being the second Tuesday in August, in every fifth year; (b) the number of special
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for ensuring that the surplus required to effect the not-more-than-two-
thirds gender principle is achieved within the county assemblies after the
general elections.
Various persons and institutions held differing opinions about the con-
sequences of this dilemma and how to resolve it. It emerged anecdotally in
popular discussions that some took the view that if a parliament arose after
the March 2013 general elections which did not conform to the gender
principle expressed in article 27(8), it would not have been properly con-
stituted and would thus be unconstitutional. Others argued, however, that
if this came to pass, the courts would not necessarily declare the parlia-
ment unconstitutional. Regardless of the stance they took, many people
agreed that the inherent inconsistency required final determination before
the elections to prevent any unwanted consequences afterwards from these
uncertainties.
Ultimately, two solutions were proposed, both of them strongly contes-
ted by their protagonists. The first was that the Constitution should be
amended to include a mechanism for achieving the surplus required to en-
sure adherence to the not-more-than-two-thirds principle. The second was
that achieving the affirmative action principle in the elections was unrea-
listic and that the principle instead ought to be realised progressively in
the long term.
With regard to the second option, commentators argued that guidance
on how the courts should view the matter was already available in Federa-
tion of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA-K) & 5 Others v Attorney General
& Another.26 Here, the complainants’ claim arose from what they saw as
seat members necessary to ensure that no more than two-thirds of the membership
of the assembly are of the same gender; (c) the number of members of marginali-
zed groups, including persons with disabilities and the youth, prescribed by an Act
of Parliament; and (d) the Speaker, who is an ex officio member. (2) The members
contemplated in clause (1) (b) and (c) shall, in each case, be nominated by political
parties in proportion to the seats received in that election in that county by each
political party under paragraph (a) in accordance with Article 90. (3) The filling of
special seats under clause (1) (b) shall be determined after declaration of elected
members from each ward. (4) A county assembly is elected for a term of five
years.’.
26 See Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA-K) & 5 others v Attorney Gene-
ral & another [2011] eKLR Petition No. 102 of 2011 [Coram J.W. Mwera, M.
Warsame, P.M Mwilu JJ] available at http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/
83092.pdf (accessed 17 June 2013).
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an anomaly in the Judicial Service Commission’s appointment of judges
to Kenya’s newly established Supreme Court. They argued that, in terms
of article 27 of the Constitution, the not-more-than-two-thirds requirement
for either sex as regards elective and appointive positions was not adhered
to because fewer women than expected had been appointed. The upshot of
the High Court’s ruling was that article 27 ought to be construed as having
been intended for progressive implementation. The judges opined that,
since one could not merely appoint anybody at all as a Supreme Court
judge, the Constitution could not have intended that the impossible be
achieved in the absence of suitable persons. According to the court, the
crux of the matter instead was whether or not the government was taking
legislative and other measures to ensure a sufficient pool of future talent
from which qualified judges worthy of appointment could be drawn.
Ultimately, after much effort by the legislature and civil society organi-
sations to resolve a dilemma that threatened to throw the first general elec-
tions under the 2010 Constitution into disarray, the Attorney General
sought an advisory opinion on the immediate implementation of the not-
more-than two-thirds gender principle in the elections. Delivering its ma-
jority opinion of four to one in December 2012, the Supreme Court ack-
nowledged that for decades women had been disenfranchised by discrimi-
natory practices, laws, policies and regulations, and that it had had a major
negative impact on their social standing. Nevertheless, the Court was of
the opinion that the not-more-than-two-thirds gender principle as provided
for by the Constitution could not be enforced immediately and was to be
applied progressively. Furthermore, the Court stated that ‘[l]egislative
measures for giving effect to the one-third-to-two-thirds gender principle
under article 81(b) of the Constitution and in relation to the National As-
sembly and Senate, should be taken by 27 August, 2015’. While the deci-
sion evoked much concern in the women’s movement and among other al-
lied civil society organisations, the Court’s timeline for the implementati-
on of the affirmative-action provisions was regarded all the same as a step
forward.
The third high-profile matter that illustrates Kenya’s constitutional cri-
sis relates to the conduct of the Supreme Court in a landmark petition filed
on 16 March 2013 by the loser of the presidential elections in the 4 March
general elections, Raila Odinga. According to him, the Independent Elec-
toral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) erred in declaring Uhuru Ke-
nyatta and running- mate William Ruto as the president- and deputy-presi-
dent-elect. Odinga took the view that the electoral process was so mired in
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flaws that it was not possible to ascertain the veracity of the presidential
results.
During the pre-trial conference stage of this case – that is, in Raila
Odinga & 2 Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission,
Isaack Hassan, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto27 – Odinga sought lea-
ve to submit a nearly 900-page-long affidavit containing information he
regarded as fundamental to his case. However, his application was made
outside of the timelines prescribed by the Supreme Court’s procedures.
The respondents were unyielding in their insistence that these procedures
be followed to the letter, maintaining that their own case would be impe-
rilled by the late introduction of copious amounts of information; further-
more, they argued, the petitioner had filed the affidavit without leave of
the court and hence should not be allowed to benefit from the irregularity.
Odinga in turn relied on article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, which de-
scribes judicial authority and states, inter alia, that ‘[i]n exercising judicial
authority, the courts and tribunals shall be guided by the following princi-
ples … (d) justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedu-
ral technicalities … .’ In refusing Odinga’s late application, the Supreme
Court drew on the same document’s article 140, which deals with issues
regarding the validity of a presidential election. Article 140(2) in particu-
lar requires that petitions filed under this clause be disposed of within 14
days after the petition is filed. For this reason, the Supreme Court was of
the view that, due to time-constraints, it could not allow the affidavit to be
filed late as it would be unfair to expect the respondents to grapple at short
notice with such a voluminous document.28 Justice Tunoi, who delivered
the ruling on behalf of the bench, stated that parties to a petition are duty-
bound to ensure compliance with the timelines stipulated by Court proce-
dures and refrain from wasting the Court’s time as well as that of other
parties to a petition. The Court also said that article 159(2)(d) of the Con-
stitution concerning ‘undue regard to technicalities’ did not mean to ob-
27 Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No. 5 of 2013 as Consolidated with
Petition No. 3 of 2013 and Petition No. 4 of 2013. (Coram: W.M Mutunga, Chief
Justice and President of the Supreme Court; P.K Tunoi, M.K Ibrahim; J.B
Ojwang; S.C Wanjala, N.S Ndungu, SCJJ.) available at http://kenyalaw.org/CaseS
earch/pdf_export.php (accessed 23 June 2013).
28 See paragraphs 214-216 of the judgment available at http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSear
ch/pdf_export.php (accessed 23 June 2013).
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viate the need for procedural propriety or allow technicalities imposed by
the Constitution or other written law to be ignored at will.29
The Supreme Court’s decision received mixed reactions. Many suppor-
ted its reasoning but others disagreed, on the basis that it set a dubious pre-
cedent liable to see the reformed judiciary revert to its former tendency to
uphold procedures to the detriment of substantive justice. Furthermore,
those opposed to the decision felt that the Court had not provided cogent
reasons for giving one constitutional article more prominence than ano-
ther. Indeed, Odinga’s view was that, with this refusal, his case had been
weakened substantially ab initio. Notably, the Court’s decision flies in the
face of the Judiciary Transformation Framework 2012-2016, which resta-
tes the provisions of article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution in its declaration
that
justice must be done to all irrespective of status and … all state organs must
assure access to justice for all persons. These twin constitutional demands re-
quire that justice be delivered expeditiously and without undue regard to tech-
nicalities. 30
Adding his voice to the fray, the Chairman of the Law Society of Kenya,
Eric Mutua, was quoted in the dailies expressing his concern about the full
import of the decision:
[T]he decision by the highest court in the land to reject the affidavit on the
grounds that it was time-barred will undermine reforms in the Judiciary … the
Supreme Court should have considered the affidavit on its own merits instead
of rejecting it on technicalities … . The Chief Justice and President of the Su-
preme Court, Justice Willy Mutunga, has time and again reminded lawyers
that the era of reliance on procedural technicalities is gone … . I see some la-
wyers taking advantage of this decision to return us to the era of litigating by
advancing arguments of a technical nature … . 31
29 See paragraph 218 of the judgment available at http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/pd
f_export.php (accessed 23 June 2013).
30 The Judicial Transformation Framework is the blueprint upon which the judicia-
ry ‘seeks to reset the relationship between the Judiciary and other arms of govern-
ment whilst maintaining its independence, reorient its organizational culture to cu-
stomize it with the exigencies of its social realities, and its institutional design and
leadership style ,and to emerge and operate as a service entity which serves the
people’. Available at, http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/assets/downloads/reports/
Judiciary%27s%20Tranformation%20Framework-fv.pdf (accessed 21 July 2013).
31 Mutua E ‘Supreme court turned back the wheels of justice in rejecting affidavit on
technicalities’ Business Daily 2 April 2013.
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The above are but three instances that demonstrate the challenges that
have been experienced in the interpretation and implementation of sec-
tions of Kenya’s Constitution of 2010, and in each case the conflict which
arose ended up in the courts; but the list is by no means exhaustive, and in
various instances the courts have been called upon likewise to interpret or
decide on clauses that created undue confusion in their interpretation and
implementation. This lends credence to Burnham’s observations32 about
the importance that should be attached to the body charged with interpre-
ting a constitution post-promulgation. In her view, the role of such a body
is critical, given that a constitution ought to be a living document which
extends beyond a written text articulating concepts, ideals and principles
to embody dynamically the hopes and aspirations of citizens. In the case
of South Africa, this body is the Constitutional Court, created under the
1996 Constitution after a comprehensive constitution-making exercise.
A comparative analysis of post-promulgation challenges to
constitutions in Africa
The post-promulgation challenges of Kenya’s Constitution of 2010 are far
from unique. For comparative purposes, this section briefly reviews a
sample of such challenges facing a number of other countries in Africa.
To begin with Uganda’s constitution, after its promulgation in 1995 it
ran into difficulties in the implementation of several radical clauses that
set out to empower women.33 In Manisuli’s view, the difficulties were due
6
32 Burnham MA ‘Constitution-making in South Africa: Forging a new legal system,
the former pariah state reveals the virtues of an activist supreme court’ available at
http://new.bostonreview.net/BR22.6/Burnham.html (accessed 29 July 2013).
33 The Constitution of Uganda of 1995 contains several provisions on non-discrimi-
nation and the equal rights of men and women. According to article 21, ‘(1) All
persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic,
social and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal protection
of the law; (2) … a person shall not be discriminated against on the ground of sex,
race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or social or economic
standing, political opinion or disability; (3) … [to] “discriminate” means to give
different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their respec-
tive descriptions by sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion,
or social or economic standing, political opinion or disability.’ Furthermore, arti-
cle 31 sets the marriage age at 18 years and recognises men and women as equal
partners in a marriage. Article 33 creates an obligation on the state to put measures
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largely to a lack of political will to ensure that women fully enjoyed the
rights granted to them by the Constitution. For instance, she decries the
fact that, ten years after promulgation, customary laws and practices conti-
nued to restrict the emancipation of women even though article 33(6) of
the Constitution proscribes laws, customs or traditions that offend the di-
gnity, welfare or interests of women. Manisuli believes this could be attri-
butable to ‘the lack of political will to confront issues of inequality and
discrimination in a holistic and comprehensive manner’.34
In South Africa, the constitutional inclusion of sexual orientation as a
ground upon which one may not be discriminated against is an example of
a clause that is conceivably out of alignment with the beliefs of the majori-
ty and which thus raises operational difficulties in its enforcement. Article
9 of the Constitution makes unconstitutional the discrimination of persons
based on sexual orientation. The clause represented the first time in the
world that a constitution had clearly spelled out the protection of persons
in same sex relationships, but it sharped divided South African society, gi-
ven that it did not receive support among the majority of the population. A
survey conducted by the University of the Witwatersrand in 1995 prior to
the Constitution’s promulgation found that only 38 per cent of respondents
supported equal rights for persons in same-sex relationships.35
Discussing the incongruity of the fact that the Constitution included a
proposition that was not widely supported by South African citizens, Mas-
soud opines that laws are not necessarily reflective of social attitudes. His
opinion is supported by Duarte’s statement:
Not only are there legal injustices to be done away with, but mindsets and
cultures have to be done away with too. It’s one thing for you to have your
in place to assist women in realising their full potential. The Constitution also ta-
kes cognisance of women’s special role in society, including their maternal role.
Constitution available at http://www.uganda.at/Geschichte/verfassung_der_republi
k_Uganda_2008.pdf (accessed 21 July 2013).
34 See Manisuli S ‘Women's rights to equality and non-discrimination: Discriminato-
ry family legislation in Uganda and the role of Uganda's Constitutional Court’
(2007) 21(3) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 341-372.
35 See Ilyayambwa M ‘Homosexual rights and the law: A South African constitutio-




rights and equality in the law, it’s quite another to have them each day in the
street, at work, in the bar, in public places. 36
Duarte’s opinion shows clearly the daily conflict that is likely to exist for
persons in same-sex relationships wishing to avail themselves of the bene-
fits of the right conferred by article 9 of the Constitution.
Ultimately, the protection of the rights of persons in same-sex relati-
onships was restated in the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbi-
an Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others.37 Here, the
Constitutional Court was called upon to confirm an order made by the
Witwatersrand High Court to the effect that the legal offence of sodomy,
and its inclusion in the schedules of some Acts of Parliament as well as in
a section of the Sexual Offences Act prohibiting sexual relationships be-
tween men, was unconstitutional and hence invalid. The Court not only
confirmed this order but also refined the definition of equality to mean
that it should be defined against the background of historical disadvantage,
in which case the rights of persons in same-sex relationships should be be
protected for having been repressed by the apartheid regime.
Since this ruling, the Constitutional Court has made further pronounce-
ments on the subject, defining the rights of persons in same-sex relati-
onships who are in permanent life partnerships to include their right to en-
joy the same rights as married persons with respect to immigration, custo-
dy and adoption of children, and employment benefits. However, Louw
notes that despite progressive legislation on the rights of persons in same-
sex relationships, there still remains more to be done, particularly with re-
gard to granting such persons the right to same-sex marriage or a civil uni-
on/domestic partnership model.38
On another matter, the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-
zulu-Natal)39 illustrates the gap between the aspirations of people, as cap-
tured in constitutional provisions, and the implementation of the same by
36 Ilyayambwa M ‘Homosexual rights and the law: A South African constitutional
metamorphosis’ (2012) 2(4) International Journal of Humanities and Social
Science 50-58.
37 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home
Affairs and Others (CCT10/99) [1999] available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
ZACC/1999/17.html (accessed 23 July 2013).
38 Louw R ‘Advancing human rights through constitutional protection for gays and
lesbians in South Africa’ (2005) 48(3-4) Journal of Homesexuality 141-62.
39 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (CCT32/97) [1997]
ZACC 17; 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (27 November 1997).
Pre-Testing Proposed Constitutions through Intelligent Scenario-Building
95
the executive. In this case, the Constitutional Court was seized of a questi-
on about the right to health guaranteed by the Constitution. Article 27 con-
tains a raft of pronouncements on this right, providing in particular at sub-
article (3) that ‘no one can be denied emergency medical treatment’. It
was therefore the contention of Mr Soobramoney, a patient with chronic
renal illness, that a decision based on a government-instituted system of
priorities to deny him regular life-saving kidney dialysis at a government
health clinic had infringed his right to health and was thus unconstitutio-
nal. The Court ruled that the constitutional right of citizens to equal access
to health care must be balanced with governmental imperatives to prioriti-
se the allocation of resources necessary for enjoyment of this right, a prio-
ritisation determined on the basis of other relevant considerations.40 In ef-
fect, the ruling introduced a restriction on the enjoyment of the right to
health that had not been envisaged in the constitution-making stage.
The cases discussed above from Uganda and South Africa offer but a
sample of the challenges states can encounter after promulgating new con-
stitutions. Clearly, some clauses, as drafted, can simply be impractical and
require interpretation by the courts to clarify them and resolve the contra-
dictions that arise between different constitutional provisions.
Courts as sites for safeguarding constitutional integrity
Notably, courts have been used in some constitution-making processes
around the world in order to safeguard the integrity of the emergent con-
stitution and to promote its viability. A case in point is South Africa’s
post-apartheid constitution, which was adopted in 1996 after having been
developed in negotiations between political leaders previously at war with
each other. Ebrahim41 states that although the Constitution was drafted be-
tween May 1994 and October 1996, its ideas and provisions were not new
but emerged from the long period of struggle which preceded the drafting.
It is a period which the country’s Constitutional Court described as having
been ‘characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice which
generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanita-
7
40 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (CCT32/97) [1997] ZACC
17; 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (27 November 1997).
41 Ebrahim H Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa (1998) Cape
Town: Oxford University Press.
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rian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and
revenge’.42
In South Africa’s constitution-making process, the mandate given to the
multiparty negotiating forum to draft an interim constitution included a
compulsory list of principles that had to be reflected in the final constituti-
on; thus, the draft of the final constitution to be prepared by the elected
constitutional assembly could be promulgated only if the Constitutional
Court certified it as compliant with the principles agreed to in the interim
constitution. The idea of involving the Constitutional Court was proposed
by the African National Congress, a key player in these events, but quick-
ly taken up by the National Party and other minority groups worried about
being affected negatively by majority opinions.43 Indeed, the first draft of
the Constitution was rejected by the Constitutional Court for non-compli-
ance with some of the 34 principles initially set out as benchmarks for de-
termining whether the resultant constitution met public expectations. Cle-
arly, the constitution-making process was undertaken with firm preconcei-
ved ideas about what the character of the eventual constitution should be.
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) present another example where constitu-
tional reform was guided by predetermined and defined standards. Accor-
ding to Gavrić, the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg in December 2009 in the case of Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and
Herzegovina44 was definitive in requiring BiH institutions and political
42 See the case of In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para.13). This case is cited in Jagwanth S
(2003) Democracy, Civil Society and the South African Constitution: Some Chal-
lenges (Discussion Paper 65 presented at the UNESCO/MOST seminar on Demo-
cracy, Governance and Associated Complexities: The Challenges Involved in Re-
cognizing Cultural Pluralism, 2003) 7. [Hereafter Jagwanth (2003).].
43 Jagwanth (2003).
44 Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (application nos. 27996/06 and
34836/06) European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg. In this case, Jakob Finci,
a BiH diplomat and president of the Jewish community, and Dervo Sejdić, presi-
dent of the Roma organisation, had taken BiH to the Court of Human Rights. The
two pleaded that they were subject to discrimination as members of minority com-
munities in BiH because, according to the Dayton Constitution, only members of
the constituent peoples, namely Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats, could be elected to
the State Presidency and the Upper Chamber of the House of Peoples of the BiH
Parliamentary Assembly. For this reason, minorities were excluded from participa-
tion in these institutions in a BiH which after the war was built on clearly identi-
fiable ethnic grounds. See Gavrić S ‘Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzego-
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elites to reorganise the political system so as to enable all citizens wishing
to stand for election to the BiH Presidency and House of Peoples of the
BiH Parliamentary Assembly to do so without reference to their ethnicity.
The Court stated: ‘Exclusion of minorities from active participation in the
elections has no objective and logical justification and thus stands in con-
tradiction with the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohi-
bits discrimination.’ The ruling triggered constitutional reforms in BiH,
where the relevant parties and institutions were enjoined to adopt amend-
ments to the BiH Constitution as well as to electoral law in order to facili-
tate an environment in which all citizens could vie for the presidency and
a seat in the House of Peoples of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly.45 Evi-
dently, the Court had prescribed the standards to which the emergent con-
stitution and electoral laws had to conform.
Where standards and benchmarks are determined for the review of a
constitution before its promulgation, as in the two preceding cases, there is
an improved likelihood that the resultant constitution will meet the expec-
tations of key protagonists in the political process. This is because incon-
sistencies and contradictions arising after promulgation can be resolved by
courts making reference to the prior agreed-upon or determined standard.
For the latter to take place seamlessly, there must be strict adherence to
the rule of law in the respective jurisdiction so as to preclude the possibili-
ty that the orders of the courts will be flouted by agents of the ruling poli-
tical class charged with implementing the new constitution.
Conclusion
From the information examined in this chapter it is evident that as much
attention should be paid to discovering the feasibility of the clauses in a
constitution as to the compulsion to include a clause capturing a certain
right or aspiration. The failure to do this before the promulgation of the
constitution is likely to result in significant challenges after its promulgati-
8
vina: A unicameral parliamentary political system as a solution for the implemen-
tation of the ruling in the case “Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina”?’
(2013) 1(2) South-East European Journal of Political Science. [Hereafter Gavrić
(2013).].




on, which in turn could lower the esteem with which citizens view the new
constitutional document. Ultimately, where these issues are not addressed
through the arena of courts, it may become necessary for them to be resol-
ved politically through the initiation of revisions to the new constitutional
document in whichever the manner the latter prescribes for this underta-
king. In the nature of things, amendments that come soon after promulga-
tion can stir anxiety and pose a threat to the viability of the constitution in
the long run. This tendency is especially apparent in the history of post-
independence African states, where a myriad of constitutional amend-
ments after independence typically served to annihilate the substance of
the constitutions and make them unrecognisable.
In Kenya, a constitutional document originally hailed as progressive has
become since then the source of bitter acrimony, with various parties stri-
ving to establish their rights or positions in respect of a number of diffe-
rent matters. Along with the other issues that have emerged after the
promulgation of the Constitution of 2010, the raging debate that surrounds
the three cases discussed in detail in this chapter have often threatened to
tear the nation apart. This, to be sure, was not a consequence intended by
the constitution-making exercise that Kenyans undertook with such vigour
and enthusiasm.
Had comprehensive scenario-building been undertaken before the
promulgation of Kenya’s new constitution, the exercise would have revea-
led, for example, the weaknesses in Chapter Six, which concerns leader-
ship and integrity. Questions would have been raised as to whether each of
the Chapter’s provisions are consonant with those in the rest of the Consti-
tution. Such an enquiry would then have revealed that the provisions of
Chapter Six are not entirely enforceable when read together with article
50, which establishes the right to presumption of innocence. What would
also have been thoroughly discussed are issues about the threshold to be
applied when considering the eligibility of persons under the provisions of
Chapter Six in relation to the threshold required in criminal trials.
In conclusion, it is submitted that a strong case exists for ensuring the
viability of a constitution by means of comprehensive scenario-building
prior to its promulgation. The various scenarios that were examined in Ke-
nya, Uganda and South Africa indicate clearly the repercussions that struc-
tural deficiencies and inherent contradictions in constitutions can have on
the state or sections of the population. As such, it is recommended that
countries undergoing constitutional reform should incorporate scenario-
building by experts in theory and practice as an integral element of the
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process. This would serve to avoid the untidy outcome of a constitution
fraught with challenges of interpretation and implementation, challenges
that could eventually cause instability in the state. By the same token,
countries that have already undergone constitutional reform ought to con-
duct similar enquiries with a view to effecting the necessary changes.
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Abstract
The new Constitution of Zimbabwe was written in a tense political en-
vironment in which devolution was one of the most contentious questions
dividing the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Zimbabwe Af-
rican National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The debate engaged
with two issues – the number of government tiers, and arguments for and
against devolution in general – and saw conflicting viewpoints come into
play among political parties, civil society organisations, business, citizens,
the media and international development organizations. In the process,
political players and the media both informed and misinformed the public
about devolution and its potential benefits to the country.
Fostering peace, democracy and development are the main aims of wri-
ting new constitutions. The chapter outlines how arguments for and
against devolution were made on the basis of these aims. ZANU-PF main-
tained it would cause regional instability and threaten the nation-state;
proponents contended it is essential for managing violence and conflict.
Arguments emphasising development held that devolution is necessary in
view of the state’s incapacity to provide ‘tailor-made’ development inter-
ventions at local level, while those in support of democracy stressed the
accountability of devolved structures. This chapter argues that adopting a
multi-level government structure was imperative in the constitution-ma-
king process and that, in assessing the prospects for devolution, six issues
require careful thought: intergovernmental coordination; management of
expectations, public service considerations; accountability incentives; fi-
nancial considerations; and collaboration.
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Introduction
That the writing of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe was premised on
contentious grounds is not in doubt. The formation of the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 was triggered by human rights abus-
es, the breakdown of norms of governance, and the need for writing a new
and progressive constitution. Ultimately, it was the strategy of the Zim-
babwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to ensure that
the constitution-making process was delayed or diluted – an aim it eventu-
ally achieved. Nonetheless, the constitutional reform, a process beginning
in 2009 and concluded in March 2013, provided a window of hope for
most citizens by outlining a new governance charter and setting out the
parameters within which the state is governed.
Against this backdrop, one of the sticking points between political com-
petitors was the issue of devolution. It was clear that the majority of Zim-
babweans across the political spectrum were in favour of it; what was also
clear was that ZANU-PF was opposed to it. As such, devolution generated
immense debate in the constitution-making process, among the major
questions being: What is devolution? Why were the Inclusive Government
(IG) parties agreed on decentralisation as a principle and not devolution?
What are the fundamentals of devolution? Why did devolution threaten the
smooth conclusion of the new Constitution? Why devolution in the first in-
stance?
The main arguments for and against devolution were premised on
peace, democracy and development. This chapter outlines the debate and
examines how the new Constitution engages with it, further to which it
seeks to answer the following research question: Is the inclusion of devo-
lution in the Constitution likely to result in an improvement in governance
and the realisation of development, given (1) the provisions in the Consti-
tution and (2) the political context and commitment to devolution?
In brief, the chapter deals with legal, policy and political matters sur-
rounding devolution in Zimbabwe. It begins by discussing key concepts in
decentralisation before giving an overview of the history of decentralisa-
tion in Zimbabwe. Thereafter it focuses on the devolution debate in the
constitution-making process, bringing into relief the main policy argu-
ments and the viewpoints of the MDC and ZANU-PF. The chapter goes
on to explain the Constitution’s devolution provisions, and assesses the
prospects for devolution in Zimbabwe.
1
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Decentralisation: concepts and definitions
The role of the state in service delivery and the development process is a
topical issue in international development. In both development theory
and practice, there is no role distinction between central and local govern-
ment. The failure of centralised planning systems heralded the concept of
decentralisation in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in developing coun-
tries. A consensus on the need to ‘roll back the state to the frontiers of de-
velopment planning’ – or, in simpler terms, to reduce the role of the state
in public service provision and development processes – provided the im-
petus for decentralisation. In its report Sub Saharan Africa – From crisis
to sustainable growth,1 the World Bank argues that decentralisation con-
cerns the division of roles and responsibilities between central authority,
local government and local communities with a view to reduce the number
of tasks performed by central government and to decentralise the provi-
sion of public services. The debate about decentralisation brings to the
fore the centrality of local governments in any state.
Deconcentration, delegation, privatisation and devolution are the four
main types of decentralisation.2 Deconcentration occurs when sub-nation-
al units within line ministries are given administrative and managerial re-
sponsibility, a practice sometimes called field administration, local admin-
istration or integrated local administration.3 In Zimbabwe, deconcentration
is practised through government ministries like health, education, home
affairs, and local government, among others. In a deconcentrated model,
people’s participation is limited to the implementation of centrally planned
policies. Delegation is the transfer of responsibilities by the centre to pub-
lic enterprises and other semi–autonomous government agencies to oper-
ate public utilities and services. In the Zimbabwean context, delegation is
manifested in public utilities like the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Au-
thority, Zimbabwe National Road Administration, Posts and Telecommu-
nications Regulatory Authority, Zimbabwe National Water Authority and
others. Privatisation is the transfer of responsibilities and functions from
2
1 World Bank Sub Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (1989).
2 Rondinelli AD and Cheema GS (eds) Decentralisation and Development: Policy
Implementation in Developing Countries (1983).
3 Rondinelli AD and Cheema GS (eds) Decentralisation and Development: Policy
Implementation in Developing Countries (1983).
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government to non-state actors, for example, non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), private associations and community associations.
Devolution refers to a situation where central government transfers le-
gislative, executive, administrative and financial decision-making authori-
ty to local governments that have clear and legally recognised jurisdictions
within which they provide public services to constituents to whom they
are accountable.4 The purpose of devolution is to create and strengthen in-
dependent levels of government that are mandated to perform defined
functions. Devolution involves the ‘transfer from centre to locality of deci-
sion-making powers and associated resources’.5
These definitions of devolution underline its essential element, namely
that local government exercises political, administrative and fiscal power
and responsibilities. Devolution is the most complete form of decentralisa-
tion in that functions as well as resources are transferred: central govern-
ment relinquishes certain functions and, conversely, devolved spheres of
government take over delivery and management of previous central gov-
ernment functions.




Autonomous, independent and clearly perceived as separate levels of government
over which central authorities exercise little or no direct control.
Local
governments
Clear and legally recognised geographical boundaries within which they exercise
authority and perform public functions.
Local
governments
Corporate status and the power to secure resources to perform their functions.
Centre-local
relations
Reciprocal, mutually beneficial, and coordinate relationships.
The purest form of devolution, rare in the African context, contains the at-
tributes listed in Table 1. In theory, these attributes are unambiguous but
in practice devolution takes various forms, with central government exer-
4 Yilmaz S, Beris Y & Serrano-Berthet R Local Government Discretion and Accoun-
tability: A Diagnostic Framework for Local Governance (2008).
5 Elcock H & Minogue M ‘Local government: Management or politics?’ in McCourt
W and Minogue M (eds) The Internationalization of Public Management: Reinven-
ting the Third World State (2001).
6 Adapted from Rondinelli AD and Cheema GS (eds) Decentralisation and Develop-
ment: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries (1983) 22.
The Inevitable: Devolution in Zimbabwe
107
cising some degree of control and influence in local government units. De-
volution as a concept entails that
local governments discharge obligations as part of a national political system
and not as dependent elements of a central hierarchy. The concept of devolu-
tion is non-hierarchical in the sense that it posits a number of governments
having a coordinate systems relationship with one another on an independent,
reciprocating basis.7
In a devolved government structure, the interaction between central and
local government pivots on reciprocity and interdependence. Government
tiers engage each other with respect and trust, co-existing in a national
governance system and working towards common national development
goals. An important element of devolution is discretionary authority,
which limits central government to maintaining a supervisory role in
which it ensures that local government is operating within national pol-
icies.8
From the above conceptual analysis, the reasons in favour of devolution
are many. First, it reduces the number of tasks performed by central gov-
ernment, leaving it to concentrate on those on which it can deliver effi-
ciently and effectively. The provision of basic services and governance re-
mains a governmental function but is a responsibility shared between the
central and local levels. Thus, central government performs tasks with
huge spill-over effects and economies of scale. Secondly, devolution leads
to distinct governmental spheres, for example, central, provincial and local
government. These spheres are critical for accountability, transparency
and planning in national development. Thirdly, the role of government in
the provision of basic services can be done best by institutions closer to
the people, whereas central governments usually perform functions of na-
tional significance such as defence, foreign affairs and macro-economic
management. Local governments, due to their proximity to the population,
are in a better position to be effective in providing human development
services that address the context-specific needs of the poor. World Bank
studies in Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines find an increase in the
7 Sherwood FP ‘Devolution as a problem of organization strategy’ in Roland RT (ed)
Comparative Urban Research: The Administration and Politics of Cities (1968).
8 Elcock H & Minogue M ‘Local government: Management or politics?’ in McCourt
W and Minogue M (eds) The Internationalization of Public Management: Reinven-
ting the Third World State (2001).
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delivery of basic services after local government assumed these functions
from central government.9
The history of decentralisation in Zimbabwe
In 1980 Zimbabwe inherited from the British colonial regime a dichoto-
mous and tripartite local government framework comprised of urban coun-
cils, ‘white’ rural councils and ‘black’ rural local authorities fragmented
along racial lines.10 The 1988 Rural District Councils Act eliminated frag-
mentation by amalgamating ‘white’ rural councils and ‘black’ rural local
authorities into rural district councils (RDCs). Local government reforms
became vehicles for pursuing the twin objectives of socioeconomic devel-
opment and the reduction of colonial disparities.
The Prime Minister’s Directive (1984 and 1985)11 outlined the new lo-
cal government structures and introduced development committees at vil-
lage, ward, district, provincial and national levels with the aim of fostering
bottom-up development planning. The newly-created development com-
mittees’ roles were information supply, implementation, delegated and in-
dependent planning, and policy-making and review.12 Development priori-
ties were identified and formulated at village level, and channelled
through ward, district, and provincial levels to national level. The national
development plan was to be premised on development priorities discussed
and agreed upon at the village and ward level.
In practice, development planning agencies experienced time and bud-
getary constraints, lacked skilled personnel, and saw central government
3
9 World Bank East Asia Decentralises: Making Local Government Work (2005).
10 Masundu-Nyamayaro O ‘The case for modernization of local planning authority
frameworks in Southern and Eastern Africa: A radical initiative for Zimbabwe’
(2008) 32 Habitat International 15-27.
11 This directive is enunciated in three government documents: ‘The Provincial Go-
vernors and Local Authorities in Zimbabwe: A Statement of Policy and directive
by the Prime Minister’, released in 1984; ‘The Provincial Councils and Adminis-
tration Act,’ 1985; and ‘Structure of Village Development Committees and Exten-
sion Services’, released in 1985.
12 Gasper D ‘Decentralisation of planning and administration in Zimbabwe: Interna-
tional perspectives and 1980s experiences’ in Helmsing HJ, Gasper DR, Mutizwa-
Mangiza ND and Brand CM (eds) Limits to Decentralisation in Zimbabwe: Essays
on the Decentralisation of Government and Planning in the 1980s (1991) 7-37.
The Inevitable: Devolution in Zimbabwe
109
interference in local decision-making, and as a result became ineffectual.
After the first decade of decentralisation, it was clear the process had
failed to yield the desired results; Coenraad Brand likened it to ‘centrally
created decentralisation’.13 Central government was evidently not commit-
ted to the letter and spirit of making local government a distinct sphere.
Local governments play a pivotal role in the promotion of local partici-
pation and local-level democracy. In the 1990s the objective of the gov-
ernment’s decentralisation programme shifted to promoting democracy,
and the focus of attention turned to elected local authorities.14 As such, it
became necessary to democratise local governments in the post-1990 peri-
od. An important vehicle in democratisation is elections, which started in
1993 in rural district councils and in 1995 in urban councils. The introduc-
tion of local government elections was a landmark development as citi-
zens became active agents in deciding who administers rural and urban
councils.
The introduction of a directly-elected executive mayor in 1995 marked
a key change in urban governance. It was aimed at strengthening represen-
tative democracy as urban residents were given a chance to elect the polit-
ical and administrative head of urban councils. Despite this development,
the Zimbabwe Institute argues that
[t]he Executive Mayor is a poor hybrid of the traditional British-style Mayor
and the American Strong Mayor … . Unlike the American strong Mayors
who are executives with appointing and dismissing powers and veto powers,
the Zimbabwe Executive Mayor is accountable to full council. In real terms,
the Executive Mayor gained no executive authority. Attempts by Executive
Mayors to assume executive functions have often led to clashes between the
Mayor and Town Clerks.15
The executive mayoral position caused political problems in cases where
the mayor was not from the ruling party, ZANU-PF. Such mayors were
castigated by central government for pursuing parallel policies to the gov-
ernmental policy agenda. The executive mayoral system resulted in a tug
13 Brand CM ‘Will decentralisation enhance local participation?’ in Helmsing HJ,
Gasper DR, Mutizwa-Mangiza ND & Brand CM (eds) Limits to Decentralisation
in Zimbabwe: Essays on the Decentralisation of Government and Planning in the
1980s (1991) 79-103.
14 Conyers D ‘Decentralization in Zimbabwe: A local perspective’ (2003) 23 Public
Administration and Development 115-124.
15 Zimbabwe Institute Local Government: Policy Review (2005).
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of war between the mayor and town clerk, with overlapping roles and re-
sponsibilities being a major trigger of conflict.
In summary, despite the government’s idealistic rhetoric, decentralisa-
tion ran into a number of practical challenges. As Rondinelli and Nellis
point out, most decentralisation policies are undertaken primarily for polit-
ical reasons, and how the policy works out in practice will depend on sim-
ilar political struggles.16 The post-2000 era revealed how high the political
stakes of decentralisation were when, to the consternation of ZANU-PF,
the MDC took control of various urban councils.17 Central government re-
acted by interfering heavily in local government, which defeated the pur-
pose of decentralisation. A strong belief in centralised planning and
staffing, along with technical and financial inadequacies and lack of politi-
cal will, compromised what could have been an effective decentralisation
programme. The government’s attempts to intervene can be likened to re/
centralisation,18 and saw devolution inevitably taking centre-stage in the
constitution-making process.
The devolution debate in the constitution-making process
Article 6 of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) provides for a people-
driven, inclusive and democratic constitution-making process. The GPA
was signed on 15 September 2008 by two MDC formations and ZANU-
PF, heralding the consummation of the Inclusive Government (IG) in
February 2009. Article 6.1 of the GPA mandated the Select Committee of
Parliament, composed of three co-chairs of the IG political parties, to steer
the constitution-making process. The Constitution Select Committee (CO-
PAC) spearheaded public hearings and consultations, the drafting of the
Constitution, two All Stakeholders Conferences, and a referendum that
voted for the new Constitution on March 16, 2013.
4
16 Conyers D 'The Management and Implementation of Decentralised Administra-
tion' (1989).
17 RTI & IDAZIM Local Governance in Transition: Zimbabwe’s Local Authorities
during the Inclusive Government (2010).
18 Machingauta N ‘Supervision of local government’ in De Visser J, Steytler N and
Machingauta N (eds) Local Government reform in Zimbabwe: A Policy Dialogue
(2010) 139-151.
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COPAC defined devolution as a unitary system in which political and
administrative power is shared between a national government and lower-
level spheres of state such as provinces and local authorities; thus, devolu-
tion is a process in which authority, responsibility, human and financial re-
sources are transferred from central governments to provincial and/or local
ones.
COPAC’s findings on devolution, gathered from outreach meetings, are
presented in Table 2. COPAC asked people in 1,950 wards what their pre-
ferred system of government is (‘National frequency’ refers to the number
of wards where the same response was mentioned). However, it is unclear
what COPAC understood as the difference between unitary and devolved
systems of government, since this was not explained in its working docu-
ments. Using statistics reflected in Table 2, ZANU-PF held that most peo-
ple rejected devolution of power as ‘it was divisive and inappropriate for a
unitary state such as Zimbabwe’.19
Table 2: Preferred systems of government chosen by 1,950 wards






Source: COPAC, 2012: 33.20
The devolution debate is discussed below in two parts: the policy argu-
ments and the debate as a whole; and the viewpoints of the MDC and
ZANU-PF.
Policy arguments and the debate as a whole
The devolution debate in the constitution-making process engaged with
two issues: the number of tiers devolved governance should have, and ar-
4.1
19 Share F ‘Devolution of power rejected’ The Herald 14 May 2012 available at
http://www.herald.co.zw/devolution-of-power-rejected/ (accessed 17 January
2013).
20 COPAC National Statistical Report Version 1: Second All Stakeholders Confe-
rence October 2012 (2012).
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guments for and against the notion of devolution itself in the Zimbabwean
context.
Number of tiers
Regarding the first issue, the COPAC process proposed a three-tier system
of central, provincial and local government.21 This system, similar to that
of South Africa and Australia, was also supported by the Zimbabwe Hu-
man Rights NGO Forum.22 Arguments against a three-tier system were
premised on three main points. First, a three-tier system poses the chal-
lenge of determining the political legitimacy and practical developmental
benefits of having a provincial government. Secondly, well-functioning
provincial governments require a vast geographical region from which to
draw their own financial and material resources. Thirdly, provincial gov-
ernments are costly to run, considering the superstructure and infrastruc-
ture that are needed to support them. In a nutshell, provincial governments
were seen as an expense to the taxpayer as they require the appointment of
extra government officials, in addition to the retention of existing provin-
cial ministry officials.
Opposing COPAC’s three-tier system, a number of organisations advo-
cated a two-tier one made up of central and local government. For in-
stance, the Democratic Councils Forum (DemCoF) proposed a two-tier
system composed of national government and local authorities.23 Local
authorities were categorised as provincial councils and district councils. A
total of 13 provincial councils – that is, the five cities of Harare, Bul-
awayo, Gweru, Mutare and Kwekwe, along with eight provinces – would
form the devolved local government.24 The proposal was premised on
democracy, equity, devolution and mutually reinforcing centre-local rela-
4.1.3
21 See COPAC Constitution of Zimbabwe (draft: 17 July 2012); COPAC Constitution
of Zimbabwe (final draft: January 2013).
22 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Devolution of Power: Human Rights Bul-
letin No. 73 English (2012).
23 This is an association of reform-minded councils, consisting of 31 urban councils
and 19 rural councils out of a potential of 31 urban councils and 60 rural councils,
aimed at adopting pro-democracy and good governance approaches and practices
in local authorities.
24 DemCOF Democratic Councils Forum Constitutional Position on Local Govern-
ment (2010).
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tions. DemCoF’s position was guided by results of a consultation process
involving mayors and chairpersons of local authorities, results which re-
quired that the relationship between central government and local authori-
ties be clearly defined and respected.
In its turn, the Local Governance Trust (LGT) advocated likewise for a
two-tier system of government consisting of central and local government,
but this proposition was based on the devolution of power from central
government directly to local governments without a provincial tier. In the
LGT’s view, considering the size of Zimbabwe, a provincial tier ‘is not
needful [sic] and is in all appearance a middle-man of sorts who is an un-
necessary inclusion in the tax paradigm’.25 The LGT’s argument was ‘De-
volution YES but NO to overburdening the tax payer’.
In outlining the arguments made in favour of a two tier-system, the fol-
lowing questions will be examined: Why a two-tier system? What to de-
volve and what not to devolve? How to devolve (that is, what form of de-
volution to take)?
What to devolve to local government level? Proponents of the two-tier
system argued that functions like land allocation, land use planning and
control, primary education, clinics, public works, local economic develop-
ment, integrated development planning and regional development should
form the core of local government functions.
The next logical question is: What functions should not be devolved?
Central government should concentrate on services/issues that are inter-
agency and inter-jurisdictional, such as foreign affairs, public (civil) ser-
vice, defence, home affairs, national infrastructure projects, national eco-
nomic development, mining, and energy development. Inter-agency ser-
vices are those cutting across branches of government and thereby scaling-
up service production and delivery. Inter-jurisdictional functions or ser-
vices are ones that cannot be demarcated between geographical boundaries
within a nation-state.
How does this form of devolution happen in practice and what is requi-
red to achieve it? Chief among the required policy and legislative changes
are reforms to the taxation system to create a situation in which local au-
thorities are established as legal corporate bodies with the power to raise
revenue and manage their expenditure. Budget allocations are made in
25 Local Governance Trust Devolution and the Constitutional Debate: A Position Pa-
per Offering an Alternative View (2012).
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such a way as to avoid conferring functions on local governments unless
the latter have the financial capacity to perform them. A two-tier system
entails strengthening local authorities, which in turn requires considerable
resources and capacity-building. The strengthening process is gradual and
piecemeal, with the goal of empowering local authorities to take on more
tasks. Supporting them with managerial, financial and technical resources
is key to effective devolution.
Arguments for and against devolution
Three major arguments were made for and against devolution. They re-
volved around remaking the state and fostering development; broadening
participation and democracy; and around giving the people a voice and
creating stability.
Remaking the state and fostering development
Devolution is among the reforms aimed at building a strong and effect-
ive developmental state. As such, it is not an attempt to dismantle the
state; rather, it matches roles to the state’s capacities. By sharing functions
between central and devolved governments, the goal is to improve service
delivery and advance socioeconomic development. Pemberton and Lloyd
argue that in a ‘congested state’, devolution can serve as ‘a policy and in-
stitutional decongestant’.26
Zimbabwe’s government has a record of failure in performing basic
functions, in addition to which state institutions in general are weak when
it comes to designing and implementing sound policies.27 When a state
fails in its functions for a long stretch of time, its reconfiguration becomes
essential. In Zimbabwe, central government has been the prime agent of
development for more than three decades, and the results need hardly be
mentioned: unemployment, poor public service provision, lawlessness, in-
creasing poverty, dilapidated infrastructure, and corruption in government
corridors.28 This has made it necessary to rethink the situation by moving
from the idea of one central government doing everything to that of diffe-
4.1.4
26 Pemberton S and Lloyd G ‘Devolution, community planning and institutional de-
congestion?’ (2008) 34(4) Local Government Studies 437-451.
27 UNDP Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe: A Discussion Document
(2008).
28 Barclay P Zimbabwe: Years of Hope and Despair (2010).
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rent government tiers performing devolved functions. Indeed, what devo-
lution seeks is to match the state’s functions with its capacity and achieve
effective service delivery to citizens.
Necessity, in other words, is the mother of invention. The country has
been in prolonged crisis largely due to its intransigent, authoritarian and
anti-developmental ZANU-PF central government,29 one which has too
much power and delivers virtually nothing. The unrestrained powers con-
ferred upon the president by the Lancaster House Constitution lie at the
heart of Zimbabwe’s constitutional crisis,30 and the constitution-making
process thus presented an opportunity to devolve power across state insti-
tutions. As a result, devolution became a non-negotiable theme in the Con-
stitution as a remedy to a centralised state.
Local development projects require extensive resources as well as prop-
er management. Over the last three decades local infrastructure projects
have been failing due either to inefficient use of resources or limited re-
sources from the treasury. Local development initiatives normally lack ad-
equate funding and resources from the centre, which often leads to
projects and programmes being abandoned before completion and local
beneficiaries therefore being negatively affected. In this context, devolu-
tion was seen as holding the potential to mobilise local resources in order
to sustain local community-development projects.
 
Broadening participation and democracy
The transfer of power and authority to local institutions is critical in fos-
tering people’s participation in the formulation and implementation of de-
velopment plans as well as in the overall development process. Democra-
cy has been under severe threat in Zimbabwe as the ‘liberators have be-
come the oppressors’.31 Devolution was therefore seen as a vehicle to lib-
erate and democratise both the state and the development process. Accord-
ing to this argument, development plans come to resonate well with local
needs and priorities while the number of ‘white elephant’ projects de-
clines.
29 Bracking S ‘Development denied: Autocratic militarism in post-election Zimbab-
we’ (2005) 32(104/105) Review of African Political Economy 341-357.
30 Linnington G ‘Reflections on the significance of the constitution’ in Masunungure
EV and Shumba JM (eds) Zimbabwe: Mired in Transition (2012).
31 MacLean JS ‘Mugabe at war: The political economy of conflict in Zimbabwe’
(2002) 23(3) Third World Quarterly 513–528.
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The GPA identifies constitutional reform as one of the fundamental
milestones of the IG, seeing the new Constitution as a way of deepening
democratic values and encouraging active citizenship. In particular, the
principle of subsidiarity – that state organs at the very local level are better
able to manage and deliver services than are higher levels of government –
was envisaged as key feature of this Constitution. Devolution is a vehicle
for democratisation.32 Following this argument, devolution is viewed as a
means of reducing the democratic deficit in a state.33
Three constitutional drafts (the Kariba Draft; Law Society of Zimbabwe
Model Constitution and the COPAC draft) sought to implement devolu-
tion as a mechanism ‘to enhance participation and accountability by in-
creasing local government in decision-making at national, provincial and
local levels’.34 Government programmes perform better when they involve
potential users and local social capital. Why is this so? Implementation is
easier, and there are better prospects for programme sustainability and
meaningful feedback to government agencies. Devolution entails develop-
ment programmes implemented and managed at the very local level,
where development is needed most. In a devolved state, local dynamics,
rather than central government, dictate the pace of development program-
ming.
Devolution brings with it constructive popular participation in decision-
making, plan-formulation and development work. Participation by local
people has brought immense benefits in, for instance, housing projects in
Port Elizabeth, South Africa; forest management in Gujarat state, India;
and water-borne sanitation systems in Recife, Brazil.35 But Zimbabwe
does not need to look abroad for examples of participatory development in
action: the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation, a community-based
organisation, has transformed the lives of thousands of people by involv-
ing them in housing development.
32 Kersting N (ed) Constitution in Transition: Academic Inputs for a New Constituti-
on (2010).
33 Ashworth ER, Boyne AG & Walker MR ‘Reducing the democratic deficit? Devo-
lution and the accountability of public prganisations in Wales’ (2001) 16(1) Public
Policy and Administration 1-17.
34 Sims MB Conceptualising Local Government: Local Perceptions on Devolution
and Participation in Zimbabwe (2013).
35 Muchadenyika D 2012. ‘Devolution: Bringing government closer to the people’
Daily News 23 September 2012 available at http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2
012/09/23/devolution-bringing-govt-closer-to-the-people.
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In Zimbabwe, most government-directed infrastructure programmes
suffer premature death36 due to corruption in public infrastructure enti-
ties37. Dysfunctional boreholes, unused gardens, collapsing fowl runs and
deteriorating pigsties are manifestations of central government’s failure to
embrace local participation. Devolution is a strategy that fosters local
ownership of development projects. When local people have a sense of
project ownership, they often fight for the survival and success of their
projects.
 
Voice to the people and stability
Despite its patriotic rhetoric ZANU-PF has consolidated its power and ex-
tended its access to resources;38 obtained through violent accumulation39
and privatised among the party and its supporters. With the country mired
in poverty as a result, and the populace lacking a political voice and access
to economic and natural resources, devolution has come to be seen as an
essential means of democratic empowerment. Linking empowerment and
devolution leads, in Miliband’s term, to ‘Double Devolution’, in which
central government, local government and their partners are committed to
devolve to communities the capacity to take up the opportunities offered
to them.40
Zimbabwe’s policy-making is elitist, side-lining the majority of citizens
who variously enjoy or suffer the outcomes. Whereas the country has been
captured under the ‘discourse and destructive party accumulation project
of ZANU-PF’,41 devolution makes public the debate about policy-making
and allows people a voice in deciding the course of action to take. Public
confidence and trust in the state increase; the incidence of violence and in-
36 World Bank Zimbabwe Multi-Sector Mission in Support to Planning and Imple-
mentation of the 2012 Capital Budget. Harare September 26 to October 21, 2011.
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (AFTP1). November 10, 2011.
37 Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion Zimbabwe: Medium
Term Plan (2011-15) (2011).
38 Kriger N ‘From patriotic memories to “patriotic history” in Zimbabwe, 1990–
2005’ (2006) 27(6) Third World Quarterly 1151–1169.
39 Moore D ‘Progress, power, and violent accumulation in Zimbabwe’ (2012) 30(1)
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 1-9.
40 Jordan G ‘Policy without learning: Double devolution and abuse of the deliberati-
ve idea’ (2007) 22(1) Public Policy and Administration 48-73.
41 Raftopoulos B ‘The Global Political Agreement as a “passive revolution”: Notes
on contemporary politics in Zimbabwe’ (2010) 99(411) The Round Table 705-718.
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stability declines. Citizen charters in Malaysia and client surveys in
Nicaragua, India and Tanzania have shown options for drawing upon the
previously ignored voices of the people.42
Channelling the voice of the people through community organisations
is key to building a critical public space and sustaining peace. Organisa-
tions representing communities on policy-making bodies enable citizens to
articulate their interests in public policies; however, if their participation is
thwarted and their interests not articulated in national policy-making pro-
cesses, the result is resentment and civil unrest.43 Devolved government
units work closely with formal and informal organisations representing the
people. This approach integrates society and fosters peace and stability.
Devolved governments create opportunities to devise governance arrange-
ments tailor-made to respond to individual economic and social issues.
The viewpoints of the MDC and ZANU-PF
Two political parties turned the constitution-making process into a show-
down between warring ideologies. The ZANU-PF regime is premised on
destructive party-accumulation, ‘authoritarian nationalist disengagement
away from the dominant international norms of political and economic ac-
countability’, in contrast to the MDC, which defined itself ‘through a lan-
guage of liberal constitutionalism, human rights advocacy and post-nation-
alist aspirations’ with a sound economic vision.44 The MDC fought hard
and drove the constitution-making process,45 even when the Select Com-
mittee of Parliament represented a position on which the MDC compro-
mised in order to try to gain as much as possible from the content.46 One
of the MDC’s founding objectives was to change the Lancaster House
4.2
42 Nelson J Building Linkages for Competitive and Responsible Entrepreneurship:
Innovative Partnerships to Foster Small Enterprise Promote Economic Growth
and Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries (2007).
43 Green D From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States Can
Change the World 2 ed (2013).
44 Raftopoulos B ‘The Global Political Agreement as a “passive revolution”: Notes
on contemporary politics in Zimbabwe’ (2010) 99(411) The Round Table 705-718.
45 Movement for Democratic Change Election Manifesto 2013: A New Zimbabwe –
The Time is Now (2013).
46 Raftopoulos B ‘The Global Political Agreement as a “passive revolution”: Notes
on contemporary politics in Zimbabwe’ (2010) 99(411) The Round Table 705-718.
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Constitution and replace it with a new ‘people-driven’ and democratic
constitution.
On March 16 2013, a total of 3,316,082 Zimbabweans voted over-
whelmingly for a new constitution, with 94.5 per cent in favour and 5.5
per cent against.47 The MDC sought to ensure in any way it could that a
new constitution would be written for Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF, the benefi-
ciary of the Lancaster House Constitution, in turn tried everything it could
to frustrate that same constitution-making process.
The political environment under which the Constitution was written
was tense and divisive. Competition between the MDC and ZANU-PF
was characterised by the privatisation of politics, patronage and vio-
lence,48 and spilled over into COPAC, where the co-chairpersons were
forever locked in disagreement and where public outreach meetings were
events fraught with animosity between party supporters. Informal and par-
allel government structures instigated by ZANU-PF and often more
powerful than their state counterparts49 constantly attempted to sabotage
the constitution-building enterprise.
Not surprisingly, then, the positions the parties took on the issue of de-
volution were varied and conflicting. ZANU-PF was anti-devolution, evi-
dent in a raft of changes it made to the COPAC draft of 17 July 2012 and
reflected in Table 3.
47 ZESN Zimbabwe Constitution Referendum Report and Implications for the Next
Elections – Advance Copy, 16 March 2013 (2013).
48 Kriger N ‘From patriotic memories to “patriotic history” in Zimbabwe, 1990–
2005’ (2006) 27(6) Third World Quarterly 1151–1169.
49 Kriger N ‘From patriotic memories to “patriotic history” in Zimbabwe, 1990–
2005’ (2006) 27(6) Third World Quarterly 1151–1169.
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Table 3: ZANU-PF’s anti-devolution position in the constitution-making
process
Section COPAC’s position based on Draft Con-
stitution of July 17, 2012
ZANU-PF’s position in response to COPAC
Draft Constitution
14.1 ‘Devolution of governmental powers and
responsibilities’
‘Decentralisation of governmental powers
and responsibilities’
14.1 (1) ‘governmental powers and responsibilities
must be devolved to provincial and
metropolitan councils and local authorities’
‘governmental powers and responsibilities
must be decentralised to provincial councils
and local authorities’
14.1 (2) ‘The objectives of the devolution of govern-
mental powers and responsibilities to pro-
vincial and metropolitan councils and local
authorities ...’
‘The objectives of the decentralisation of
governmental powers and responsibilities to
provincial councils and local authorities ...’
14.2 (1) ‘Provincial and metropolitan councils and
local authorities must, within their spheres’
‘Provincial councils and local authorities
must, within their spheres of jurisdiction’
14.2 (c) ‘exercise their functions in a manner that
does not encroach on the geographical,
functional or institutional integrity of anoth-
er tier of government’
‘exercise their functions in a manner that
does not encroach on the geographical, func-
tional or institutional integrity of another
structure of government’
14.5 (1) ‘There is a provincial council for each
province, except the metropolitan provin-
ces, consisting of ..’
‘There is a provincial council for each pro-
vince consisting of …’
5 ‘Tiers of government’ ‘Structures of government’
Adapted from COPAC Draft Constitution of Zimbabwe, 17 July 2012; The Draft Con-
stitution of Zimbabwe 18 July 2012, incorporating approved ZANU-PF Amend-
ments;50 and The Herald 30 August, 2012.51
Driven by a strong belief in centralisation, ZANU-PF saw devolution as a
threat to its hold on power. Its 2013 election manifesto leaves out devolu-
tion in the list of the ‘goals of the people’ it had defended in the COPAC
process;52 nor, for that matter, is the term ‘devolution’ mentioned any-
where else in this 108-page document, as telling a sign as any of the par-
ty’s disregard for it.
In contrast, the MDC-Tsvangirai manifesto takes pride in it: ‘We fought
for devolution and it is now a cardinal principle of the new Constitution
50 As distributed by Veritas.
51 ‘ZANU-PF-approved amendments to COPAC Draft Constitution’ The Herald 30
August 2012.
52 ZANU-PF Taking Back the Economy, Indigenise, Empower, Develop and Create
Employment. 2013 Election Manifesto (2013).
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and we are committed to making sure it works for the people’.53 In the
run-up to the July 2013 elections, the party reiterated its pro-devolution
stance in its vision of ‘promot[ing] devolved local governance that is
democratic, sustainable and delivers quality services equitably’.54 As for
the MDC-Ncube 2013 harmonised elections manifesto, it mentions devo-
lution more often than any other manifesto, and, what is more, carries the
banner, Actions for Devolution, Devolution is the New Revolution.55
These contrasting views were not unexpected, as the successful comple-
tion of a progressive Constitution would be interpreted as a milestone for
the MDC and a drawback for ZANU-PF.
The documentary Part of the Solution, aired on 25 July 2013 by First
Television, conveys the fierce contestation of the constitution-making pro-
cess.56 In it, the National Constitution Assembly chairman argued that
COPAC outreach meetings were stage-managed by ZANU-PF each to al-
low only four or five MDC supporters to give one- or two-word responses
to official questions. In response, the ZANU-PF COPAC co-chairperson
said his party had simply mobilised supporters as it had in the victorious
liberation struggle. The documentary exposes how MDC members were
killed during this period, and their houses set on fire; human rights
lawyers were hamstrung by selective application the law, which saw vic-
tims of violence – rather than perpetrators – being incarcerated. The defin-
ing features of Zimbabwe’s constitution-making, indeed, were nothing
less than violence and torture.
The Constitution was drafted not only in a highly contested process but
a protracted one, too. Due to the deeply entrenched conflict surrounding
the content of the Constitution, the process took nearly 48 months to com-
plete instead of the planned 18 months.57 Table 4 shows the time taken by
the constitution-making process compared to its planned time-frame.
53 Movement for Democratic Change Election Manifesto 2013: A New Zimbabwe –
The Time is Now (2013).
54 Movement for Democratic Change Agenda for Real Transformation: 2013 Policy
Handbook (2013).
55 Movement for Democratic Change (Ncube Faction) Harmonised Election Mani-
festo: Actions for Devolution – Devolution is the New Revolution! (2013).
56 First Television Part of the Solution 25 July 2013 (documentary).
57 ZESN Zimbabwe Constitution Referendum Report and Implications for the Next
Elections – Advance Copy, 16 March 2013 (2013).
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Table 4: constitution-making process compared to the planned time frame.
Aspect Planned Time frame Actual Time Taken
Set up Inclusive Go-
vernment
- February 2009










No later than 4 months after 1st All
Stakeholders Conference
June-October 2010
Draft Constitution Tabled within 3 months of the com-




Within 3 months of the completion
of public consultation
October 2012
Draft Constitution & ac-
companying report
Within 1 month of 2nd All Stake-
holders Conference
Draft Constitution (17 January
2013), 2nd All Stakeholders Con-
ference Report (October 2012)
Draft Constitution & ac-
companying report
Debated in Parliament within 1
month
February 2013
Referendum Within 3 months of completion of
debate
16 March 2013
Gazetting 1 month of referendum date 22 May 2013
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs (2009:
6-7)58 and ZESN, 2013.
Although ZANU-PF’s highest decision-making body, the politburo, re-
jected devolution, as shown in Table 3, most of its supporters favoured it,
as shown in Table 5.
58 Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs Global Political Agreement,
15 September 2008 (2009).
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MDC-T 67 7 19 7
ZANU-PF 55 7 26 12
Others 77 13 9 2
Would not
vote
71 9 11 9
Refused to
answer
59 8 22 12
Do not
know
54 10 26 10
Source: Afrobarometer, 2012.59
The Afrobarometer survey reveals that 65.7 per cent of Zimbabweans
were in favour of devolution. Thus, the survey shows considerable support
for a devolved system of government by Zimbabwean citizens across the
political divide.
Devolution provisions in the Constitution
What was the outcome of the devolution debate? The Constitution of Zim-
babwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 recognises and entrenches three
tiers of government – national, provincial and local – in that chapter 14
provides for provincial and local government. The vision of provincial and
local government as outlined is to preserve national unity and promote
democratic citizen and community participation in government, equitable
national resource allocation and participation of local communities in de-
termining development priorities.60 Devolution of power and responsibili-
ties to lower tiers of government constitutes the essentials of provincial
and local government.
5
59 Afrobarometer Summary of Results (2012).
60 Government of Zimbabwe Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013).
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The general principles of provincial and local government, as outlined
in section 265 of the new Constitution, include:
• ensuring good governance through effectiveness, transparency, ac-
countability and institutional coherence of provincial and local govern-
ments;
• cooperation between tiers of government;
• avoiding performing functions that encroach on other tiers of govern-
ment;
• public welfare security;
• preservation of peace, national unity, and indivisibility of Zimbabwe;
• fair and equitable representation of people; and
• coordination mechanism between central governments, provincial and
metropolitan councils and local authorities to be outlined in an Act of
Parliament.
The devolved structures include eight provincial councils, two metropoli-
tan councils, and urban and rural local authorities. The composition of
provincial councils includes the chairperson of the council, elected at first
sitting of provincial council after elections, senators elected from the
province concerned, two senator chiefs, all members of the National As-
sembly elected under a party-list system of proportional representation,
and mayors and chairpersons of all local authorities in the province con-
cerned.
The Constitution creates the two metropolitan councils of Bulawayo
and Harare. The composition of metropolitan councils includes the mayor
of the city concerned, who chairs the metropolitan council; the mayor or
chairperson of the second-largest urban local authority in the province; all
members of the National Assembly whose constituencies fall in the
metropolitan council concerned; six women members of the National As-
sembly elected under a party-list system of proportional representation;
senators elected from the metropolitan council; and mayors, deputy may-
ors or chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of local authorities in the
metropolitan council concerned.
Section 270 of the new Constitution outlines the functions of provincial
and metropolitan councils with socioeconomic development as the key
function. Other functions include:
• socioeconomic development planning and implementation;
• government programmes coordination and implementation;
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• natural resources planning and management;
• tourism promotion and development; and
• provincial resources monitoring and evaluation.
The Constitution, subject to an Act of Parliament, gives a local authority
‘the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local affairs of the people
within the area, for which it has been established, and has all the powers
necessary for it to do so’. Furthermore, it provides two ways of electing
mayors and chairpersons of urban local authorities. One is through the
election of non-executive mayors or chairpersons by councillors at the
first meeting of the council after a general election (section 277(2)). The
second is through an Act of Parliament conferring executive powers on the
mayor or chairperson of an urban local authority, with such mayors or
chairpersons being elected directly by registered voters in the area for
which the local authority has been established (section 274(5)).
The Constitution provides for an Act of Parliament to confer powers
and functions to local authorities. Section 276 outlines the functions of lo-
cal authorities, including making by-laws and other regulations for effect-
ive local authority administration; and taxation and revenue-raising pow-
ers.
The functions assigned to local governments are not fully stated in the
new Constitution. The COPAC constitution failed to incorporate substan-
tive provisions to specify how the devolution process will work, what
structures are to be set up, and how the provincial councils will work.61
Thus, devolution to local authorities is still unfinished and it awaits an Act
of Parliament to determine the scope and depth of devolution. However,
the constitutional provisions are a promising starting-point. How the new
government will deal with devolution by enacting an Act of Parliament is
still unclear and will depend largely on the shrewdness of the 8th Parlia-
ment, in which ZANU-PF has more than a two-thirds majority.
61 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights ‘An Analysis of the COPAC Final Draft








Assessment of the prospects for devolution
This section explores some of the implications of the Constitution’s devo-
lution provisions.
Intergovernmental affairs coordination
The new Constitution recognises local authorities (rural and urban),
provincial and metropolitan councils, Parliament (National Assembly and
Senate), and central government (executive, ministries, government de-
partments). Inevitably, there has to be a coordination mechanism between
these state institutions. Thus government has to decide on the nature and
location of an intergovernmental agency aimed at facilitating interactions
and relations as well as allowing feedback between the aforementioned in-
stitutions. In executive-dominated, Westminster-style parliamentary feder-
ations, intergovernmental relations tend to be coordinated by agencies lo-
cated near the centre of government.62 The location of the intergovern-
mental agency is critical in facilitating coordination between different
government tiers.
Managing public expectations
Frustration with the practical problems of devolution may result in calls
for recentralisation,63 necessitating the management of public expecta-
tions. There was, and is, a strong belief among Zimbabweans that devolu-
tion would solve most of the problems facing the country. As such, it is
critical that devolved tiers manage expectations and deliver on their con-
stitutional mandates. Devolution has its limits, which should be under-




62 Horgan WG ‘Devolution and intergovernmental relations: The emergence of inter-
governmental affairs agencies’ (2003) 18(3) Public Policy and Administration
12-24.
63 Devas N & Delay S ‘Local democracy and the challenges of decentralising the sta-
te: An international perspective’ (2006) 32(5) Local Government Studies 677-695.
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Public service considerations
While it is clear that the Constitution provides three tiers of government,
this raises questions about the public service. Does it mean Zimbabwe is
to have a ‘unified’ civil service or a disaggregated one (that is, one for
central government and one for provincial governments)? Section 199 of
the new Constitution, however, provides for a single civil service respon-
sible for the administration of Zimbabwe. It is unclear in terms of the Con-
stitution as to whether the workforce of provincial government and
metropolitan councils falls within the ‘unified’ civil service, but local gov-
ernments at least will maintain their status in respect of having their own
workforces. Nevertheless, if lower-level structures are staffed by poorly
trained and incompetent personnel, the chances are high that devolution
will fail.
Accountability incentives
Devolution requires that there be incentives to make institutions account-
able, given that tiers will each be responsible for providing different ser-
vices. An example is ensuring that local governments are responsible and
accountable to local communities in the provision of basic services such as
local roads, water and sanitation. A suitable mechanism should be in
place, either through a senior tier or voters reprimanding a tier if it fails to
deliver an appropriate mandate. One way of promoting accountability is
by endowing electorates with the power to recall failed governments. In
addition, transparent and participatory budgeting processes can forge a
critical link between communities and their governments.
Financial considerations
Distributing funding resources to provincial and local governments is im-
perative. Shifting the tax base to provincial and local governments can en-
able devolved governments to perform their functions adequately. Further-
more, intergovernmental transfers from central to local governments play
an important role in ensuring that devolved systems work – the share of
such transfers in the total revenue of local governments is quite large in






Philippines (70-80%), and Vietnam (50%).64 In short, devolution requires
proper intergovernmental transfers or a shared taxation mechanism to
match the devolution of functions with finances.
Collaboration
Devolution creates distinct levels of competence and power, and while re-
ality demands that they collaborate with one another, the Constitution does
not offer assistance in this regard by providing explicitly for intergovern-
mental collaboration: this collaboration needs, then, to be actively promot-
ed. Sharing responsibilities across government tiers fosters competition
between them and invites citizens to compare their efforts, with better-per-
forming tiers receiving public support. However, if this is not well-man-
aged, it may lead to instability and antagonism.
Conclusion
Devolution is not a magic wand for solving each and every problem that
confronts Zimbabwe; it is, instead, a promising starting-point for rebuild-
ing a ‘collapsed’ state. If not properly planned and executed, however, it
could end up creating more problems than it solves. To achieve the desired
outcomes, devolution has to be designed and implemented with care and
thoroughness. In simple terms, in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, devolution
currently is unfinished business.
While it has brought significant developmental gains to India, China
and Latin America, in the Zimbabwean case policy-makers should be on
the lookout for three setbacks it could incur: rising inequality, macroeco-
nomic instability and the risk of local capture. The gap between regions
may widen, and marginalisation according to ethnic origin can spark civil
unrest. If devolved governments lack fiscal discipline, central government
may be required to provide financial stimulus – bail-outs that could weak-
en its national macroeconomic policy. Local governments may also be
captured by local elites with political power and intent on pursuing their
self-interests to the detriment of ordinary citizens.
6.6
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64 World Bank East Asia Decentralises: Making Local Government Work (2005).
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The dangers of devolution show the importance of central government
to the success of any devolution strategy. Finding a formula of sharing re-
sponsibilities between central government and other tiers of government is
a crucial step in this regard; but set against this is the equally crucial con-
sideration that various political forces will view devolution as a threat to
their hold on power and seek to resist it at all costs.
This chapter has argued that devolution, by transferring greater deci-
sion-making powers to local and provincial governments close to commu-
nities, is a powerful means of enabling citizens to participate in gover-
nance and of advancing peace, democracy and development. To be sure, it
has its challenges, which range from its practical implementation to coor-
dination of various development programmes at different tiers of govern-
ment. A devolved structure with a two- rather than three-tier system domi-
nated the devolution debate in Zimbabwe, with a three-tier system eventu-
ally finding its way into the new Constitution. The devolution debate was
hotly contested, and citizens themselves were not clear on what form of
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Abstract
The Best Loser System (BLS) has been part of the electoral arrangements
of Mauritius since independence. It is a system which is regarded as ha-
ving been instrumental in holding different religious communities together
in peace; as such, the BLS is held as one of the underlying reasons for the
country’s social, economic and political development. However, in recent
years it has drawn criticism for allegedly entrenching ethnic divisions and
thereby hampering the attainment of solidarity in Mauritius.
This chapter examines the BLS from a historical perspective in order to
shed light on its raison d’être. Using the simple mathematical calculations
that are the basis of the system, the chapter explains how the BLS works
and goes on to assess it against the international legal framework for the
political representation of minorities. An analysis is undertaken of the
case law that interprets the BLS and its essential components; the BLS is
also discussed in relationship to other inclusive political systems. The
chapter concludes by assessing its effectiveness as a means of securing
political representation of minorities in Mauritius; in so doing, this sec-
tion responds to the criticism that has been directed at the BLS.
Introduction
The African continent is distinctive for its great diversity of ethnicity, reli-
gion, language and culture, a situation of heterogeneity diversity which the
unifying term ‘African’ itself can remove from view: as a reference to the
continent’s indigenous peoples, it embraces nearly 3,000 distinct ethnic
groups. This immense diversity should be cause for celebration, but in se-
veral states it has triggered bloodshed and war instead, with unhappy and
1
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dissatisfied sections of the population often being at the root of political,
social and economic unrest. For instance, it was reported that Coptic
Christians face persecution in post-Morsi Egypt.1 The Coptic Pope, Tawa-
dros II, said former President Morsi intended to ‘islamicize’ the political
system, side-lining the Copts and preventing free expression of religions
other than Islam.2
In the few years since the so-called Arab Spring, ethnic conflict has be-
come common in the African Arab world. Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Su-
dan have all known such conflicts, which are serious hurdles to state-buil-
ding in those countries. This chapter argues that, as Africa enters another
era of constitution-making after the Arab Spring’s challenge to autocratic
regimes, appropriately designed constitutions can serve as starting-points
for fostering participatory politics and securing adequate representation of
minorities in countries demographically dominated by one or more reli-
gious or ethnic groups.
The chapter examines a unique political arrangement in Mauritius
known as the Best Loser System (BLS) to determine the extent to which it
can provide a useful working model for African countries engaged in con-
stitution-making. On the one hand, the BLS is regarded as an underlying
reason for Mauritius’s success in maintaining a peaceful and tolerant mul-
tiracial society; on the other, some believe that, having served the political
system for 46 years, it has institutionalised racial division. The BLS, it is
said, violates the principle of Mauritianism, is undemocratic in nature, and
is in need of reform.
As such, the following questions emerge and will be considered: Is the
BLS in line with the international normative framework on political repre-
sentation of minorities? Is it inherently flawed, given that it is drawn up
along religious lines? Does it breed racism, or has it been instrumental in
binding Mauritians with diverse religious backgrounds?
The chapter begins with an explanation of the BLS and how it works in
practice. The focus shifts to the historical reasons for its incorporation in
the electoral system. What follows is a summary and discussion of major
1 Curtis M ‘Certain persecution awaits Coptic Christians in post-Morsi Egypt’ The
Balfour Post 9 July 2013 available at http://balfourpost.com/certain-persecution-aw
aits-coptic-christians-in-post-morsi-egypt/ (accessed 28 July 2013).
2 Hussein AR ‘Egypt’s new Coptic pope faces delicate balancing act’ The Guardian
4 November 2012 available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/04/egypt
-coptic-pope-balancing-act (accessed 28 July 2013).
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court decisions on the BLS; this system is also assessed in terms of exis-
ting norms regarding minority representation in politics and public affairs.
The chapter ends with a critical analysis of the BLS that appraises its de-
mocratic nature and the main objections that have been made to it.
The Best Loser System
An overview of the electoral system
The Republic of Mauritius has a population of about 1.3 million, with
1,255,020 inhabitants on the Island of Mauritius, 38,240 in the Island of
Rodrigues and 289 in Agalega.3 Mauritian society consists of people who
affiliate themselves to Hinduism, Islam, Christianity and Buddhism. The
diversely religious nature of Mauritian society is further apparent in the
scores of denominations that exist in turn within each of these faiths, di-
versity which explains why it was essential to design a political system
that would ensure political representation of all the various communities.
The electoral system of Mauritius is a distinctive one, as is evident in
the First Schedule to the Constitution. The country is divided into 20 con-
stituencies (with Rodrigues Island being the twenty-first constituency) in
which each voter votes for three candidates who get elected based on the
highest number of votes, an electoral arrangement known as the ‘three-
first-past-the-post’ system (TFPTP). The National Assembly consists of
70 members, 62 of whom are voted in directly through the TFPTP (20
constituencies each return three members, with the remaining two being
elected from Rodrigues Island) and eight through the BLS (discussed fur-
ther below).
Regarding the TFPTP system, it leads to relatively stable governance
since voters have the opportunity to hold accountable each elected mem-
ber from a specific constituency based on the way he or she has imple-
mented a manifesto.4 It therefore keeps a connection between the people
and parliament through the elected member, as the latter represents a parti-
cular geographical area. However, the drawbacks are significant. The pos-
2
2.1
3 Statistics Mauritius ‘Population and vital statistics, Republic of Mauritius 2012’
(2012) available at http://statsmauritius.gov.mu/English/StatsbySubj/Documents/ei1
018/Amended%20FINAL%20_ESI%202012.pdf (accessed 5 March 2014).
4 Woolf A Systems of Government: Democracy (2009) 25.
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sibility exists that representatives can be elected with only tiny amounts of
public support, seeing as the number of votes obtained does not matter –
what does is getting more votes than other candidates.5 In addition, the vo-
tes cast for losing candidates count for nothing even if there is a narrow
difference between the losing and winning candidate.
The BLS explained
While the TFPTP system can be observed in other democracies in the
world, the BLS can be said to be distinct to the Mauritian electoral system.
As mentioned, 62 of the country’s 70 members of parliament are directly
elected from 21 constituencies, while the other eight enter the National
Assembly through the BLS, which was designed to ensure political repre-
sentation of religious minorities. This section describes how it works.
Section 5(1) of the First Schedule to the Constitution states that ‘in or-
der to ensure a fair and adequate representation of each community, there
shall be 8 seats in the Assembly, additional to the 62 seats for members
representing constituencies’. This raises questions about how a ‘communi-
ty’ and how the Mauritian population is divided into communities. Ac-
cording to section 3(4) of the First Schedule:
the population of Mauritius shall be regarded as including a Hindu communi-
ty, a Muslim community and a Sino-Mauritian community; and every person
who does not appear, from his way of life, to belong to one or other of these
three communities shall be regarded as belonging to the General Population,
which shall itself be regarded as a fourth community.
What is equally important to know is how many people belong to each
category. This is where the 1972 census comes into play, according to
which 428,348 Mauritians belong to the Hindu, 261,439 to the Muslim,
and 24,374 to the Sino-Mauritian community; 137,173 people belong to
the General Population.
As indicated, 62 MPs are elected directly to the National Assembly. To
demonstrate how the BLS works, it is assumed that for any particular gen-
eral election these 62 members have been elected as follows: 40 Hindu
candidates, 15 Muslim candidates, six candidates elected as General Popu-
2.2
5 Electoral Reform Society ‘First Past the Post’ available at http://www.electoral-refo
rm.org.uk/?PageID=481 (accessed 30 July 2013).
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lation and one as Sino-Mauritian. The next step is to calculate the ratio of
representation, that is, how each category is represented numerically. This
is done by dividing the number of people in the category by the number of
elected candidates.





Ratio of representation (number of people in the cate-
gory divided by number of elected candidates for that
category)




15 261,439 divided by 15 = 17,429 people for each elec-
ted member




1 24,374 divided by 1 = 24,374 people for each elected
member
From the above calculation, it is clear that the General Population and
Sino-Mauritians are less represented than, for example, the Hindus. While
every 10,709 Hindus have one elected candidate to represent them, 24,374
Sino-Mauritians have only one representative in the National Assembly –
and could even have none if the candidate were not elected. However, the
BLS tries to remedy such unfair representation in a mathematical way, as
illustrated below.
The Electoral Commission has to determine which community/category
is the most poorly represented in parliament. The most poorly represented
communities/categories are designated the ‘best losers’. A best loser is an
unsuccessful candidate who has come fourth (in the TFPTP system) in a
constituency, but who has acquired the highest number of votes among
the ‘losers’, that is, the unsuccessful candidates.
As a first step, one best loser is allocated to each category. The second
step is to calculate which category has the largest number of people repre-
sented by one MP. This would then mean that the most poorly represented
category is entitled to be allocated another best loser.6 The first four seats
would be allocated to under-represented communities without regard to
6 See Lalit Against Communalism of the Best Loser System (2005) 47. The computa-
tion of the allocation of the best losers is somewhat complex and not clearly unders-
tood by Mauritians themselves. Lalit is a political party which has worked extensi-
vely in the field of electoral reforms and the BLS. It is also the only party that has
The Best Loser System in Mauritius
139
party affiliation and on a purely ‘communal’ (community/category/reli-
gious) basis. The second set of four would be designated on the basis of
party and community/category. The second set takes into account party af-
filiation so that it can still maintain the winning political party as winners
in case there is a change after the allocation of the first set of best-loser
seats. In simpler terms, the remaining four best losers would be best losers
of the political party that won the election through the TFPTP system; the-
se ‘losers’ are there to make sure the winning party stays a winner.
The entirety of the mathematical process is summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: Calculation for allocation of best loser seat
Logical steps Category
A
Category B Category C Category D
1972 census 428,348 261,439 137,173 24,374
Elected members after the
TFPTP system
40 15 6 1
Each member represents
(no. of people divided by
no. of members elected):
10,709 17,429 22,862 24,374
If one is added into each
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made a concerted effort to explain the BLS, and the author of this chapter has dra-
wn on its work for the explanation he provides here.
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The process goes on as above until all the eight best loser seats are allocat-
ed to make representation fair and equally distributed. The only difference
with the last four best-loser seats is that they are allocated to the best loser
of the winning political party to maintain them as winners. Table 3 shows
the constitution of the National Assembly and its ethnic representativeness
after the BLS was applied after the 2010 general elections.
Table 3: Ethnic representation in National Assembly after BLS applied to
2010 election results





The concepts of ‘community’ and ‘way of life’
The backbone of the BLS is the categorisation of the population along re-
ligious lines first and, then, if there is no religious affiliation, into the Ge-
neral Population. However, this was challenged in Narain v Mauritius,
heard before the United Nations Human Rights Committee.7 The complai-
nants made a number of submissions:
• Regulation 12, paragraph 5, of the National Assembly Elections Regu-
lations 1968, to the extent that it invalidates the nomination of a candi-
date to a general election who does not declare to which of the Hindu,
Muslim, Sino-Mauritian or General Population communities he alle-
gedly belongs, violates article 25 of the International Covenant on Ci-
vil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
• In imposing an obligation on a candidate in a general election to decla-
re the ‘community’ to which he or she supposedly belongs, paragraph
3(1) of the First Schedule to the Constitution, also violates article 25 of
the Covent.
• Regulation 12, paragraph 5, of the National Assembly Elections Regu-
lations 1968 and paragraph 3(1) of the First Schedule to the Constituti-
2.3
7 Devianand Narain et al v Mauritius (2012) Human Rights Committee Coomunica-
tion No. 1744/2007 CCPR/C/105/D/1744/2007.
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on, individually or cumulatively violate article 25, inasmuch as they
create objectively unreasonable and unjustifiable restrictions on the
right to stand as candidates and be elected at general elections to the
National Assembly.8
• The criterion of a person’s ‘way of life’, which is the basis of the four-
fold classification of the State party’s population, is not only vague and
undetermined but also unacceptable in a democratic political system. It
cannot form the basis of a sanction, and leads to curtailment of the
complainants’ rights under article 25.
In its ruling, the Committee referred to its jurisprudence in stating that any
condition which applies to the exercise of the rights protected by article 25
must have a reasonable and an objective basis.9 It also made reference to
its General Comments on article 25, in which it stated that persons who
are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded on unre-
asonable or discriminatory grounds by unreasonable or discriminatory
grounds such as education, residence or descent, or political affiliation.10
The Committee found Mauritius to be in violation of article 25, and the
State party was ordered to report to the Committee within 180 days on any
measure taken to remedy the situation.
The Committee’s views on this matter drew considerable criticism. For
instance, it has been argued that it failed to understand concepts such
as ‘way of life’ as explained by the Supreme Court of Mauritius and that
its decision was hence ill-informed. The Committee simply accepts the
complainants’ argument that they were ‘unable to categorise themselves in
the prescribed compartments, that is, as belonging either to the Hindu,
Muslim, Sino-Mauritian or General Population community’, whereas it is
clear that the General Population residual category was created precisely
to cover instances like these where the ‘way of life’ test does not apply.11
Moreover, the challenge to the BLS and the Committee’s finding raise
other, and deeper, questions. If the BLS – as discussed, a distinctive ele-
8 Devianand Narain et al v Mauritius (2012) para. 3.1.
9 Debreczeny v Netherlands (1995) Human Rights Committee Communication No.
500/1992.
10 General comment No. 25, para. 15.
11 ‘Mauritius will not be bullied by an unfair and biased UN Human Rights Commis-
sion’ Le Matinal 7 September 2012 available at http://www.lematinal.com/blogs/1
8398-Blog-BLS---Mauritius-will-not-be-bullied-by-an-unfair-and-biased-UN-Hu
man-Rights-Commission.html (accessed 27 August 2013).
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ment of the Mauritian electoral system and one involving a fairly elaborate
computational procedure – rests on a ‘four-fold classification’ of the popu-
lation – what are the historical reasons for its design? In particular, how
did it happen that ‘Hindu’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Sino-Mauritian’ and ‘General Po-
pulation’ came to form the categorical matrix for the application of the
BLS?
The historical background of the BLS
The Mauritian population consists mainly of Hindus, Muslims, Christians
and Buddhists, with the latter two being minority groups; the rationale be-
hind the BLS was primarily to give concrete reassurance to religious mi-
norities that they would be fairly represented in parliament and thus able
to participate actively in political life.
Before the country gained its independence, elections held under British
rule were based solely on the TFPTP system. Mauritians themselves did
not really participate in local politics except for playing merely symbolic
advisory roles. At the time, then, the under- or over-representation of this
or that religious group was not a serious issue as the locals contented
themselves with the fact that at least Mauritians were represented at all.
However, the need to have all religious communities represented politi-
cally was raised by Hilary Blood, Governor of Mauritius from 1949 to
1953.12 While he was of the view that a temporary measure to accommo-
date minorities was necessary in the interests of fair and equal representa-
tion, he warned of the danger of having such a measure installed for long
as it would show that the country was still divided along racial lines and
unable to find a basis for national unification. In 1956, at the London Con-
ference, the independence and electoral system of Mauritius was discus-
sed, and it was decided that an electoral system based on multipartyism ra-
ther than race and religion should be designed.13 But, given the populati-
on’s religious diversity, it was also decided that this system should provi-
de an opportunity for all sections of the populace to elect representatives
in a proportional way.
2.4
12 Blood H Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism in Mauritius (1982) 356-362.
13 Collendavelloo I Report of the Select Committee on the Introduction of a Measure
of Proportional Representation in Our Electoral System (2004) 7.
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The London Agreement of 1957 set up the first commission that was
responsible for the design of an electoral system in line with the above-
mentioned criteria. Under the chair of Sir Malcolm Trustman-Eve, it sub-
mitted a report in terms of which Mauritius was divided into 40 constitu-
encies, with each returning one elected candidate through the TFPTP sys-
tem. A second part of the report contained the BLS, which suggested
that ‘nominees’ be appointed by the governor on racial lines in order to
secure proper representation of all religious groups.
It was the first time communal representation was institutionalised in
the electoral map of Mauritius.14 For it to function, the Mauritian populati-
on was divided into Indo-Mauritian Hindus, General Population and Indo-
Mauritian Muslims. At the time, Sino-Mauritians had not yet naturalised
and were not considered part of the Mauritian population. The election of
40 members and a maximum of 12 nominated members based on the
Trustman-Eve Report were provided for by section 17 of the Mauritius
(Constitution) Order in Council of 1958. In 1964, the number of nominees
was increased to 15.15
A second meeting, the Lancaster House Conference, followed in 1965,
at which the Banwell Commission of 1966 was appointed to review the
Mauritian electoral system.16 Banwell’s task was to advise the British Go-
vernment on the most appropriate way of allocating seats in Mauritius
with regard to the main sections of the population being given a fair repre-
sentation of their interests.17 Banwell proposed that there be 20 constituen-
cies and each constituency elect three members based on the TFPTP sys-
tem: this proposal was enacted and the system still exists today.
However, his proposal of five constant correctives or ‘best losers’ to
provide for fair representation was opposed by the majority party, the
Mauritius Labour Party, headed by Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. Accor-
ding to this party, such a measure would be against the concept of propor-
tional representation. Due to major differences between political parties as
far as the BLS was concerned, John Stonehouse was nominated to act as
negotiator. The Stonehouse Report maintained the 20 three-member con-
stituencies for Mauritius and one two-member constituency for Rodrigues,
14 Mathur H Parliament in Mauritius (1991) 55.
15 Mauritius (Constitutional) Order in Council 1964, section 25.
16 Cawthra G Security and Democracy in Southern Africa (2001) 98.
17 Central Office of Information Great Britain Mauritius (1968) 9.
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an arrangement in terms of which 62 members were directly elected based
on the TFPTP system.
A legal overview of the BLS
Entrenched in the First Schedule of the Constitution, the BLS was desi-
gned for fair and adequate political representation of minorities. At the in-
sistence of Sir Abdool Razack Mohamed, leader of the Muslim Action
Committee, the BLS became an integral part of the Constitution. In short,
it involves the division of the population into religious groups and the al-
location of eight additional seats as best losers. Nevertheless, the division
of the population along religious lines requires closer scrutiny as it has be-
en the reason for criticisms levelled at the BLS; moreover, the population
census on which this division is based dates back to 1972 and has not been
revised.
The third and fifth paragraph of the First Schedule reads as follows:
Every candidate for election at any general election of members of the As-
sembly shall declare in such manner as may be prescribed which community
he belongs to and that community shall be stated in a published notice of his
nomination.
For the purposes of this Schedule, the population of Mauritius shall be regar-
ded as including a Hindu community, a Muslim community and a Sino-Mau-
ritian community; and every person who does not appear, from his way of
life, to belong to one or other of those 3 communities shall be regarded as be-
longing to the General Population, which shall itself be regarded as a fourth
community.
It is mandatory for candidates in the elections to state in the nomination
paper to which community (religious group) they belong, as this informa-
tion is essential for the calculation of best losers’ seats after the counting
process. If the community is not stated, the returning officer can treat the
nomination paper as invalid.18
The interpretation of the word ‘community’, and the way some candi-
dates have used the provision, have required the intervention of the Supre-
me Court of Mauritius. In the case of Carrimkhan v Tin How Lew Chin &
Orsi,19 the respondents did not belong to the communities they stated in
2.5
18 Paragraph 11 of the National Assembly Elections Regulations 1968.
19 Parvez Carrimkhan v Tin How Lew Chin & Ors SCJ 264 (2000).
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their nomination papers. Being ardent opponents of the BLS, which they
viewed as instigating racism, five of the respondents, who were candidates
of the Tamil Council, declared in court that they are atheists and therefore
do not belong to the Hindu, Muslim or Sino-Mauritian communities but to
the General Population. However, historically Tamils have been conside-
red part of the Hindu community. The remaining respondents, again to
show their opposition to the BLS, decided upon their communities by dra-
wing lots. In summary, the respondents believed that qualified candidates
could not have their nomination papers rendered invalid based on their
community. The applicant was claiming that his right to stand as a candi-
date had been violated by the respondents wrongly declaring their commu-
nities and that this would affect the allocation of the best loser seats.
The judge stated that the respondents’ nomination papers could not be
rendered invalid per se, given that their communities had been declared.
However, the question was whether they really belonged to the commu-
nities they pretended to. The judge argued that it would be incorrect to in-
terpret ‘community’ in the First Schedule as community according to
one’s religion. This is because it is possible that a Sino-Mauritian can be
Buddhist or Christian. According to the judge, it was perfectly constitutio-
nal for some of the respondents to declare themselves as belonging to the
General Population, but he left the BLS as a matter to be addressed by par-
liamentary electoral and constitutional reform. This judgment was con-
sidered proof that the BLS is an aspect of the electoral system on which
even the Supreme Court is not ready to pronounce; the case was also re-
garded as a missed opportunity for the Court to initiate reformist debate on
racism and the BLS.
In Narain & Ors v Electoral Supervisory Commissioner & Ors,20 the
matter again related to the declaration of community in the nomination pa-
per. The applicants had chosen not to fill in the required community in the
form, and when their nomination was declared invalid, they challenged
this in Court. The main contention was about whether a provision enacted
by parliament rendering a nomination invalid in the case of failure to de-
clare community was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. The Supre-
me Court ruled in favour of the applicant, stating that forcing a candidate
to declare his or her community curtailed the constitutional right to stand
as a candidate at general elections, but the decision was reversed by the
20 Narrain & Ors v Electoral Supervisory Commissioner & Ors SCJ 159 (2005).
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full bench of the Supreme Court, which maintained that declaration of
community in a nomination paper was compulsory under the First Schedu-
le to the Constitution.21
The 1972 census on which the division of the population along commu-
nity lines is based has also been the subject of criticism and contention. In
Ex Parte Electoral Supervisory Commissioner and Electoral Commission
& Ors,22 the issue was whether the allocation of best-loser seats should be
based on a census that harks back to 1972. The Court held that the exerci-
se could be conducted only on the basis of the latest census, as can be read
from paragraph 5(8) of the First Schedule, saying it was questionable that
representation would be fair and adequate if the allocation of best-loser
seats were founded on statistics reflecting the reality of 20 years ago rather
than the present.23 However, the wording ‘latest census’ had been amen-
ded by parliament to ‘the results of the published 1972 official census’,
because from 1982 censuses no longer asked people to indicate to which
community they belonged, with the result that only the 1972 census could
provide the required information.
In an effort to respect the separation of powers, the Supreme Court in
this case yet again invited parliament to look into the matter, as it did
when the ‘archaic’ nature of the 1972 census was highlighted once more
in Joomun v The Government of Mauritius & Anor.24 Here, too, the Court
opted to apply the principle of separation of powers in a rigid way and left
any possible reform in the hands of the executive.
From the Supreme Court rulings, it can be observed that a number of
cases were decided on technicalities relating to the interpretation of ‘way
of life’, the definition of ‘community’ and the use of the 1972 Census. The
general perception is that while judges of the Supreme Court may not be
in favour of the BLS, they have not taken a proper stand because they are
either daunted by the prospect of coming out against it or especially heed-
ful of the constitutional separation of powers.
21 The Electoral Supervisory Commission v The Honourable Attorney General SCJ
252 (2005).
22 Ex Parte Electoral Supervisory Commissioner and Electoral Commission & Ors
MR 166 (1991).
23 Leclezio H ‘People and Politics’ in Macmillan A (ed) Mauritius Illustrated (1914)
139–141.
24 Joomun v The Government of Mauritius & Anor SCJ 234 (2000).
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The BLS assessed against the international legal framework
Given that there are political parties completely opposed to the BLS, the
population in general may not necessarily understand its importance in
protecting the representation of minorities. As discussed later, the prin-
ciple of Mauritianism is often accorded a higher status than personal reli-
gious belonging, but such nationalistic passion can be endorsed only if
there is a guarantee that minorities are adequately represented.
With technical and practical aspects of the BLS having been examined
and the system as a whole having been placed in historical context, this
section assesses it in the light of the international legal framework on the
political representation of minorities, a framework provided by the ICCPR
as well as other UN legal instruments.
Participation of minorities in public life
To highlight the importance of the participation of minorities in public
life, it is first worth considering the definition of a minority. Article 1 of
the United Nations Minorities Declaration makes reference to minorities
as groups based on national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic
identity, and imposes an obligation on states to protect their existence. It is
notable that there is no globally agreed definition of a minority. This is ex-
plained by the fact that minorities live in different countries and under dif-
ferent conditions, such that categorising them may not be easy or even ap-
propriate. According to Francesco Capotorti,25 a minority would be
[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-
dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – possess
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of
the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.26
3
3.1
25 Former Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention
of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
26 See ‘Minorities’ rights under international law’ United Nations Human Rights
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationallaw.as
px (accessed 26 August 2013).
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Capotorti’s definition implies that a minority is not only a numerical mi-
nority but one with ‘a non-dominant position’. The latter, then, is an es-
sential criteria for a group to qualify as a minority, given that a numerical
minority could indeed be dominant, as in the case of apartheid South Afri-
ca. Furthermore, as the definition suggests, categorisation as a minority al-
so depends on subjective criteria, such as whether the particular group
wants to preserve its distinctness or whether an individual wants to be part
of that group.
As a distinct section of the population, minorities have particular con-
cerns and needs, be they economic, social or political. For these to be ta-
ken into account, it is essential that minorities have access to means of po-
litical participation that give them the opportunity to influence the course
of a society’s general development.27 A number of mechanisms have been
adopted across the world to realise minority political representation, such
as federalism, proportional electoral systems, territorial autonomy or gua-
ranteed minority seats in parliaments.28 The goal of ensuring political par-
ticipation by minorities is to guarantee that they can enjoy similar treat-
ment as the majority. They need to be consulted when laws are enacted,
their interests must be taken into consideration when decisions are made
by the government, and, most importantly, they need to be given the pro-
per platform for effective political representation. International law has
developed a framework for such representation (summarised below).
In Mauritius, the BLS exists to cater for religious and non-religious mi-
norities. Non-religious minorities would include citizens who do not affi-
liate themselves to any religion but who would be regarded as a minority
under the General Population class. The BLS allows them to be represen-
ted in the National Assembly and they are therefore able to participate in
public life through representatives who voice their needs and concerns.
27 Crowley J ‘The political participation of ethnic minorities’ (2001) 22 International
Political Science Review 99-121.
28 Baubőck R Multinational Federalism: Territorial or Cultural Autonomy (2001)
Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Re-
lations available at http://muep.mah.se/bitstream/handle/2043/690/Workingpa-
per201.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 28 July 2013).
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Participation of minorities under the UN rights system
Article 25 of the ICCPR provides the right for everyone to be involved in
the public affairs of a state, directly or through freely chosen representati-
ves. This provision is, in fact, inspired by article 21 of the Universal De-
claration on Human Rights, which provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right
to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives’.
The Human Rights Committee has interpreted the conduct of public life
as the exercise of power in the legislative, executive and administrative
branches.29 It adds that once a mode of participation in public affairs is es-
tablished, no distinction can be made between citizens based on grounds
such as colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status, and that no unreasonable
restrictions should be imposed. This implies that, via the BLS, minorities
in Mauritius have acquired political representation and been provided fur-
ther protection against discrimination on the grounds mentioned above.
Their voice can be heard in the National Assembly and they can participa-
te actively in public life; stated conversely, based on the pattern of voting
in Mauritius and the FPTP system, it is evident that without the BLS the
human right provided for by article 25 of the ICCPR would have been dif-
ficult to fulfil.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Linguistic or Religious Minorities (UNDM) states
that ‘persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effec-
tively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life’.30 The same
Declaration provides for the right to ‘participate effectively in decisions
on the national, and where appropriate, regional level concerning the mi-
nority to which they belong or the regions in which they live’.31 It is im-
portant to highlight the use of the word ‘effectively’ to qualify the partici-
pation, because it implies an understanding that the mere existence of poli-
tical structures is not good enough: what is crucial is whether such struc-
tures can be used ‘effectively’ by minorities and whether the latter have a
3.2
29 General Comment No. 25 ‘The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights






significant, and not merely symbolic, role when it comes to participation
in public affairs.
In addition to the provisions of the ICCPR and UNDM, article 5 of the
International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD) prohibits racial discrimination and guarantees equality in the en-
joyment of political rights. Furthermore, in terms of article 7 of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), women are guaranteed equal rights to men to political partici-
pation, a guarantee that imposes an obligation on states to take all appro-
priate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in political and
public life.
The importance of minority participation in public affairs cannot be em-
phasised enough. Given the small size of Mauritius, its high level of litera-
cy, the keen interest of its people in politics and the relatively high number
of political parties there, the BLS guarantees direct forms of participation
in public life, such as standing as a candidate for election. It may not al-
ways be easy for minorities to participate actively in elections, as can be
seen in Antonina Ignatane v Latvia32 in which the complainant was prohi-
bited from standing as a candidate in a local election in Latvia on the
grounds that she was not competent in the Latvian language even though
she had passed a certified test on the highest level of proficiency in that
language. The Human Rights Committee upheld article 25, stating that mi-
norities cannot be excluded (in this case, on the basis on language) from
the public affairs of a state by preventing them from standing as candida-
tes for elections.
In this regard, the BLS guarantees not only that a member of a minority
group can stand for election, but that, even if he or she were unsuccessful
in the FPTP system, he or she has a chance of acquiring a seat as a minori-
ty representative in the National Assembly.
Participation of minorities under the African rights system
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) provides,
in article 13, for the right of every citizen to participate freely in the go-
3.3
32 Antonina Ignatane v Latvia (2005) Human Rights Committee Communication No.
884/1999, CCPR/C/72/D/884/1999.
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vernment of his or her country directly or through freely chosen represen-
tatives. This is reinforced by article 20 on the right to self-determination,
which provides for the right of peoples (minorities included) freely to de-
termine their political status.
An example of how article 13 has been interpreted is found in the case
of Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, where the African Commission
on Human and People’s Rights held that the phrase ‘in accordance with
the law’ should not allow states to create laws that would prevent an indi-
vidual from freely exercising his or her right as guaranteed under article
13; instead, the ACHPR’s provisions should be interpreted holistically,
with all of its clauses reinforcing each other.33 In addition, the Commissi-
on emphasised that legal limitations to article 13(1) can be allowed only if
they conform to internationally acceptable norms and standards.34 In this
way, the BLS helps Mauritius to fulfil its obligation under the ACHPR
with respect to the political rights of minorities.
International examples of inclusive political systems
Minority groups are present in almost all countries of the world, albeit to
varying degrees. Minority representation can present real challenges as it
is not easy to identify clearly who should count as a minority in a given
country. Certain countries, such as Belgium and France, refuse to make
distinctions among citizens and, for instance, do not even collect data
about ethnicity but only citizenship.35 The problem is accentuated by the
fact that there is no internationally-agreed definition of ‘minorities’.
However, some countries have tried to engineer their political systems in
such a way that minorities are either politically represented or, at any rate,
accommodated. Explicit recognition of minorities is provided by way of
communal rolls, reserved seats for minorities, ethnically mixed or manda-
ted candidate lists, and best-loser seats.
Communal rolls provide an entire system of parliamentary representati-
on based on communal considerations. In other words, each defined mino-
3.4
33 Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia reference (2001) AHRLR 84 (ACHPR
2001).
34 Purohit v The Gambia reference (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003).
35 Feskens R ‘Collecting data among ethnic minorities in an international perspec-
tive’ available at http://fmx.sagepub.com (accessed 28 August 2013).
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rity has its own electoral roll and minorities can elect members to repre-
sent them in the parliament. Fiji and New Zealand are examples where
communal rolls are applied in the electoral system. Fiji, for instance, al-
lows its minority groups (indigenous, Indian, European and Chinese) to
elect members to parliament based on this system.36 In New Zealand,
Maori candidates can choose to be on either national electoral rolls or a
specific Maori roll.37
Reserved seats are considered the most effective system when it comes
to political representation of minorities. Here, reserved seats are allocated
to members of the legislature who are elected by voters from minority
groups.38 The system has been adopted by countries as diverse as India (in
respect of scheduled tribes and castes), Pakistan (non-Muslim minorities),
Colombia (black communities), Slovenia (Hungarians and Italians) and
Taiwan (aboriginal community).
The UK has modified this system by using representation of regions; in
other words, since most minority groups tend to be from Scotland or Wa-
les, the electoral rolls for those regions cater for that diversity.39
Other countries, such as Lebanon, make use of an ethnically mixed list
to ensure balanced ethnic representation.40 The list consists of candidates
from all ethnic groups: hence, the voters can ensure their political repre-
sentation.
Finally, the Best Loser System is similarly designed for political repre-
sentation of minorities. However, it is important to note that in some coun-
tries where it is used, such as Singapore and Ecuador, the system is not
based on ethnic or racial criteria.
36 Newton W ‘Fijians, Indians and independence’ (1970) 42 The Australian Quarter-
ly 33.
37 Stern P & Druckman D International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War
(2000) ch 14.
38 Reilly B & Reynolds A Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies (1999)
41.
39 Saggar S & Geddes A ‘Negative and positive racialization’ (2000) 26 Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies 28.
40 Ekmekji A Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon (2012) 16.
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A critical analysis of the BLS
This section analyses the drawbacks and merits of the BLS in order to arri-
ve at a balanced opinion as to whether it has helped Mauritius maintain a
peaceful and tolerant society or whether it breeds racial sentiments. While
it is commonly alleged that politicians have exploited the system to suit
their needs (for example by increasing the number of minorities in their
parties to improve their chances of being allocated seats under the BLS
and hence to strengthen their hold on power in parliament), this allegation
will not form the basis of the discussion here. The aim instead is to look at
the system itself, consider its inherent defects or advantages, and assess
whether it has assisted Mauritius in its process of nation-building.
The most frequent criticism of the BLS is that it is ‘undemocratic’ and
inimical to ‘Mauritianism’. For instance, Raj Mathur, a famous political
scientist in Mauritius, described it as ‘undemocratic and … incompatible
with the spirit and the letter of the Constitution, which stipulates that Mau-
ritius shall be a sovereign and democratic state’.41 Rama Sithanen, a for-
mer Minister of Finance and Vice Prime Minister of Mauritius, contended
that it ‘ethnicizes’ the electoral system, classifies candidates and electors,
legitimises communalism and inhibits nation-building in contradiction of
the new dawn hailed by so many.42
The two key phrases are ‘undemocratic’ and ‘against Mauritianism’.
Among the most important components of democracy are inclusivity and
the possibility of all eligible citizens to participate in government.43 This
is why it was important to assess the BLS using the international normati-
ve framework on political representation of minorities. It is clear that the
BLS allows minorities to be represented in parliament and actively take
part in politics. As such, it is highly questionable to call the BLS undemo-
cratic for seeking to include minorities and give them more effective rep-
resentation.
In addition, the Mauritian political system has been applauded by the
outside world for the way in which minorities have been taken into ac-
count. According to the World Development Report, the country’s govern-
ments have generally chosen broad-based growth and distributive policies
4
41 Mathur R Parliament in Mauritius (1991).
42 Sithanen R ‘The Best Loser System: Can the new Prime Minister rise to the na-
tional unity challenge?’ L’express 6 October 2003.
43 Young I Inclusion and Democracy (2002) 21.
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over ethnic preferences. In other words, the BLS has allowed minorities to
be fairly represented and ensured that economic and developmental poli-
cies apply to all and do not exclude minorities.
Moreover, several globally accepted indicators testify to the effect that
Mauritius is peaceful and politically and economically stable. For instan-
ce, the Africa Global Peace Index ranks it first among African countries,
while the Mo Ibrahim Index has it in first place as the least corrupt coun-
try in Africa. Mauritius is also a frontrunner in the Ibrahim Index of Afri-
can Governance as well in the Rule of Law Index of the World
Governance Indicators (WGI) project. These achievements have often be-
en credited to the fact that the country has been able to accommodate eth-
nic differences within a well-designed parliamentary political system.44
All governments of Mauritius have had to form multi-ethnic coalitions to
assume and maintain power,45 and political parties have developed a
spoils system that ensures minorities have an established stake in public
affairs.46
It is essential to point out that the BLS opposes the principle of ‘Mauri-
tianism’, a locally coined term that can be paraphrased as ‘feeling Mauriti-
an first and then Hindu, Muslim or Christian second’. What matters most
in a multi-racial society are tolerance and the will to learn and respect dif-
ferences, which sociologists refer to as managed intimacy – the will to mi-
nimise open conflicts and undue stress.47 Mauritius is often used as an
example to illustrate how the most dominant religions of the world have
co-existed peacefully. Differences in culture, tradition and religious prac-
tices are celebrated, rather than erased for the purpose of nation-building.
The country has enjoyed positive peace for a long time. Not only has it
been able to avoid violence but it has also managed to strengthen its insti-
tutions.
This raises the question: Does the BLS institutionalise racism in Mauri-
tius? Institutional racism describes any system of inequality based on
44 See National Bureau of Economic Research ‘Mauritius: African success story’
available at http://www.nber.org/digest/may11/w16569.html (accessed 12 March
2014).
45 World Bank Report (1997) 113.
46 Mukonoweshro E ‘Containing political Instability in a poly-ethnic society: The
case of Mauritius’ (1991) 14 Ethnic and Racial Studies 199-224.
47 Bunwaree S ‘Economics, conflicts and interculturality in a small island state: The
case of Mauritius’ (2002) 9 Polis/R.C.S.P.
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race,48 and it occurs when access to goods, services and opportunities are
limited and regulated negatively on this basis.49
The BLS was introduced in the electoral system to allow political repre-
sentation of minorities: it is not a system that breeds institutionalised ra-
cism. On the contrary, it has encouraged political parties to be multi-ethnic
in nature and prevented their polarisation on religious or racial grounds. It
has created the possibility for minorities to be represented in parliament
and influence debates on matters that touch their affairs and way of life
directly. Minorities and their representatives in parliament have been able
to guide law-makers on how to balance their competing demands through
legislation. For instance, the Marathi Speaking Union Act of 2008 regula-
tes and promotes the Marathi language, culture and tradition.50 The draf-
ting process and substantive components of such a piece of legislation
would have been highly ineffective and insensitive to the Marathi minority
if the latter were not adequately represented in parliament.
Conclusion
The BLS was introduced in the Mauritian electoral system as a temporary
measure up to the point where, with the good will of political parties, a
new system which is not based on religion could be devised to ensure the
political representation and participation of minorities. Four and a half de-
cades after independence, the BLS is still very much present in Mauritius
and expected to remain so for a long time. Undeniably, the system may
have defects. However, at the end of the day, it serves one purpose – rep-
resentation of minorities in parliament. They have an opportunity through
the BLS to exercise their right to political representation and participation.
Mike Moore, former Prime Minister of New Zealand assessed the BLS
in the following terms:
How to handle minorities is a difficult path to navigate in many societies
which have deep differences in religion, race, language and customs. Some
5
48 McCormack D ‘Stokely Carmichael and Pan-Africanism: Back to Black Power’
(1973) 35 The Journal of Politics 386-409.
49 Coretta P ‘Institutional racism and ethnic inequalities’ (2011) 40 Journal of Social
Policy 173-192.
50 Mauritius also has the Tamil Speaking Union Act, the Telegu Speaking Union
Act, the Urdu Speaking Union Act and the Chinese Speaking Union Act.
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seek solutions to ensure a majority does not overwhelm minorities by embrac-
ing federal systems. Others seek proportional representation to ensure all opi-
nions sit in Parliaments but proportional representation sometimes means can-
didates only mobilise their own communities, creating polarisation. It’s not
easy. Clever little Mauritius has a unique way of ensuring that their large
Muslim, Hindu and smaller Christian communities are represented in their
parliament. It’s called the ‘best loser’ system, not the most snappy or dignifi-
ed title but it means that individuals from different communities must seek
support from across all groups. A constitutional quota demands a certain
number of members of Parliament from each community. 51
Many African countries that are either looking to remodel their constituti-
ons or entering a new era after a long period of dictatorship can draw in-
spiration from the BLS. Whether after 45 years of it their citizens would
feel that it institutionalises racism or not is an altogether different story.
Nevertheless, even if they did, it would be good news, a sign that they feel
patriotic and wish to belong more so to a country as a whole than a religi-
on or race. This is currently the feeling in Mauritius, but what tends to be
overlooked is that such a feeling has been made possible in the first place
largely by the BLS and the way it has enabled minorities to feel part of the
country and its public life.
The BLS has been a success in Mauritius, and while it is true there can-
not be an ideal model capable of fitting each and country given their diffe-
ring contexts, it is also possible that certain of its aspects, as discussed in
this chapter, could usefully inform constitution-building in African socie-
ties that are on the road to political democratisation.
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Abstract
The adoption of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, radically altered the ru-
les of the game for the country's political class and public institutions.
These actors continue to grapple with the practical challenges of constitu-
tional reform and struggle to internalise the values upon which that re-
form was based. To mitigate resistance to the implementation process, the
Constitution strengthened key institutions and put in place a number of
procedural safeguards. Of these, the judiciary – as the guardian of the law
– is arguably the most important. Mandated to uphold the purpose and
principles of the Constitution, it is relishing its newfound autonomy and is
better positioned to deliver than ever before.
Against this backdrop, the chapter investigates the extent to which the
judiciary’s independence has enabled it to deliver on its mandate in an en-
vironment in transition. It is argued that the contemporary judiciary is a
more accountable and transparent institution than its politicised and de-
funct predecessor. This can be attributed, first, to structural changes that
have insulated the courts from undue external interference and enhanced
their operational efficiency, and, secondly, to the progressive leadership
of some senior judicial officers. The chapter also examines whether the ju-
diciary has the capacity to preserve these gains in the long term. In this
regard, it is observed that succession politics and internal tensions within
the courts are exposing areas of vulnerability which the political class ex-
ploits in order to undermine judicial authority.
‘The political elite may be fragmented, the transition may be fragile, but it is
such moments that provide an opportunity for great institutions and leadership
to emerge and stabilize societies. The Judiciary is conscious of its historical
mission in making Kenya a strong constitutional democracy.’ – Chief Justice
Hon. Willy Mutunga, 3 December 2012, Supreme Court of Kenya
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Introduction
The judiciary of Kenya plays a central role in upholding the purpose and
principles of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. This function is particularly
important in the current transition period, one in which public institutions
grapple with implementing the practical and normative changes brought
about by the Constitution and, in many instances, resist those change alto-
gether. It is against this backdrop that the present chapter investigates the
extent to which the judiciary’s newfound independence has enabled it to
deliver on its mandate in a context of uncertainty.
Section 1 contextualises the discussion by providing historical and con-
temporary insight into the strained relationship between the judiciary and
the political class.1 Section 2 assesses the specific structural changes that
have accorded the judiciary greater independence under the new constitu-
tional dispensation. Section 3 analyses how this independence has been le-
veraged by the institution’s leadership to reduce outside interference in the
affairs of the courts. Section 4 critically analyses the judiciary’s capacity
to preserve in the long term those gains it has made.
Background
Various bodies are mandated to facilitate and oversee the implementation
process. These include the Ministry of Justice National Cohesion and Con-
stitutional Affairs (MoJNCCA),2 Kenya Law Reform Commission (KL-
RC),3 Ministries, Parliament, Office of the Attorney General (AG), Com-
1
2
1 In this chapter ‘the political class’ or ‘political elite’ refers to arms of government
other than the judiciary, that is, the legislature and executive.
2 The MoJNCCA is mandated to ‘co-ordinate and facilitate the realization of Demo-
cratic Governance through protection and enjoyment of fundamental rights and
freedoms, creation of a Constitutional Order, promotion of Ethics and Integrity and
nurturing a cohesive society’. Presidential Circular No. 1/2008 dated 30th May
2008.
3 ‘The KLRC is mandated to keep under review all the law and recommend its re-
form to ensure— (i) that the law conforms to the letter and spirit of the Constituti-
on; (ii) that the law systematically develops in compliance with the values and prin-
ciples enshrined in the Constitution; (iii) that the law is, among others, consistent,
harmonized, just, simple, accessible, modern and cost-effective in application; (iv)
the respect for and observance of treaty obligations in relation to international in-
struments that constitute part of the law of Kenya by virtue of Article 2(5) and (6)
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mission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC)4 and Parliamen-
tary Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee (CIOC).
Collectively, these institutions contribute to the implementation process
in two ways: first, by enacting and reviewing the necessary raft of legisla-
tion and policies required to implement the Constitution, and, secondly,
restructuring and creating institutions, structures and systems in alignment
with the Constitution. The judiciary, meanwhile, assigns normative mea-
ning to the Constitution.5 If implementation is viewed as a time-bound, li-
near process, each of the aforementioned actors play an important role at
different stages of that process. The buck stops at the judiciary, which is
why in this chapter it is held as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the assumption that processes of implementation require
safeguarding implies the existence of one or multiple threats to constitu-
tional implementation. These threats are defined as political inte-
rests ‘which seek to retain the status quo, reverse the gains, or manipulate
the content, direction and pace of reform or implementation’.6
Historical context
The Repealed Constitution of Kenya, 1963 created a weak judiciary sus-
ceptible to political interference and subjugation by the executive. The co-
lonial state’s autocratic systems shaped the judiciary to such an extent that
they remained intact even in the post-colonial era. Fundamentally, colonial
systems of rule were based on concentrating power in the leading classes.
Following independence in 1963, these powers were transferred to the in-
2.1
of the Constitution; (v) keep the public informed of review or proposed reviews of
any laws; and (vi) keep an updated date of all laws passed and reviewed by Parlia-
ment.’ Section 6 of The Kenya Law Reform Commission Act, No.19 of 2013.
4 The (CIC) is established under section 5(6) of the Sixth Schedule of the Constituti-
on of Kenya, 2010, and The Commission for the Implementation of the Constituti-
on Act, No. 9 of 2010. Section 4(a) of the latter mandates the Commission to’moni-
tor, facilitate and oversee the development of legislation and administrative proce-
dures required to implement this Constitution’.
5 Section 159(e) of The Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
6 Sihanya B ‘Constitutional implementation in Kenya, 2010 – 2015: Challenges and
prospects, 2 December 2012’ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Kenya, Occasional Paper No.
5.
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digenous Kenyan elite, who continued on the course of centralising state
power.
Under the leadership of Kenya’s first president, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta of
the Kenya African National Union (KANU), a series of constitutional
amendments was passed to centralise the authority of key public instituti-
ons within the Office of the Executive. One extreme instance saw the Of-
fice of the Prime Minister abolished in 1964 and all its powers absorbed
by the executive. In 1986 Kenyatta’s party successor, President Daniel
Arap Moi, issued an Amendment Bill aimed at removing security of tenu-
re for the Attorney General and Controller and Auditor General; in a KA-
NU-dominated Parliament, the bill was passed.7 This action set a prece-
dent for disregarding the ‘importance of tenure for officials that uphold the
rule of law’.8 The impact of the amendment was felt two years later when
the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill of 1988 removed security of tenure
for judges in the High Court and Court of Appeal.9 Under intense interna-
tional pressure, President Moi restored judicial tenure in 1990, but the da-
mage had been done, given that ‘once tenure is abolished there is no gua-
rantee that it will not happen again’.10 Although the space for democracy
expanded somewhat when Moi’s successor, President Mwai Kibaki, came
into power in 2002, judicial independence was habitually undermined. It is
this process – one in which institutions have been politicised through con-
stitutional dismantling – that largely explains why constitutional reform
has a central place in Kenya’s struggle for democracy.
A constitutional moment
In December 2007 Kenyans took to the polls in a presidential election.
Claims of electoral malpractice emerged as results were announced put-
ting the incumbent Kibaki, of the Party of National Unity (PNU), ahead of
the opposition heavyweight, Raila Odinga, leader of the Orange Democra-
2.2
7 Ogot BA ‘The politics of populism’ in Ogot BA and Ochieng WR (eds) Decolo-
nization & Independence in Kenya 1940-93 (1995) 211.
8 Mutua M ‘Justice under siege: The rule of law and judicial subservience in Kenya’
(2001) 23(1) Human Rights Quarterly 100.
9 Ogot BA ‘The politics of populism’ in Ogot BA and Ochieng WR (eds) Decolo-
nization & Independence in Kenya 1940-93 (1995) 211.
10 Mutua M ‘Justice under siege: The rule of law and judicial subservience in Kenya’
(2001) 23(1) Human Rights Quarterly 101.
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tic Movement (ODM).11 Although the opposition protested that the resul-
tant irregularities had not been thoroughly investigated, Kibaki was decla-
red winner, with 4,584,721 votes to Odinga’s 4,352,993.12 On the same
day, he was hurriedly sworn in for a second term. The eruption of violence
that followed was instantaneous and characterised by ethnic divisions.13
Throughout the crisis, Odinga publicly contested the presidential re-
sults. However, at no point did he consider seeking a fresh election by
filing a petition in court, because the judiciary was perceived as partisan.
This was due largely to the ethnic bias Kibaki had shown in the choice of
High Court and Appellate judges he appointed shortly before the elections,
appointments which were widely interpreted as ‘a strategy to counter the
possibility of a petition to contest the results’.14 The political impasse be-
tween PNU and ODM was resolved on 28 February 2008 after a tense pro-
cess of mediation led by the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent Afri-
can Personalities and creation of a Grand Coalition government. In sum,
the crisis claimed 1,133 lives and seriously injured 3,651 people.15
Comprehensive democratic reforms were seen as critical to achieving
long-term stability, with the result that the political elite fast-tracked re-
forms16 by putting in place a legal framework to govern the review pro-
cess.17 The framework was a revolutionary first for Kenya in that it ent-
renched the process of review in the Constitution in order to safeguard it
from executive interference. Moreover, it established the Committee of
Experts on Constitutional Review (CoE), an independent body charged
with developing a harmonised draft Constitution for Kenyans to consider
11 Cheeseman N ‘The Kenyan elections of 2007: An introduction’ (2008) 2(2) Jour-
nal of Eastern African Studies 176.
12 Cheeseman N ‘The Kenyan elections of 2007: An introduction’ (2008) 2(2) Jour-
nal of Eastern African Studies 176.
13 Branch D & Cheeseman N ‘Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Afri-
ca: Lessons from Kenya’ (2008) 108(430) African Affairs 2.
14 Cussac A ‘Institutional shortfalls and a political crisis’ (2008) The General Elec-
tions in Kenya, 2007 Special Issue: Les Cahiers d’Afrique de I’Est No. 38 273-4.
15 Commission of Enquiry into Post-Election Violence Report of the Commission of
Enquiry into Post-Election Violence (15 October 2008) (‘Waki Report’) available
at www.dialoguekenya.org (accessed 30 August 2013) 245-6.
16 Elite consensus was achieved through a shared sense of vulnerability to the risk
that Kenya would enter a state of permanent emergency; this provided sufficient
levels of group unanimity for enacting the revolutionary legal framework.
17 See The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, No. 10 of 2008 and The Consti-
tution of Kenya Review Act, No. 92 of 2008.
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through a referendum.18 The document provided for the protection of Ke-
nyan’s human, economic and social rights through a Bill of Rights; intro-
duced a devolved system of government; and established checks and ba-
lances to executive authority. Informed by a history of institutional corrup-
tion, partisan affiliations and failed reform efforts, the drafters put in place
a legal framework conducive to the realisation of an independent, non–
partisan, transparent and fair judiciary. On 4 August 2010, Kenyans went
to the polls once again, with an overwhelming 67 percent19 of them voting
in favour of the then draft Constitution.
The drafters of the Constitution accurately foresaw that the political
class could not be trusted with the responsibility of shepherding the imple-
mentation process. Indeed, the Coalition was a frail one, borne from a
need to bring an end to the election crisis. Once stability had been restored
and the terms of the constitution review process agreed to, politicking re-
commenced with replenished zeal. Post-promulgation, coalition members
began campaigning ahead of the first general election under the new con-
stitutional dispensation, which was expected to take place in 2012. The
stakes were higher than ever before in contemporary Kenya as both the
opposition and incumbent were equal players in government and the rules
of the game had been radically altered. The drafters attempted to avert the
risk of a politicised implementation process by embedding statutory dead-
lines into the Constitution to ensure that legislation would be enacted to
implement the Constitution fully within a period of five years. Judicial re-
forms were prioritised, and most of the supporting legislation required to
effect them had to be passed within the first year. This was considered ne-
cessary if the judiciary was to assume at the outset its guardianship role
over constitutional implementation.
The judiciary under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010
‘In the exercise of judicial authority, the Judiciary … shall be subject only to
this Constitution and the law and shall not be subject to the control or direc-
tion of any person or authority.’ - The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article
159(1)
3
18 Section 5, The Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008.
19 ‘Final Kenyan referendum result’ Reuters 6 August 2010 available at http://www.a
lertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6751DA.htm (accessed 14 September 2010).
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Establishment of a supreme court
Where the Court of Appeal (CoA) was previously the most superior Court
in the country, the 2010 Constitution establishes a Supreme Court (SC)
with ‘exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes rela-
ting to the elections to the office of the President,’20 ‘the interpretation or
application of … [the] …Constitution,’21 and ‘in any case in which the
[SC], or the [CoA], certifies that a matter of general public importance is
involved’.22 In addition, ‘the [SC] may give an advisory opinion at the re-
quest of the national government, any state organ, or any county govern-
ment with respect to any matter concerning county government’.23
The establishment of the SC can be understood as part of a universal
trend in contemporary constitutional design in which the excesses of the
executive and legislature are constrained by the articulation of fundamen-
tal rights for the individual and the establishment of special courts to safe-
guard those rights.24 This is not to say that the rights of individuals are not
protected in judiciaries without SCs; rather, the establishment of a body
dedicated solely to the adjudication of constitutional matters raises the es-
teem of the constitution itself and respect for processes of implementation.
Beyond the typical client-service provider relationship, an additional layer
of accountability is created whereby citizens fully expect the courts to
uphold the values and principles of the constitution. For the judiciary, the
guardianship function bestowed upon it produces an ideal which is inter-
nalized by its members and informs their individual sense of purpose. This
relationship is particularly important in the Kenyan context, whereby judi-
cial authority is derived from the people of Kenya.25
Atieno Odhiambo, Law Clerk of the Supreme Court of Kenya, speaks
to this heightened normative accountability:
The Courts must interpret the Constitution, for [the ordinary man] and ensure
that it is understood by [him]. The Judiciary is the only institution that will
salvage and keep the promises of the Constitution alive.
3.1
20 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 163(3)(a).
21 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 163(4)(a).
22 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 163(4)(b).
23 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 163(6).
24 Ginsburg T Judicial Reviews in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian
Cases (2003) 2.
25 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 159.
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Financial autonomy
In the past the judiciary lacked financial autonomy. Given that annual fis-
cal allocations were determined by the executive and parliament, the judi-
ciary’s operational and decision-making independence was severely com-
promised; because its officers feared monetary reprisal, the tendency was
to pacify other arms of government by means of conservative judgments
or ones otherwise biased in favour of the political class.
In a strong departure from this state of affairs, article 173 of the 2010
Constitution creates an autonomous financial mechanism under the Judici-
ary Fund. The Fund is managed by the administrative head of the instituti-
on and can be utilised for administrative expenditure ‘and such other pur-
poses as may be necessary for the discharge of the functions of the Judici-
ary’.26 By providing an administrative buffer from political interference,
this development has enabled the judiciary to implement an ambitious and
expensive reform programme.
However, annual budgets must be approved by the National Assembly
(NA). This has led to tension between the two of them, with the judiciary
often complaining of substantial reductions in requested allocations and
reallocations or earmarked funds. Most recently, in March 2014 US$5.8
million intended for construction of courts was reallocated to the Director
of Public Prosecutions and State Law Office. According to members of
parliament, this followed underutilisation of funds by the judiciary. For
Chief Justice Willy Mutunga, the move was a deliberate attempt to intimi-
date members of the judiciary after various state officials ignored orders to
appear in court in relation to an impasse between senators and gover-
nors.27
Even so, what is important is that budgetary negotiations no longer take
place behind closed doors or through the courtrooms but have been trans-
ferred instead to the institutional level and public domain.
3.2
26 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 173(2).
27 Mutai E ‘Parliament denies Mutunga’s courts budget cut claims’ Business Daily
Africa 3 March 2014 available at http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Parliament-
denies-Mutunga-s-courts-budget-cut-claims/-/539546/2229596/-/ptjodx/-/index.ht




Although the Repealed Constitution created a Judicial Service Commissi-
on (JSC) with a mandate to recruit, discipline and dismiss judicial offi-
cers,28 it lacked autonomy as all six of its members were appointed direct-
ly by the president.29 Essentially, the executive possessed discretionary
powers in the selection, promotion and dismissal of judicial officers. This
led to casual appointments – based on ethnic and political considerations –
and entrenched a culture of corruption and complacency within the judici-
ary.
Today’s reconstituted Commission comprises 12 members, the majority
of whom are nominated by their peers and are more representative of Ke-
nya’s legal fraternity.30 In contrast to its predecessor, the Commission is
responsible for promoting the ‘independence and accountability of the ju-
diciary and the efficient and transparent administration of justice’.31 This
entails an expanded human-resource function, including: the design and
implementation of capacity-building initiatives;32 provision of ‘recom-
mendations on the conditions of service’;33 and means of improving the
administration of justice.34 When appointing judicial officers and staff, the
Commission must follow transparent and competitive processes.35 With
3.3
28 The Repealed Constitution of Kenya, 1963, article 69(1).
29 Composition of the JSC – Repealed Constitution of Kenya, 1963: Article 68(1)
Chief Justice (appointed by the President); Attorney General (appointed by the
President); Chairman of the Public Service Commission (appointed by the Presi-
dent); two judges from the High Court (HC) and Court of Appeal (COA), appoin-
ted by the President.
30 Composition of the JSC – Constitution of Kenya, 2010: Article 171(2) Chief
Justice (who is appointed by the President, in accordance with the JSC recommen-
dation and approval of the National Assembly, NA); Attorney General (who is no-
minated by the President and, following approval of the NA, appointed by the Pre-
sident); a COA judge elected by the judges of the COA; a Supreme Court (SC)
judge elected by the judges of the SC; a HC judge and Magistrate elected by mem-
bers of the Kenya Magistrates and Judges Association (KMJA); two advocates
(one woman, one man), elected by the Law Society of Kenya; one person nomina-
ted by the Public Service Commission; one woman and one man to represent the
public, appointed by the President with the approval of the NA.
31 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 172(1).
32 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 172(1)(d).
33 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 172(1)(b).
34 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 172(1)(e).
35 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 172(1)(a).
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regard to the dismissal of officers, the 2010 Constitution provides clear
circumstances warranting removal from office, whereas the previous Con-
stitution was vague.36 Furthermore, it is the JSC – and not the executive or
parliament – which initiates the process of removal from office. In additi-
on, a maximum age limit for retirement is set at 70 years, whereas in the
past parliament was responsible for capping this age limit.
Minimising political interference to enhance institutional independence
We found an institution so frail in its structures; so thin on resources; so low
on its confidence; so deficient in integrity; so weak in its public support that
to have expected it to deliver justice was to be wildly optimistic. We found a
Judiciary that was designed to fail …. [and in which] power and authority we-
re highly centralised. Accountability mechanisms were weak ... [but] that is
the old order. – Chief Justice Dr Willy Mutunga37
The totalitarian nature of the colonial regime shaped Kenya’s post-inde-
pendence judiciary in that its autocratic structures remained largely intact.
These were susceptible to political interference, and the primary function
of the courts was to protect the interests of the ruling elite and often facili-
tate their illicit and corrupt activities. In 2003 the judiciary’s Integrity and
Anti-Corruption Committee estimated that ‘fifty six (56) per cent of the
Court of Appeal, fifty (50) per cent of the High Court and thirty two (32)
per cent of the magistracy is probably infected with corruption’.38
Ten months after the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, the judici-
ary commenced its first strategic-planning process under the new constitu-
tional dispensation. Three high-level outcomes were identified for the
2012–2016 period:
4
36 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 168.
37 Judiciary of Kenya The Judiciary Transformation Framework, 2012 – 2016 avail-
able at www.judiciary.go.ke (accessed 30 August 2013). [Hereafter The Judiciary
Transformation Framework.].
38 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee of the Judiciary of Kenya Report of the
Integrity and Anti–Corruption Committee of the Judiciary of Kenya (‘The Ringera
Report’) available at http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/Government/Ringer
a_Report.pdf (accessed 30 August 2013) 46.
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• ‘reset the relationship between the judiciary and other arms of govern-
ment … premised on the principle of robust independence and con-
structive interdependence’;39
• ‘reorient [our] organizational culture, institutional design and leader-
ship style to customize the judiciary with the exigencies of its social
realities and known models of modern management science’;40 and
• ‘emerge and operate as a service entity which serves the people’.41
The outcomes were designed to support the institution’s legal framework
and purposefully delimit the judiciary’s space in relation to other arms of
government. In addition, they were intended to build a lasting alliance
with the public which – in part – would further mitigate excessive influ-
ence from the executive and legislature.
Vetting judges and magistrates
In previous years attempts were made to address corruption and partisan
affiliations within the courts, but the public generally perceived them as
illegitimate because these processes lacked transparency. The most nota-
ble of such initiatives was President Kibaki’s ‘radical surgery’ of 2003,
which resulted in the removal of the then Chief Justice Bernard Chunga
and suspension of 82 magistrates and 23 judges on the grounds of corrup-
tion.42 Although evidence was found against some of the judges, the pur-
ges eroded judicial independence thanks to their blatant neglect of security
of tenure and of the right to due process.
The transition to the new constitutional dispensation made it necessary
to appraise the fitness of those senior judicial officers who held office
when the 2010 Constitution became effective, appraisals undertaken
against redefined minimum standards of appointment. In line with the
Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates
Act, 2011 was enacted and an independent Judges and Magistrates Vetting
Board (JMVB)43 constituted in that same year. The primary function of
4.1
39 The Judiciary Transformation Framework 3.
40 The Judiciary Transformation Framework 3.
41 The Judiciary Transformation Framework 3.
42 Transparency International Radical Surgery in Kenya’s Judiciary available at
www.transparency.org (accessed 30 March 2014).
43 The Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board Act, 2011, No. 2 of 2011.
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the JMVB was to vet the suitability of 53 senior judicial officers to remain
in service in accordance with the principles and values enshrined under ar-
ticles 10 and 159 of the Constitution.44
Various criteria were employed in determining suitability, including the
quality of the officers’ judgments, the extent to which complainants had
perceived officers as biased, and objective measures such as timeliness in
concluding cases. Of the vetted judges, 40 were found suitable and 13 dis-
missed.45 Rather than seeking to punish, exonerate or reward judges, the
Board was centrally motivated in its decisions by the desire to restore pu-
blic faith in the courts. As it noted in its interim report:
If the processes followed were themselves arbitrary and … [the board’s]…
decisions were not solidly based on material before it, public confidence
would not be restored. Equally, if judges who had manifestly failed to meet
the required criteria were passed as suitable, public confidence would not be
restored. 46
Recruiting non-judiciary careerists
Running parallel to the vetting process, mass recruitment of senior officers
commenced in 2011 and has continued until the time of writing. The aim
is to address gross understaffing which saw the judiciary operate at
just ‘47 per cent of the established staff capacity’47 before internal reforms
began. As at the end of 2012, approximately 251 senior officers and staff
were appointed.48 Where previously there were only two legal researchers
in the entire judiciary, the figure now stands at 61. By the close of the
2014/2015 fiscal year, the judiciary estimates that the number of judges
4.2
44 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010: The Sixth Schedule, Transitional and Conse-
quential Provisions, article 23(1).
45 JMVB JMVB Interim Report – Sept 2011 – Feb 2013 available at http://www.jmv
b.or.ke/downloads/viewdownload/1/24.html (accessed 25 January 2014) 40.
[Hereafter JMVB Interim Report.].
46 JMVB Interim Report 39.
47 Chief Justice of Kenya State of the Nation Address (October 2012) available at
www.judiciary.go.ke (accessed 30 August 2013) 9.
48 Chief Justice of Kenya State of the Nation Address (October 2012) available at
www.judiciary.go.ke (accessed 30 August 2013) 10. The amendment of the Judi-
cature Act paved the way for many of these appointments by increasing the ceiling
on the number of officers that could sit in each court. The Judicature Act Amend-
ment, No. 10 of 2012.
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and magistrates will total 925 – an increase from 417 in 2011.49 Prior to
this, officers were unable to carry out their core functions proficiently,
with magistrates being expected to supervise the construction of court sta-
tion buildings and judges sitting on administrative committees.
Notably, the majority of incoming judicial officers and staff are being
drawn from the private and civil society sectors. For instance, SC Judge
Smokin Wanjala was formerly a law lecturer and his peer, Judge Njoki
Ndung’u, a gender rights activist. Several explanations can account for
this shift away from judiciary careerists. Since understaffing was so chro-
nic, the judiciary had to look outwards as a means of boosting its human-
resource capacity. As all job openings were advertised and competitively
filled in a manner previously unheard of, the pool of applicants was broa-
der. From a strategic perspective, hiring from the ‘apolitical’ private sector
or ‘non-political’ civil society sector served to distance the courts from
partisan affiliations.
In addition, the judiciary is adopting streamlined, private-sector ma-
nagement approaches to its administrative and operational organisation.
The Office of the Chief Registrar is split horizontally into seven directora-
tes and vertically into five registrars.50 New directorates include Public
Affairs and Communication, Performance Management and ICT. Initiati-
ves to decentralise functions to the court-station level have been imple-
mented to empower relevant officers and staff and produce a more custo-
mer-driven, results-oriented institution.
Setting the terms of engagement with the executive
Encouraged by the new dispensation, the judiciary is growing increasingly
bold in its determinations – even where the executive is directly involved.
The case of Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) & 7
others v Attorney General [2011] illustrates this well. On February 2011
4.3
49 ‘Narrative on the 2012/2013 Budget Estimates’ Judiciary of Kenya available at
http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/assets/files/CRJ%20speeches/Judiciary%20-%2
0Executive%20Summary%20on%202012-13%20Budget%20Estimates%20(24%2
0April%202012).pdf (accessed 29 January 2014).
50 Judiciary of Kenya State of the Judiciary Report 2011 – 2012 available at http://w
ww.judiciary.go.ke/portal/assets/files/Reports/State%20of%20Judiciary%202011-
2012.pdf (accessed 30 August 2013).
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former President Kibaki made a series of unilateral public appointments
which included the nomination of Alnashir Visram as Chief Justice.51 The
High Court ruled the Chief Justice nomination unconstitutional as it did
not comply with article 166(1)52 and section 24(2) of the Sixth Schedule53
of the Constitution. In delivering his ruling, Justice Daniel Musinga stated
that
in view of [the] Court’s findings regarding [the] constitutionality of the man-
ner in which the nominations were done, I make a declaration that it will be
unconstitutional for any state organ to carry on with the process of approval
and eventual appointment … based on President Kibaki’s nominations.
Kibaki withdrew his nominations and, on the recommendation of the JSC,
went on to nominate the human rights activist Dr Willy Mutunga as Chief
Justice after a competitive and public recruitment process.
The significance of this case is that the judiciary asserted its standing as
an equal arm of government from the outset of the constitution-implemen-
tation process by setting the terms of engagement with the executive. In
reaching its judgement, the High Court consulted with other stakeholders
in the justice sector – including the attorney general – who went on to be-
come strategic allies and fight the ‘nominations’ battle in the political are-
nas.54 This approach diluted the influence of the executive on the judicia-
ry, thereby serving to depoliticize the role of the courts. The constitutional
law expert Tom Ginsburg is a proponent of the alliance-building tactic and
argues that the ‘judiciary cannot survive without some support from some-
where in the system’.55 Given Kenya’s history of constitutional dismant-
ling at the hands of the political class, the construction of a network of al-
lies within and beyond the justice chain should indeed provide this system
51 In addition, Kibaki recruited Kioko Kilukumi as Director of Public Prosecutions,
William Kirwa as Controller of Budget and Githu Muigai as Attorney General.
52 ‘The President shall appoint – (a) the Chief Justice … in accordance with the rec-
ommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, and subject to the approval of
the National Assembly.’.
53 ‘A new Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President, subject to the National
Accord and Reconciliation Act, and after consultation with the Prime Minister and
with the approval of the National Assembly.’.
54 It is noteworthy that the Court’s bold decision went on to influence the declaration
of the then Speaker of Parliament, Kenneth Marende, who reaffirmed that the no-
minations were unconstitutional.




support. Arguably, bold judgements and alliance-building are tantamount
to judicial activism. Professor Ginsburg agrees, but affirms that activism is
not necessarily a bad thing for Kenya:
There is a real justification for an activist Judiciary at this particular time. We
are in this period of transition and the political institutions are not yet … [ful-
ly] … functioning. The Judiciary is the only body that is in a position to step
in. Over time political institutions mature, and at that time the legislature will
step into its own, to sometimes constrain the Courts. From a normative point
of view, that is appropriate. If I could speak to the critics I would defend judi-
cial activism as being appropriate but also being a temporary condition.
Crucially, an increasingly litigious public has legitimised the judiciary’s
growing activism. The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, has empowered Ke-
nyans through a series of rights, freedoms and an expanded democratic
space.56 This, combined with a participatory process of constitution design
during the review process, has resulted in strong levels of public ow-
nership of the new Constitution. Kenyans frequently seek the courts to in-
terpret the Constitution in individual matters as well as in cases with high
public interest. As Lucianna Thuo, the former Research Coordinator for
the Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations (JWCEP), re-
marked:
Anyone who comes before the Courts seeking clarification on a constitutional
provision or applying that provision in a petition must be heard and the courts
must duly interpret the Constitution. This is important because our Constituti-
on is new and complex, few understand it. It is these cases which will clarify
the meaning of the text. 57
Challenges
Until August 2013 the judiciary appeared to have effectively established
its institutional independence and credibility. It was the JSC’s suspension
and eventual dismissal of Chief Registrar (CR) Gladys Boss Shollei on the
grounds of financial mismanagement, favouritism and impropriety that
5
56 Chapter 1 upholds the supremacy of the Constitution and sovereignty of Kenya’s
people; Chapter 4 provides for the rights and freedoms of Kenyans, through a bill
of rights; Chapter 6 outlines the minimum leadership and integrity standards that
public servants must comply with; and preceding each chapter is a set of specific
principles and values intended to guide the reading of subsequent provisions.
57 .
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brought the institution’s internal divisions to the fore. The integrity of the
institution was shaken in September 2013 when an alleged ‘war strategy’
aimed at forcing Shollei out of the judiciary was leaked to the press. Ac-
cording to local media, email exchanges and documents detailing the stra-
tegy originated from the Office of the Chief Justice and other senior judi-
cial officers. In March 2014 the Industrial Court ruled the JSC’s dismissal
of Shollei unlawful. A month later the Court of Appeal suspended the de-
cision of the Industrial Court. Some attribute Shollei’s dismissal to ‘the
sweeping administrative powers of … [the CR function which] … upset
old networks that traditionally controlled how money was spent in the Ju-
diciary’.58
Others maintain that the CR is guilty of the allegations brought before
her, but most analysts blame succession politics. It is the very mechanisms
introduced by the 2010 Constitution to accord the judiciary greater inde-
pendence that have ushered in an era of succession politics within the in-
stitution. Senior judicial officers are lobbying for the highly coveted titles
of Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and positions on the JSC, with the
current holders of those positions eliminating threats to their tenure.
On a day-to-day basis, these internal power struggles are visible in the
conflicting ideological approaches to reform that have caused the emer-
gence of opposing camps. Led by a Judiciary Transformation Secretariat
(JTS), the institution’s official reform programme is initiating change
from below through the creation of leadership and management teams at
the court-station level. However, the Secretariat lacks strategic leadership,
and there is no oversight body to assess its progress. Meanwhile, adminis-
trative reforms – including staffing, physical infrastructure and Informati-
on Communication Technologies (ICT) development – are led by the Of-
fice of the Chief Registrar through newly established directorates. Chan-
ges under the CR tend to be uncoordinated and in most cases less than
consultative. In addition, there are idealists in the judiciary who possess a
grandiose vision of the institution but lack a framework by which to see it
through to fruition. Finally, at the policy level, the strengthening of the
broader justice sector is guided by the National Commission on Adminis-
tration of Justice (NCAJ), which was established under section 34 of the
Judicial Service Act, 2011. These reform camps represent competing inte-
58 Munene M ‘Mutunga succession and budget row behind dispute in corridors of
justice’ The Daily Nation 25 August 2013.
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rests; in other words, where there should be synergy in the reform process,
there is tension instead.
The result is a steady erosion of the public confidence accorded to the
judiciary just one year previously. A poll conducted by Transparency In-
ternational in August 2013 revealed that of all the public institutions in
Kenya, the judiciary was the most trusted in the fight against corruption.59
In March 2014, however, levels of public confidence in the lower courts
had fallen by seven per cent since November 2013, while confidence in
the Supreme Court had declined by 12 per cent.60
Troublingly, internal wrangling has exposed areas of vulnerability with-
in the political class. Following Shollei’s dismissal, the National Assem-
bly summoned the JSC to explain its decision to suspend Shollei, arguing
that Commission members had breached the law on disciplinary procedu-
res. The JSC refused to comply, countering that doing so would undermi-
ne the principle of separation of powers. The matter escalated into a turf
war, culminating in President Kenyatta’s suspension of six JSC members
and his appointment of a tribunal to investigate their conduct. The six we-
re later reinstated by the High Court.61
Conclusion
The 2010 Constitution has endowed the courts with increased autonomy
and an expanded mandate that the judicial leadership has leveraged to ef-
fect far-reaching reforms. Given the judiciary’s history, the role bestowed
upon it by the new constitutional dispensation is a Herculean one and the
public has high expectations that it should prove itself fit to the task. Ne-
vertheless, incremental internal reform was never an option. The judiciary
had to capitalize on this unique window of opportunity to transform the
outward and inward face of the courts. But cracks are starting to show, and
6
59 Wanyama H ‘Kenyans trust the judiciary, shows new poll’ The Star 17 September
2013 available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201309171392.html (accessed 29
January 2014).
60 Ipsos Synovate Ipsos Poll: Performance Ratings of Public Institutions and Public
Office Holders 4th March 2014 available at http://www.ipsos.co.ke/home/index.ph
p/downloads (accessed 30 March 2014).
61 Komugor K ‘Battle between legislature and Judiciary spills into 2014’ The People
Online 29 December 2013 available at http://www.thepeople.co.ke/43467/battle-le
gislature-judiciary-spills-2014/ (accessed 29 January 2014).
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at the group level members of the judiciary are not entirely unified, sug-
gesting that their sense of a shared purpose often wavers. In the absence of
clarity, the judiciary is weakening, which could create openings for the po-
litical class to undermine it permanently. Should this scenario come to
pass, the most unfortunate aspect of it will be that Kenya’s constitutional
vanguard would have collapsed – and, seemingly, from within.
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Abstract
Working in the light of recent experiences in Madagascar and the Como-
ros, this chapter examines the transgression of constitutional rule. Trans-
gressions are serious violations of a constitution that endanger democra-
cy. To counter the collapse of the legal and constitutional order, a consti-
tutional court is required to adopt the extraordinary response of inventing
transitional constitutional law. The chapter addresses the formal and sub-
stantive constitutional law of the two countries during their respective
transitional periods, with the expression ‘sui generis non iuris’ emerging
as the most appropriate way of characterising it. While valid objections
can be raised against transitional constitutional law, it is the case nevert-
heless that in the Comoros the court’s action facilitated a prompt return to
a state of normality in which institutions operate in accordance with con-
stitutional law.
Introduction
How do constitutional judges guarantee democratic order in the face of ex-
cesses of political power and of manoeuvres that are increasingly inventi-
ve, indeed brilliant, in their effort to bypass and dilute the ostensible
1
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norms of the highest constitutional authority?1 The question merits reflec-
tion given the many crisis situations in which these judges seem to be
among the last lines of defence of that order. In these instances, the judge
has to affirm a pragmatic form of constitutionality that mediates between
two extremes: on the one hand, there is the notion that ‘a constitution is
the supreme law’, a notion that presupposes a perfect – yet unrealistic –
state of legal order; on the other, there is an executive which, whether be-
cause it is too weak or over-developed, disregards the constitution and the-
reby works in opposition to democracy.
Recent crises of governance in the Comoros and Madagascar called for
the intervention of the constitutional judge and, by implication, a normali-
sation of the relationship between the judge and the political authorities.
After seceding from France and attaining independence in 1975,2 the
Comoros have been characterised by periodic upheavals and coups d’état
that side-lined both the people and the judge.3 In Madagascar, which gai-
ned independence from France in 1960, the judge had been called upon as
early as 1996, in a controversial impeachment case4 made against the head
of state for violating the Constitution. Instability seems to be chronic in
this country,5 and the latter case did little to temper the madness of the po-
litical with the rationality of the law. Nevertheless, interventions of this
kind serve in times of crisis to reassert the founding importance of consti-
tutional law, and, beyond the specifics of the matters brought before jud-
ges, allow more general findings to be articulated.
These interventions, moreover, take place in a context that sets the
Comorian and Malagasy constitutional courts apart from other jurisdic-
tions and which can be termed the experience of transitional law. This is
not a common notion in Francophone doctrines of constitutional law,
which favour a formal conception of law, but is fitting as a description of
1 This chapter was written in French and proceeds from a French-speaking doctrinal
perspective. The author thanks the editors for translating his work into English.
2 See Abdallah A Le statut juridique de Mayotte: Concilier droit interne et droit in-
ternational; réconcilier la France et les Comores (2014) 656.
3 See Bourhane I ‘L’actualité constitutionnelle dans la vie politique des Comores’ in
Colom J (ed) Le développement constitutionnel dans les Etats de l’océan Indien
(2013) 145-163; Madi B & Sermet L ‘La crise comorienne et le droit’ (2002) Revue
juridique de l’océan indien 7-15.
4 The verdict is available at http://www.saflii.org/mg/cases/MGHCC/1996/1.html.
5 Sermet L & Goussot P ‘La crise malgache et le droit’ (2002) Revue juridique de
l’océan indien 33-42.
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the law adopted by the current Malagasy government and Constitutional
High Court.6
Transitional constitutional law may be characterised as follows:
• It forms a legal order and, as such, it is endowed with legal force.
Transitional law is the product of a transitional power or government.
• It may be the applicable law in times of war, but it differs from con-
ventional war-time constitutional clauses such as the French Constituti-
on’s notorious article 167 in that it respects neither procedural nor sub-
stantive niceties.
• If it is not contra constitutionem it is at any rate para constitutionem,
owing to the support provided of the constitutional judge, who thereby
demonstrates pragmatic adaptability. By showing at least partial non-
observance of the constitution, he or she ensures the survival of his or
her office by signalling approval of, or acquiescence to, the transitional
state of affairs.
From a theoretical perspective, transitional law is a fascinating subject. It
reveals how flexible constitutional judges can be when confronted by cri-
sis situations, yet also highlights the intractable dilemmas they encounter
as they drift away from the constitutional pact. As such, in analysing these
circumstances one is necessarily engaging with the field of transgression
of the law.8 Transgression, a notion which belongs less to classical legal
theory than to the social sciences, refers to a predicament in which (a.) ju-
dicial rulings reach an impasse and are unable to stop a crisis or rectify
political disorder, and (b.) serious violations of the letter and spirit of con-
stitutional principles are accepted and accommodated by virtue of the ac-
tions of the judge. The situation is acutely paradoxical: under normal cir-
cumstances constitutional violations are expelled from the legal system; in
6 For information in English on transitional constitutional law, see the online resour-
ces of the Centre for Research of New York University, available at http://constituti
onaltransitions.org/.
7 Under exceptional circumstances this provision gives enhanced powers to the Presi-
dent of the Republic. At the start of the Fifth Republic, General de Gaulle used it in
the Algerian War, a decision severely criticised as an abuse of presidential power.
8 On the theme of transgression, see Torcol S ‘Trangresser pour le peuple, par le peu-
ple: La volonté contre la norme?’ in La transgression, Toulon, 24-25 November
2011, Dir. J-J Sueur, P. Richard, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2013 225-259. Drawing on
the French constitutional experience, the author develops a distinction between rea-
sonable transgressions and unacceptable ones.
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times of crisis, however, transgressions are acknowledged, analysed and
often accepted. The collapse of the rule of law is obvious, and is com-
pounded by the legitimacy given to the transitional power.
Thus, a fourth characteristic can be added to the three definitional ele-
ments of transitional law provided so far: it constitutes a legal order paral-
lel but different to common law, and aims to curb political excesses albeit
in a limited and biased way, given that it is obliged to work within a con-
dition of disorder and take this as the basis for the notional order it con-
structs.
Two distinct situations emerge from observation of the Comorian and
Malagasy constitutional disputes. In the Comoros, in a controversy con-
cerning an unjustified postponement of the date of the presidential elec-
tions, the Constitutional Court was asked to record and declare the term of
office of President Sambi, this term not having been the result of a presi-
dential election. Here, the conduct of the judge was ambiguous. On the
one hand, the Court clearly stated its support for the postponement as well
its conditions, and was thus obviously in breach of the public trust; on the
other hand, the time-limits of the president’s mandate were nevertheless
precisely circumscribed: 26 May 2006 – 26 May 2011.
In Madagascar, by comparison, one could argue that any such ambigui-
ty was resolved by the fact that the judge completely redefined the coun-
try’s constitutional norms in such a way as to legitimate the transitional re-
gime. The root causes of the Malagasy crisis are deeper and more complex
than those of the crisis in the Comoros, but the apparent explanation rela-
tes to the incapacity of President Ravalomanana – elected for a second
term between 2006 – 2011 and literally ousted from power in March 2009
when he had to flee abroad – to respect the separation of powers and re-
nounce personal enrichment in a society which, according to a World
Bank report, is the poorest in the world only after countries at war.9
Although this is perhaps a schematic approach, one may consider the
Comoros as an instance of controlled transgression, and contrast it with
Madagascar as an instance of much bolder, uncontrolled transgression.
This chapter discusses each of these situations in turn, after which it de-
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Controlled transgression in the Comoros
A Comorian Constitutional Court decision made on 8 May 2010 is the ba-
sis of the discussion in this section. The judge was faced with an attempt
to extend the term of the mandate of the executive by 18 months by law.
Originally, the presidential term was meant to end on 26 May 2010, whe-
reupon elections were to be held. According to a new law enacted on 1
March 2010, the general elections of the President of the Union and Go-
vernors of the islands would be held on 27 November 2011; in addition,
the President, Vice-Presidents and Governors would remain in their posts
during the extension.10 Given that, even in the absence of this law, the
executive had arranged matters so as to rule out the possibility of elections
on or after 26 May 2010, the judge was presented in effect with a fait ac-
compli.
The law was also not without constitutional arguments in its favour.
Amendments in 2009 to the country’s referendum law served to revise
certain clauses of the Constitution of the Union of Comoros. Article 8(4)
of the referendum law refers to the second sentence of article 13 of Consti-
tution, which previously stipulated that the President and Vice-President
are elected together by a direct majority vote in one ballot for a four-year
term renewable in respect of the rotation between the island; in article 8,
the four-year term is replaced by a five-year term, and the word ‘rene-
wable’ is deleted. As such, the constitutional amendment of 2009, in terms
of which the next executive term would be in four to five years, would ap-
ply to the present term, albeit that the extension would be for six months
only, not 18 months.
The court did not accept these arguments, ruling that the provisions of
article 2, according to which the President, Vice-Presidents and Governors
would exercise their functions until the elections on 27 November 2011,
were unconstitutional. However, it did not declare the postponement of the
elections as unconstitutional, which at first sight seems strange.
The picture becomes clearer when other factors are considered. The
court ruled that when the presidential term ended at midnight on 26 May
2
10 According to article 1 of the law, ‘General elections of the President of the Union
and of the Governors of the islands will be held on 27 November 2011.’ Accord-
ing to article 2, ‘The President of the Union, the Vice-Presidents as well as the




2010, there would be an interim period until the inauguration of the new
President during which the executive would have to rule by consensus.
The requirement of consensus is not official policy, and although legally
this was not a time of exceptional circumstances, the imposition of an inte-
rim period was itself an exceptional event. Moreover, the court secured
rule by consensus with a triple interdiction: an interdiction to dissolve the
parliament; an interdiction to change the government; and an interdiction
to modify the composition of the Constitutional Court. These measures
were coupled to a stipulation that there would be ‘no recourse to exceptio-
nal measures except in the case of interruption of the normal functioning
of constitutional institutions’.
Conceptually, the decision involved establishing a relationship between
a judicial legal order and an order of standards fabricated ex nihilo; socio-
politically, it drew scandalised reaction from Comorian citizens on the In-
ternet, but the interim period had the virtue of being short and effective,
with elections being held only six months later than originally scheduled,
on 7 November and 26 December 2010. The outgoing president, Ahmed
Abdallah Mohamed Sambi, could not stand for election again, and Ikililou
Dhoinine was elected president of the Comorian Union in the second
round of elections, taking 60.91 per cent of the votes.
By comparison, the situation in Madagascar is more complex than that
in the Comoros. Its transgression is not controlled, because the court has
embarked on a dangerous adventure.
Uncontrolled transgression in Madagascar
‘Deconstitutionalisation’
The transitional period in Madagascar began when President Ravalomana-
na fled abroad on 17 March 2009 and plunged the country into crisis. Or-
dinance no. 2009-001 of 17 March 2009 transferred his powers to a milita-
ry committee, which, mindful of its lack of experience in exercising ulti-
mate political responsibility, in turn transferred them in terms of ordinance
no. 2009-002 of 17 March 2009 to Andry Rajoelina, the then mayor of the
Malagasy capital. However, Rajoelina’s accession to power was declared
unconstitutional – and yet at the same time validated by the judge. The
High Constitutional Court [HCC] delivered its decision on 23 April 2009,
3
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in the process breaking new ground because the decision resulted in a hit-
herto-unknown construct: the transitional ordinance.11
An ordinance [ordonnance] is a regulation proclaimed by the President
of the Republic, but though it emanates as such from the executive it is a
materially legislative act. The Malagasy Constitution of 1992, as amended
in 2007, allows that the constitutional competence of the legislature may
be bypassed under six conditions, set out in its articles 60, 86, 88, 99, 100
and 156, which recognise the constitutional competence of presidential re-
course to regulations.
In this instance, the HCC took issue with ordinance no. 2009-001 of 17
March 2009, maintaining that it did not conform to any of these six pre-
established conditions, notably that of article 60, which authorises such an
ordinance in exceptional circumstances but with its proclamation subject
to the approval of the presidents of the National Assembly, the Senate and
the HCC. The HCC thus found that the ordinance ‘does not meet the con-
ditions and form prescribed by the Constitution … [that] its purpose does
not fall within the scope of the law but that of the Constitution; [and] that,
finally, it was not subjected to constitutional review before its promulgati-
on’. Putting matters plainly, the Court called this unconstitutional act ‘a
unilateral manifestation of the will of the President of the Republic which
does not conform to constitutional [principles]’.
The Court’s line of reasoning is impeccable; but it does not end here.
Despite recognising the non-observance of the Constitution, the HCC goes
on to declare that ‘notice is … taken of the decision as being the acknow-
ledgement of circumstances which prevailed and the necessity to save the
principle of the continuity of the State’. This raises the question of the
extent to which constitutional rule may be ignored on the grounds of
the ‘acknowledgment of circumstances’ and justified by ‘the principle of
the continuity of the State’. Yet whatever the depth and range of the impli-
cations, both of the ordinances were approved by the HCC on 18 March
11 Decision no. 03-HCC/D2 of April 23 2009.
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200912 by means of a simple letter not subjected to constitutional scruti-
ny13. The result was that ‘the legitimacy of the transition is founded on the
objective necessities of social order’.14 Fact triumphs over law, with the
approval of the court; the latter asserts the authority of the law and, in the
same gesture, exposes the law’s powerlessness.
In its decision of 23 April 2009, the HCC adopted the approach of ‘de-
constitutionalising’ the executive, a notion that is now part of constitutio-
nal jurisprudence. ‘Deconstitutionalisation’ relates to a theory developed
by Marcel Prélot and Jean Boulouis to describe what happens when con-
stitutional formations from an earlier order survive uprisings and revoluti-
on by virtue of their compatibility with the new regime and lack of direct
connection to its form of government.15 However, their theory is not app-
licable to Madagascar, where the constitutional formation did not so much
survive as fall to pieces. ‘Deconstitutionalisation’ entailed the decline of
former constitutional standards, which were both negated and displaced by
a reconstructed constitutional order.
‘Deconstitutionalisation’ and ‘reconstitutionalisation’
In order not to abandon constitutional order when faced by the prospect of
oblivion, the Court affirms the ongoing existence of this order; however,
the price for it is the renunciation of the Constitution itself. Thus, the cen-
trifugal movement of deconstitutionalisation is, to a degree, compensated
for by the inverse, and centripetal, movement of re-constitutionalisation.
As the HCC’s ruling of 23 April 2009 attests, despite the transition in Ma-
dagascar and the formal and organic change in the State’s organisation
brought about by deconstitutionalisation,
3.2
12 Decision no. 03-HCC/D2 of 23 April 2009 concerning the transitional situation.
See also Decision no. 04-HCC/D2 relating to ordinance no. 2009-003 March 18
2009 bearing on the suspension of parliament.
Decision no. 04-HCC/D2 relating to the unconstitutionality of ordinance no.
2009-003 March 18 2009 bearing on the suspension of parliament.
13 Decision no. 04-HCC/D2 relating to the unconstitutionality of ordinance no.
2009-003 March 18 2009 bearing on the suspension of parliament.
14 Avis no. 02-HCC/AV July 31 2009 on the interpretation of article 53 of the Con-
stitution.
15 Prélot M & Boulouis J Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel (1980) 201.
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the fundamental principles remain inviolable, such as the separation of
powers as well as the integrity of national territory, the Republican nature of
the State and the cultural values peculiar to the nation.
Here, a special notion of legality is invoked so as to counteract the vacu-
um that results from the negation of the Constitution, this shrinkage of its
substance. Of course, taking refuge in the merely implicit – in this case the
fundamental principles of the Republic16 – and in a body of interpretation
rather than in the explicit letter of a constitution is always, by comparison,
a backward step and an imperfect means of protection. In this regard, the
HCC has shown on numerous occasions that the level of transitional legal
protection is, unsurprisingly, lower than what it would be under normal
circumstances.
An example of this attenuation is evident in a decision concerning the
rights and privileges of members of parliament (MPs).17 Having addressed
the two relevant elements of the matter, that is, an exception to equality
before the law (non-accountability) and a temporary exception to the sepa-
ration of powers (immunity), the Court refused to extend those provisions
of the common law which are affirmed in article 73 of the Constitution
and which grant MPs special protection to enable them to fulfil their du-
ties as public representatives. Instead, it considered the ordinance before it
(the ordinance of 8 October 2010) purely in terms of the transitional re-
gime’s internal rules, which in this instance were being modified to ack-
nowledge certain parliamentary privileges. Having validated the ordinance
(on 7 October 2010), the HCC thus duly granted immunity to MPs, but it
is a qualified, partial immunity recognised only within, and on the basis
of, the framework of the transitional period.
Components of transitional legality
In its opinion of 31 July 2009, the Court was both more – and less – direct
in its explication of the substitution of law that had taken place:
3.3
16 The ‘fundamental principles of the Republic’ amount to a constellation of notions
and meanings implied by the ‘content’ of the Republic; as such, they are neither
predetermined, nor entirely predeterminable.
17 Notice no. 01-HCC/AV of July 15 2011 relating to article 73 of the Constitution
and its provisions regarding the immunity of parliamentarians.
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During the transition, although the Constitution cannot be applied in all its
provisions, the general principles of the law remain applicable, [as do] the ge-
neral principles of law with constitutional value, the commonly accepted in-
ternational commitments, the spiritual and cultural values proper to the nati-
on, [and] the ordinances and statutory texts after their publication and promul-
gation.18
The HCC admitted that the Constitution could not be applied in its entire-
ty, in particular because the Road Map signed by various Malagasy politi-
cal actors on 17 September 2011 had, if not replaced, then at least supple-
mented the Constitution and eclipsed certain of its provisions.
The Road Map is a political agreement meant to resolve the country’s
crisis. Previously, in August 2009, the four parties affiliated, respectively,
to Andry Rajoelina, Marc Ravalomanana, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Za-
fy adopted a transition charter; the Road Map of 2011, however, was si-
gned by 11 parties and is partly internationalised since it falls under the
authority of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
The Road Map was developed into a law (Act no. 2011-014 of 28 De-
cember 2011) and, with the cognisance of the HCC in its Decision no. 15-
HCC/D3 of 26 December 2011, inserted into the internal juridical order.
The HCC observed that
the present law appears amongst the sources of the transitory law which must
serve in the implementation of the commitments of Malagasy political actors
in order to put a transitional Parliament and of a Government of national uni-
on in place, the organisation of credible elections, just and transparent in
cooperation with the international community, of the adoption of measures of
trust and efforts for national reconciliation, of the unconditional return to Ma-
dagascar of all Malagasy citizen in exile due to political reasons, in the re-
spect of national integrity, national sovereignty and of the independence of ju-
diciary systems of the country ….
However, from a constitutional perspective, this so-called ‘Road Map le-
gislation’ has a highly ambiguous status. Vested with a centrally important
role in the transitional legal order, and yet by nature a political artefact set-
ting forth significant aspirations on the assumption that there is unanimity
about what these aspirations are and how they should be achieved in terms
of practical implementation, strictly speaking it cannot at one and the sa-
me time have a political nature and the meta-reflexive distance from its
own procedures and assumptions to be able to act as a judge, arbiter and
18 Notice no. 02-HCC/AV July 31 2009 on the interpretation of article 53 of the Con-
stitution.
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assessor of disputes that arise and/or of implementation measures taken to
achieve these aspirations and bring about a return to constitutional order.
The Road Map, that is to say, is endowed with a quasi-constitutional status
but without the forms, norms and procedures of constitutional law.
Indeed, at the time of writing, the HCC had recently issued an import-
ant clarification that partly excluded the Road Map from the transitional
legal order. In a decision of 17 July 2013, the Court tellingly referred to
the ‘coexistence of the Constitution and the Road Map’ and moved to dis-
qualify its applicability with respect to the vacant office of the presidency,
this on the grounds that any such pronouncements would amount to redun-
dant clauses no longer needed at such time as the Constitution is again ful-
ly in place.
Currently, then, Madagascar’s transitional law seems to consist of three
main components: the Constitution (or at any rate those parts of it that re-
main in force, along with the inviolable standards highlighted by the
HCC); the transitional legality; and the Road Map of September 2011.
This transitional order is not a normatively homogeneous ‘constitutional
bloc’ capable of being assimilated into a single body of standards; rather,
it contains diverse ideological, legal and constitutional norms.
Inviolability of transitional legality
Transitional legality is composed of both inviolable and temporary norms.
What, then, is the substance of this inviolable legality? An appropriate
term appears to be ‘intangibility’, namely those aspects of the constitutio-
nal order that are immune from amendment even if the constitution is ab-
rogated. A second term that appears appropriate is ‘constitutional reserve’,
namely elements of the constitutional order that are left untouched. These
terms are to be preferred to ‘supraconstitutionality’, which seems to miss
the necessary nuance. It is suggested that the Court’s decision implies that
there are two forms of intangibility. The first is specific to the transitional
period and was established by the Court in its decision of 23 April 2009.
This constitutional reserve seems to contain four components, relating to
the organisation of power (respect for the separation of powers), to the sta-
te (respect for territorial integrity), to the republic (respect for the republi-
can form of government), and to the nation (respect for the cultural values




The HCC’s formula may lead one to think that the list is not exhaustive,
but in the absence of further elaboration, only these four principles should
be considered certain.
This first ‘reserve’ must be distinguished from the constitutional reser-
ve, which follows from article 163 of the new Constitution. This ‘reserve’
excludes any constitutional amendment regarding the following three
components: the republic (respect for the republican form of government),
the state (respect for territorial integrity) and the organisation of public
power (respect for the decentralisation to local government as well for the
number and duration of presidential terms). The protection of the republic
and the protection of the state are aspects of the constitutional reserve that
appear in both of its manifestations.
It would thus seem that the transitional intangibility is sustained by a
form of legal order. This is inferred from the opinion of 31 July 2009,
which complements the decision of 23 April 2009. The order is pluralistic,
given that the spiritual and cultural values of the nation are regarded as
material and non-formal sources of law.19 An important question remains
whether the transitional intangibility comes about as a result of internatio-
nal commitment. The purpose of international commitments is generally
not to fashion transitional law. Or does the intangibility come about as a
result of the general principles of law or, a fortiori, as a result of the acts
of transition?
Furthermore, the opinion of 31 July 2009 reveals a formally diversified
hierarchy. At the apex thereof is the Constitution, and this part of the con-
figuration contains the general principles of law with constitutional value.
Then, at a lower level, are the accepted international commitments. Under
the heading of transitional law are the general legal principles that apply to
ordinances and statutory texts; it is also advisable to consider the insertion
of the Road Map in legal form, as noted by the HCC on 26 December
2011. This particular transitional law, given its ambiguous legal status, es-
capes all constitutional control and does so with the acceptance of the
HCC itself.
19 'During the transition, although the Constitution cannot be applied in all its provi-
sions, the general principles of the law remain applicable, [as do] the general prin-
ciples of law with constitutional value, the commonly accepted international com-
mitments, the spiritual and cultural values proper to the nation, [and] the ordi-
nances and statutory texts after their publication and promulgation.’.
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The following observations can be made:
• The normative inviolability that obtained in this context seems to have
originated in a reserve of constitutionality decided by the HCC for the
transitional period and has little if anything to do with the constitutio-
nal pact. There is uncertainty about the nature of the inviolability of
general law principles with constitutional value.
• As the terminology implies, transitional constitutional law is temporary
and belongs to the transition. In periods of transition, it should not be
confused with the legal order proper, which is a wider concept.
• The transitional legal order is organised according to a hierarchy of
norms which remain applicable even if the ideal of a formal constituti-
on is set aside.
• The law introducing the Road Map is an exception to this transitional
hierarchy of norms. It cannot be directly challenged and disputed, alt-
hough its measures of application and enforcement can be, indirectly.
• Transitional constitutional law pursues a functional vocation: ‘to esta-
blish constitutional institutions and organs in the shortest possible time
and in the most appropriate manner’.20
On the basis of these observations it can be said that in a transitional pe-
riod there exists a materially constituted and formally organised legality.
Transitional constitutional law
From an abstract perspective, three types of situations can be discerned,
each of which can lead to greater degradation: ordinary constitutional law;
constitutional law carried out under exceptional circumstances; and transi-
tional constitutional law outside the framework of law and legality.
Beyond the third type, there is anarchy, be it with or without war.
In its extreme form, transitional constitutional law is a phenomenon that
arrogates the right to speak in the name of the law, but in the Malagasy
and Comorian situations it is more apt to evoke a twilight where darkness
and light, obscurity and clarity, intermingle with one another. Transitional
constitutional law has not entirely extinguished ordinary constitutional
law, and they co-exist in a dynamic tension in which each attempts to sub-
4
20 Speech of the HCC president at the announcement of the results of the constitutio-
nal referendum of November 17 2010.
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ordinate the other. From a principled point of view, the ordinary law
would be imagined as inexorably triumphing over the transitional law, for-
cing it out in the way that law per se is meant to overcome the brute fac-
ticity of existence; yet in this transitional period there can be no certainty
that the principle of the supremacy of the law will prevail, given that no
date has been set by which the period must end and no conditions speci-
fied for its termination.
What exists instead is an interplay of ‘deconstitutionalisation’ and ‘re-
constitutionalisation’ without an end-point in sight or – as in South Afri-
ca’s post-apartheid exercise in transitional justice – a political pact direc-
ted clearly towards a state of normalisation. Transitional law is ostensibly
a form of law with a temporary character, but the more it is prolonged the
more it loses precisely this characteristic, its temporariness, and becomes
an open door for corruption to thrive and multiply: if the head cannot lead
by example, how shall the body on its own be able to seek out, let alone
form a conception of, the common good?
Nevertheless, in thinking about transitional constitutional law, the task
is not to appeal for reformist ‘improvement’ within it or to denounce the
actions of the constitutional judge, but to engage with and understand the
problems that arise when the law encounters its limits and is powerless to
counter political disorder. Transitional constitutional law raises many
questions, yet offers few clear or satisfactory answers.
A first question, perhaps, is this: What should one call it? ‘Transitory
law’, ‘experimental law’, ‘transitional law’, ‘law under exceptional cir-
cumstances’, ‘interim law’, ‘the law of necessity’? The possibilities are
many and varied. For instance, it is fairly easy to distinguish transitory law
and transitional law, as the former is that which can be accommodated
within the legal system whereas the latter is that which overruns it. Howe-
ver, the two have a tendency to be intertwined. Thus the Constitution of
the IVth Malagasy Republic was adopted in a referendum, but it did not
end the transition ipso jure. The Constitution remains in force, but until
the presidential elections are held it is applicable only inasmuch as it con-
forms to a number of transitional measures; it remains in force, moreover,
but is applicable only in a deferred manner, given its ‘amendment’ by the
Road Map. The situation, indeed, is a chain of paradoxes: adopt a new po-
litical pact, but postpone its application sine die; organise a constitutional
referendum, but not the presidential elections; legally recognise that the
Constitution has been replaced by a transitional text, but by one which is
not of a constitutional nature.
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Alternatively, transitional constitutional law is not a ‘law of necessity’,
if one takes this to mean something that sanitises transgression or gives in-
fidelity the righteous air of marriage. The fact that the HCC affirmed a
hierarchy of transitional orders of which it is the guardian is relatively so-
lid proof of the distinction between transitional law and the law of necessi-
ty.
There are other questions over and above that of the most fitting termi-
nology to use. Maya Sahli Fadel, a member of the African Commission of
Human and Peoples’ Rights, asked the three following ones:
• Given its frequency in African countries, could transitional constitutio-
nal law qualify as common law?
• Could it qualify as law sui generis?
• Does it constitute a regional custom?21
To respond to each question in turn, the absence of an established term ap-
propriate to transitional situations is not in itself, legally speaking, a suffi-
cient criterion for transitional constitutional law to become constitutional
common law in the place of the transitional law. From a scholarly point of
view, there is no doubt that the confrontation between transitional consti-
tutional law and common constitutional law shows a shortcoming of the
latter in relation to the former and that it is necessary to disqualify it.
The following consideration should also be borne in mind. Transitional
constitutional law presents itself as a last line of defence in a crisis before
the onset of arbitrary power and the dissolution of the law into regressive
violence and generalised corruption; indeed, in its way the HCC protects
what remains in the field of law, that is, the fundamental constitutional
and republican principles, while the Comorian Constitutional Court, too,
has been in a similar, albeit easier, situation.
Generally speaking, the expression sui generis is used to qualify a re-
gime that does not enter into legal reasoning. Is the nature of transitional
constitutional law sui generis? The term sui generis juris could not be ac-
cepted if one sees the law sui generis as a component of the legal system,
a law of exception or an inadequately written law. Common constitutional
21 Oral intervention at a colloquium hosted by the Community Law Centre, Universi-
ty of the Western Cape, on 6 September 2013.
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law provides no justification for accepting transitional constitutional law,
so it would be more appropriate to speak of sui generis non juris.22
Finally, the repeated occurrence of transitional regimes in Africa would
not be admitted as proof of an emerging regional custom. Under article 2
of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, demo-
cracy is held as ‘a universal value and principle’ and as such is a binding
obligation in international law; by extension, the principles of the rule of
law, the supremacy of the constitution, and free elections and democratic
changes in government are obligatory.
What is less clear is whether the Charter is an instrument codifying in-
ternational law in Africa. Given that few African states – ten in all – have
ratified it, the Charter appears to be a developing, rather than established,
instrument of international law. Simplifying the situation in extreme
terms, in this developing space there are two tendencies, the first aligned
to the Charter and affirming the principles of democratic constitutional
law, the other engaged in the regressive practice of transitional law.
Nevertheless, one cannot see how the latter could be accorded opinio
juris in view of article 2(4)’s declaration that one of the Charter’s objec-
tives is to ‘[p]rohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of go-
vernment in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, secu-
rity and development’. In the circumstances it would be difficult indeed to
maintain in effect that Africa is not made for democracy, given that it can
be counter-argued that transitional situations show the difficulties of im-
plementing the principle of democracy rather than resistance to the prin-
ciple itself.
Moreover, the phrase ‘unconstitutional change of government’ is inte-
resting in that it makes no distinction between a coup d’état and revoluti-
on. While this does not leave any room for considering the legitimacy or
otherwise of such changes, it does have a positive implication: no matter
what the case, there can be no compromise with democratic principles. It
is possible, therefore, to outline a tripartite typology of changes of govern-
ment based on both their legality as well as legitimacy: coup d’état (neit-
her legal nor legitimate); revolution (legitimate but not legal); and a con-
stitutional change of government (legal and legitimate).
22 Sofie Baker Djoumessi, oral intervention at a colloquium hosted by the Communi-
ty Law Centre, University of the Western Cape, on 6 September 2013.
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The concluding question is perhaps the most trenchant of them
all. ‘Transitional constitutional law’ is such an ambiguous, twilight object
that one may wonder if it is even tenable to link those three words toge-
ther. In other words, is it not a contradiction in terms? More plainly, can
such a thing as ‘transitional constitutional law’ properly be said to exist –
or is this just a beguiling term of art for mystifying a reality of dominati-
on, capitulation and misrule?
There are grounds, however, for qualifying the pessimism of these ob-
servations. In a decision of Madagascar’s special electoral board on 17
August 2013, the three ‘elephants’ of the presidential election – the cur-
rent president, Andry Rajoelina, former president Didier Ratsiraka, and
the wife of the former president, Mars Ravalomanana – had been disquali-
fied on the basis of transitional legal rules, namely for not having filed for
candidacy in person and for lacking proof of having been resident on Ma-
lagasy territory for longer than six months. The decision came as a thun-
derbolt: it was unprecedented – two presidents disqualified! An appeal
was lodged against the decision but declared inadmissible; and, at the time
writing, general elections were scheduled for October 2013, presaging –
perhaps – an end to the crisis.
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Abstract
In acknowledging that constitutionalism is the liberal democratic value
that aims at having a constitutional government the powers of which are
capable of being effectively limited, this chapter seeks to highlight the si-
gnificant role that a country’s constitution plays in ensuring constitutiona-
lism. The chapter examines the potential of the constitution to provide
checks on the powers of the president in order to achieve constitutiona-
lism in Africa’s democratic states; in so doing, it singles out the presiden-
cy, because this institution wields more powers that impact on constitutio-
nalism than other institutions. With the focus on Malawi, the chapter high-
lights how the 1966 Constitution of Malawi gave the president unlimited
powers whereas the 1995 democratic Constitution contains provisions
that seek to limit the president’s powers; nevertheless, post-1995 presi-
dents of Malawi have continued to wield unlimited powers that choke con-
stitutionalism. In view of this, the chapter traces the constitutional concep-
tualisation of the presidency in Malawi by comparing the 1966 and 1995
constitution-making processes and the provisions which emerged. Whilst
the 1966 process created a strong presidency, the 1995 process did not do
enough to put effective limits on the president’s powers despite the expec-
tations that it would do so.
Zonse zimene nza Kamuzu Banda (‘Everything else belongs to Kamuzu Ban-
da’) was a song in praise of Kamuzu Banda, the president of Malawi from
1964 to 1994. It shows how people came to view their ruler as the owner of
everything, as the man ‘who has it all’.
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Introduction
Malawi replaced its autocratic constitution of 1966 with the democratic
one of 1995 amidst a general belief that constitutionalism would be pro-
moted.1 However, challenges continue to face the realisation of constitu-
tionalism under the 1995 dispensation.2 A feature common to both consti-
tutions is that neither of them managed to limit the powers of the presiden-
cy.3 Accordingly, this chapter analyses the role that constitutions play in
Africa’s democratic states in checking presidential power and thereby ad-
vancing constitutionalism. The study singles out the presidency because it
wields more powers than other institutions and has a major impact on con-
stitutionalism.4 The focus is on Malawi, and the chapter mounts a critical
discussion of how neither the constitution-making processes of 1966 nor
1995 were capable of adequately constraining presidential power, a power
which, when unchecked, stands as a perpetual threat to constitutionalism.
The chapter’s structure is as follows: after introducing concepts rele-
vant to constitutionalism, hegemonic presidency and constitution-making,
it undertakes a comparative analysis of Malawi’s constitution-making pro-
cesses of 1966 and 1995 and their impact on the presidency and, by exten-
sion, constitutionalism. Thereafter, the chapter appraises measures in the
1995 Constitution that could check or augment presidential powers and
thus (depending on how these powers are used or abused) promote or frus-
trate constitutionalism. Furthermore, the chapter examines the fact that the
1
1 The 1995 Constitution was based on the aspiration to have a democratic state. See,
for example, Kanyongolo FE ‘The limits of liberal democratic constitutionalism in
Malawi’ in Phiri & Ross (eds) Democratisation in Malawi (1998) 365; Kanyongolo
FE ‘The Constitution and the democratization process in Malawi’ in Sichone O (ed)
The State and Constitutionalism in Southern Africa (1998) 1; Banda J ‘The consti-
tutional change debate of 1993–1995’ in Phiri KM & Ross KR (eds) Democratisati-
on in Malawi: A Stocktaking (1998) 320. See also Malawi Constitution (1995), sec-
tion 12. Constitutionalism had been stifled under the 1966 Constitution. See Kan-
yongolo (1998) 358, 359 & 361; Meinhardt H & Patel N Malawi’s Process of De-
mocratic Transition (2003) 3.
2 See generally Kanyongolo FE ‘Law, power and the limits of liberal democratic con-
stitutionalism in Malawi’ (2012) 6(1) Malawi Law Journal 1, 2.
3 See generally Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Ma-
lawi Law Journal 63-73.
4 See generally Prempeh H ‘Presidents untamed’ (2008) 19 Journal of Democracy
109-123; Diamond L ‘The rule of law versus the big man’ (2008) 19 Journal of De-
mocracy 138-149.
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1995 Constitution envisages a strong presidency, one in terms of which




Constitutionalism is a liberal democratic notion that advocates having a
constitutional government with powers that can be limited and checked;5
by implication, a democratic constitution must ensure constitutionalism if
it is to have any worth6. Although there is no single agreed-up definition
and the concept is interpreted in different ways in the literature, including
in the context of Malawi, much of this literature suggests that it should be
thought of as the spirit of a political system in which limited government
is guaranteed by a constitution.7 As such, constitutionalism entails, inter
alia, the ability to limit the power of the state, including checking the
powers of the president.
Constitutionalism is expressed through a number of attributes, these
being constitutional or legal mechanisms that serve to limit governmental
power. Among the attributes are the rule of law; constitutional supremacy;
respect for human rights; regular periodic elections; and transparency and
accountability.
The rule of law is especially noteworthy in this regard. It facilitates
constitutionalism by requiring that political power be used with restraint,
efficiently, and for the good of all citizens;8 moreover, it emphasises limit-
2
2.1
5 Allen M & Thompson B (eds) Cases and Materials on Constitutional and Adminis-
trative Law (1998) 13.
6 See Okoth-Ogendo HWO ‘Constitutions without constitutionalism: Reflections on
an African political paradox’ in Shivji I (ed) State and Constitutionalism in Africa
(1991).
7 Heywood A Key Concepts in Politics (2000) 124. For discussion specific to Mala-
wi, see Ngwira T & Kaukonde M ‘The role of the courts in the promotion of ac-
countability by the government’ (2003) 7(1) UNIMA Student Law Journal 1-18;
M’meta M & Kayuni J ‘Civil society and constitutionalism’ (2003) 7(1) UNIMA
Student Law Journal 34-44.




ed government, separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial re-
view of executive actions or decisions.9 Constitutionalism would be an il-
lusion in the absence of respect for the rule of law.10 Above all, constitu-
tionalism ensures that, in order to avoid abuse, the government’s power is
limited by mechanisms within the law.
A very strong institution of government, such as a hegemonic presiden-
cy, defeats the ends of constitutionalism by wielding unlimited powers and
flouting the rule of law.
Hegemonic presidency
A hegemonic presidency is one which is so strong that it dominates all
other entities in a political system.11 Such presidencies are no strangers to
African countries, where they are commonly seen as a key to ‘everything’,
that is, a route to accessing state resources for personal abuse.12 By the sa-
me token, hegemonic presidents and their supporters are often unwilling,
sometimes ruthlessly so, to relinquish the presidency due to the power and
scope for abuse associated with it. The hegemonic presidency is also per-
sonalised, thereby forming a neo-patrimonial leadership constituting a po-
litical system of governance dominated by personalised authority and cli-
entelism, private appropriation of public funds, selective resource distribu-
tion and nepotism.13 The result is that the phenomenon of persistent hege-
monic presidency presents a major obstacle to constitutionalism in Afri-
ca.14
As will be argued below with reference specifically to Malawi, hege-
monic presidency flourished under the 1966 Constitution, with a number
2.2
9 Alder J General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law (2002) 27.
10 See Joseph R ‘Africa, 1990-1997: From arberture to closure’ in Diamond L &
Plattner MF (eds) Democratisation in Africa (1999) 13.
11 See generally Prempeh H ‘Presidents untamed’ (2008) 19 Journal of Democracy
110.
12 Prempeh H ‘Presidents untamed’ (2008) 19 Journal of Democracy 110; Diamond
L ‘The rule of law versus the big man’ (2008) 19 Journal of Democracy 138, 145.
13 Abbink J ‘Introduction: Rethinking democratisation and election observation’ in
Abbink J & Hesseling G (eds) Election Observation and Democratisation in Afri-
ca (2000) 11.
14 See Southall R ‘Electoral systems and democratisation in Africa’ in Daniel J, et al.
(eds) Voting for Democracy (1999) 33.
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of its elements continuing to manifest themselves in the subsequent consti-
tutional dispensation of 1995. Thus the presidency has posed a longstan-
ding challenge to the realisation of constitutionalism in this country. The
lesson which emerges is that, since hegemonic presidency is incompatible
with constitutionalism, a constitution which leaves room for the former to
flourish will either place the latter under constant threat or ensure its demi-
se. In view of this, constitutionalism is most likely to be guaranteed if the
makers of the constitution take care that it does not accommodate ele-
ments of hegemonic presidency. There is, hence, a close relationship be-
tween, on the one hand, constitutionalism and hegemonic presidency, and,
on the other, constitutionalism and constitution-making.
Constitution-making
As the term implies, constitution-making is the process of developing a
constitution, a process which in itself is considered a political action.15 In
this regard, the manner in which constitutions are made is as important for
securing constitutionalism as the constitution that emerges as the outcome:
the more democratic the framers, the more democratic the process and its
result.16 Furthermore, ‘[for] a constitution to have real meaning it must be
premised on consensual legitimacy’.17 This entails a process that embraces
the concepts of participation and legitimacy, which are achieved through
popular consultation and ‘authorship’.
2.3
15 See Nkhata MJ ‘Popular involvement and constitution-making: The struggle for
constitutionalism in Malawi’ in Mbondenyi MK & Ojienda T (eds) Constitutiona-
lism and Democratic Governance in Africa (2013) 219-242, 221; Elazar DJ ‘Con-
stitution-making: The pre-eminently political act’ available at http://www.jcpa.org
/dje/articles3/constisramer.html (accessed 27 August 2013).
16 See generally Ginsburg T, et al. ‘Does the process of constitution-making matter?’
(2009) 5 The Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2001, 214.
17 Nkhata MJ ‘Popular involvement and constitution-making: The struggle for con-
stitutionalism in Malawi’ in Mbondenyi MK & Ojienda T (eds) Constitutionalism
and Democratic Governance in Africa (2013) 221.
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Participation: A constitution of the people and by the people
Popular participation affects a constitution’s principles and values as well
as its legitimacy and acceptability. Achieved, inter alia, by consulting the
masses, it makes for an inclusive process that serves the interests of the
people and renders the constitution acceptable to them. Participation can
be understood in terms of degree and quality. It should involve large num-
bers of participants (its degree) and draw in actors from diverse sectors
with diverse interests, notably the socially weak and marginalised (its qua-
lity). In such a case, the constitution will have been made by ‘a majority’
but also have served ‘diverse interests’ rather than only those of powerful
elites. The process, in short, should strive for a product that ‘[integrates]
ideas from all major stakeholders in a country’.18
Legitimacy: A constitution for the people and accepted by the
people
A legitimate constitution is one which citizens believe it is proper to re-
spect and obey; it rests on a grundnorm from which it derives its validi-
ty.19 Legitimacy ‘centrally revolves around the reasons that make the citi-
zenry feel compelled to obey a constitution’.20 These reasons are deter-
mined both by the constitution’s contents and the constitution-making pro-
cess itself. Thus the citizenry will be inclined to obey a constitution in
which they have actively participated.
In this regard, ensuring a consultative constitution-making process
through popular participation increases the likelihood of advancing consti-
tutionalism.21 The failure to do so does not necessarily mean that the re-
2.3.1
2.3.2
18 Ndulo M ‘The democratic state in Africa: The challenges for institution building’
1998) 16 National Black Law Journal 70.
19 See Dias RWM Jurisprudence (1985) 362. The grundnorm is the highest norm in
the hierarchy of norms and the original source of authority from which all laws
derive their validity. See generally Riddall JG Jurisprudence (2002) 128; Dias
(1985) 361.
20 Nkhata MJ ‘Popular involvement and constitution-making: The struggle for con-
stitutionalism in Malawi’ in Mbondenyi MK & Ojienda T (eds) Constitutionalism
and Democratic Governance in Africa (2013) 225.
21 Olivier L & Ludman B Constitutional Review and Reform and the Adherence to
Democratic OPrinciples in Southern African Countries (2007) 6-7.
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sultant constitution will not facilitate constitutionalism,22 given that the
quality of the final text (including its potential to promote constitutiona-
lism) is influenced by a variety of factors;23 nevertheless, a participatory
process plays crucial role in engendering respect for the principles of con-
stitutionalism and, as such, giving them legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.
The making of the 1966 and 1995 Constitutions
Historical overview: 1964-2013
Malawi gained independence from Britain in 1964 and became a republic
in 1966. Post-colonial Malawi has had three constitutions: the 1964 inde-
pendence Constitution; 1966 republican Constitution; and 1995 democra-
tic Constitution. It has also had five presidents: Kamuzu Banda
(1964-1994) of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP); Bakili Muluzi
(1994-2004) of the United Democratic Front (UDF); Bingu Mutharika
(2004-2012) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); Joyce Banda
(2012-2014) of the Peoples’ Party (PP); and Peter Mutharika of the DPP,
who assumed the presidency in 2014 after having won the presidential
elections held that year.24
The country has had two systems of party government. Between 1966
and 1993 it was a one-party dictatorship, but since then – and specifically
under the 1995 Constitution – it has been a multiparty democracy. No-
netheless, it continues to face challenges in achieving constitutionalism.
This is attributable in part to the shortcomings of the 1966 and 1995 con-
stitution-making processes and the absence of effective constitutional me-
chanisms to check the presidency, as will be discussed below.
3
3.1
22 See Nkhata MJ ‘Popular involvement and constitution making: The struggle for
constitutionalism in Malawi’ in Mbondenyi & Ojienda (eds) (2013) 226.
23 For further discussion in this regard, see Elazar (2011); Nkhata (2013) 22, 223,
225.
24 At the time this chapter was written, Peter Mutharika had been inaugurated as pre-
sident following the general elections on 20 May 2014.
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Making the 1966 Constitution
The 1966 Constitution, which replaced the 1964 independence Constituti-
on, was designed to transform Malawi into a republic.25 The focus was on
maintaining peace and unity in order to further development, with the re-
sult that provisions such as constitutional supremacy and a Bill of Rights,
ones which would have facilitated constitutionalism, were sacrificed.26
Malawi became independent on 6 July 1964 under the 1964 Constituti-
on, with Kamuzu Banda as Prime Minister and head of government; the
British Monarch, acting through the Governor General, was head of state.
The only de facto party was Banda’s MCP, which had won a landslide
majority in the elections of 1963. In 1965 Banda formed a Constitutional
Committee to produce what became the 1966 Republican Constitution of
Malawi.27 The Committee was made up of MCP members and chaired by
the party’s secretary general, Aleke Banda. The constitution-making pro-
cess was geared towards a constitution that would achieve unity and stabi-
lity, as Malawi was considered underdeveloped and inexperienced in nati-
onhood. Within merely two months, the Committee managed to compile
its proposals for the constitution, after having held deliberations and con-
ducted consultative meetings in at least three sites.28
These proposals demonstrated the framers’ intention to have a strong
imperial presidency. For example, it was proposed that the president
would serve as many terms as the support of the people determined. In ad-
dition, members of parliament (MPs) would be expected to declare their
support for the president before standing for parliamentary elections.29
The common thrust of the constitution-making process was to have ‘a very
strong executive in general and a very strong presidency in particular’30 in
3.2
25 Chirwa DM ‘A full loaf is better than half: The constitutional protection of econo-
mic, social and cultural rights in Malawi’ (2005) 49(2) Journal of African Law
207, 208; Nkhata (2013) 230.
26 See Chiwra (2005) 209.
27 See generally Malawi Government Proposals for the Republican Constitution of
the Republic of Malawi (1965).
28 Nkhata (2013) 231; Kanyongolo FE ‘The limits of liberal democratic constitutio-
nalism in Malawi’ in Phiri & Ross (eds) Democratisation in Malawi (1998) 353,
359.
29 For more details of the proposals, see Malawi Government Proposals for the Re-
publican Constitution (1965).
30 Nkhata MJ Rethinking Governance and Constitutionalism in Africa (2010) 105.
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the belief that centralised governance would serve to drive national deve-
lopment. The Committee submitted its proposals to the MCP National
Convention held between 13 and 17 October 1965. On the sixteenth, the
Convention unanimously adopted them. They were endorsed by the cabi-
net, and, in time, parliament passed the 1966 Constitution, which was ba-
sed extensively on the proposals of the MCP Constitutional Committee.31
The 1966 Republican Constitution was negotiated by the MCP (through
the Constitutional Committee); proposed and endorsed by the MCP
(through the MCP National Convention and Banda’s cabinet); and passed
by the MCP (through the MCP-dominated parliament). The process, in
other words, served only the interests of the MCP, interests which inclu-
ded the desire to avoid division and create a unified, one-party state led by
a hegemonic president. Put differently, it did not follow the principle of
securing popular participation in constitution-making and, by extension, of
enhancing legitimacy and creating a basis for constitutionalism.
Making the 1995 Constitution
Malawi became a multiparty state after a referendum in 1993. It was
agreed that general elections would be held in 1994 to elect MPs as well
as a president, and that, in order to do away with the one-party dictator-
ship, a democratic constitution would be adopted.
Opposition groups made up of the newly-formed UDF and Alliance for
Democracy (AFORD) parties, pushed the government to establish the Na-
tional Consultative Council (NCC) and National Executive Committee
(NEC) to lead the transition from dictatorship to democracy.32 The NEC
was given appropriate executive powers, while the NCC was allocated le-
gislative powers to spearhead the necessary legal changes, including the
adoption of a new constitution. Comprised of leaders from the MCP, op-
position parties and churches, the NCC hosted a Constitutional Drafting
3.3
31 See Nkhata MJ ‘Popular involvement and constitution-making: The struggle for
constitutionalism in Malawi’ in Mbondenyi MK & Ojienda T (eds) Constitutiona-
lism and Democratic Governance in Africa (2013) 231.
32 Chirwa DM ‘A full loaf is better than half: The constitutional protection of econo-
mic, social and cultural rights in Malawi’ (2005) 49(2) Journal of African Law
210; Mutharika AP ‘The 1995 Democratic Constitution of Malawi’ (1996) Journal




Conference attended by party representatives and other delegates. The
draft it produced was adopted as ‘an interim Constitution’ by the MCP
parliament on 16 May 1994.33
Following the 1994 elections, the Constitution provisionally entered in-
to force on 18 May 1994 under Bakili Muluzi’s UDF-led government. It
was to stay in effect for a one-year period because the consensus was that
it had been adopted in a short span of time (four months) that did not per-
mit sufficient consultation or popular involvement.34 In addition, it was
held that participants at the Drafting Conference did not represent a wide
cross-section of interests and that discussions were dominated by foreign
experts. In view of this, a Constitution Committee was formed to review
the interim Constitution. Its mandate included facilitating education and
consultation; reporting to the public on proposals received; and convening
a fully representative national conference.35
While the Committee failed on the first point of its mandate and the pu-
blic was not aware of its existence, it did discharge the task of holding of
the Constitutional Review Conference in February 1995, which was atten-
ded by a wider range of people than the previous conference. Participants
included politicians, traditional leaders, professionals, businessmen, wo-
men’s groups and youth associations.36 The Review Conference proposals
were submitted to parliament, which adopted the ‘apparently revised’
Constitution – but not before making major amendments and rejecting
most of the recommendations. This revised Constitution came into force
on 18 May 1995.37
Although the 1995 constitution-making process saw improvements on
the 1966 process, several drawbacks affected its credibility. First, the Con-
33 Republic of Malawi (Constitution) Act 20 of 1994.
34 Chirwa DM Human Rights under the Malawian Constitution (2011) 5.
35 Chirwa DM ‘A full loaf is better than half: The constitutional protection of econo-
mic, social and cultural rights in Malawi’ (2005) 49(2) Journal of African Law
211; Meinhardt H & Patel N Malawi’s Process of Democratic Transition (2003)
12.
36 Banda J ‘The constitutional change debate of 1993–1995’ in Phiri KM & Ross KR
(eds) Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking (1998) 322.
37 Republic of Malawi (Constitution) Act 7 of 1995. This chapter relies on the copy
of the 1995 Constitution as last revised in 2010 containing the amendments done
to the Constitution between 1994 and 2010. The first revision was done through
Republic of Malawi (Constitution) Act, 20 of 1994; while the last amendment was
effected by Constitution (Amendment) Act, 11 of 2010.
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stitution was negotiated, drafted and adopted in a short period of time; one
author describes it as a ‘hurried affair, conceived at the end of 1993 and
executed at the beginning of 1994’.38 This does not accord with the prin-
ciple of participation since there was no time for proper consultation. Se-
condly, there was insufficient popular involvement in negotiating the basic
content of the Constitution, which is contrary to the key principles of legi-
timacy and popular participation.39 The 1995 Constitution in fact
was ‘drafted’ by the NCC, a body comprising party-political representati-
ves who assumed their positions not through elections but appointments
by their parties. Thus, the NCC led constitution-making process lacked a
legal mandate from the people to draft the Constitution.
Furthermore, while it was attended by a wider spectrum of participants
than the Drafting Conference, the Review Conference did not remedy the
shortfalls in the constitution-making process. For instance, participation
was biased in favour of elites and people from urban areas; the Conference
was held for only four days, which was not long enough for meaningful
deliberation; and parliament subsequently undermined the Conference by
rejecting most its recommendations.40
It can be concluded, then, that the 1995 constitutional process fell short
of complying sufficiently with the crucial principles of popular participati-
on and legitimacy to increase the likelihood of ensuring effective guaran-
tees for constitutionalism.
38 Banda J ‘The constitutional change debate of 1993–1995’ in Phiri KM & Ross KR
(eds) Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking (1998) 321.
39 Nkhata Nkhata MJ ‘Popular involvement and constitution-making’ in Mbondenyi
MK & Ojienda T (eds) Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa
(2013) 235.
40 See generally Nkhata (2013) 235-236. See also Lwanda J Promises, Power, Poli-
tics & Poverty (1996) 192-196; Hara MH ‘Popular involvement in constitution-
making: The experience of Malawi’. Paper presented at the World Congress of
Constitutional Law, Athens, 11-15 June (2007) 17.
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Constitutional mechanisms relating to presidential powers
Mechanisms under the 1966 Constitution
The 1966 Constitution made Malawi a one-party state under President
Banda’s reign, thereby increasing his power.41 It also concentrated state
powers in the presidency. For example, it made Banda the ‘supreme exe-
cutive authority of the Republic’ with powers to appoint cabinet ministers
and other top public executives as he deemed fit; gave him the latitude to
act ‘in his own discretion without following the advice tendered by any
person’;42 and granted him powers to assign any ministerial position or
government post to himself.43 In 1970 the Constitution was amended to
make Banda the president of Malawi for life,44 further entrenching his
power in that he could act in any manner without being accountable to the
people or fearing removal from office.
The Constitution, moreover, gave the presidency powers to control par-
liament, the effect of which was to render the MCP parliament subservient
to Banda and enable him to fortify his already unlimited authority.45 As
the president, Banda had powers, for instance, to appoint up to 15 MPs
who held their seats at his will and pleasure;46 to appoint or fire the parlia-
mentary speaker at his will;47 and to dissolve parliament at any time,48 a
power which could also be exercised if parliament passed a vote of no
confidence in him or the government or insisted on enacting a bill to
which he had refused to assent.49 Such powers militate against the checks




41 The Constitution recognised the MCP as the (only) national political party. See
Malawi Constitution, 1966, section 4; Chirwa (2011) 4.
42 Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, sections 8 and 47.
43 Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, section 54. At one point Banda held six
government positions. See Nkhata (2010) 118-120.
44 Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, section 9, as amended by Republic of Ma-
lawi (Constitution) (Amendment) Act 3 of 1970.
45 See Nkhata (2010) 119; Muluzi, et al. (1999) 90.
46 Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, sections 20 and 28(2)(i).
47 Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, section 55.
48 Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, section 45.
49 Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, section 35.
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Also contrary to the tenets of constitutionalism was that the 1966 Con-
stitution did not contain a Bill of Rights.50 By implication, the president
had powers to act in the manner that contravened human rights standards,
especially if such action could be justified as falling within section 2(2) of
the Constitution, which exempted conduct backed by law from complying
with the UDHR if it was deemed ‘reasonable and required in the interest
of defence, public safety, public order or the national economy’.51 It is no
surprise, then, that the ‘Banda regime ... was characterised by oppression,
intolerance and lack of respect for human rights, the rule of law and con-
stitutionalism’, not to mention ‘hero-worship, centralised authority struc-
tures, exclusiveness, and intimidation of potential critics’.52 The basis for
this lay in the 1966 Constitution, which created and sanctioned the hege-
monic presidency that so stifled constitutionalism during Banda’s thirty-
year old rule.
Mechanisms under the 1995 Constitution
Malawi adopted the 1995 Constitution to reverse autocracy and usher in a
new order based on constitutional democracy.53 However, although chan-
ges were made to the presidency, other elements of this institution remai-
ned unchanged. Consequently, the 1995 Constitution contains mecha-
nisms that place checks on the continuation of hegemonic presidency; at
the same time, the effect of other provisions is instead to perpetuate it.54
4.2
50 The only reference to human rights was a constitutional principle stating that Ma-
lawi recognised the personal liberties enumerated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). See the Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, section
2(1)(iii).
51 See Republic of Malawi Constitution 1966, section 2(2), as introduced by Consti-
tution (Amendment) Act 6 of 1968.
52 Phiri KM & Ross K ‘Introduction: From totalitarianism to democracy in Malawi’
in Phiri & Ross (1998) Democratisation in Malawi 9, 10; Chirwa (2011) 4; Chir-
wa (2005) 209.
53 J Banda ‘The Constitution change debate of 1993-1995’ in Phiri & Ross (1998)
Democratisation in Malawi 320; Nkhata (2010) 131-132.
54 See generally Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Ma-




Powers to make appointments
The presidency has the authority to make almost all key appointments
across all the branches of government. In respect of the executive, he or
she can appoint ministers and deputy ministers;55 the chief secretary to the
president and cabinet;56 the director of public prosecutions (subject to con-
firmation by the public appointments committee of parliament);57 the in-
spector general of police (subject to confirmation by a majority vote in
parliament);58 and the chief inspector of prisons.59 The president can also
appoint a second vice president, who must come from another party, if it is
necessary in the public interest.60 In addition, the president is responsible
for the appointment of most senior public officers in the civil service and
in statutory corporations, which includes members of boards of direc-
tors.61
In respect of the judiciary, the president appoints the chief justice (who
has to be confirmed by parliament),62 as well as judges to the high court
and supreme court (on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Com-
mission).63 The presidency has powers, moreover, to assign a judge tem-
porarily to another public office. With regard to the legislature, the presi-
dent has the power to appoint and dismiss the clerk of parliament (on the
recommendation of the Parliamentary Service Commission).64 He or she
can also appoint MPs or non-MPs, whether from the ruling or opposition
party, as cabinet ministers.65
4.2.1
4.2.1.1
55 1995 Constitution, section 92(1) and 94(1). The 1995 Constitution does not set the
size of cabinet and does not prevent the president from holding ministerial positi-
ons.
56 1995 Constitution, section 92(4).
57 1995 Constitution, section 101(1).
58 1995 Constitution, section 154(2).
59 1995 Constitution, section 166.
60 1995 Constitution, section 80(5).
61 See generally Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Ma-
lawi Law Journal 66.
62 1995 Constitution, section 111(1).
63 1995 Constitution, section 111(2).
64 See Parliamentary Service Act 29 of 1998, sections 16(1) and 17(1).
65 See In the Matter of Presidential Reference of Dispute of a Constitutional Nature
under Section 89(1)(h) of the Constitution and in the Matter of Section 65 of the
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Furthermore, the president retains powers to make other crucial senior
appointments to institutions with oversight and rule-of-law-related func-
tions. These include the attorney general;66 the law commissioner (on the
recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission);67 and members of
the Malawi Human Rights Commission (from a list of nominees by the
law commissioner and the ombudsman);68 and the chief of the defence
force.69
These powers of appointment are so extensive that they virtually insti-
tutionalise the potential for the presidency to be misused as a conduit, inter
alia, for patronage, clientelism and nepotism; they embody, that is to say,
elements of presidential hegemony and thus stand to perpetuate it, mea-
ning that they are inconsistent with constitutionalism.
Powers of legislative interference
Under the 1995 Constitution, the president may prorogue parliament at
any time as long as it is done so in consultation with the parliamentary
speaker.70 However, the courts take the view that ‘consultation’ means the
president need only inform, and solicit views from, the consulted party be-
fore taking any action.71 Such an interpretation, contrary to the Constituti-
on,72 gives him or her excessive powers to frustrate parliament and advan-
ce personal interests.
4.2.1.2
Constitution and In the Matter of the Question of Crossing the Floor by Members
of Parliament Presidential Reference Appeal No. 44 of 2006 (Malawi Supreme
Court of Appeal, unreported); Fred Nseula v Attorney General & Malawi Con-
gress Party Civil Cause No. 63 of 1996 (High Court of Malawi); Fred Nseula v
Attorney General & Malawi Congress Party MSCA Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1997
(Malawi Supreme Court of Malawi).
66 1995 Constitution, section 98(3).
67 1995 Constitution, section 133(a).
68 1995Constitution, section 131(2).
69 1995 Constitution, section 161(2).
70 1995 Constitution, section 49(1) and 59(1)(b).
71 See the case of State and The President of the Republic of Malawi, ex parte Dr
Bakili Muluzi & John Tembo Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 99 of 2007.




The Constitution also provides that parliament can be convened only af-
ter consultations between the president and the Speaker of Parliament.73
The implication is that, in practice, it is the president who has powers to
summon parliament for a session or meeting in consultation with the
Speaker.74 Considering the powers the president already wields, it is unli-
kely that parliament could meet without his or her consent.75 Thus, the
president can abuse these powers to frustrate parliamentary meetings if the
parliament intends to deliberate on issues that threaten his or her interests.
The president, furthermore, has the power to assign a cabinet post or
other position to the Speaker, a move which compels the office-holder to
relinquish the position.76 This could easily be done if the Speaker is from
the president’s party. Such powers have the effect of making the Speaker
subservient to the president, contrary to the constitutional requirement that
the Speaker, elected by parliament, must discharge his or her duties with-
out interference from any person.77
Lastly, although in terms of the Constitution the clerk of parliament is
answerable to the speaker and serves parliament,78 the legislation that re-
gulates the operation of parliament gives power to the president to appoint
and dismiss the clerk (on the recommendation of the Parliamentary Ser-
vice Commission).79 This implies that the clerk is, in fact, under the presi-
dent’s thumb and predisposed to facilitate the interests of the president ra-
ther than those of parliament or its speaker.
It can thus be observed that the 1995 Constitution gives the president
powers that could be used to place a stranglehold on the legislature, inclu-
ding its speaker and clerk.
73 See 1995 Constitution, sections 59(1) and (3).
74 See 1995 Constitution, sections 59(1) and (3).
75 This is the practical implication of the powers that the president has over conve-
ning g parliamentary meetings and sessions. See 1995 Constitution, sections 59(1)
and(3).
76 See section 53(3)(c).
77 See 1995 Constitution, sections 53(1) and (5).
78 1995 Malawi Constitution, section 55.
79 See Parliamentary Service Act 29 of 1998, sections 16(1) and 17(3). See also Msi-
sha (2012) 66.
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Powers of leverage in independent institutions
The Constitution establishes a number of state institutions and positions
which are supposed to be independent. However, it still manages to alloca-
te powers that grant the president considerable influence over their opera-
tions and public officers. For example, it establishes the Malawi Police
Service as an independent institution within the executive, in view of
which the Police Service is accountable to the courts.80 At the same time,
though, the Constitution grants the president powers in respect of the ap-
pointment and dismissal of the police chief, the Inspector General (IG).81
The Police Service Commission, formed under section 155 of the Consti-
tution,82 has the authority to inquire into the appointment, confirmation,
discipline and dismissal of members of the police service – except for the
IG,83 who is made unanswerable to the Commission.84 It is left instead to
parliament’s Public Appointments Committee to inquire into matters rela-
ting to the IG.85 The implication in practice, then, is that the Police Ser-
vice is answerable to the presidency, even though there is no legal basis
for it apart from the fact that the president has a stranglehold over the IG.
Similarly, the Constitution establishes the Malawi Electoral Commissi-
on as an independent institution entrusted with all matters relating to the
electoral process.86 In view of this, the Judicial Service Commission chair-
person nominates the chair of the Electoral Commission.87 The enabling
legislation, however, gives powers to the president to appoint the other
members of the Electoral Commission in consultation with the leaders of
political parties in parliament;88 but since the courts’ view on consultation
is that the president merely has to get the views of the party leaders before
making the appointments, the president is at liberty to reject these views.
Msisha has correctly observed that ultimately ‘the presidency is by the
4.2.1.3
80 1995 Constitution, sections 153(1) and (2).
81 1995 Constitution, sections 154(4).
82 Section 155(1).
83 Sections 155(2) and (3).
84 See Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Malawi Law
Journal 69.
85 1995 Constitution, section 154(2).
86 1995 Constitution, section 75.
87 1995 Constitution, section 75(1).
88 See Electoral Commission Act No. 11 of 1998, section 4.
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Constitution placed in a commanding position regarding the custodians of
and aspects of the electoral process’.89
Lack of a strong accountability framework
The Constitution lacks strong mechanisms for holding the president ac-
countable. For instance, while it requires that the president, among others,
must declare assets, including business interests and liabilities, on assu-
ming office,90 this is largely ignored.91 The asset law has been revised to
be made more effective, but until it is tested, it is the case that the law as it
stood has proven to be toothless as a check on the president, thus weake-
ning accountability and thwarting constitutionalism.
Powers making the presidency ‘untouchable’
The presidency enjoys certain powers making it ‘untouchable’ and allo-
wing it to get away with conduct that contradicts the tenets of the rule of
law and constitutional democracy. Enumerated below, these powers aug-
ment the presidency to the detriment of constitutionalism.
Powers to fire top public officers arbitrarily
The president is constitutionally empowered to hire and fire most top pu-
blic officers.92 Although he or she is supposed to comply with the rules of
administrative justice and fairness when removing people from office, it
would seem that the Lunguzi case (discussed below) set a precedent whe-
reby the president may fire any public official so long as compensation is




89 See Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Malawi Law
Journal 70.
90 1995 Constitution, section 88A(1).
91 See Nkhata MJ ‘Popular involvement and constitution-making: The struggle for
constitutionalism in Malawi’ in Mbondenyi MK & Ojienda T (eds) Constitutiona-
lism and Democratic Governance in Africa (2013) 211.
92 See, for example, 1995 Constitution, sections 98(3) and (6); 101(1) and 102(2).
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it has not had the intended effect. The reality is similar to that under the
1966 Constitution, where offices were held at the president’s pleasure.
Criminal laws and immunity fortify the presidency
Various laws create criminal offences against individuals for the mere act
of criticising the president. These include the offences of sedition and in-
sulting the president.93 Such laws impinge on the right to freedom of ex-
pression and can be abused by presidents to suppress public scrutiny of
their actions. Moreover, whilst in office the president is immune from cri-
minal prosecution as well as personal civil suits, except if these relate to
orders under the Constitution or statutes to do with human rights obligati-
ons. 94 Immunity of such magnitude makes the presidency a fortress.
Discretionary powers
The 1995 Constitution recognises that the president can exercise any other
powers which are not conferred by law as long as they are exercised in ac-
cordance with the Constitution and are deemed to be incidental duties or
functions.95 This provides a blank cheque to exercise many additional
powers as long as they do not contravene clear legal provisions. Although
the courts would be expected to interpret the provision strictly in favour of
constitutionalism, the situation nevertheless embodies elements of hege-
monic presidency.
In summary, therefore, it can be observed that although the 1995 Con-
stitution was adopted to foster constitutional democracy, it has numerous
provisions conducive to a mushrooming of a presidency with unlimited
powers – a hegemonic presidency that threatens constitutionalism.
4.2.1.5.2
4.2.1.5.3
93 See, for example, Penal Code, Chapter 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi, sections 51
and 50. See also the Protected Flag, Emblems and Names Act, Chapter 18:03 of
the Laws of Malawi, section 4.
94 See, for example, 1995 Republic of Malawi Constitution, section 91(2) and (3);
section 91(1).





The 1966 Constitution provided for a life-presidency. Seeking to avoid a
repetition of this, the Constitution in section 83(3) imposes a presidential
term-limit of two terms. The High Court, sitting as a constitutional court,
has clarified that whenever a person serves two terms of five years as pre-
sident or vice president, he or she is precluded from standing again for the
presidency.96 The term-limit provision thus acts as a limitation on the
power of the person serving as president, thereby promoting constitutiona-
lism.
4.2.2.2 Constitutional outline of presidential powers
The 1995 Constitution has provisions that outline the president’s
powers and responsibilities. For example, section 89(1) lists his or her du-
ties and functions.97 This position is a departure from the 1966 Constituti-
on in that the president would be expected to discharge the duties alloca-
ted under the Constitution.98 The position could also facilitate constitutio-
nalism by preventing arbitrary exercise of presidential powers. However,
as discussed above, section 89(5) has the effect of neutralising the impact
of the listed presidential duties as it allows the president to exercise any
other powers as long as they do not contravene the law. Set against this is
the fact that presidential powers must be consistent with the law and that
the Constitution could act as a check against abuse.
The courts’ judicial powers of review
The 1995 Constitution gives powers to the High Court of Malawi, among-
st others, to review any decision or action of the government, including




96 See State & Electoral Commission v Bakili Muluzi & United Democratic Front
Constitutional Civil Cause No. 2 of 2009, being Civil Cause No. 36 of 2009 (High
Court (Constitutional Court) of Malawi, unreported).
97 Section 89(1).
98 The 1966 Constitution allowed the president to act in any manner without follow-
ing anyone’s advice.
99 1995 Constitution, sections 108(2) and 5.
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ciary could play a crucial role in putting a check on governmental power.
As will be shown below, the courts have stepped in to constrain the exer-
cise of presidential powers on a number of occasions on the basis of this
constitutional mandate. The implication is that if the president acts in dis-
regard of the Constitution, the courts could be called on to review the ex-
ercise of such powers.
The Constitution’s Bill of Rights
Chapter 4 of the 1995 Constitution contains a justiciable Bill of Rights
which could play a role in curbing presidential power. The Constitution
expressly provides that everyone, including the president, is bound by the
Bill of Rights.100 Furthermore, it guarantees avenues for redress in cases
of any threats to the enjoyment of Constitution’s human rights.101 It also
expressly prohibits any governmental or state action that interferes with
the enjoyment of the rights.102 Above all, section 91(1) recognises that the
president is not immune to orders regarding human rights made by the
courts under the Constitution. Hence, any presidential conduct that is con-
trary to the enjoyment of the human rights within the Constitution could
be successfully invalidated.
Other measures: Declaration of assets and impeachment
As mentioned, presidents are constitutionally required to declare their as-
sets on assuming office, a measure which is intended to promote transpa-
rency and accountability as well as prevent abuse of the presidency for
material or financial gain. Nevertheless, as it has proven ineffectual, the
asset law has been revised to address this.103 In terms of the enabling le-
gislation, it will be mandatory for senior political and public officers, in-
cluding the president, to declare their assets, with penalties to be imposed
for non-compliance; in addition, the public will be able to apply to the Di-
4.2.2.4
4.2.2.5
100 See 1995 Constitution, section 15(1).
101 See 1995 Constitution, sections 15(2) and 46(2)(a).
102 See 1995 Constitution, section 46(1).
103 See generally ‘Assets law sparks row’ The Nation 26 April 2014 available at
http://www.mwnation.com/assets-law-sparks-row/ (accessed 2 June 2014).
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rector of Public Officers’ Declarations to access information about the de-
clared assets.104
The Constitution also allows the president and/or vice president to be
removed from office through impeachment in the event of serious violati-
ons of Malawi’s written laws and Constitution.105 The impeachment me-
chanisms could provide checks on presidential powers, whereas the only
means of removal which the 1966 Constitution recognised was the death
of the president.
Accordingly, it can be observed that, unlike the 1966 Constitution, the
1995 Constitution has several mechanisms which, if used properly, could
go a long way in limiting presidential powers. However, as previously dis-
cussed, it also has provisions that perpetuate presidential hegemony. It is
thus relevant to examine how the Constitution has fared so far in practice
in its effort to check the powers of the president.
The impact of the strong presidency under the 1995 Constitution
A number of events demonstrate the extent to which the 1995 Constitution
has variously failed or succeeded in providing mechanisms for checking
presidential powers. This section discusses a selection of them.106
The unstoppable semi-hegemonic presidency in action
Legislative interference: Disregard for separation of powers
On several occasions the presidency has exercised those of its powers that
enable it to dominate the legislature. In 2006 and 2008 President Muthari-
ka prorogued the parliament with the sole aim of preventing it from deli-




104 See Public Officers (Declaration of Assets, Liabilities and Business Interests) Bill
21 0f 2013, section 5 as read with First Schedule; see also sections 17 and 18.
105 See 1995 Constitution, sections 86(1) and (2)(a); Malawi National Assembly,
Draft Standing Orders 208 and 209.
106 Many recent presidential actions impacting on constitutionalism, especially those
of presidents Mutharika and Joyce Banda, have not yet been documented in scho-
larly literature. As a result, this study has had to rely on coverage by the print and
electronic news media.
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being expelled for having earlier defected from the parties which sponso-
red them into parliament and crossed the floor to join the DPP. Mutharika
abused his powers of prorogation to frustrate parliament and serve his own
partisan interests.
In addition, he thwarted parliament’s ability to hold meetings by taking
advantage of the fact that in practical terms the Constitution gives the pre-
sidency a major say in convening these sessions. Indeed, in the later years
of Mutharika’s first term, he reduced parliament to a budget-passing insti-
tution: given that his party, the DPP, did not command a majority in par-
liament and he thus saw the legislature as a threat, he would not approve
meetings other than budget sessions. Even though the Constitution requi-
res parliament to convene at least twice a year,107 Mutharika was able to
defeat these provisions by means of his powers to summon parliament.
In the case of President Muluzi, he invoked his powers to assign a cabi-
net post or another position to the parliamentary speaker in order to force
Sam Mpasu to relinquish this position. Initially Mpasu refused the minis-
terial position and sought intervention from the courts, which ruled in his
favour before finally bowing to Muluzi’s demands.108 Hence, Muluzi ma-
naged to remove Mpasu as Speaker of Parliament even though the Speaker
is elected by parliament. This illustrates a point made earlier, namely that
the president has powers which in effect subordinate to the Speaker to him
or her. It can thus be observed that the presidency has had the leeway to
wriggle through the Constitution and gain a stranglehold over the legisla-
ture.
Manipulating the weak framework of ‘pecuniary’ accountability
Hiding behind a toothless declaration-of-assets law
As earlier discussed, the presidency has frequently ignored its obligations
regarding the declaration of assets. Ironically, even if presidents do decla-
re their assets, the information is not publicised. For example, when Presi-
5.1.2
5.1.2.1
107 1995 Constitution, section 59(2).
108 See ‘Malawi: Court blocks Muluzi's appointment of Speaker as minister’ Pan-
african News Agency 21 April 2003 available at http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/3
378.html (accessed 8 February 2014).
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dent Joyce Banda declared hers, the government refused to make the in-
formation public.109
Becoming instant billionaires
Experience shows that Malawi’s presidents become billionaires on assu-
ming office. For example, when Mutharika became president in 2004, he
declared assets worth about 154 million kwacha (or US$360,000), but,
strikingly, after eight years in office he had managed to amass assets va-
lued at about 61 billion kwacha (US$143-million).110 Similarly, President
Joyce Banda was said to own assets worth billions in kwacha.111 It is not
unreasonable to suspect that corruption and abuse of office could have
played a hand in the acquisition of such vast personal wealth.112
It is noteworthy, too, that presidential incumbents rapidly gain the abili-
ty to make lavish donations at any time yet do not offer explanations as to
the source these funds. For example, President Joyce Banda distributed
maize, shoes and cattle, in addition to which she made cash donations at
her rallies.113 Such largesse sustains a perception that individuals and or-
5.1.2.2
109 See, for example, ‘Joyce Banda’s assets not for public consumption’ Malawi
Voice (Zodiak Online) 6 August 2013 available at http://www.malawivoice.com/
2013/08/06/joyce-bandas-assets-not-for-public-consumption/ (accessed 8
February 2014).
110 See ‘Bingu wa Mutharika amassed wealth worth K61 billion in 8 years of power,
civil society cry foul’ Malawi Today 24 June 2013 available at http://www.mala
witoday.com/news/129300-bingu-wa-mutharika-amassed-wealth-worth-k61-billi
on-8-years-power-civil-society-cry-foul (accessed 30 August 2013). The ex-
change rate at 9 February 2014 was 1US$ to 428K.
111 See, for example, ‘Malawi president Joyce Banda is also a billionaire!’ Maravi
Post 28 July 2013 available at http://www.maravipost.com/scope/op-ed/4203-mal
awi-president-joyce-banda-is-also-a-billionaire.html (accessed 30 August 2013).
112 See, for example, ‘Ex-Malawi leader Bakili Muluzi’s K1.7 billion graft case re-
sumes Wednesday’ Maravi Post 14 May 2013 available at http://www.maravi-
post.com/scope/law-and-order/3779-ex-malawi-leader-bakali-muluzi-s-k1-7-bil-
lion-graft-case-resumes-wednesday.html (accessed 8 February 2014).
113 See, for example, ‘Malawi Pres. Banda says won’t stop giving out handouts’
Nyasa Times 2 November 2013 available at http://www.nyasatimes.com/2013/11/
02/malawi-pres-banda-says-wont-stop-giving-out-handouts/ (accessed 8 February
2014); ‘Malawi top musician Lucius Banda attacks President Joyce Banda on
cows, maize, shoes handouts: Having no idea is a bad thing’ Malawi Voice 14
January 2014 available at http://www.malawivoice.com/2014/01/14/malawis-top-
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ganisations can always resort to approaching the president when financial
assistance is needed: he or she is a money tap that never runs dry. It is a
notion which reinforces, and legitimates, beliefs that the president is (and
should be) a mighty – indeed, hegemonic – potentate. Moreover, Joyce
Banda did not give any indication of where these funds originated, and un-
explained sources of wealth contradict important tenets of constitutiona-
lism such as accountability and transparency.
Becoming virtually ‘untouchable’
As mentioned, the presidency is an ‘untouchable’ institution that can get
away with conduct which contradicts the tenets of the rule of law and
constitutional democracy.
Disregarding court orders
Presidents have defied court orders on a number of occasions without fac-
ing sanctions.114 For example, Mutharika defied a court order to restore
Chilumpha’s benefits as vice president, which had been withdrawn after
the latter’s purported dismissal from office.115 Mutharika also defied a
court order to open the Electoral Commission offices, which he sealed af-
ter suspending it due to allegations of fraud and abuse of funds.116 In the
same vein, he defied a court injunction restraining him from assenting to




-outs-having-no-idea-is-a-bad-thing/ (accessed 8 February 2014).
114 See generally Kanyongolo FE Malawi: Justice Sector and the rule of law (2006)
51-57.
115 See State v The President & Others ex parte Dr Cassim Chilumpha Miscella-
neous Civil Cause No. 22 of 2006 (High Court of Malawi).
116 The State v The President & Others ex parte Malawi Law Society Miscellaneous
Civil Cause Number 173 of 2010 (High Court of Malawi, Principal Registry, un-
reported); ‘Malawi president challenges injunction over elections body’ Pana-
press 14 December 2010 available at http://www.panapress.com/Malawi-preside
nt-challenges-injunction-over-elections-body--13-746168-17-lang1-index.html
(accessed 6 February 2014).
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courts.117 Equally President Joyce Banda defied court orders stopping her
from installing Chief Chikowi and elevating Chief Kapeni.118
In practice, the president is capable of defying court orders, with little
that can be done about it while he or she remains in power. This perpetua-
tes the belief that the president is ‘untouchable’, and renders the doctrines
of constitutional supremacy and checks and balances meaningless.
Wantonly firing top public officers
When a new president assumes power, he or she typically fires most of the
top public officers, including those in government departments, statutory
corporations and public boards (usually without reasons), only to pay them
huge sums of money in compensation for the otherwise ‘unlawful’ dismis-
sals.119 For example, after becoming president, Muluzi removed the in-
cumbent, Lunguzi, from his post as Inspector General (IG) of Police with-
out any reason, as did Joyce Banda in her turn.120 Similarly, all post-1994
attorneys general were removed from office by the president before they
completed their five-year tenure, for reasons inconsistent with section
98(6) of the Constitution.121 The practice fuels perceptions that presidents
cannot be stopped and get exactly what they want; the further implication
of such presidential powers is that all senior government and public offici-
5.1.2.3.2
117 See ‘Bingu overlooks court injunction, signs Injunctions Bill’ Malawi Today 14
July 2011 available at http://www.malawitoday.com/news/871-bingu-overlooks-c
ourt-injunction-signs-injunctions-bill (accessed 30 August 2013).
118 Banda went ahead with the installation and elevation ceremonies despite injunc-
tions against her doing so. See, for example, ‘Malawi president defies court order
on chieftaincy’ BNL Times 26 July 2013 available at http://timesmediamw.com/
malawis-president-defies-court-order-on-chieftainship/ (accessed 30 August
2013).
119 See, for example, ‘Donors to Malawi: Huge payouts to people fired by Banda’s
Govt unjustified’ The Maravi Post 1 March 2013 available at http://www.maravi-
post.com/national/society/3178-donors-to-malawi-huge-payouts-to-people-fired-
by-banda%E2%80%99s-govt-unjustified.html (accessed 30 August 2013).
120 See, for example, ‘Malawi’s new president sacks police chief Mukhito’ BBC
News 9 April 2012 available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-1765599
9 (accessed 10 February 2014).
121 See generally Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1)
Malawi Law Journal 71.
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als are forced to serve the interests of the president (rather than those of
the nation).
Using penal laws to fortify the presidency
A number of arrests have been made pursuant to laws that create criminal
offences against individuals for making critical statements directed at the
president (these laws were discussed in more detail above).122
Using discretionary powers and arbitrary powers based on
practice or tradition
As mentioned, section 89(5) of the Constitution enables the president to
exercise any other powers which are not given under law as long as they
are exercised subject to written law and are deemed as incidental duties or
functions – a ‘blank cheque’ which presidents continue to manipulate in
their favour, given that they have been called upon to resolve issues falling
outside their ordinary ambit of duties and that they thereby reinforce the
notion that, like emperors, they rule by decree.
For example, whenever teachers, university lecturers and students, civil
servants, vendors or others are staging protests over complaints, the presi-
dent is usually expected to intervene in the impasse even if this falls with-
in the purview of another institutional authority.123 Similarly, when two of
Malawi’s football teams, the Silver Strikers and Mighty Wanderers, were
banned from the country’s top league due to violence by supporters at a
match in December 2013, officials and supporters of the Mighty Wande-
5.1.2.3.3
5.1.2.3.4
122 See, for example, ‘Man arrested for “insulting” Malawi President Joyce Banda’
Nyasa Times 18 July 2013 available at http://www.nyasatimes.com/2013/07/18/m
an-arrested-for-insulting-malawi-president-joyce-banda/ (accessed 29 August
2013); Gondwe G ‘Mutharika to arrest journos who “insult” him’ Bizcommunity
12 March 2012 available at http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/129/15/72145
.html (accessed 9 February 2014); ‘Malawi: Republican party chairman arrested
for insulting president’ Malawi Nation 15 September 2005 available at http://ww
w.afrika.no/Detailed/10476.html (accessed 9 February 2014).
123 See, for example, ‘Bingu orders Chanco lecturers reinstatement’ The Malawi De-
mocrat 25 October 2011 available at http://www.malawidemocrat.com/bingu-ord
ers-chanco-lecturers-reinstatement/ (accessed 30 August 2013).
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rers threatened to march to present a petition to President Joyce Banda.124
Thus, it is still believed that the president has powers to do ‘anything’ as
long as it is not contrary to law. This position embodies elements of presi-
dential hegemony in which the president is perceived ‘the Emperor’.125
Furthermore, the president enjoys other powers and titles derived purely
from tradition or practice and without any basis in law. For instance, alt-
hough under section 153 of the Constitution the Malawi Police Service
(MPS) is supposed to be an independent institution answerable to the
courts, the president has the title of Commander of the Malawi Police Ser-
vice.126 As a result, in practice the MPS is answerable to the presidency,
who is regarded as its Commander even though there is no legal basis for
it save for the fact that the president has a stranglehold over the Inspector
General of Police. Msisha sees this development as an illustration of Ma-
lawi’s imperial (hegemonic) presidency.127
In summary, experience shows that the presidency, insufficiently cons-
trained by the Constitution, is semi-hegemonic and continues to exercise
powers that suffocate constitutionalism.
Stopping the semi-hegemonic presidency in its tracks
However, set against the above, in a number of instances constitutional
mechanisms have indeed managed to put a brake on the presidency and
thereby promote constitutionalism.
Presidential term-limit
Malawi’s former President Muluzi attempted to remove the presidential
term-limit of two terms in section 83(3) of the Open Term Constitution
5.2
5.2.1
124 See, for example, ‘Nomads plan demo, won’t play rematch’ Nyasa Times 3 Janu-
ary 2014 available at http://www.nyasatimes.com/2014/01/03/nomads-plan-demo
-wont-play-rematch/comment-page-5/ (accessed 8 February 2014).
125 See Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Malawi Law
Journal 67.
126 See Msisha (2012) 71; Kuwali D ‘The end of securocracy: The future of security
sector governance in Malawi’ (2012) 6(1) Malawi Law Journal 75.
127 See See Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Malawi
Law Journal 72.
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Amendment Bill.128 The Bill was defeated in the National Assembly after
it fell short of the three votes needed for the required two-thirds majority.
If the Bill had been passed, it would have created the possibility of a sit-
ting president winning every subsequent election and thus ruling indefini-
tely, a development that would certainly have thwarted the advance of
constitutionalism.
Furthermore, in 2009 Muluzi unsuccessfully sought the intervention of
the court in his bid to stand for presidency despite having already served
two consecutive terms, his argument being that since he had taken a break
after serving the two terms, the Constitution allowed him to ‘bounce back’
and serve another ‘fresh presidential term’.129 In effect, therefore, section
83(3) of the Constitution acts as a limitation on the power of the person
serving as president and thus promotes constitutionalism.
The courts’ judicial powers of review
The judiciary plays the crucial role of checking governmental power by
acting pursuant to the powers under the Constitution to review any decisi-
on or action of the government, including the presidency, for consistency
with the Constitution.130 On the basis of this constitutional mandate, the
courts have stepped in to constrain the exercise of presidential powers on a
number of occasions. As early as 1994, when Muluzi removed Lunguzi
from the post of Inspector General of Police (IG) and assigned him a di-
plomatic post without giving any reasons, the High Court and Supreme
Court found that the president had acted unconstitutionally by removing
Lunguzi without giving him reasons in writing, contrary to section 43 of
the Constitution.131 Hence, the courts made it clear the president could no
5.2.2
128 Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1 of 2002.
129 See State & Electoral Commission v Bakili Muluzi & United Democratic Front
Constitutional Civil Cause No. 2 of 2009, being Civil Cause No. 36 of 2009
(High Court (Constitutional Court) of Malawi, unreported).
130 See 1995 Constitution, section 108(2) as well as section 5, which recognises that
the courts can invalidate any action of the government that is inconsistent with
the Constitution to the extent of the inconsistency.
131 See Lunguzi case [1994] MLR 72. Section 43 entrenches the right to fair admi-
nistrative action, which includes the right to be heard and given reasons before a
decision that affects one’s rights or legitimate expectations is executed.
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longer act in disregard of the Constitution and that they would intercede to
review the exercise of presidential powers.
Quashing unconstitutional presidential decrees
In 2011 a stand-off occurred between the government and lecturers at the
University of Malawi during the notorious ‘academic freedom’ battle.132
Lecturers alleged the state was using student spies to inform the authori-
ties, including the police, whenever they made comments critical of the
government in their teaching. The lecturers stayed out of classes, saying
these were unsafe places infested with spies; in turn, the president, without
addressing their concerns, ordered them to return to duty. Lecturers then
obtained an injunction against the president’s directive and sought a judi-
cial review of a decision forcing them to attend class when, contrary to the
right to academic freedom, they were being spied upon.133 The courts or-
dered that the injunction should subsist for the duration of the crisis.134
The president, through the University Council, fired lecturers suspected to
be ‘ringleaders’, following which the courts granted injunctions stopping
these dismissals. In the end, the president’s orders came to nought: after
an impasse of eight months, he reinstated the lecturers and gave assuran-
ces that academic freedom would be respected.
Similarly, when Muluzi, allegedly in the interests of national peace and
security, issued a ban on all demonstrations for or against the proposed
amendment to the presidential term-limit (discussed above), the High
Court quashed the decree, finding that it was unconstitutional as it had not
5.2.2.1
132 See generally ‘Malawi: Collapsed dialogue, campuses stay closed’ University
World News 28 August 2011 available at http://www.universityworldnews.com/a
rticle.php?story=20110827181402793 (accessed 30 August 2013).
133 See State & President of the Republic of Malawi & Others, ex parte Chancellor
College Academic Staff Union (Academic freedom case) Miscellaneous Civil
Cause No. 2 of 2011 (High Court of Malawi, unreported).
134 See, for example, Academic freedom case Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 2 of
2011 (High Court of Malawi, unreported); Council of the University of Malawi &
Others v Dr Jessie Kabwila (Sued in her own personal behalf capacity and on
behalf of all members of CCASU and all academic staff of Chancellor College) &
Others Civil Cause No. 24 of 2011 (as consolidated with Miscellaneous Civil
Cause No. 16 of 2011) (High Court of Malawi, unreported).
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been issued in writing and did not carry a presidential (public) seal as re-
quired by the Constitution.135
Reviewing the exercise of presidential prerogatives
President Mutharika appointed a Commission of Enquiry to investigate
the circumstances surrounding the academic-freedom issue discussed
above and to assist in defining academic freedom. University lecturers saw
this as an attempt by the president to interfere with the right to academic
freedom through the back door. Hence, they obtained a court injunction
stopping the Commission from doing its work on the basis that the presi-
dent had misconstrued his powers by, inter alia, seeking to interpret a con-
stitutional provision instead of leaving this to the courts.136 They also mo-
ved for a judicial review of the exercise of the powers by the president.
In another instance, parliament enacted a bill amending a statute that re-
gulated civil suits against the government, purporting to limit the court’s
exercise of powers to grant ex parte injunctions against government or pu-
blic officers.137 The amendment would have watered down the essence of
injunctions as an effective remedy against the government.138 The High
Court issued an interim injunction restraining Mutharika from assenting to
the passed bill, pending the outcome of a judicial review of its constitutio-
nality.139 It is noteworthy that powers to assent to bills and appoint com-
missions of inquiry are among the presidential prerogatives under the
Constitution.140 By curbing them, the Court sent a message that the presi-
5.2.2.2
135 See 1995 Malawi Constitution, section 90; Malawi Law Society & Others v The
President of Malawi & Others, Civil Cause No. 78 of 2002 (High Court of Mala-
wi, unreported).
136 See generally ‘Lecturers stop Bingu’s commission on academic freedom’ Malawi
Today 23 November 2011 available at http://www.malawitoday.com/news/96251
-lecturers-stop-bingu%E2%80%99s-commision-academic-freedom (accessed 30
August 2013).
137 Civil Procedure (Suits by or against the Government or Public Officers) (Amend-
ment) Bill of 2010.
138 The law would have made it impossible to obtain urgent injunctions against the
state without the government being heard and contesting.
139 Although the president defied the court and assented to the law, the injunction
stood and it is unlikely that the courts would respect such law.
140 1995 Constitution, sections 89(1)(a) and (g).
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dent cannot hide behind prerogatives to exercise powers contrary to the
Constitution and the law.
Halting the unconstitutional removal of the vice president
Towards the end of his term, Muluzi attempted to remove his deputy by
filing two cases before the High Court through the Attorney General see-
king a declaration that the vice president (VP) had resigned ‘construc-
tively’ by going on leave during an election year when the resident needed
someone to deputise him.141 The Court found against the president. Simi-
larly, Mutharika tried to remove his VP, Cassim Chilumpha, by announ-
cing that Chilumpha had constructively resigned as VP since he was not
attending cabinet meetings.142 The High Court (Constitutional Court) held
by a majority decision that the VP could not resign constructively; hence,
Mutharika did not succeed in firing Chilumpha.
The Constitution’s Bill of Rights
The justiciable Bill of Rights in the 1995 Constitution plays a role in che-
cking the powers of the president by, inter alia, guaranteeing avenues for
redress in cases of any threats to the enjoyment of the rights.143 The courts
have intervened accordingly. As mentioned, for example, when Muluzi
banned demonstrations around proposed changes to the presidential term-
limit, the High Court quashed the ban for violating the right to demonstra-
te as provided by the Bill of Rights in section 38 of the Constitution.144
In view of the discussion in this section, it can be observed that there
have been instances where mechanisms under the 1995 Constitution have
managed to stop the abuse of presidential powers. However, such mecha-
nisms have often involved the courts, the implication being that it might
5.2.2.3
5.2.3
141 Attorney General v Justine Malewezi Civil Cause No. 10 of 2004 (High Court of
Malawi, unreported); Attorney General v Justine Malewezi Civil Cause No. 370
of 2004 (High Court of Malawi, unreported).
142 See State v The President & Others ex parte Dr Cassim Chilumpha Miscella-
neous Civil Cause No. 22 of 2006.
143 See 1995 Constitution, section 15(2).
144 Malawi Law Society & Others v The President of Malawi & Others Civil Cause
No. 78 of 2002 (High Court of Malawi, unreported).
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have been futile to rely on them on their own and without the force of a
court order.
Conclusion
Diagnosing Malawi’s constitutionalism debacle
Malawi’s experience of constitutional democracy shows that the president
has retained various unlimited powers that stifle constitutionalism. It can
be concluded that, to this extent, the 1995 constitution-making process ga-
ve Malawians a raw deal by not emancipating them from the jaws of presi-
dential hegemony.
This is a theme taken up by authors like Msisha, who seem to blame the
imperial presidency on the constitution-making process, one which left
loopholes allowing semi-hegemonic powers to flourish over the years.145
This suggests that the constitution-makers did not appreciate the implicati-
ons of giving the presidency the benefit of the doubt rather than putting
checks on its powers; in other words, they were under the mistaken im-
pression that hegemonic presidency was a thing of the past buried with the
1966 Constitution. Indeed, it could be said they merely rectified those
powers which Banda had abused rather than developed checks to cover all
potential abuses, for instance, by instituting a two-term limit in view of the
fact that Banda had been made president for life. Similarly, given that he
had powers to hire and fire most senior public officers, they put in a proce-
dure for parliament to have a say in such appointments – ironically leaving
the president with all of the powers to remove most of these, not to menti-
on absolute powers to hire and fire a number of other public officers with-
out any involvement at all by parliament or another body.
As such, the constitution-making process did not put the presidency un-
der close enough scrutiny,146 as evidenced by the fact, amongst others,
that certain presidential abuses have flouted what are clearly strong consti-
tutional provisions, abuses for which the Constitution offers no ready so-
lution. Msisha’s verdict appears to express regret for the missed opportu-
nities in the constitution-making process: ‘The experience of democracy
6
6.1
145 See See Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Malawi
Law Journal 72.
146 See Chimango (2012) 137; Msisha (2012) 72-73.
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over the past 18 years suggests that we were probably wrong in taking tho-
se arguments lightly. The presidency wields too much power in Malawi
due in part to the fact that the Constitution allows it.’147
Therefore, it can be observed that the realisation of constitutionalism in
Malawi will remain a pipedream as long as the Constitution fails to
prevent the mushrooming of a semi-hegemonic presidency. Elements of
presidential hegemony can be traced to Kamuzu Banda’s one-party dicta-
torship, elements which have subsisted in the 1995 constitutional dispen-
sation and suggest that, consciously or subconsciously, Malawi’s presi-
dency has been enduringly conceptualised in hegemonic terms. The presi-
dency is, in practice and theory, still regarded as ‘the owner of everything,
as an untouchable and unstoppable institution, and as saviour and em-
peror’. The difference is that under Malawi’s one party-dictatorship, impe-
rial presidency was created and nourished by both practice and the 1966
Constitution; under multiparty democracy, it was partly created by the
Constitution but nourished through practice. Unfortunately, the 1995 Con-
stitution manages to provide mechanisms for checking only some of the
presidential powers, while leaving unscathed many others which are open
to abuse. As a result, the 1995 Constitution, in its current form, provides
the recipe for the mushrooming and manifestation of the semi-hegemonic
presidency and its consequent perpetual threat on constitutionalism. The
antidote to the constitutionalism conundrum thus lies to a significant de-
gree in checking presidential hegemony.
Searching for the antidote
As discussed at the outset, the purpose of a democratic constitution is ge-
nerally to limit the powers of government. Hence, preserving constitutio-
nalism is crucial to maintaining the democracy which the 1995 Constituti-
on envisioned after Malawi was emancipated from dictatorship. However,
with a flawed constitution-making process having allowed for a renas-
cence of a semi-hegemonic presidency, it can be deduced that the remedy
is to find mechanisms that can quell the perceived and actual manifestati-
ons of such a presidency.
6.2
147 See Msisha M ‘The nature of the Malawian presidency’ (2012) 6(1) Malawi Law
Journal 73.
They Keep Saying, 'My President, My Emperor, and My All'
233
The situation might not be as hopeless as it seems since, as demonstra-
ted above, Malawi’s present constitutional dispensation provides avenues
for checking presidential powers. The drawback, as experiences shows, is
that the president has the potential to act in any manner unless the courts
intervene. Thus, the only interim remedy is to resort to the courts while the
hunt for an antidote goes on. Another avenue could be for Malawi to make
use of the ‘the periodic constitutional review process that the Malawi Law
Commission undertakes’ in addressing gaps and loopholes in the Constitu-
tion.148 Malawi could use this process to identify other mechanisms for
controlling the powers of the president.
Nonetheless, Malawians have to continue to explore other viable means
to identify appropriate constitutional measures that could constrain the ex-
ercise of presidential powers. Among other measures, Malawi should seize
the opportunity that the process of strengthening the law on the declaration
of assets has presented and put in place mechanisms requiring the presi-
dent to account for large disparities between the wealth declared on assu-
ming office and the wealth amassed by the time of leaving it. Furthermore,
it should strengthen respect for the principle of the separation of powers
between the presidency, parliament and judiciary by, inter alia, establis-
hing mechanisms to limit presidential interference in the legislature. In ad-
dition, measures should be taken to deal with practices that elevate the
presidency as ‘untouchable’. For example, the president should be liable
for defying court orders. This will build confidence among the public that
no institution is above the law. Moreover, section 89(5) of the Constituti-
on could be revised or deleted to remove loopholes allowing the president
to exercise powers that are not founded in law.
Indeed, unless Malawi successfully explores the mechanisms that could
be utilised to quell the otherwise unlimited powers of the president,149 the
strong presidency will pose a perpetual threat to constitutionalism.
148 See Nkhata MJ ‘Popular involvement and constitution-making: The struggle for
constitutionalism in Malawi’ in Mbondenyi MK & Ojienda T (eds) Constitutio-
nalism and Democratic Governance in Africa (2013) 219-242, 241. See generally
Malawi Law Commission Report of the Law Commission on the review of the
Constitution (2007). See also 1995 Malawi Constitution, sections 132 and 135(b),
(c) and (d).
149 See generally ‘Malawi lobby pushed for reduced presidential powers’ Africa Re-
view 21 October 2012 available at http://www.africareview.com/News/Malawi-lo
bby-pushes-for-reduced-presidential-powers/-/979180/1608380/-/urchqp/-/index.
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Abstract
This chapter examines legislative-executive relations in Ethiopia in the pe-
riod 1995–2013. It identifies factors that have contributed to executive do-
mination of an apparently sovereign parliament, after which it recom-
mends that a number of legal and institutional reforms be made in order
to swing the balance in favour of parliament. Ethiopia is characterised by
cabinet supremacy rather than parliamentary sovereignty, but the chapter
goes beyond this obvious conclusion by finding that legislative-executive
relations cannot be understood fully without taking into account intra-
party politics and their impact on democratic institutions. Some compara-
tive insights are drawn from selected parliamentary systems to explain
gaps and controversies; the chapter also draws on constitutional princi-
ples, policies issued by the government, laws, the internal regulations of
the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR) and trends observed in
parliamentary practice.
Introduction
The parliamentary system is not new to Ethiopia.1 The 1931 and revised
constitution of 1955 provided for a bicameral parliament, albeit in an ab-
1
1 Ethiopia’s parliamentary practices before 1991 are discussed in several publicati-
ons. For example, see: Berhanu K ‘Parliament and dominant party system’ in Salih
M (ed) African Parliaments: Between Governance and Government (2005); Marka-
kis J Ethiopia: Anatomy of Traditional Polity (1974); Clapham C ‘Constitutions and
governance in Ethiopian political history’ in Constitutionalism: Reflections and Re-
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solute monarchy in which the chambers played merely an advisory role.
The military regime (1974 – 1991) that deposed the monarch ruled by de-
cree until 1987 when it issued a socialist-oriented constitution with some
presidential elements. After the overthrow of the military in 1991 and four
years of transition, the constitution of 1995 established a federal parlia-
mentary system, one which remains in effect to this day.
It is possibly the case, however, that the narrative of Ethiopia’s parlia-
mentary system is taking a new turn. Soon after the death in 2012 of the
prime minister Meles Zenawi, a senior member of the ruling Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) spoke publicly about
the government’s failure to build democratic institutions, notably a vibrant
parliament, quipping that ‘parliament’s programme on Ethiopian Televisi-
on is the least attractive [of them all]’. Likewise, a Member of Parliament
observed that ‘until recently the House of People’s Representatives [Ho-
PR] did not even exercise the right to approve its own budget’; that bud-
get ‘was decided by the executive’.2
As these remarks suggest, Ethiopia’s parliament is regarded as subordi-
nate to the executive, yet it did indeed challenge the executive in the first
half of the 2013 term. While it is too early to tell what this betokens, it
offers food for thought. Is it, for example, simply a transient phenomenon,
the result of temporary political vacuum created by the death of a strong
prime minister, or is it the first sign of emergent institutional reform, an
indication that strict party-discipline is weakening and that the centre of
political gravity is shifting to parliament?
Historical and constitutional basis of parliamentary sovereignty
Modern parliamentary systems first evolved in Europe,3 notably so in Gre-
at Britain where the cardinal principle is that of parliamentary sover-
eignty4. What the latter means is that parliament can make and unmake
2
commendations, Symposium on the Making of the New Ethiopian Constitution
(1993).
2 Former Member of Parliament, conversations with the author. Addis Ababa, April
2009.
3 See Hoogwoods P & Roberts G European Politics Today (2003) 155.
4 Sartori G Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, In-
centives and Outcomes (1997) 101.
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any law whatsoever,5 that a law enacted by parliament is sovereign, and
that, conversely, no individual or institution is allowed to set aside such an
act of parliament.
Although the principle is centrally important, its actualisation was a
slow process spanning nearly three centuries of contestation and negotiati-
on between the monarch and parliament, a process that began with the re-
volution of 1688 and its limitations on monarchical power, saw ministers
becoming accountable to parliament at the end of the eighteenth century,
and entered an especially significant phase thereafter with the extension of
voting rights to widening circles of the population and eventually all
adults.
In sum, the locus of power shifted from an absolute monarch to a sover-
eign parliament, with the result that ‘parliament inherited the King’s omni-
potent position’.6 Crucially, what proved the most efficacious in limiting
the monarch’s power was occupation of seats in parliament by way of
elections, a lesson that is key to contemporary thinking. As it is unders-
tood today, democracy is manifested primarily, if not exclusively, through
elected legislative bodies; at the heart of democracy is the recognition of
the central role of the legislature.
The parliamentary systems of government that originated in Britain and
continental Europe spread to other countries, among them Ethiopia, which
too has adopted the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Although the
country’s parliament is subject to the supremacy of the constitution,7 the
latter enshrines it as ‘the highest authority of the Federal Government’,8
one which expresses ‘the will of the people’ through regular and competi-
tive elections9 and which serves as the primary source of laws. The legis-
lature has the strongest democratic credentials in the state; as for the exe-
5 The adage is that there is nothing the British parliament cannot do except make a
woman a man, and a man a woman. De Lolme’s popular expression is quoted in
Dice AV An Introduction to the Study of the Constitution 10 ed (2008) 43.
6 Koopmans T Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative View (2003) 19.
7 Other limitations include the introduction of constitutional courts as distinct institu-
tions that check the compatibility of an Act of Parliament with the constitution, and
the notion of human rights as constitutional entrenchments by which the lawmaker
must abide.
8 Article 50(3), emphasis by the author.
9 See article 54(1), which provides that members of the HoPR are elected by the
people for a term of five years on the basis of universal suffrage and through direct,
free and fair elections held by secret ballot.
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cutive, it gains its legitimacy indirectly from parliament – as discussed in
the sections below, it comes from and is accountable to parliament. In this
respect, parliament legitimises the executive and is hence a key institution
of governance.
Government accountability to parliament
Examining legislative-executive relations in the context of a sovereign
parliament leads to a second core feature of parliamentary democracies.
Inasmuch as there is a fusion of power between a legislature and executi-
ve, the executive derives from and is constitutionally accountable to the
legislature.10 That is to say, the cabinet, including its prime minister (PM),
is appointed, supported and, if need be, removed from power by parlia-
ment.11
Parliamentary systems, however, are not all the same. In the United
Kingdom (UK)12 the leader of the majority party in parliament assumes
the position of PM, a convention that often results in a one-party cabinet
though not necessarily a one-party parliament – unlike the case in Ethio-
pia’s HoPR, largely dominated by a single party and thus unreflective of
the people’s divergent opinions.
3
10 ‘Parliament makes and breaks the government’ expresses this in an extreme form.
See Giannetti D & Benoit K (eds) Intra Party Politics and Coalition Governments
(2009) 10.
11 Sartori G Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, In-
centives and Outcomes (1997) 101; Flinders M ‘Shifting the balance? Parliament,
the Executive and the British Constitution’ (2002) 50 Political Studies 24.
12 It has been argued that the UK parliament’s supremacy over the executive is
thwarted by the latter’s tight party discipline and procedural control of the House’s
timetable. More than 95 per cent of the bills proposed by the executive are adop-
ted, while 82 per cent of all laws are initiated by the government. See Meny Y &
Knapp A Governments and Politics in Western Europe 3 ed (1998) 189; Flinders
M ‘Shifting the balance? Parliament, the Executive and the British Constitution’
(2002) 50 Political Studies 24: 30-31.
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By comparison, in Germany the chancellor is ‘first among unequals’13
in that he or she is elected by parliament as chancellor and is often not the
party leader.14 Any MP with majority support in parliament has the oppor-
tunity to become chancellor, but once elected, stands above the other cabi-
net ministers as their head and takes responsibility for designing the go-
vernment’s policies. In addition, the fact that the German parliament is
frequently run by a coalition limits the chancellor’s power to establish his
or her government, given that the coalition parties decide on their own
which candidates to nominate for ministerial positions.15 This paves the
way for a more balanced relationship between the legislature and executi-
ve.
Whatever the parliamentary system, though, once a government has be-
en appointed to power by parliament, it must secure a functioning majority
in parliament to stay in power.16 In other words, a government’s durability
depends on continuous support in parliament. Conversely, parliament can
ensure executive accountability17 through a number of mechanisms, the
most prominent of which are the vote of confidence or the constructive
13 Sartori G Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, In-
centives and Outcomes (1997) 102. In the UK the PM is ‘first above unequals’, i.e.
parliament has little role in his or her appointment or the PM’s hiring and firing of
ministers. The PM’s powers are comparable to those of the president of the United
States.
14 Sartori G Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, In-
centives and Outcomes (1997) 105.
15 Oeter S ‘Republic of Germany’ in Le Roy K & Saunders C (eds) Legislative, Exe-
cutive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (2006) 146.
16 Some authors present this as a matter of mutual dependence between parliament
and executive; others, like Sartori, argue that the fact that parliament is sovereign
rules out a reciprocal dependence between parliament and the executive.
17 Related to this is the cabinet’s collegial responsibility to parliament, which applies
differently across systems. In the UK, for example, the PM is first above unequals
and cabinet members are often more accountable to the PM and less to parliament.
In parliamentary systems such as those in Germany, with its principle of ‘first
among unequals’, and Scandinavia, where the PM is first among equals, collegial
responsibility is more apparent. See Cheibub JA & Limongi F ‘Legislative-execu-
tive relations’ in Ginsburg T & Dixon R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law
(2011).
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vote of no-confidence18 in which a parliamentary majority can remove go-
vernment out office.19
The notion that the executive comes from and remains accountable to
parliament is expressly provided in the Ethiopian constitution. With regard
to the establishment of the government, the constitution declares, ‘The Pri-
me Minister shall be elected [emphasis added] from among members of
the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR),’20 while Article 74 states
that the PM is required to submit nominees for ministerial posts to the Ho-
PR for approval. Similarly, in relation to government accountability to
parliament, the constitution states that the HoPR ‘has the power to call and
question the PM and other federal officials and to investigate the executi-
ve’s conduct and discharge of its responsibilities’.21 Furthermore, the Ho-
PR ‘shall at the request of one third of its members, discuss any matter
pertaining to the powers of the executive. It has in such cases, the power
to take decisions or measures it deems necessary.’22
Yet while the constitution ensures parliamentary supremacy over the
executive and is thereby consistent with parliamentary systems, it is not
clear how ministers who fail to discharge their responsibility are removed;
in other words, they are appointed subject to the approval of parliament,
but it is unclear who has the final say when it comes to their removal.
18 For details on the initiation of vote of confidence, see Storm K, Muller W & Berg-
man T ‘Parliamentary democracy: Promises and problems’ in Storm K, Muller W
& Bergman T (eds) Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
(2003) 13-19; article 67 of the Basic Law; Ackerman B ‘The new separation of
powers’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 3:654-655. In Ethiopia, articles 93 and
94 of Regulation No. 3/2006 require the approval of the Business Advisory Com-
mittee and support of one-third of the MPs to initiate a motion of no confidence.
See also article 6/94 of the same regulation.
19 For details on other mechanisms of control, see Meny Y & Knapp A Governments
and Politics in Western Europe 3 ed (1998) 208.
20 See articles 73/1 of the constitution and article 95(2) of Regulation No. 3/2006,
which reinforce parliament’s mandate to elect the PM. Nevertheless, article 97(2)
of the Regulation suggests that the party or coalition of parties with a majority in
the House shall be given the privilege of introducing the candidate PM to the
House through the Speaker, which in turn might imply that the party’s decision
does not, as such, need the House’s approval.
21 55(17) of Regulation No. 3/2006. Article 4(1)(b) goes even further by stating that
parliament has the mandate to control government bodies – a stronger expression
than the softer and commonly-used term ‘oversight’.
22 55(18) of Regulation No. 3/2006.
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The leading precedent in this respect is the Tamirat Layne case. In a re-
port to parliament after dismissing Tamirat, his deputy prime minister,
Meles Zenawi expressly said he was doing so to inform the House of the
decision rather than because such decision-making is a mandate of the
House, hinting that the dismissal of ministers is the PM’s exclusive do-
main. However, under paradigmatic parliamentary systems this is not the
case, because the executive – be it collectively or individually – remains
accountable to the House, and a House dissatisfied by the executive’s per-
formance can take whatever measures it deems necessary.
Constitutionally, Ethiopia is comparable to the German rather than
Westminster system in that the PM must be elected from among the mem-
bers of the House. This implies that he is not necessarily the party leader,
given that two or more candidates can be nominated. In practice, however,
during the first two terms (1995–2000 and 2000–2005) parliament has vo-
ted on the PM’s appointment albeit there was only one nominee for the
position. In the later two terms (2005–2010 and 2010–2012), the party
simply declared its decision to the House as to whom the PM was, a deci-
sion that parliament endorsed without voting on it. The appointment of
Haile Mariam Desalegn as the new PM in September 2012, following the
death of the former PM Meles Zenawi in August 2012, seemed to reinsti-
tute the former practice, however. Parliament was requested to approve
the nomination of the only candidate from the party. The latter indicated
the intention of the EPRDF (or its leader) to shift away from the German
practice to that of the Westminster model.
The significance of these developments is that, due to internal party dif-
ferences, it is possible that two or more contenders for the premiership
could emerge from the same party; accordingly, the House could play the
pivotal role of having to decide between them. If legislative-executive re-
lations were rendered as a triangle, the legislature would occupy the apex
and the executive and judiciary, the bottom two corners. However, compa-
red to the German system, the Westminster version of parliamentary de-
mocracy gives the executive greater leverage since the PM has a dual role
as both head of the executive branch and leader of the majority party in
the legislature, the cohesiveness of this group being enforced by party dis-
cipline.23
23 In Germany and other parliamentary systems the House elects the PM because of-
ten it is composed of a coalition government and there may be no clear majority;
in additon, overlaps between the PM and the party leadership (in parliament) are
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What this discussion highlights is that important contextual factors
shape the operation of parliamentary systems in general and Ethiopia’s in
particular, so much so that in certain cases the executive could gain supre-
macy over the legislature. In this respect, three interrelated factors are cru-
cial: the nature of the dominant political party and its internal rule; the
overlap of functions between key party leadership and the executive; and
the widespread practice of delegated legislation with little or no political
control. The following sections elaborate on them in the context of the
Ethiopian parliamentary system.
Parliamentary-fit party and internal party rule
Parliamentary-fit parties
An effective parliamentary system depends on what Sartori calls ‘parlia-
mentary-fit parties’.24 For a government to stay in power, it must obey
the ‘majoritarian imperative’25 and ensure that its party members in parlia-
ment continue to support and approve its policies; if its MPs rebel, it may
not be able to garner a majority in parliament. The way to achieve govern-
mental stability, then, is to maintain a parliamentary-fit party.
Depending on the nature of the parliamentary system, such parties ma-
nifest their fitness through party cohesion or party discipline.26 Concep-
tually, this is where the political party and its leadership come into the pic-
ture as central institutions defining legislative-executive relations in par-
4
4.1
not conspicuous. See Krotosznski R ‘Separation of legislative and executive
powers’ in Ginsburg T & Dixon R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (2011)
242.
24 Sartori G Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, In-
centives and Outcomes (1997) 102. By this he means parties that do not cross
House party lines when voting. See also see Storm K, Muller W & Bergman
T ‘Parliamentary democracy: Promises and problems’ in Storm K, Muller W &
Bergman T (eds) Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
(2003) 67. The term refers to complex relations between the party and its members
both within the party’s internal decision-making processes and outside of it (usual-
ly in public institutions such as parliament and the executive).
25 See Cheibub JA & Limongi F ‘Legislative-executive relations’ in Ginsburg T &
Dixon R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 222.




liament, because parliamentary fitness is a key factor determining whether
the government is able to sustain itself or is at risk of being ousted. If there
is too little fitness, a government could collapse; if too much, it could turn
into a cabinet dictatorship.
In this regard, authors often draw a distinction between cohesive and di-
sciplined political parties.27 Why do members of a party in parliament vo-
te together and differently to those of another party? One answer is to look
at the sources of cohesion within the party and within parliament, which
can be of two kinds: party cohesion or party discipline.
In the former, party members vote together because intra-party organi-
sation and democratic decision-making processes enable them to reach
consensus on the main issues and thus stand by the positions that the party
adopts. The assumption is that members debate freely inside the party ma-
chinery, after which they present a united front in parliament. In other
words, the party secures loyalty and support from MPs by ensuring the
right to debate within the party. If the party does not do this, the normal
expectation is that MPs may rebel on the floor of the House, potentially
bringing about the collapse of the government and early elections.
Party cohesion is common in Germany and other coalition-based parlia-
mentary systems, where it usually makes for a balanced relationship be-
tween the legislature and executive. For example, the German parliament
has the mandate to set an agenda of its own, one which need not align with
the government’s initiatives. Parliamentary autonomy is further enhanced
by how MPs view themselves, given that Germany is noteworthy for the
way it promotes the legislature’s autonomy by separating parliamentary
and cabinet leadership.
The Chancellor and leader of the majority party are not necessarily the
same person; they have different jobs, and in terms of their hierarchical
positions the latter is not necessarily a servant of the former. By extension,
German MPs tend to see themselves as members of the Bundestag (House
of Representatives) first and members of their party, second.28 King notes
that ‘members of the Bundestag take seriously their work as members of
parliamentary committees and approach it in a non-party or more precisely
27 Giannetti D & Benoit K (eds) Intra Party Politics and Coalition Governments
(2009) 1-6; Cheibub JA & Limongi F ‘Legislative-executive relations’ in Gins-
burg T & Dixon R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 118.
28 King A ‘Modes of executive–legislative relations: Great Britain, France and West
Germany’ (1976) 1(1) Legislative Studies Quarterly 28-29.
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a cross-party frame of mind’, examining bills on their merits and making
concessions on this cross-party basis; as implied by Article 38 of the Basic
Law, MPs represent the people and are supposed to act as a check on go-
vernment.29
In the case of party discipline, however, party members vote together –
be it within the party or in parliament – not so much because there is con-
sensus but because party leaders have the leverage to impose party discip-
line on rank-and-file members. The party and its key leaders take priority
over MPs, who are members of the party first and members of parliament
only second. Through its leadership, the party mobilises voters, finances
election campaigns, serves as a gatekeeper to political careers, nominates
candidates for election and office, and determines the substance of policy
proposals as well as, at times, even the order in which these proposals ap-
pear on the parliamentary calendar.
In a balanced legislative-executive relationship, parliament as an auto-
nomous institution has the mandate to determine its own agenda and rules
of procedure,30 a situation in which the executive proposes and the parlia-
ment disposes (i.e. accepts, endorses or rejects). However, where party
discipline obtains, the legislature takes executive proposals as decisions.31
Through the cabinet, the party has virtually monopolistic control of the
parliamentary agenda,32 a tendency that seems to apply in the case of
Ethiopia. Regulation No. 3 of 2006, Article 32, states, ‘In all cases, a go-
vernment agenda shall be given priority and submitted for debate.’33 The
legislature’s function becomes a mainly executive-driven operation, espe-
cially so in a context where the party system is crucial to political life and
29 King A ‘Modes of executive–legislative relations: Great Britain, France and West
Germany’ (1976) 1(1) Legislative Studies Quarterly 1: 27.
30 Hoogwoods P & Roberts G European Politics Today 2 ed (2003) 155.
31 Laver M ‘Divided parties, divided government’ (1999) 24 Legislative Studies
Quarterly 1:8; Storm K, Muller W & Bergman T ‘Parliamentary democracy: Pro-
mises and problems’ in Storm K, Muller W & Bergman T (eds) Delegation and
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (2003) 71.
32 Flinders M ‘Shifting the balance? Parliament, the Executive and the British Con-
stitution’ (2002) 50 Political Studies 25-26.
33 Article 31 of Regulation No 3/2006 states: ‘Initiating an Agenda: The business to
be debates may be initiated by: (1) The Executive, (2) The Speaker, (3) The Com-
mittees, 4) Members, and (5) Parliamentary groups.’ In practice the executive con-
trols virtually all agenda-setting.
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party members who are also MPs can achieve their career and policy goals
only if they act in line with their party’s preferences.34
The fact that party leaders can employ a carrot-and-stick strategy to en-
sure discipline necessarily also has impact on the autonomy of individual
MPs and the question of whether they are free to decide on matters of pu-
blic concern or must abide by party dictates; a related question is whether
MPs represent their specific constituencies, and are thus merely agents of
those who voted for them, or if they are elected as trustees competent to
decide issues on the floor according to their own free judgment and with-
out instructions from voters.
Ethiopia’s constitution addresses these issues in its declaration that ‘
[m]embers of the House are representatives of the Ethiopian People as a
whole. They are governed by the constitution, the will of the people and
their conscience.’35 Furthermore, it adds that ‘[t]he House is responsible
to the People.’36 The fact that MPs represent people ‘as a whole’ suggests
that they have the mandate to decide national issues freely based on what
is best for the country rather than on the basis of constituency interests. It
should also be noted that the article makes no mention of a party to whom
MPs should defer or consult in arriving at their decisions.
Nevertheless, an MP who is tempted to ignore constituency demands
will pay dearly come the following election; nor can he or she afford to
ignore the role of the party, which emerges as a dominant force influen-
cing decision-making in the House. The reality is thus that there are three
conflicting interests. One is the constituency voter who wants the MP to
address his priorities and concerns; if the MP fails to do so, the voter may
rebel in the next election. Moreover, as noted, parties nominate candida-
tes, finance election campaigns and mobilise voters, which implies that,
through its leaders, the party has full control of the process.
Lastly, MPs are bound by their own conscience. A crucial issue which
arises is this: What happens in the event of a conflict between party priori-
34 Laver M ‘Divided parties, divided government’ (1999) 24 Legislative Studies
Quarterly 1:8; Storm K, Muller W & Bergman T ‘Parliamentary democracy: Pro-
mises and problems’ in Storm K, Muller W & Bergman T (eds) Delegation and
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (2003) 68-69; Flinders M ‘Shifting
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ties and voter/national priorities, or between the latter and the MP’s con-
science? How should he or she decide in such cases, and which interest
ought to prevail? The constitution dictates that MPs are bound by the con-
stitution, their conscience and will of the people, while party discipline
dictates that MPs should obey party lines or be purged from parliament
and the party.
It is here that intra-party democracy is vital. If the party is internally de-
mocratic, it can handle situations where MPs are in a dilemma, and per-
haps also tolerate their deviation from the party line; if not, it gives rise to
party autocracy instead of parliamentary democracy. In more developed
parliamentary systems, the issue of whether MPs who deviate from the
party line on the floor of the House should be tolerated is linked to whe-
ther the government enjoys a large majority or only a bare minimum.
If it is a large majority, of, say, 80 per cent of seats, then a degree of
deviation by MPs from the ruling party does not necessarily put the go-
vernment at risk of losing power. Seen from the perspective of the MPs of
majority party, the expectation is that the legislature would be more auto-
nomous in its functions as there is little or no fear that the government
could collapse as a result of defeat in the House. The size of the opposition
(in this case, 20 per cent of seats) is not significant enough to cause trou-
ble to the government; the legislature can therefore be vigilant in relations
with the government and act as a ‘debating club’.
However, if a government has only a slender majority (for example, 52
to 48), then deviation by two or three of its MPs might be enough to remo-
ve it from power. Here, a party would be likely to impose tight discipline
on its members to toe the party line in parliament to ensure the govern-
ment continues in power. As a result, the parliament has a dilemma in its
relations with the executive in that the fear of parliamentary dissolution
could lead to a reduction of parliamentary autonomy. The compensation is
that MPs stand to enjoy more freedom in the intra-party decision-making
process and that whatever has been approved at the party level will beco-
me government’s/parliament’s decision in the House.
The EPRDF has controlled Ethiopia’s parliament for four consecutive
elections since 1995; in none of these elections has the opposition posed a
threat.37 While this would seem likely to lead to a situation in which
37 Following the 2005 elections, a coalition of opposition parties secured improved




EPRDF MPs would be relatively autonomous, parliament has, on the con-
trary, remained a weak institution unable to monitor the executive, and,
save for the 2005-2010 term (see below), less than vibrant in representing
voters’ concerns.
Two explanations for this are the excessive use of party discipline and
the hegemonic nature of the ruling party. Excessive party discipline, rather
than party cohesions, requires MPs to support the government no matter
what the circumstances, thereby undermining parliament’s role in holding
the government accountable and, in the worst case, turning it into a rub-
ber-stamp institution serving as a mouthpiece for the executive. Where
MPs might otherwise be compensated for this through heightened intra-
party democracy, party documents suggest that the EPRDF has problems
in this regard owing to its practice of ‘democratic centralism’.
According to one such document, ‘members of the ruling party in par-
liament or in other places shall have the right and the duty38 to support the
party’s policy and decisions’39. What is noteworthy is that the need for an
MP’s complete loyalty to the party is in no way linked to any perceived
threat of government collapse or to the size of the ruling party in parlia-
ment. Indeed, the document states that should MPs experience a contradic-
tion between the party’s policy and their own conscience, they have the
option of leaving the party.40 By implication, if the party’s policy and de-
cisions are in contradiction with those articulated in parliament, then the
former prevails over the latter.
While parliament’s supremacy over the executive is stipulated in the
constitution, in practice ‘democratic centralism’ seems at odds with an au-
tonomous, sovereign legislature. A recent publication on ‘democratic cen-
tralism’ and how it is incorporated in the EPRDF’s internal regulation li-
kens it to the ‘command and control/order system’ in the military.41 Lo-
38 If someone has a right, then there must be an entity that bears the duty. So, if MPs
have a duty to support their party, the party has the right/authority/power to impo-
se it on its members in parliament. Something cannot be a right and a duty at the
same time.
39 Ministry of Information Be Ethiopia Ye Democracy Sirat Ginbata Gudayoch
(1994) 66.
40 Ministry of Information Be Ethiopia Ye Democracy Sirat Ginbata Gudayoch
(1994) 67.
41 See the book by the former ruling-party politbureau member, Siye Abraha, Nesta-
net ena Dagninet be Ethiopia (2002) 39-9 and 48. Among the numerous publicati-
ons describing democratic centralism in Ethiopia, see, for example: Bach J-N
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wer-level party members must accept decisions made by the higher level
(hence ‘centralism’); though this does not rule out the possibility of grass-
roots participation and influence over the higher levels of party structure
(hence ‘democratic’), in practice whatever comes from the political lead-
ership must be obeyed at all costs. In short, it is ‘centralism with little or
no democracy’.
If this is so, it suggests something of the nature of intraparty democracy
in the EPRDF in particular and political parties in general. Since the mid-
twentieth century, these have become key institutions of democracy,42 ma-
king it critical to understand their internal politics and the impact thereof
on the wider polity.
In Ethiopia the Party is omnipresent: both within the party and parlia-
ment, voting is more a matter of organisational coercion than of democra-
tic decision-making process. Operating under party discipline, MPs are
consequently not free agents but instruments of party preferences as deter-
mined by party leaders. In effect, the MP’s mandate as trustee is ‘expro-
priated’,43 with the executive occupying the apex of a triangular hierarchy
and the legislature and judiciary, the bottom corners. The legislature is re-
placed in position by the executive; parliamentary supremacy is replaced
by cabinet predominance. As Berhanu aptly remarks:
[T]he Ethiopian Parliament has consistently depicted a feature of dependence
on mainstream centres of power to which it is inextricably linked. ... Successi-
ve Ethiopian Legislatures have increasingly been subservient to the wielders
of power, notably the political executives.44
An important point to draw from parliamentary systems such as Germa-
ny’s is that the government has no monopoly over the parliamentary agen-
(2011) ‘Abyotawi democracy: Neither revolutionary nor democratic – a critical re-
view of EPRDF’s conception of democracy in post-1991 Ethiopia’ (2011) 5 Jour-
nal of Eastern African Studies 4: 641-663; Aalen L Ethnic Federalism in a Domi-
nant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 (2002).
42 According to Przeworski, political parties were detested institutions in the nine-
teenth century, when they were known factions with parochial interests; political
parties are a twentieth-century phenomenon. See Przeworski A Democracy and
the Limits of Self-Government (2010) 23.
43 Cheibub JA & Limongi F ‘Legislative-executive relations’ in Ginsburg T & Dixon
R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 226.
44 Berhanu K ‘Parliament and dominant party system’ in Salih M (ed) African Par-
liaments: Between Governance and Government (2005); Markakis J Ethiopia: Ana-
tomy of Traditional Polity (1974) 178-179.
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da and that bills introduced by the government do not necessarily have
priority:45 the speaker, not the government, defines the legislative agenda.
There is also a degree of separation between party/executive positions and
parliamentary leadership, enabling parliament to maintain a certain auto-
nomy from executive control.
In the light of such lessons, Ethiopia should consider amending its in-
ternal rules of procedure to allow MPs more initiative in the legislative
process and ensure they can set their own priorities, amendments which
could pave the way for a more negotiated policy-making arrangement be-
tween the legislature, executive and ruling party. Furthermore, a healthy
parliamentary system requires a cohesive rather than a disciplined party,
one which does not undermine parliament’s autonomy as a democratic in-
stitution.
The nature of the party system
The party system in Ethiopia also tends to sway legislative-executive rela-
tions in favour of the executive. A thin line distinguishes ‘hegemonic’ par-
ties from ‘dominant’ ones46, and in Ethiopia there are growing doubts
whether the country is a multiparty or one-party state.47 While the consti-
tution stipulates that ‘[a] political party, or a coalition of political parties,
that has the greatest number of seats in the HoPR shall form the Executive
and lead it’,48 thus declaring Ethiopia a multiparty system, the actual poli-
tical practice is more complicated.
The 2010 national and regional elections made it clear that Ethiopia’s
transition to genuine multiparty democracy is far from achieved. The ru-
ling party’s aggressive campaign, its advantages of incumbency (for
example, using government institutions and resources such as the media to
its advantage), its better organisational structure,49 its improved service
4.2
45 Cheibub JA & Limongi F ‘Legislative-executive relations’ in Ginsburg T & Dixon
R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 126, 131.
46 See Sartori G Party and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (1976) 109.
47 Tronvoll has already concluded it is a one-party state. See Tronvoll K ‘Briefing:
The Ethiopian 2010 federal and regional elections – re-establishing the one-party
state’ (2010) 110 African Affairs 438: 121-136.
48 Article 56.
49 The EPRDF has penetrated deeper into rural Ethiopia than any of it predecessors.
Kebele was the lowest unit of government administration the DERG invented. The
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delivery at grass-roots level, and the fragmentation of the opposition50 led
to an electoral outcome dominated by a single party,51 with only one seat
going to the opposition and another to an independent candidate. While it
is premature to conclude, as some have done, that Ethiopia’s multiparty
system is giving way to a one-party state,52 the results certainly do suggest
where the country’s democratisation process is heading.
In this respect, Sartori draws a useful distinction between a dominant-
party system and a hegemonic one.53 In the former, the political system is
not antagonistic to multipartyism as such, but it happens that voters are sa-
tisfied with the dominant party and continue to elect it to office in conse-
cutive elections. Regular and free elections are held, opposition parties ta-
ke part in competitive elections, there are few complaints of irregularity or
fraud in the electoral process, and the outcome is respected by winners and
losers alike.
By contrast, a hegemonic-party system is not competitive, yet, even so,
is not the same as a one-party state.54 Often associated with the ‘develop-
mental state’, it aims to create a political and economic hegemony, for
example by designing development projects that require more than one
term; opposition parties are tolerated so long as they do not pose a threat
to the party in power, but because the latter seeks to retain power at all
costs, the system does not bode well for multiparty democracy. The politi-
cal elite retains control of the political process and economic sector, and
EPRDF has gone further in setting up ‘1 to 5’ units that go down to the family
level for electoral, administrative and other purposes. See ‘And le amist yelimat
weyis ye political serawit’ The Reporter available at http://www.ethiopianreporter.
com/index.php/politics/item/292 (accessed 22 February 2013).
50 There are more than 60 national political parties in the opposition camp.
51 The European Union held that the elections failed to meet international standards.
See European Union Election Observation Mission Ethiopia Final Report on the
House of Peoples Representatives and State Council Election (2010).
52 Tronvoll K ‘Briefing: The Ethiopian 2010 federal and regional elections – re-esta-
blishing the one-party state’ (2010) 110 African Affairs 438: 121-136.
53 Sartori G Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, In-
centives and Outcomes (1997) 102; Cheibub JA & Limongi F ‘Legislative-execu-
tive relations’ in Ginsburg T & Dixon R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law
(2011) 29-30.
54 Cheibub JA & Limongi F ‘Legislative-executive relations’ in Ginsburg T & Dixon
R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 29-30.
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while the government it is not against competition per se, as in a one-party
state, it plays a central role in politics and in leading the economy.55
Particularly in the wake of the elections in 2010, the EPRDF maintains
that Ethiopia needs an Awra, or a dominant, vanguardist party,56 with the
party literature citing precedents for this in countries such as Japan be-
tween 1954 and 1993. Restrictions are imposed on other parties attempting
to stand for election; complaints about election-rigging are common; and
political pluralism is far the order of the day. Competition and uncertainty
of outcome are vital elements of a democratic electoral process,57 but in
hegemonic systems the hegemonic party’s victory is virtually assured; mo-
reover, should it lose an election, there is no guarantee it will peacefully
transfer power.
The EPRDF argues that Ethiopia post-2010 Ethiopia is a dominant-par-
ty system, not a one- party system. The analysis is based largely on com-
parisons with Japan after World War II, yet it does not mention the electo-
ral irregularities mentioned by several international observers, nor, more
importantly, does it address the case, stated above, of hegemonic parties
that occupy the ground between dominant- and one-party systems. Fur-
thermore, while the constitution and electoral laws formally ensure a mul-
tiparty system, irregularities were reported in nearly all of the four elec-
tions between 1995 and 2010.58
The EPRDF plans to have control over the economy and political pro-
cess, something which will certainly create hegemony and which is likely
to embolden its leadership in dominating institutions of governance crea-
ted by the constitution. These institutions are perceived as tools for achie-
ving the party’s economic and political goals rather than checking or ba-
lancing power; as such, contrary to what the constitution declares, they are
not regarded as superior to the party but subordinate to it.
55 Chalmers J MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy
1925-1975 (1982).
56 EPRDF ‘Addis Raey Hamle-Nehase’ (2002) 3 Bulletin of EPRDF 3: 30-38.
57 Cheibub JA & Limongi F ‘Legislative-executive relations’ in Ginsburg T & Dixon
R (eds) Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 29-30.
58 For instance, see Abbink J ‘Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 election crisis
in Ethiopia and its aftermath’ (2006) 105 African Affairs 419: 187; Lyons
T ‘Ethiopia in 2005: The beginning of a transition?’ (2006) 25 Centre for Strategic
and International Studies.
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Post-2005 parliamentary reforms and procedure
The discussion above describes a reversal of legislative-executive relati-
ons in favour of the executive, a shift arising from the EPRDF’s dominan-
ce over the political process in general and parliament in particular. Cer-
tain of its members explain this as a development in common with those
in other parliamentary systems such as that of the UK, but it oversimpli-
fies key differences between the two systems.
While a one-party cabinet may be the norm in the UK, a one-party par-
liament is certainly not. The opposition plays a critical role in parliament:
along with the existence of vigorous mass media, centuries of democratic
parliamentary practice counter-balance executive dominance in parlia-
ment.
An important exception is the third parliamentary period (2005 – 2010).
After the election outcomes of May 2005, the outgoing parliament was en-
gaged during the summer of the same year in making new laws for the
forthcoming parliament composed of the ruling EPRDF and two major op-
position parties, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF). This gave rise to a wides-
pread uproar in June and November 2005 that claimed 192 lives. Once a
larger section of the opposition joined the parliament, it became clear that
the HoPR’s internal rules had to be revised to accommodate this new de-
velopment. Intense negotiations between the government and opposition
led to an agreement that the revision would be based on the parliamentary
practices of India, Germany, Canada and the UK.59
Among the major reforms was the enactment of a new regulation.60
One pitfall of the former practice was that the agenda could be set only
through the ruling party. In the new regulation, agendas for debate and the
time allocated for discussion are to be decided by consensus in the Busi-
4.3
59 See the final report of the committee of experts of all these countries, which made
important suggestions that served as basis for the new rules of procedure of the
HoPR issued in 2006 (Regulation No. 3/2006): Committee of Experts Integrated
Comparative Study of the Rules of Procedures of the House of Peoples’ Represen-
tatives of the FDRE Ethiopia and the Rules of Procedures of the House of Com-
mons of Canada, of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany, of the Lok
Sabha of the Parliament of India and of the House of Commons of the United
Kingdom (2006). [Hereafter The Committee of Experts.].
60 The House of Peoples’ Representatives of FDRE Rules of Procedure and Mem-
ber’s Code of Conduct Regulation No. 3/2006. [Hereafter the Regulation.].
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ness Advisory Committee.61 If this fails, the matter is referred to the floor
of parliament by the speaker for it to be decided by a one-third vote (in a
548-seat parliament).62 The total number of the opposition seats (diverse
in itself) was 173, if all the opposition were to vote together.
In response to this development, a former opposition MP remar-
ked, ‘The irony of the matter is that all of the opposition combined cannot
add up to one-third of the vote of the total members of parliament. It is
thus a foregone conclusion that the ruling party will have a simple majori-
ty vote on any issue either in the committee or the floor.’63 Another for-
mer opposition MP noted that although the opposition may have been bet-
ter represented in parliament than ever before, this did not improve its ef-
fectiveness as the new rules required the support of 18364 members for an
agenda item to be tabled for debate, whereas previously they required only
2065.
Thus, despite the reforms, it remains difficult for the opposition to set
an agenda in the House without the agreement of the ruling party. The on-
ly way to do so is through the ‘one hour a month’ schedule; known as ‘op-
position day’, it enables the opposition to discuss its agenda, as provided
in the regulation.66
Modest efforts were also made to accommodate opposition MPs in va-
rious committees. The number of committees rose from 12 to 13 (even in-
creasing after 2010 to 16), and membership in each committee increased
from 13 to 20, allowing members of the opposition to participate in com-
mittees; in addition, in line with parliamentary traditions elsewhere, the
61 According to articles 32 and 142 of the Regulation, the House’s Business Adviso-
ry Committee is composed of the speaker, deputy speaker and party whips (pres-
umably including the government whip in parliament). It is responsible for key
business related to the House, such as agenda-setting time allocation for MPs in
parliament.
62 See articles 31 and 32 of the Regulation for details; the experts suggested that the
restriction be removed.
63 Zewdie T ‘One year of experience with democracy in the Ethiopian parliament’ in
Muller-Scholl M (ed) Democracy and the Social Question: Some Contributions to
a Dialogue in Ethiopia (2009) 150.
64 Combined, the opposition had 173 elected MPs.
65 Gudina M ‘Elections and democratization in Ethiopia, 1991-2010’ (2011) 5 Jour-
nal of Eastern African Studies 4: 672.
66 See article 35 of the Regulation. For an item to be tabled on the agenda as per this
provision required the support of the majority of the opposition MPs in the Busi-
ness and Advisory Committee.
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budget and finance affairs standing committee was chaired by the opposi-
tion.
Overall, the reforms do not appear to have satisfied the opposition, and
in the 2010 elections such gains as had been made were reversed when the
ruling party took control of 99.6 per cent of the seats in parliament.67 Ex-
perts from the countries from which the reform process drew for its mo-
dels noted that, despite the differences between their respective sys-
tems, ‘all have in common either that the opposition parties are given a
formal role in drawing up the agenda or, as in the UK, are given many
safeguards under the rules and practices of the House to provide space for
them to pursue their own wishes … .’68 In particular, the experts under-
lined the value of understanding the mutual roles of government and oppo-
sition: the former needs to make the necessary decisions, pass laws and
explain policies in parliament; the latter needs to able to criticise the exe-
cutive and present and deliberate political alternatives.69
Because the business of parliament is often decided by a majority, one-
party dominance stands to make the life of the opposition difficult and its
voice insignificant. To minimize this risk, a minority in parliament may be
given procedural guarantees to ensure its voice is heard. Filibustering/
blocking is one such measure, but if it is overused it can create complica-
tions for the majority.70 As a result, certain parliaments make use of a mo-
tion of closure in which the speaker initiates a vote that enough debate has
taken place; if it is supported by a majority, the motion terminates the fili-
bustering. In Ethiopia, the absence of a significant opposition and proce-
dural guarantees to the opposition diminishes parliament’s role of reflect-
ing diversity of opinion.
Given these realities, the post-2005 reforms saw some improvements
favourable to multiparty democracy but did not cause any significant shift
in legislative-executive relations. If such a shift is to occur, it requires an
67 Only two seats exist, one for an opposition candidate and another for an indepen-
dent.
68 The Committee of Experts (2006) 115.
69 The Committee of Experts (2006). The experts recommended that the opposition
be represented in the office of the speaker, for example as deputy speaker (pg 38),
a position which in Germany is occupied by a representative from the largest op-
position party (pg 42). It was also recommended that open, recorded and secret
ballots be introduced in parliament (pg 48).




overhaul of the parliamentary system that goes beyond small, tinkering
amendments to the House’s internal rules of procedure. Indeed, political
scientists have maintained that the most important variable in these sys-
tems is not the number of parties in parliament but the number of parties
in government.71
Currently, the operative law in Ethiopia72 is based on the notion of First
Past the Post (FPTP). In an ideal parliament with three parties, A, B and C
– each with three, four and five votes, respectively, in a parliament of 12
seats – C is the winner even though it secures less than half of the votes; in
fact, seven (the sum of the votes for A and B) of the voters are opposed to
C. Party C obtains 100 per cent of them despite the fact that it has not won
with an absolute majority (‘50’ plus one vote). As for A and B, they get
zero seats, and the votes cast for them are effectively thrown into the dust-
bin. Ethiopia’s electoral system, in other words, discards the preferences
of innumerable voters, while the winner in turn is not necessarily the party
with an absolute but merely a relative majority.73
By implication, Ethiopia has to consider shifting from an FPTP to pro-
portional (PR) electoral system in which parties with a minimum threshold
of five to ten per cent of voter support can share executive as well as legis-
lative positions, a development which prepares the way for genuine
power-sharing and multiparty democracy. A first step would be to reform
the electoral law to require an absolute majority to win in elections, that is,
to require a candidate to win an absolute majority in each district. The
more radical reform, though, as above, would change from an FPTP to PR
system. The latter is a workable instrument for translating voter preferen-
ces into seats in parliament and executive power; whether it would work
in Ethiopia in particular is another question, but this is a debate worth ha-
ving.74
71 See Lijphart A Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 68-75.
72 Article 54(2) states that members of the HoPR shall be elected from candidates in
each electoral district by a plurality of the votes cast.
73 For details see Lijphart A Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 68-75.
74 The challenges of coalition-based parliaments are well known but Germany’s is a
workable example. For details, see Sartori G Comparative Constitutional Enginee-
ring: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (1997) 101; Lijphart
A ‘Consociationalism and federalism: Conceptual and empirical links’ (1979) 12
Canadian Journal of Politics 3: 499-515; McGarry J & O’Leary B The Northern
Ireland Conflict: Consociational Elements (2004) 1-51; Mehler A ‘Introduction:
Power-sharing in Africa’ (2009) 44(3) Africa Spectrum 2-10.
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Overlapping functions between the executive and party leadership
Another factor subordinating parliament to higher-level leadership is the
overlap of functions between key party figures and top government execu-
tives. The EPRDF has a clear tendency to assign party leaders to the exe-
cutive rather than parliament. Almost all party executives are MPs; in turn,
party MPs who do not also hold government portfolios – and who are
hence parliamentarians in the strict sense – are nearly all junior party
members. For example, the EPRDF has not once assigned its deputy-chair
to lead parliament as the HoPR speaker; the rule instead is that he and the
party chairman occupy top positions within the executive.
The resulting problem is what Kaare and Storm term ‘adverse selec-
tion’.75 The executive is bound to prevail in parliament,76 because it is
hard indeed to see how junior political figures in parliament could control
or exercise oversight over their own party leaders, especially so in the con-
text of democratic centralism and party discipline.
Widespread delegated legislation and lack of political control
Central to limited government is the assumption that all administrative
authority must be conferred by legislation. Consequently, if the executive
assumes powers not conferred by the constitution or proclamation, it can
be challenged either as unconstitutional or ultra vires, that is, beyond dele-
gated authority. Delegated legislation is often preceded by guidelines and
principles contained in the constitution or a proclamation. It is, in other
words, a conditional grant of power by the legislature to the executive.
As discussed in this section, the widespread practice of delegated legis-
lation,77 combined with parliament’s failure to exercise effective political
4.4
4.5
75 Storm K, Muller W & Bergman T ‘Parliamentary democracy: Promises and pro-
blems’ in Storm K, Muller W & Bergman T (eds) Delegation and Accountability
in Parliamentary Democracies (2003) 25. It means the legislature as a principal
cannot control the executive as agent.
76 Laver M ‘Divided parties, divided government’ (1999) 24(1) Legislative Studies
Quarterly 8.
77 Powers exercised under delegation from parliament have different names across
jurisdictions. For present purposes they can be taken to mean the same thing,
and ‘regulations’ will be the term of reference used.
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control over it, can be considered as a final factor contributing to executi-
ve predominance in Ethiopia’s parliamentary system.
Viewing the issue in a comparative perspective, it is the case that the
shift in the twentieth century from the laizzez faire to welfare state saw a
huge expansion in the government’s role in the economy and society at
large. Punder argues there are some justifications for this: owing to the
complexities of the modern state and a lack of time and resources, the le-
gislature cannot be expected to get involved in the level of detail required
in regulations.78 In this regard, studies suggest that governing by executi-
ve-issued regulations has become the rule rather than the exception.79 In
the UK some 3,000 regulations are made annually, while in the US the
number increases to about 7,000.80 Similarly, in Ethiopia it is estimated
that the number of regulations issued every year far exceeds proclamations
made by parliament.81
The government’s expanded role is not without consequences, notably
the risk of arbitrariness and abuse of power. Increased executive discretion
through the use of delegated legislation tends towards legislative inflation,
a multiplication of legal sources that creates uncertainty and thereby jeo-
pardises the rule of law. Another difficulty relates to the separation of
powers and the specialised roles of each branch of the state. If parlia-
ment’s main function is to make laws, delegating its powers in this regard
to the executive may reach the point where it undercuts its relevance and,
indeed, its reason for being. In addition, delegated legislation has fuelled
concerns about the ‘new despotism’ of rule of bureaucracy82 and raised
78 Punder H ‘Democratic legitimation of delegated legislation: A comparative view
of America, Britain and German law’ (2009) 59 International Comparative Law
Quarterly 354.
79 Page E Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-Ma-
king (2001).
80 Page E Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-Ma-
king (2001) 4, 14.
81 A recent study indicates that in 1991-2010 parliament made 313 proclamations
and the government, 325 regulations. See Worku L ‘Express repeal of delegated
legislation in Ethiopia’ (2012) available at www.abyssinialaw.com (accessed 10
June 2012).
82 Punder H ‘Democratic legitimation of delegated legislation: A comparative view
of America, Britain and German law’ (2009) 59 International Comparative Law
Quarterly 356.
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the question of whether there are sufficient mechanisms of political con-
trol over such delegated powers.
More importantly, powers exercised through delegation can lead to a
democratic deficit or crisis of legitimacy. Whereas the executive is only
indirectly responsible to the electorate via a legislature which represents
the will of the people, the legislature derives legitimacy directly from vo-
ters; however, overuse of delegated authority causes a shift of significant
power away from the legislature and, by implication, the voters they repre-
sent. To address the democratic deficit and ensure executive accountabili-
ty, then, parliament must exercise political control over delegated legislati-
on.
In the United States (US), the country’s non-delegation doctrine has be-
come largely irrelevant in limiting executive discretion but still applies to
human-rights issues. When fundamental rights and interests are at stake,
the choices must be made not by the executive but Congress, with its di-
verse membership, bicameral houses and multiplicity of voices; the courts
will not permit the executive to intrude on liberty or limit rights without
congressional authorisation.83
Moreover, while the US apparently grants wide powers to the executi-
ve, the latter is subject to a range of political and judicial checks and ba-
lances. For instance, regulations (issued by the executive as a body) and
rule-making (directives issued by agencies or individual ministers) are
strengthened in their democratic legitimacy by the requirement for public
participation. The American Administrative Act provides for participation
by interested persons as a necessary step in all cases of delegated legislati-
on (553 APA). The Act also provides details on the process of rule-ma-
king, which is strictly monitored by state and federal courts.84 Public parti-
cipation thus compensates for the lack of substantive predetermination by
Congress.
Another mechanism for giving regulations democratic legitimacy is to
limit executive discretion by requiring that regulations be made only when
there is an explicit provision in the primary legislation.
In the UK, for example, regulations cannot stand on their own: nearly
all of them must be consistent with the parent law, which implies that the
83 Sunstein C Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2001) 138-139.
84 Punder H ‘Democratic legitimation of delegated legislation: A comparative view




executive has no inherent power to make regulations separately from a pri-
mary source. Delegated legislation must be aligned with the intentions of
the parent law,85 and delegated powers are to be used only for that law’s
express or implicit purpose. Setting guidelines and principles in the parent
law – the details of which are fleshed out by regulation – is ex ante politi-
cal control of delegated legislation and has been termed ‘parliamentary
substantive predetermination of executive rule’.86
The UK also provides ex post parliamentary mechanisms of control
over delegated authority. These take many forms over and above the nor-
mal requirements that the executive report to parliament and reply to ques-
tions. Most regulations are subject to an affirmative resolution procedure
in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, a requirement which
can be met in a variety of ways.
First, the draft regulation is laid before parliament for approval within a
certain period to time to come into effect; here, parliament may annul or
endorse it. Secondly, the regulation is laid before parliament, coming into
effect immediately but only for a specified period (often 40 days), its fate
dependent on parliamentary approval; if there is no approval within that
period, the regulation expires at the end of it. In a third possibility – a ne-
gative resolution – the executive allows parliament to annul the regulation
in a stated period after submission to a special committee; if it is not an-
nulled within, say, 40 days of submission, it remains effective.87
This third practice emanates from Germany, which has even stricter re-
quirements than the UK for issuing regulations. According to Article 80
(section 1) of the Basic Law, ‘The Federal government, a Federal Minis-
ter, or the Land (state) governments may be authorised by a law to issue
statutory instruments [regulations]. The content, purpose and scope of the
authority conferred shall be specified in the law ... .’88 Not only is delega-
ted authority required to emanate from parent law but the parent law also
determines the content, scope and purpose. If this is not complied with, the
85 Punder H ‘Democratic legitimation of delegated legislation: A comparative view
of America, Britain and German law’ (2009) 59 International Comparative Law
Quarterly 357.
86 Page E Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-Ma-
king (2001) 20.
87 Page E Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-Ma-
king (2001) 26; 155-157.
88 Emphasis added by the author.
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Constitutional Court can quash the law. Ordinary courts are also compe-
tent to check the compatibility of the regulation with the parent law.
The Basic Law thus places a substantive limit on parliament’s power to
delegate, given that proclamations must predefine the ‘content, purpose
and scope’ of the delegated authority. In other words, parliament may not
simply give the executive broad authorisation to do as it wishes; more-
over, post-enactment political control applies in Germany as it does in the
UK, in that parliament can veto delegated legislation. These requirements
ensure that, as the representative of the people, parliament bears political
responsibility for all laws issued by the executive, an arrangement that in
turn guarantees the executive’s constitutional responsibility to parlia-
ment.89
The procedures discussed in respect of the US, UK and Germany are all
tools for exercising parliamentary control over the executive, and, more
particularly, for legitimising delegated legislation and thereby addressing
the problem of a democratic deficit. By contrast, Ethiopia has a very weak
system for doing so, with delegated legislation subject neither to prior sub-
stantive predetermination by parliament nor to plenary or committee ap-
proval after having been enacted. Instead a common trend is for the parent
law to make a general statement that enables the executive to issue regula-
tions but which gives little in the way of guiding detail.
An example is Article 34 of Proclamation No 691/2010 on the Re-orga-
nization of Federal Government, which states:
The Council of Ministers is hereby empowered, where it finds it necessary, to
Re-organize the Federal Government executive organs by issuing regulations
for the closure, merger or division of an existing executive organ or for chan-
ge of its accountability or mandates or for the establishment of a new one.
Such a broad authorisation to the executive, literally entitling it to ‘make
and unmake’ itself, does not sit well with the principle that the executive
derives its existence from, and is accountable to, parliament. In this case,
parliament has not so much delegated authority to the executive as abdica-
ted its core function in favour of another branch of state, a function which,
in view of the notion of separation of powers, is arguably non-delegable.
89 Punder H ‘Democratic legitimation of delegated legislation: A comparative view




As Scalia has noted, ‘[t]he legislative power is the power to make laws,
not the power to make legislators’.90
What purpose has it left to serve, then, if a parliament not only delega-
tes a primary function – that of organising, supporting and supervising the
executive – but sets no guidelines or principles in terms of which it could
later check to see if the executive has complied with its intentions? By the
same token, this delegation of authority endows the executive with powers
more comparable to those in a presidential than a parliamentary system,
such a system being one in which the presidents gets a mandate from di-
rect election and remains the sole office for making and unmaking the
executive.
In short, the executive takes away one of the powers of parliament and
at the same time keeps the latter in the dark about what it then does with it
– a situation revealing how emboldened Ethiopia’s executive is and how
impotent its parliament.
A second case relates to the executive mandate emanating from a parent
law. Proclamation No. 587/2008 deals with the establishment of the Ethio-
pian Revenue and Customs Authority and, in Article 19 sub 1 (b), decla-
res ‘the administration of the employees of the Authority shall be gover-
ned by regulation to be issued by the Council of Ministers’. This procla-
mation, in other words, is meant to serve as a parent (enabling) law to the
regulation to be issued by the Council of Ministers. The latter issued Re-
gulation No. 155/2008, in which Article 37 states:
1. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the Director General
may, without adhering to the formal disciplinary procedures, dismiss
any employee from duty whenever he has suspected him of involving in
corruption and lost confidence in him.
An Employee who has been dismissed from duty in accordance with sub
article 1 of this Article may not have the right to reinstatement by the deci-
sion of any judicial body.
The regulation mandates the Director General (DG) with two contested
powers, the first of which is the DG is not required to prove that the em-
ployee is corrupt since a mere suspicion is enough to dismiss an em-
ployee;91 secondly, contrary to the separation of powers, the DG is a judge
90 Scalia A A Matter of Interpretation (1997) 35.
91 Article 20 subsec 3 of the Constitution states that ‘accused persons have the right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty’. Corruption is an increasingly serious
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on his or her own case and has no need to subject it to a court decision or
investigation by an impartial body.
Here, the parliament has set no guiding principles against which the de-
cisions of the DG are to be checked via the institution of political control.
In effect, it wrote a blank cheque, leaving the executive free to fill in
whatever amount it pleases – and, as a bonus, parliament even ousted the
judiciary from adjudicating cases arising from such unlawful dismissal, a
power the executive lacks under Ethiopia’s constitution.
As these examples show, the executive enjoys wide and unrestrained
discretion while the judiciary and parliament exercise little or no control
over it. Executive enactment of delegated legislation is widely practised,
not subject to accountability, and often democratically deficit.
To redress these problems, parliament needs to limit executive discreti-
on in regulations by stating some general principles when it authorises se-
condary legislation. Each standing committee must also be expressly em-
powered by the HoPR to check the compatibility of delegated legislation
of the respective executive wing with the law enacted by parliament. In
addition, the committees need to check whether executive discretion has
been exercised in line with the purpose stated in the legislation. A more
comprehensive reform would require parliamentary approval of regulati-
ons issued by the executive before they come into effect.
Such institutional reforms, it is hoped, would mitigate executive power
and help to restore some balance in favour of the HoPR.
Conclusion and recommendations
This chapter has analysed the Ethiopian case in the light of two key noti-
ons: parliamentary supremacy and government accountability to parlia-
ment. What the analysis demonstrates is that, if Ethiopia is any guide, par-
liament’s role as an institution of democracy hinges on intra-party demo-
cracy, particularly in the ruling party. If the party is authoritarian, parlia-
ment will become a rubber stamp for an executive composed of party lea-
ders, with parliamentary supremacy replaced by executive supremacy,
5
issue in Ethiopia and proving such sophisticated crimes is a difficult job, but one
wonders if it is not possible to fight corruption without violating rights.
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even cabinet dictatorship; if it is democratic, parliament may become a
viable institution for policy debate and oversight of the executive.
Ideally, parliamentary systems require ‘parliamentary-fit parties’ based
on party cohesion, not party discipline. These systems, to be sure, need so-
me manner of party rule at their disposal to ensure that MPs continue to
support their party’s positions, yet that should not be extended to allow
party leaders to impose discipline on MPs under all circumstances no mat-
ter if the government is threatened with collapse or not. The reality is
that ‘democratic centralism’ and an excess of party discipline have com-
promised, if not defeated, parliamentary supremacy in Ethiopia.
It is therefore recommended that there be a shift from party discipline to
the practice of party cohesion. Parliament may then have the means to in-
itiate policy and laws on its own. Through the speaker and party whips,
parliament should have an undisputed mandate to set its own agenda and
revise its internal rules of procedure in ways that restore its supremacy.
Furthermore, the overlap of functions between party and executive
leadership needs to be reconsidered. The fact that heads of the party are
automatically heads of the executive sends the message that, in the opini-
on of the party, the legislative body is of lesser important and encourages
voters to adopt the same attitude. It is crucial to assign key party figures to
head the legislature without assuming executive positions. This new ap-
proach can pave the way for the evolution of the differing institutional in-
terests and enhance parliament’s role as a democratic institution. It is nai-
ve to expect junior political figures in parliament to exercise effective
oversight and control of the executive and the party leadership at the helm
of power.
Closely related to these considerations is the idea that parliament should
represent society’s diversity of views. Except for the 2005 – 2010 term,
Ethiopia has been a one-party-dominated parliament, a state of affairs due
in part to its FPTP system. Revisiting the relevant electoral laws is crucial
to ensuring better representation of diverse political views in parliament.
The absence of ex ante and ex post control of parliament over delegated
legislation and the widespread practice of executive discretion are matters
requiring that parliament give priority to establishing mechanisms for che-
cking the executive. In other parliaments, executive discretion is subject
either to parliamentary guidelines set before secondary legislation is enac-
ted or to approval by parliament after to their enactment. None of these
mechanisms exist in Ethiopia. It is high time to revise parliament’s inter-
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nal rules and establish these practices in order to enable parliament to ex-
ercise political control over the executive.
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Abstract
The post-election violence that brought Kenya to its knees in 2007/2008
was blamed on the poor construction of its post-independence constituti-
on. Like many other countries that turned to constitution-making to resol-
ve structural political and socioeconomic issues, Kenya resorted to consti-
tutional reform in the belief that a democratic and properly designed con-
stitution would address the factors that occasioned instability and vio-
lence. The resultant constitutional negotiations and reform led to a wide
range of institutional and policy changes. The constitution provided for an
independent judiciary and a number of independent commissions; an exe-
cutive that is now limited both in scope and through a robust system of
checks and balances; and a judicially enforceable bill of rights. Moreover,
in a departure from a history of highly centralised and unitary
governance, the constitution devolved part of the national government
power to 47 newly constituted counties.
However, these institutional niceties did not see constitutionalism and
the rule of law becoming embedded in the society’s lived experience. As
the elections in March 2013 showed, power is contested and voters are
mobilised by political actors who behave in much the same way as they
did before the advent of the new constitution. What factors account for
this? What needs to be done to help ensure that the fine institutional de-
signs of the Constitution become part of society’s lived experience? In ad-
dressing these questions posed by the experience of Kenya, I submit that
any attempt to achieve a just, democratic and rule-based political dispen-




In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 post-election violence, Kenya reopened
the process of reviewing the country’s constitution, a process which oppo-
sition and civil society actors had been demanding since the 1990s. This
resort to constitutional reform was informed by a widely held view that
the violence was attributable in significant measure to structural flaws in
the way the Lancaster House constitution had organised power and desi-
gned institutions. The constitutional review process culminated in the ad-
option of a new constitution, one supported by 67 per cent of voters in a
popular referendum and promulgated on 27 August 2010 at a ceremony at
Uhuru Park in Nairobi.
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya promised to usher in fundamental
changes to the legal and political system. It provided for an independent
judiciary and a number of independent commissions; an executive that is
now limited both in scope and through a robust system of checks and ba-
lances; and a judicially enforceable bill of rights. Moreover, in a departure
from a history of highly centralised and unitary governance, the constituti-
on devolved part of the power of the national government to 47 newly
constituted counties. Yet while these are undoubtedly important and ne-
cessary changes, the institutional and policy changes enacted in the 2010
Constitution are not enough on their own to lead to a triumph of constitu-
tionalism and rule of law over the corrupt and violence-ridden politics of
the old regime. In this chapter, I argue that any attempt to achieve demo-
cratic transformation should go beyond the making of a good constitution
and seek to attain democratic politics in a democratic society. Unless it is
accompanied by democratic politics, a constitution in and of itself will not
result in the emergence of a just and democratic system of governance free
from violence.
To the extent that the country’s elites are bent on upholding the political
techniques of the old order, the promise of the 2010 Constitution for ushe-
ring in a new political dispensation would be very difficult to realise. As
the general elections in March 2013 showed, power is contested, voters
are mobilised and political actors conduct themselves in much the same
way as before the making of the new constitution. This clearly indicates
that the success of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution remains uncertain and that it
will depend on the degree to which the country is able to break with the





Amartya Sen’s theory of justice underlines the importance of democratic
politics. In The Idea of Justice, he suggests that the achievement of a just
democratic system should go above and beyond John Rawls’s contractari-
an theory of justice and its emphasis on the virtue of fairness. As Sen
points out, ‘the exercise of fairness through the approach of [the] social
contract is geared, in the Rawlsian case, to identifying only the “just insti-
tutions”.’1 Accordingly, ‘[i]n the Rawlsian system of justice as fairness,
direct attention is bestowed almost exclusively on “just institutions”, ra-
ther than focusing on “just societies” that may try to rely on both effective
institutions and on actual behavioural features’.2
For Sen, it is one thing to identify just institutions, but quite another to
have their ideals realised in practice; in other words, identifying just insti-
tutions does not by itself lead to the emergence of a just democratic sys-
tem. As he maintains, ‘[t]he unanimous choice of the principles of justice
is ground enough, Rawls argues, for their forming a “political conception”
of justice that all accept, but that acceptance may still be a far cry from the
actual patterns of behaviour that emerge in any actual society’.3
From Sen’s insightful critique of the Rawlsian theory of justice, it fol-
lows that the effort to achieve a just democratic system should address
both just institutions as well as the behaviour of political actors and mem-
bers of society. Sen’s theory gains further applicability to the purposes of
this chapter when it is read in conjunction with the distinction Yash Ghai
makes between ‘the enactment of a constitution and the adherence to its
values, institutions and procedures’.4 As Ghai emphatically reminds us,
the ‘notion of a constitutional order is broader than merely the text of the
Constitution. It represents, a fundamental commitment to the principles
and procedures of the constitution and therefore emphasizes behavior,
practice, and internalization of norms.’5
2
1 Sen A The Idea of Justice (2009).
2 Sen A The Idea of Justice (2009).
3 Sen A The Idea of Justice (2009) 68.
4 Ghai Y ‘Decreeing and establishing a constitutional order: Challenges facing Ke-
nya’ African Arguments available at http://africanarguments.org/2009/08/10/decreei
ng-and-establishing-a-constitutional-order-challenges-facing-kenya/ (accessed 20
August 2010). (Hereafter Ghai Y ‘Decreeing and establishing a constitutional or-
der’.).
5 Ghai Y ‘Decreeing and establishing a constitutional order’.
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This distinction between, on the one hand, decreeing and, on the other,
establishing a constitutional order suggests that a just, democratic system
of governance depends on more than the rules and institutional designs of
the constitution itself. Although these are essential, of equal or even
greater importance are ‘the social and political processes, the interplay of
economic, social and ideological interests, which influence, and often de-
termine, the impact of constitutions’.6 As such, in addition to restructuring
institutions of state and enacting democratic policy principles in a consti-
tution, inaugurating a democratic order demands a complete break from
the corrupt politics of the old order and the pursuit of a democratic culture
founded on the rule of law, constitutionalism and human rights.
Such institutional and political transformation necessitates the self-em-
powerment and active mobilisation of various centres of public power as
key elements in the pursuit of the vision and aspirations of the constitu-
tion. In this regard, the role of civil society organisations, individual citi-
zens, professional associations, the free press and public intellectuals is of
paramount importance.
Locating the roots of the crisis
The theoretical framework above provides a means of locating factors that
precipitated large-scale post-election violence in 2007-2008. Two sets of
factors can account for the crisis of the post-colonial state in Kenya. The
first relates to flaws in the design and structure of state institutions; the se-
cond is the emergence of a corrupt and conflict-ridden political culture and
the resultant absence of ethical leadership and a culture of respect for con-
stitutionalism and rule of law.
Post-election violence as a manifestation of a crisis in state
institutions
One of the major manifestations of the crisis in state institutions was the
way in which the power of the presidency had been configured. Since Ke-
3
3.1
6 Ghai Y & Ghai GC ‘Kenyan constitution: The challenges of implementation’ Pam-




nya’s independence in 1963, the constitution was routinely amended and
manipulated to consolidate and over-concentrate government authority in
the hands of the presidency. Although the 1963 Lancaster House constitu-
tion provided for a dual executive authority divided between a president
and a prime minister, it lasted only until December 1964, when it was re-
placed by a pure presidential system. The constitutional change instituting
this system marked the beginning of a series of constitutional amendments
that gave the president absolute authority and control over all affairs of the
state.7
This process saw the rise of a legendary ‘imperial presidency’ reminis-
cent of the all-powerful Ruler of the fictional Republic of Aburiria in Ngu-
gi wa Thiong’o’s novel Wizard of the Crow.8 As had happened with the
Ruler, power had been concentrated in the office of Kenya’s president to
such an extent that, according to the Waki Report, people eventually see-
med to believe that ‘everything flows not from laws but from the Presi-
dent’s power and personal decisions’.9 Indeed, as the Report put it, ‘acqui-
sition of presidential power [was] seen both by politicians and the public
as a zero sum game, in which losing is seen as hugely costly and is not
accepted’.10 Because control of the presidency amounted to control of a
system of patronage for the exclusive advantage of the president’s sup-
port-base, it became the main site of struggle between rival groups vying
for power over the state machinery and the economic prosperity that came
with it.
The accumulation of absolute power in the hands of the president emas-
culated the authority and independence of various state entities. Key insti-
tutions such as the judiciary, the electoral management body and security
organs became entirely subservient to the president. The administrative
bureaucracy served as the machinery for primitive accumulation, abuse,
repression, and the dispensing of patronage; lack of professionalism fur-
ther undermined the role assigned to these institutions under modern de-
7 As the Waki Report established, laws were routinely passed to increase executive
authority, while those laws which stood in the way were either changed or igno-
red. By 1991 the constitution had been amended about 32 times. See Report of the
Kenya Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence available at http://relief
web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15A00F569813F4D549257607001F459
D-Full_Report.pdf (accessed 10 July 2013). (Hereafter Waki Report.).
8 Ngugi T The Wizard of the Crow (2006).
9 Waki Report 29.
10 Waki Report 29.
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mocracy. Consequently, as the Waki Report pointed out, state institutions
were seen as neither credible nor legitimate.11
One of the instruments through which modern states resolve disputes
through democratic process rather than violence is judicial adjudication.
By providing disputing parties an impartial hearing, an independent judici-
ary ensures that disputes do not degenerate into violence. In 2007, the ju-
diciary’s lack of independence from the president and its resultant loss of
credibility led to an institutional vacuum at a time when there was a criti-
cal need for a mechanism to resolve the country’s electoral dispute and
prevent it from escalating, as it did, into Kenya’s worst political violence
since independence.12 There was a widely-held public perception ‘that
Government institutions, and officials, including the judiciary, were not
independent of the presidency, were not impartial and lacked integrity.
Hence, they were perceived as not able to conduct the election fairly.’13
In addition, the electoral commission and security institutions suffered a
similar crisis as the judiciary, in the process losing public confidence in
their ability to discharge their mandates credibly and effectively.14 For
example, deep mistrust of the Electoral Commission of Kenya meant that
opposition politicians had little reason to believe commissioners would
address their complaints fairly.15 The irregularities that blighted these in-
stitutions are described in detail in the Kriegler and Waki reports.
A further structural flaw arose when the country’s first post-indepen-
dence government repudiated the semi-federal system of government that
had been provided for in the 1963 constitution. Regional and local govern-
ments were stripped of autonomous power, with all governmental power
being concentrated in the national government in Nairobi. Ghai describes
the adverse effects thereof in the following terms:
[The] CKRC (Constitution of Kenya Review Commission) noted widespread
feeling among the people of alienation from central government because of
11 Waki Report 29.
12 The Kenya Independent Review Committee Report of 2008 (also known as the
Kriegler Report) 141. (Hereafter the Kriegler Report).
13 Kriegler Report 28.
14 As Ghai notes, ‘The subordination of the electoral commission, the police, and the
judiciary to the executive has resulted in their inability to resolve national pro-
blems, though this is why they are set up, with independent powers.’ See Ghai
Y ‘Decreeing and establishing a constitutional order’.
15 International Crisis Group ‘Kenya’s 2013 elections’ (2013) Africa Report No. 197.
(Hereafter the ICG Report.).
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the concentration of power in the national government, and to a remarkable
extent, in the president. They felt marginalised and neglected, deprived of
their resources; and victimised for their political or ethnic affiliations. They
considered that their problems arose from government policies over which
they had no control. Decisions were made at places far away from them … .
As their poverty deepened, they could see the affluence of others: politicians,
senior civil servants, cronies of the regime. They felt that under both presi-
dential regimes, certain ethnic groups had been favoured, and others discrimi-
nated against. There was particular resentment against the provincial adminis-
tration which was seen as an extension of the president’s office, and of the
arbitrariness and abuse of power by its officials. Local government had lost
its authority and had been deprived of financial resources since indepen-
dence.16
As Michela Wrong puts it, ‘Under both Kenyatta and Moi, the (central)
government’s hold on the Kenyan economy – whether in terms of civil
service jobs, parastatal posts or contracts up for grabs – was … vast.’17 In
the context of the winner-take-all politics of a patronage system, successi-
ve governments used their hold on the economy for the benefit of groups
and regions within their support base. Kenya’s post-colonial period has
been marked consequently by uneven development of the different regions
of the country. As the Waki Report noted, this produced ‘a feeling among
certain ethnic groups of historical marginalization, arising from perceived
inequities concerning the allocation of land and other national resources as
well as access to public goods and services’.18
Post-election violence as a manifestation of corrupt and violent
politics
Considered on its own, the crisis facing state institutions does not fully ex-
plain the 2007-2008 violence. Indeed, that crisis is, to a significant degree,
attributable to the nature of the political behaviour and conduct that has
been nurtured in the country during both the colonial and post-colonial pe-
riods. Corruption, violence, the manipulation of ethnic grievances, abuse
3.2
16 Ghai Y ‘Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan state’ (2008) 2(2) Journal of Eas-
tern African Studies 215.
17 Wrong M It’s Our Turn to Eat (2009) 160. (Hereafter Wrong (2009).).
18 Waki Report, 23.
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of public office and the arbitrary exercise of power have come to define
much of the character of Kenya’s politics.19
Perhaps the strongest manifestation of Kenya’s troubled political cul-
ture is corruption, a problem of such pervasiveness and obscenity that it
calls to mind Chinua Achebe’s treatment of this subject in his essay, The
Trouble with Nigeria. In Achebe’s diagnosis, corruption is Nigeria’s cen-
tral problem, and the same can be said of Kenya. As Wrong aptly notes,
the ‘system of corruption [was] so ingrained, so greedy it was … throttling
the life from the country’: 20
Whether expressed in the petty bribes the average Kenyan had to pay each
week to fat-bellied policemen and local councillors, the jobs for the boys do-
led out by civil servants and politicians on strictly tribal line, or the massive
scams perpetrated by the country’s ruling elite, sleaze had become endemic.21
An equally troubling dimension of Kenya’s political culture, one inherited
from the colonial era and widely entrenched since then, is tribalism.22 Gi-
ven that the government power centrally controlled in Nairobi was used to
the exclusive benefit of the group from which the president comes, mem-
bership of an ethnic group determined the life chances of citizens. Indeed,
as Wrong points out, ethnic favouritism ‘does more than blight life chan-
ces. It can actually kill’. Illustrating this dramatic point, she observes:
A 1998 survey found that Kalenjin children were 50 per cent less likely to die
before the age of five than those of other tribes, despite the fact that most li-
ved in rural areas, where life is generally tougher … . Under Moi, Kalenjin
areas benefited from better investment in clinics, schools and roads.23
Ethnic membership is manipulated and marshalled whether to consolidate
power or to attempt to wrest it from an existing ruling class. In the Waki
Report, tribalism is described as ‘a feeling among certain ethnic groups of
historical marginalization, arising from perceived inequities concerning
the allocation of land and other national resources as well as access to
public goods and services’. The Report notes that
19 See generally Branch D Kenya: Between Hope and Despair 1963-2011 (2011);
Wrong (2009) 160.
20 Wrong (2009) 160.
21 Wrong (2009) 11.
22 Wrong (2009) ch 4.
23 Wrong (2009) 56.
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[t]his feeling has been tapped by politicians to articulate grievances about his-
torical injustices which resonate with certain sections of the public. This has
created an underlying climate of tension and hate, and the potential for vio-
lence, waiting to be ignited and to explode.24
Following the introduction of multiparty elections in 1992, ethnic grievan-
ces have been manipulated so routinely and extensively in the contest for
government power that the practice has virtually institutionalised violence,
particularly during elections.25 According to the Waki Report, ‘[v]arious
reports covering elections held during this period alleged that high-ranking
political figures, civil servants, and others close to the heart of the Govern-
ment organized and used violent gangs to intimidate people in areas of po-
tential opposition support, most of whom were Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kam-
ba, and other groups’.26
The failure to bring to justice those responsible for violence has created
what the Report called a ‘culture of impunity’,27 one that involves the
practice ‘of forming groups and using extra-state violence to obtain politi-
cal power and of not being punished for it’28. This culture of impunity ap-
plies not only to politically-motivated ethnic violence but to corruption.
Thus, in spite of the fact that a number of independent commissions were
established, none of them has resulted in anyone being held accountable
for massive corruption scandals such as the Goldenberg and the Anglo
Leasing scandals.
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya
In addition to its preamble, Kenya’s Consitution of 2010 has 18 chapters
and 264 articles. It introduces important norms, values and principles that
could potentially transform the Kenyan polity from one based on the whim
of politicians to one founded on the rule of law and committed to accoun-
tability and responsible leadership. While the contents of the 2010 Consti-
tution were shaped by political compromises meant to accommodate the
4
24 Waki Report 29.
25 See Branch D Kenya: Between Hope and Despair 1963-2011 (2011) 197-215;
Waki Report 25.
26 Waki Report 25-26.
27 Waki Report 26.
28 Waki Report 26.
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diverse interests of Kenya’s political elites, the Constitution also introdu-
ced substantive institutional and policy changes. With their aim and pro-
mise of ushering in a new democratic order in Kenya, the changes have
received the support of vast majority of the public.
Establishing just institutions
The logic of the analytical framework developed in this chapter, one based
on Sen’s theory, suggests that the first step for achieving a just and demo-
cratic system is the establishment of just institutions. This objective was
central to the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. At the institutional level, the
most important changes include the attempt to reconfigure the power of
the president, the establishment of a system of devolved government, and
the restructuring of the judiciary and the election management system.
Demolishing the imperial presidency and boosting the role of
parliament
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya redefined the power configuration of the
executive branch of government. Before it was quashed at the stage of the
Parliamentary Select Committee, the draft that the technical experts sub-
mitted proposed a shift from a purely presidential system to a mixed sys-
tem of government in which executive power is divided between a presi-
dent and prime minister.29 Despite the defeat of the dual executive system
at the parliamentary stage of the constitution-making process, the 2010
Constitution introduced changes that have curbed to a degree the scope of
executive power vested in the president and which have institutionalised a
system of checks and balances, albeit that the system is not far-reaching.
In terms of redefining the balance of power in the relationship between
the executive and the other branches of government, the 2010 Constitution
did a good job of institutionalising separations of powers and the system
of checks and balances. Unlike the case in the old system, the president
cannot be a member of parliament; in addition, the practice of appointing
4.1
4.1.1
29 The proposal divided the two camps in the Government of National Unity into op-
posing positions, with President Kibaki and his party rejecting the proposal and
Prime Minister Raila Odinga supporting it.
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cabinet ministers from members of parliament has been abolished, thereby
substantially reducing the influence of the executive over parliament. Si-
milarly, the president can no longer suspend or dissolve the national as-
sembly; its members will be elected to fixed five-year terms.
Significantly, the 2010 Constitution enhanced the authority of the legis-
lature and the judiciary to enable them to exercise effective checks and ba-
lances over the executive. Key presidential appointments are subject to
vetting and approval by parliament.30 The role of the president in the ap-
pointment of members of the judiciary has also been drastically reduced
and replaced by a transparent, independent selection process.
The Constitution established a bi-cameral parliament, with a legislative
assembly and a senate. The senate will have a limited role in developing
legislation and will function primarily as a checks-and-balance mechanism
for legislation developed by the Members of Parliament (MPs) in the le-
gislative assembly. The senate will also be able to oversee the activities of
the executive. In particular, the senate can impeach the president of Kenya
if circumstances require that this be done. The parliament has powers of
accountability, such as reviewing the conduct of the executive (including
that of the president) and exercising oversight over state organs.
In order to entrench the accountability of MPs to the people, the 2010
Constitution also provides for the right of recall, allowing the electorate to
remove an MP through a vote of no confidence. Furthermore, public parti-
cipation in the conduct of parliament has been made a constitutional obli-
gation.
In terms of curbing the power of the president, the most substantive
change introduced under the 2010 Constitution is the removal of the aut-
hority of the president over regional governments. This puts a limit on the
traditional powers of the president in a number of ways, including deter-
mination of the appointment of regional governments and the distribution
of resources. The entrenchment of an enforceable bill of rights adds fur-
ther limitations to the president’s power.
However, as significant as these limitations are, their impact on the aut-
hority of the president is not far-reaching, given that most of the powers of
the president have been left almost intact. The president retains the power
to constitute offices in the public service and make government appoint-
ments.
30 See articles 95, 152, 166, 228 and 229.
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Devolving government authority
Devolution of government is another important change introduced under
the 2010 Constitution. Article 176 provides that there shall be a county go-
vernment for each county, consisting of a county assembly and a county
executive. Accordingly, apart from the national government, the Constitu-
tion envisages the establishment of 47 county governments. In a departure
from the previous highly centralised unitary state structure, government
power is now divided between the central government and the county go-
vernments. This has not only led to a reduction in and limitation on the
authority of the central government, but has also created the possibility for
county representatives to participate in national policy-making through a
second house of parliament, the senate, in which they are represented.
While the system carries, and may itself encounter, certain challenges at
the stage of implementation, it has substantially eroded the over-centrali-
sation of power in Nairobi by constitutionally assigning certain forms of
political and financial authority to county-level governments.31 This con-
stitutes potentially one of the most transformative changes in the organisa-
tion and distribution of government power.
Rectifying the deficiencies of state institutions
The 2010 Constitution envisages a process for substantive reform of vari-
ous institutions of the state. While the reform covers all organs of the
state, among the most notable of these are the judiciary and the electoral
management body.
In an effort to reinstate the credibility of the judiciary, the 2010 Consti-
tution provides for mechanisms for boosting and securing its indepen-
dence. Administrative and political independence of the judiciary is to be
secured through the establishment of the Judicial Services Commission
(JSC), a body with the authority to nominate judicial appointees in a legal-
ly established and transparent process. For example, in April 2011, after
the president withdrew his nomination of Justice Alnasir Visram as the
Chief Justice and deferred to the JSC, the Commission conducted public
interviews of the candidates short-listed for the offices. Judicial office-
4.1.2
4.1.3
31 Ghai Y ‘Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan state’ (2008) 2(2) Journal of Eas-
tern African Studies 215.
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holders such as the chief justice (CJ), deputy chief justice as well as
judges and magistrates were appointed on the basis of a more rigorous,
thorough, competitive and transparent recruitment process.
The judicial restructuring envisaged in the Constitution involves not on-
ly ensuring the independence of the judiciary but also restoring its integri-
ty and credibility. Accordingly, the Constitution provides for justices and
magistrates to be vetted in order to identify and dismiss those found to be
corrupt, impartial and incompetent. This is undertaken in accordance with
article 73 of the Constitution and the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates
Act (2011).32
The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) is es-
tablished by section 88 of the 2010 Constitution. Since the failure of the
Electoral Commission of Kenya in 2007 was attributable to the unilateral
control the president exercised over the election of its members, the 2010
Constitution requires that commissioners to the IEBC be appointed
through a consultative and more transparent process. This has led to the
emergence of an electoral management body that enjoys greater indepen-
dence and credibility than was the case in 2007. As one report put it: ‘A
selection panel, set up in August 2011 through consultations between pres-
ident and prime minister, identified commissioners who were formally
nominated by the president. The list was vetted and approved by parlia-
ment in transparent hearings, some of which were even streamed on-
line.’33
Breaking from the corrupt and conflict-ridden politics of the old order
As the analytical framework adopted in this chapter makes clear, one of
the most significant contributions of Sen’s theory of justice compared to
the Rawlsian theory is its emphasis on the notion that the conduct of poli-
tical actors and members of society is a key element of a just and demo-
cratic system. Applied to the discussion at hand, it suggests that while ha-
ving a just and effective constitution is important, constitutional change in
itself cannot be expected to serve as a panacea for Kenya’s social and poli-
tical woes. Indeed, as Yash Ghai would remind us, the constitution does
4.2
32 Article 73 outlines the required qualities of leadership, which include competence,
integrity and accountability.
33 ICG Report 19.
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not have arms and legs of its own by which to transform Kenya. For the
constitution to effect the required changes, what is required is more than a
redesign of institutions and restructuring of political power. Equally im-
portant, if not more so, is that a culture of constitutionalism should be im-
planted in the psyche of the Kenyan people, including its leaders – a cul-
ture of respecting the rule of law and abiding by the dictates of the consti-
tution and its values.
To this end, it is imperative that the Constitution provide for a complete
break from the country’s corrupt, authoritarian, violent political culture
and put in place provisions that nurture ethical, democratic and rule-based
politics. In this respect, what the late Ismail Mohamed, Chief Justice of
South Africa, said of South Africa’s constitution is most instructive:
In some countries the Constitution only formalizes, in a legal instrument, a
historical consensus of values and aspirations evolved incrementally from a
stable and unbroken past to accommodate the needs of the future. The South
African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is defensi-
ble and represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, that part
of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and repressive,
and a vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalis-
tic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos expressly articulated in the
Constitution. The contrast between the past which it repudiates and the future
to which it seeks to commit the nation is stark and dramatic. The past institu-
tionalized and legitimised racism.34
In a similar fashion, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya seeks to mark a de-
cisive break from a culture characterised by tribalism, corruption, vio-
lence, impunity and disregard for constitutionalism and rule of law. Ac-
cordingly, it elaborates on the values to which state institutions and hol-
ders of public office should adhere. The preamble asserts the aspirations
of all Kenyans for a government based on the essential values of human
rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law.
Article 10 of the Constitution outlines national values and principles of
governance, which include (a) patriotism, national unity, sharing and de-
volution of power, the rule of law, democracy and participation of the peo-
ple; (b) human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, hu-
man rights, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalised; (c)
good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability; and (d) sus-
tainable development.
34 See The State v T Makwanyane and M Mchunu 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 262.
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Additionally and most notably, the Constitution dedicates an entire
chapter (Chapter 6) to articulating the qualities of ethical and democratic
leadership. The chapter requires that state officers (elected leaders includ-
ed) meet appropriate standards of integrity, ethics, and morality. To give
effect to the provisions of the Charter, article 80 of the Constitution pro-
vides that parliament should enact legislation establishing procedures and
mechanisms for the effective administration of Chapter Six. It further
tasks parliament with making relevant laws for ensuring the promotion of
the principles of leadership and integrity and for the enforcement of the
chapter.
The inadequacy of constitutional reform and the persistence of old-
regime politics
In an assertion that captures the emphasis the analytical framework puts
on the conduct and behaviour of political actors and members of society,
the Commission on the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) rightly
pointed out that ‘[c]onstitutional building as well as constitutionalism re-
quire positive reaction and response from every citizen. The absence of
good values from the citizenry and government officials is a significant
challenge to the implementation of process.’35 This requires one to look
beyond the Constitution and examine the political practice and disposition
of the political forces that control and shape the exercise of government
power.
The political elites that dominate Kenya’s politics – and the manner in
which politics has been conducted since the adoption of the 2010 Consti-
tution – illustrate Sen’s argument that the ‘political conception’ of justice,
one which all accept in theory, can be ‘a far cry from the actual patterns of
behaviour that emerge in any actual society’.36 While it could be said the
2010 Constitution was largely successful in establishing just institutions
and in articulating the values and principles that ought to guide their beha-
viour, it is the case, unfortunately, that the country’s political elite de-
monstrably lack commitment to these norms; as a result, politics continues
to be conducted largely on the basis of the rules of the old regime.
5
35 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) 2nd Quarterly Re-
port (April–June 2011) 4.
36 Sen A The Idea of Justice (2009) 68.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution, and despite their in-
ternal differences, political elites holding public office deploy practices
that are meant to serve their vested interests. In this regard, Charles
Nyachae, head of the CIC, observed that a major challenge facing the pro-
cess of implementation emanates from precisely those state organs with
the greatest obligations to ensure the Constitution’s implementation.37
Recent cases which illustrate that personal enrichment is the overriding
concern of political elites involved the controversy over benefits and sala-
ries to public officials. In October 2012 members of the old parliament,
among the highest paid in Africa, proposed a $110,000 bonus to reward
themselves at the end of their term.38 A pay structure put forth by the Sala-
ries and Remuneration Commission in March 2013 sought to reduce the
salaries of public officials under the new government, but was fiercely
contested by the newly-elected office-holders; following public protests, a
compromise was reached to keep the reduced salaries but reinstitute the
benefits that the proposed pay structure sought to eliminate.39
Another manifestation of the reluctance of the political elites to aban-
don the rules of the old politics and abide by the principles of the constitu-
tion is the failure of parliament to uphold the standards of leadership and
integrity envisaged under Chapter 6 of the Constitution in the implementa-
tion law it passed. The Leadership and Integrity Act No. 19 of 2012,
which the previous parliament adopted to give effect to Chapter 6, reduced
the ethical criteria initially proposed in the draft that the Constitutional Im-
plementation Committee (CIC) adopted. According to Kenya’s The Nation
newspaper:
The original Bill created by CIC had put in place stringent vetting measures
for individuals seeking elective posts (presidency, senatorship, governorship
etc.). The vetting agencies included [the] National Intelligence Service,
Kenya Revenue Authority, Chief Registrar of the Judiciary, the Commission
for Administrative Justice, Higher Education Loans Board, professional agen-
cies, commercial organizations and any individual or institution as prescribed
by the Bill. Thereafter, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission would is-
sue a Certificate of Compliance with Chapter 6, which would then clear them
to vie. This provision was however removed by Cabinet, which cited time
37 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) 3nd Quarterly Re-
port (July–September 2013).
38 See ‘Kenyan MPs’ proposed pay rise sparks protest’ Al Jazeera 9 October 2012.




constraints and impracticability of the proposed vetting process as being
among the reasons for the amendment.40
Upon receiving the draft bill from the CIC, the cabinet and parliament
changed the requirement of mandatory vetting with a permissive one.
In this context, a Constitution of Kenya (amendment) 2013 bill was in-
troduced to remove members of parliament, judges, magistrates and mem-
bers of the county assembly from the list of designated state officers under
article 260 of the 2010 Constitution.
These strategies were deployed as measures to secure the personal in-
terests of office-holders by insulating them from various rules of the con-
stitution.41 Similarly, the mandatory requirement in the CIC draft for state
officials to declare their income, assets and liabilities was replaced with an
optional declaration. In contravention of article 77(1) of the Constitution,
the bill as amended and subsequently enacted by parliament made it per-
missible for public office-holders to engage in other gainful employment
while in office.
Political elites also showed little appetite to establish accountability for
embezzlement of public funds or the violations perpetrated in the
2007-2008 post-election violence. As the Economist magazine put it in
2010, ‘Few leading politicians seem to be genuinely determined to end the
culture of impunity’; instead, ‘Kenya’s politicians across the spectrum
seem far more concerned to jockey for position’.42
The March 2013 elections manifested the tension between the corrupt
culture of the old regime and the new political order envisaged by the Ke-
nyan Constitution of 2010. While the Constitution envisions a political
process based on democratic principles, the major candidates conducted
their electoral campaigns using the rules and techniques of the old order.
One commentator deftly captured the disjuncture between the changes in-
troduced by the Constitution and the actual conduct of politics:
40 Mureithi F ‘Cabinet dilutes Bill on integrity’ The Star 7 August 2012 available at
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-7181/cabinet-dilutes-bill-integrity (acces-
sed 26 August 2013).
41 For example, regarding the proposed amendment to article 260 of the Constitution,
the Head of the CIC observed that ‘[b]eyond the individual, partisan and group in-
terests, it is not clear whether some of the proposed amendments enhance the con-
stitutionalism and promote the interest of the Kenyan people’. See Commission for
the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) 3nd Quarterly Report (July–Septem-
ber 2013).
42 The Economist 18 February 2010, 55.
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It is certainly the case that, in the intervening years, formal institutions have
been overhauled and reforms implemented, a new constitution has been ap-
proved, and transitional justice mechanisms have been pursued. But the un-
derlying dynamics of how power is contested and distributed have not chan-
ged. The salience and politicization of ethnicity remains a defining characte-
ristic of the Kenyan political system, even if at the local level voters have
shown that they are willing not to vote along ethnic lines. The winner-takes-
all nature of the system generates dynamics that reinforce fault lines of con-
flict along ethnic and regional divides and make it extremely hard for political
leaders to look beyond their narrow self-interest (or who gets to ‘eat) and fo-
cus on the broader national interest. But unless these kinds of perverse incen-
tives are addressed at their core, the patterns of exclusion and patronage they
engender will continue to be latent sources of violence.43
Writing in 2010 about notable features of the country’s polity, the Econo-
mist argued that ‘tribalism remains the motor – and the bane – of Kenyan
politics’.44 Political choices, it said, are not made out of ideological prefer-
ence; due to perceptions of discrimination, politically-fanned prejudice
and the manipulative acts of political elites, they are made instead on the
basis of ‘tribe or tribal alliances’.45 As John Githongo observed after the
2010 constitutional referendum, ‘the results demonstrated that no idea as
yet transcends the ethnic one and so the tribal number-crunching by the
elite in the new dispensation has started’.46 The March 2013 elections
demonstrated beyond doubt that the politics of tribalism are alive and
well. Politicians running for elected offices formed alliances, mobilised
the electorate and conducted their electoral campaigns in terms of the po-
litics of tribalism, and it was mainly on the basis of ethnic arithmetic that
Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto formed the winning electoral al-
liance.47
43 Menoca AR ‘Kenya’s peaceful election does not make it a healthy democracy’
Foreign Policy 22 March 2013 available at http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/po
sts/2013/03/22/kenyas_peaceful_election_doesnt_make_it_a_healthy_democracy?
wp_login_redirect=0 (accessed 30 March 2013).
44 The Economist 18 February 2010, 56.
45 The Economist 18 February 2010, 56.
46 Githongo J ‘The old is dead but the new is not yet born’ 6 October 2010 available
at http://johngithongo.wordpress.com/2010/10/06/kenyas-new-constitution-the-old
-is-dying-but-the-new-is-not-yet-born/ (accessed 19 October 2010).
47 Mutua M ‘Why the tribe is still king in Kenya’s power politics’ Daily Nation 9
March 2013 available at http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Why+the+tribe+is
+still+king+in+Kenyas+power+politics/-/440808/1715680/-/view/printVersion/-/n
1bxj3/-/index.html (accessed 20 March 2013).
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It emerges from the foregoing discussion that while the establishment
of just institutional and policy frameworks has largely been met, the con-
duct of key political actors remains untransformed. Indeed, despite the in-
stitutional and normative changes under the constitution, the elites of the
old order have not been dislodged and maintain much of their political and
economic leverage. This is visible from both the leadership of the new go-
vernment and the membership of parliament. These important political ac-
tors are still inclined to conduct themselves in accord with the rules of the
old political order; as such, they impede development of the democratic
political culture which is required if the ideals of the 2010 Constitution are
to be translated into reality.
A struggle clearly exists between the change the Constitution seeks to
bring about and the continuity with the past which the old order wants to
maintain in one form or another. Although it is too early to conjecture as
to which of these will eventually triumph, it is not out of the question that
the forces of changes could prevail. The dispute over the March 2013 elec-
tions was successfully resolved through judicial adjudication; attempts by
MPs to award themselves egregious pay rises were countered by civic mo-
bilisation; and the media, civil society organisations and the CIC continue
to promote adherence to the Constitution and challenge acts of constitutio-
nal sabotage by public officials. These and other actions offer hope for the
incremental realisation of ethical, rule-based and democratic politics.
Conclusion
Countries seeking democratic transformation often place great faith in
achieving this objective through constitutional reform. As the experience
of Kenya vividly shows, however, such reform alone is not sufficient for
the task. An equally, if not more, important determinant is the existence of
political commitment in adequate supply.
With the adoption of the 2010 Constitution and the subsequent process
of putting in place the right institutions and legal frameworks, Kenya has
fulfilled one of the two requirements of Sen’s theory of justice, namely the
establishment of just institutions. Not unexpectedly, Kenya faces major
challenges in relation to Sen’s second theme, the conduct and behavior of
political actors and members of society. This chapter has shown shown
that the entrenched culture of political corruption, along with the lack of a
culture of rule of law and constitutionalism, is yet to be overcome. The
6
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most serious impediment to attaining the Constitution’s vision of a decisi-
ve break with the old regime is the nature of the politics practised by Ke-
nyan politicians. This is characterised by the manipulation of ethnicity,
disregard for the rule of law, the abuse of public office, corruption, and the
infliction of socioeconomic and political injustices on various sectors of
Kenyan society.
The dilemma concerns the institutionalisation of constitutionalism and
the rule of law, and the answer has to be drawn from sources outside of
the constitution. Accordingly, there is a need for all political actors to
demonstrate commitment to abiding by, and faithfully applying, the con-
stitution’s democratic principles and values. This, Ghai points out, is
about ‘the inculcation of a culture of respect for and discipline of the law,
acceptance of rulings by the courts and other bodies authorised to interpret
the law, giving effect to judicial decisions, acceptance of the limits on the
government, respecting and promoting human and collective rights, [and]
the participation and empowerment of the people.’48 As the Waki Report
said, ‘What is required … is political will and some basic decisions to
change the way politics is conducted, as well as to address its intersection
with other issues related to land, marginalization and inequality, and
youth.’49
Where such commitment is absent, proponents of constitutional renew-
al should make a sustained and stronger investment in mobilising and nur-
turing constituents of constitutionalism to push the implementation of the
principles of democratic values and rule of law. As the Kenyan experience
shows, this is particularly necessary where constitutional reform has not
led to the replacement or removal of elites wedded to the rules and meth-
ods of old-regime politics. Under such circumstances, the implementation
of the Constitution should not be left entirely to these elites; indeed, doing
so stands to condemn the Constitution to the same tragedy as in the past,
given that ‘vested interests among politicians, businesspeople, and the bu-
reaucracy will sabotage reforms (as they have done ever since Kenya’s in-
dependence)’.50
In the absence of political elites and leaders genuinely committed to the
values of the Constitution and willing to abide by them, centers of public
power should be mobilised to serve as the constituents and guardians of
48 Ghai Y ‘Decreeing and establishing a constitutional order’.
49 Waki Report 36.
50 Ghai Y ‘Decreeing and establishing a constitutional order’.
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constitutionalism. These include independent public institutions, such as
the judiciary and other constitutional bodies, which are able to exercise
their authority to enforce constitutionalism. Most importantly, organised
and leading members of the public – including civil society actors in all
their forms and diversity, public intellectuals and the media – should as-
sume greater responsibility for galvanising the public into holding public
officials accountable for the implementation of the Constitution.
In adopting the 2010 Constitution, Kenya has taken the first step for
making a decisive break with its corrupt, violence-ridden and abusive past.
But for this new constitution to achieve the objectives of justice, rule of
law and constitutionalism, there is a need for a sustained and a far more
robust struggle than was required for reforming the Constitution: changing
the country’s politics.
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Abstract
Since the 1990s Africa has seen an unprecedented wave of newly-crafted
constitutions, with more than 50 countries having modified their constitu-
tions or written new ones. In 1995 Uganda rewrote its constitution, em-
barking on consultative as well as non-consultative constitution-making
processes with the hope that consultation would make the constitution
stand the test of time, unlike its three previous constitutions which each
had been abrogated or abolished within a decade. Nevertheless, the 1995
Constitution has not survived intact. In less than six years after it was ad-
opted, a commission was established to review it and, in the two decades
since the Constitution came into effect, more than 120 amendments have
been made or proposed. Such constitutional instability is variously a cau-
se and/or effect of the political conflicts that have characterised African
countries in the post-independence era. Using Uganda as a case study,
this chapter examines why constitutions in Africa do not stand the test of
time and argues that contextual factors are centrally important to long-
term outcomes. The context in which a constitution is conceived, drafted,
debated and promulgated influences not only its framing as a document
but whether it will be respected and upheld after promulgation.
Introduction
A constitution, it has been said, is a work of political engineering, ‘to be
judged like any other construction by how well it stands the test of time’.1
Although constitutions are intended to withstand this test, some do not:
1
1 Hague R, Harrop M & Breslin S Comparative Politics 6 ed (1988) 154.
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they are usually designed to endure in order to maintain political stability
but are not immutable documents untouched by changes in the polity’s cir-
cumstances and the values of citizens. Since it is inevitable that a constitu-
tion will fall into obsolescence, processes should exist for updating it re-
gularly to avoid the dangers of change.2
In recent years, amidst a wave of democratisation around the world,
constitutionalism has become prominent in Africa in questions of politics,
statehood and democracy. There have been new winds of change, bringing
hope that the continent will see an end to the corruption and authoritaria-
nism for which it was notorious. Today African governments look to writ-
ten constitutions as a way of legitimising themselves in the eyes of citi-
zens and the world at large, and, under pressure from within and without,
have sought to re-establish credibility by amending or radically changing
their constitutions.
Against this backdrop, 38 African constitutions have been rewritten sin-
ce the 1990s and eight underwent major revisions.3 However, given that
nineteenth-century European laws have generally been the primary foun-
dation of law in Africa, these new or revised constitutions take a diversity
of forms that nevertheless reflect received colonial models – a tendency
particularly evident in the earlier, independence constitutions, which me-
rely imitated the constitutional models of former colonial powers, making
it no wonder they could not stand the test of time and were altered or over-
turned soon after promulgation.
The constitutions of the last two decades, that is to say, contain nume-
rous structural weaknesses and gaps that point to a failure to learn from
the lessons of Africa’s authoritarian past. For example, little has been done
to curb attempts by leaders to entrench their parties or themselves in of-
fice, and executive power remains dominant, partly because leaders do not
believe in constitutional rule or the provisions that limit their authority.
2 Manga CF ‘Challenges to constitutionalism and constitutional rights in Africa and
enabling role of political parties’ (2007) 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 1.
3 Tripp AM ‘The politics of constitution-making in Uganda’ in Miller L (ed)




The result is that while recent developments in Africa could rightly be
described as a constitutional-rights revolution, its prospects are uncertain.4
Several countries have amended, abrogated, suspended or rewritten their
original constitutions, changes usually motivated less by a wish to preser-
ve and improve upon them than to weaken or eradicate them. The Zimbab-
wean constitution was amended 19 times in 32 years; by 2010, Kenya’s
constitution had been amended 50 times; and in the two decades since its
passage in 1995, Uganda’s constitution has seen 120 amendments.
Despite the promise in the air, then, Africa’s history of constitutiona-
lism is not a happy one. Many of the problems have been caused not by
the absence of constitutions per se but the ease with which their provisions
were abrogated, subverted, suspended or brazenly ignored.5 Uganda provi-
des a laboratory of considerable magnitude for examining such issues. Its
history is replete with constitutional crises, civil wars, military coups, in-
surgencies, ethnic/religious/political cleavages and violent unconstitutio-
nal regime-changes, all of which have led to constitutional instability.
The concept of constitutional stability
‘Constitutional stability’ is difficult to define and measure. The lifetime of
constitutions can be affected by various events. From a formal or legal
point of view, constitutions can be altered by amendment, interpretation
and replacement.6 Arguably, suspension of all or part of their provisions is
also a form of alteration; as such, any alteration of the original agreement
would affect a constitution’s stability.
Indeed, the very notion of a ‘stable constitution’ is perhaps only an ab-
stract ideal, given that (as noted earlier) constitutions are not immutable
and that amendment procedures, for instance, exist for adapting them to
new circumstances without affecting their legal continuity.7 Constitutions
need to be, and often are, altered over time to respond to changes in their
2
4 Manga CF ‘Challenges to constitutionalism and constitutional rights in Africa and
enabling role of political parties: Lessons and perspectives from southern Africa’
(2007) 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 3.
5 Manga CF ‘Challenges to constitutionalism and constitutional rights in Africa and
enabling role of political parties: Lessons and perspectives from southern Africa’
(2007) 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 2.
6 Negretto G The Durability of Constitutions in Changing Environments (2008) 3.
7 Negretto G The Durability of Constitutions in Changing Environments (2008) 2.
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political, economic or social environments. This underlines the paramount
importance of contextual appropriacy: a constitution’s design should
match a country’s circumstances at particular historical moments; howe-
ver, alteration or amendment does not imply the legal abrogation of the
existing constitution.
The situation is different with constitutional replacement. Here, whether
or not procedural forms are observed, institutional reformers decide that a
new constitution should be created. Even if it is symbolic and involves
little substantive change to the existing constitution, the sheer act of repla-
cing a constitution introduces discontinuity and thus counts almost self-
evidently as an indicator of constitutional instability.8 By contrast, the irre-
gular suspension of a constitution by a military or civilian coup is harder
to classify. Clearly, this disrupts the continuity of the constitution; the
problem is that such suspensions generally coincide with regime change,
indicating political rather than constitutional instability.
Taking these considerations into account, constitutional stability may
be defined as the durability, in legal terms, of the original constitution.
From this perspective, the lifespan of a constitution is the length of time
that passes between its enactment and formal replacement by another con-
stitution. Thus, constitutions that stand the test of time are those which
survive for long periods without being replaced.
In the scholarly literature, numerous theories seek to explain constitu-
tional stability, a multi-factorial phenomenon in which the durability of
constitutions is seen as a function of variables that increase or decrease
their capacity to survive.9 One group of theories emphasises the role of so-
cial and political environmental or exogenous shocks, both domestic and
international, in determining the probability of constitutional survival.
Others focus, inter alia, on factors such as constitutional design, self-en-
forcement mechanisms, judicial independence, and the inclusivity of the
constitution-building process.10
Within this context, some scholars argue that constitutions are more li-
kely to survive if they have elements that make them self-enforcing, for
example, counter-majoritarian provisions. Such provisions include federal
structures, limits on governmental power, and super-majority requirements
for amendments; in particular, a constitutional court with powers of judici-
8 Negretto G The Durability of Constitutions in Changing Environments (2008) 5.
9 Negretto G The Durability of Constitutions in Changing Environments (2008) 3.
10 Rice E ‘International participation and constitutional survival’ (2013) 2.
Sauda Nabukenya
296
al review is seen to contribute to constitutional stability.11 In this vein, El-
kins, Ginsburg and Melton examine the design factors of inclusivity, flexi-
bility and specificity: inclusive drafting processes make constitutions more
visible and engender greater consent because they ‘can promote a unifying
identity and invite participants to invest in a bargain’.12
The touchstone for arguments about constitutional endurance is Thomas
Jefferson, who derided those who ‘look at constitutions with sanctimo-
nious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to
be touched’.13 James Madison, his equally famous interlocutor in these de-
bates, tied constitution-making to crisis, believing that reform without cri-
sis could be overly tainted by self-interest.14 It is certainly true that consti-
tutions tend to be created in the wake of crises such as revolution, coups,
civil war, political demonstrations, or even shifts in the political landscape
that are not a direct consequence of the constitution, for example, the sud-
den rise of a new dominant party.15
Constitutions also interact with processes in the economy, and resear-
chers have examined in particular the relationship between constitutions
and capitalism.16 Since constitutions provide a basis for regulating econo-
mic activity, correlations are likely to exist between their duration and
long-term investment. Little explored, though, is the international commu-
nity’s role in influencing constitutional survival or replacement. Constitu-
tions do not exist in a vacuum,17 and their content has grown increasingly
isomorphic. This is partly attributable to the fact that third-party countries
often serve as constitutional models for others.18
This chapter asserts the primacy of context in determining constitutio-
nal stability, arguing specifically that the context in which a constitution is
drafted, debated and promulgated influences its shaping and operationali-
11 Weingast BR & Mittal S ‘Symposium: The judiciary and the popular will: Consti-
tutional stability and the deferential court’ (2010) 13 University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law.
12 Elkins Z, Ginsburg T & Melton J The Endurance of National Constitutions (2009)
90-1, 211.
13 Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816.
14 Elkins Z, Ginsburg T & Melton J ‘The lifespan of written constitutions’ (2007) 12.
15 Negretto G The Durability of Constitutions in Changing Environments (2008) 18.
16 Person T & G Tabellini The Economic Effects of Constitutions (2003).
17 Rice E ‘International participation and constitutional survival’ (2013) 7.
18 Bailey MJ ‘Toward a new constitution for a future country’ (1997) 90(4) Public
Choice 73-4.
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sation; more widely, it examines the political, socio-economic and interna-
tional structural factors that have contributed to constitutional instability in
Africa in general and Uganda in particular.
Factors shaping the operationalisation of the 1995 Constitution
Structural factors
Historical legacy
Uganda emerged as an administrative unit when it was declared a British
protectorate in 1894. Britain began its colonisation in the kingdom of Bu-
ganda, situated in the southern parts of modern Uganda, a development
that saw its inhabitants receive preferential treatment to those in other
kingdoms in Uganda. In 1900 the Buganda Agreement,19 a treaty between
the British protectorate and the kingdom of Buganda, dealt with nearly all
aspects of Buganda’s relations with the protectorate government.20 Alt-
hough the British signed similar agreements with Toro and Ankole, these
were neither as detailed nor favourable as that with Buganda, which was
thrust into the centre of Uganda’s constitutional crisis.21 Successive go-
vernments until the present day have experienced problems with Buganda,
which still demands special treatment and federal status, the latter due to
the fact that the Buganda Agreement was legally binding as it had been
incorporated into the protectorate law.
A further crucial legacy arose from colonial boundaries, dictated purely
by economic logic. British colonialism brought within the fold of one
country peoples of different levels of social development, at the same time
splitting nationalities among several countries.22 The colonial, and later
the post-colonial, state found it a daunting task to weld these communities




19 The Buganda agreement of 1900 is also sometimes referred to as the Uganda
Agreement.
20 Mugambwa TJ ‘The legal aspects of the 1900 Buganda Agreement revisited’
(1987) 25 & 26 Journal of Legal Pluralism 246.
21 Francis MS Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Uganda Constitution (1994)
2.
22 Mukherjee R Uganda: A Historical Accident (1985).
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tated economic investment primarily in the southern parts of the country,
whereas the north was considered less valuable.23 The north-south divide
in Uganda today is one of the most enduring legacies of colonialism, a di-
vision rooted in divide-and-rule strategies and political structures that en-
couraged polarisation of ethnic identities.24 The assignment of the north,
for instance, as a source of soldiers and policemen had negative implicati-
ons for post-colonial stability, given that the ruling-class elite, drawn from
the north, used their military predominance either to acquire and retain
power undemocratically or to abrogate the constitution.
Religion, too, produced social cleavages. Religious groups include Ca-
tholics, Protestants and Muslims. The British-supported administrative eli-
te had largely converted to Protestantism but most of the population were
Catholics, which meant that Protestants excluded Catholics from power.25
Because religion was entrenched in the status quo since the 1900s, it has
been highly influential in Uganda’s political and constitutional history.
Catholics were affiliated to the Democratic Party (DP), which was foun-
ded on their marginalisation; while the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)
was mainly Protestant, Muslims had no independent party but felt more
comfortable in the UPC than the DP. Political parties entered the constitu-
tional process as purveyors of irredentist ideologies.26
Thus, colonial governments created highly factionalised political cul-
tures, institutionalised conflict, and strengthened centrifugal forces.27
While in the colonial context factionalism was an aspect of divide and
rule, in the post-colonial state it enhanced the power of bureaucracy.28 A
rising bureaucracy and the personalisation of power accompanied the de-
mise of formal institutions and constitutions.
Colonialism has had a lasting impact on Africa. As Young observes, ‘
[The] colonial legacy cast its shadow over the emergent African state sys-
23 Lunyigo S The Colonial Roots of Internal Conflict (1987) 30-3.
24 Okuku J ‘Ethnicity, state power and the democratization process in Uganda’
(2002) IGD Occasional Paper No. 33: 8.
25 Kabagambe J The Democratisation Process in Uganda (2006) 29.
26 Okoth-Ogenda I ‘Constitutions without constitutionalism: Reflections on an Afri-
can political paradox’ in Greenberg D, et al. (eds) Constitutionalism and Demo-
cracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (1993) 69. [Hereafter Okoth-Ogen-
da (1993).].
27 Okoth-Ogenda (1993) 10.
28 Okoth-Ogenda (1993) 69.
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tem to a degree unique among the major world regions.’29 The implication
is that Africa cannot be understood without first unravelling its colonial
experience. In a nutshell, colonial rule distorted the political, social, and
economic institutions indigenous to Uganda society by imposing its own
logic. Coupled with the decentralised despotism of the colonial state, it left
the post-colonial elite (and society at large) bereft of any experience with
democratic governance. This fundamental problem became manifest in the
later post-colonial crisis, a crisis arising from the challenge of acquiring
and maintaining the right to rule fragmented societies that had been corral-
led into the unwieldy entity known as Uganda. These conditions resulted
in coups d'état and the general failure of the post-colonial constitutions.
The foundation of political and constitutional instability in Uganda, in
other words, can be traced to colonialism and the independence constituti-
on. Uganda has undergone a turbulent constitutional history, given that
since independence it has had four constitutions, namely those of 1962,
1966, 1967 and 1995. From colonial times, Uganda has witnessed a num-
ber of changes in government and subsequent constitutional alterations, in
the course of which successive governments have politicized constitution-
making processes and manipulated the constitutions to suit their needs.
None of the constitutions has stood the test of time. The manner in which
they were made and unmade, as well as the suitability of the institutions
and the processes that were established, have long been subjects of contro-
versy.30
Uganda’s first constitution was put in place at independence. Coming
into force in October 1962, it was the culmination of negotiations that
sought to reconcile the conflicting interests of, on the one hand, Buganda,
the western kingdoms and Busoga, and, on the other, the rest of the coun-
try. The result was a delicate compromise between the UPC and Buganda
traditionalists. Under this constitution, Uganda instituted a unitary system,
with Buganda enjoying autonomous or federal status as well as greater
rights and privileges than other districts in Uganda; by contrast, the coun-
try’s other three kingdoms – Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro – had quasi-auto-
nomous status. As such, the constitution had a mixture of federal, semi-
29 Young C ‘The heritage of colonialism’ in Harbeson JW & Rothchild D (eds) Afri-
ca in World Politics: Post-War Challenges (1995) 24.
30 Odoki B in Oloka-Onyango (ed) Constitutionalism in Africa: Creating Opportu-




federal and unitary features, which is why it was described as a me-
re ‘Elastoplast’ over a system held together largely by force and expedient
compromise.31 It lacked political legitimacy and became unworkable, with
Buganda’s special status being a notable source of tension; the constituti-
on survived for only three years and was suspended in February 1966.
Ugandans had little say in the making of this constitution, to the extent
that articles and clauses with limited applicability to local contexts were
imported from foreign constitutions. As Okoth-Ogenda notes, Anglophone
Africa adopted modified versions of Westminster-modelled constitutions,
complete with bicameral legislatures, separation of powers, judicial re-
view and bills of rights.32 While these constitutions were democratic in the
Western-liberal sense, they were not based on the values and beliefs of the
people to whom they applied, a cultural disconnection that made post-in-
dependence constitutions seem contrived and distant from everyday life.
Literature on decolonisation reports widespread dissatisfaction among new
African rulers with the imported constitutional regulations, which is why
the latter were soon withdrawn, ignored or modified;33 in addition, these
constitutions were superimposed in situations where constitutionalism had
not significantly taken root.
It is thus not surprising that soon after independence Uganda was plun-
ged into political and constitutional chaos when the implementation of the
constitution became impractical. The fusion of a cultural leader as a politi-
cal head of state with an executive prime minister presented a conflict of
interest which led to the abrogation of the independence constitution and a
constitutional crisis thereafter. The matter came to ahead when Uganda
was to decide on the ‘Lost Counties’ in a 1965 referendum allowing resi-
dents to choose between remaining part of Buganda Kingdom or returning
to Bunyoro Kingdom. The British had used the Baganda to conquer Bun-
yoro and rewarded Buganda by giving it six counties of Bunyoro territory,
the so-called ‘Lost Counties’. In the referendum, they voted to re-join
Bunyoro, leading to a split between the Baganda leadership and Prime Mi-
nister Obote and precipitating the constitutional crisis of 1996.
Following a confrontation between Obote and the president, Edward
Mutesa, Mutesa (also Kabaka of Buganda) was suspended from office and
31 Olaka-Onyango J Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda (1993) 478.
32 Okoth-Ogenda (1993) 70.
33 Nohlen D, Thibaut B & Krennerich M (eds) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook
(1999) 1-4.
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ministers arrested. In April that year, a new constitution was promulgated
under the declaration that it would ‘remain in force until such time as a
Constituent Assembly established by parliament enacts a constitution in
place of this constitution’.34 However, it was not debated and came to be
known as the ‘pigeon-hole constitution’, given that Obote had told MPs
they would find copies of it in their pigeon-holes at the end of the National
Assembly sitting. These developments led the king of Buganda to attempt
secession and demand that the central government remove itself from Bu-
gandan soil; in retaliation, Obote staged a military takeover of the Bugan-
da Kingdom palace.
The 1966 crisis led to the introduction of a new constitution in 1967.
Republican in nature, it provided for a more powerful executive president
while paying lip-service to parliamentary supremacy. It also abolished
kingdoms and other aspects of federalism, turning Uganda into a unitary
state, and although the constitution recognised a multiparty system, oppo-
sition political parties were later banned and the country transformed into
a single-party state.35
These events set the stage for the reign of terror under Idi Amin
(1971-1979) and later Obote’s second government (1980-1998). When
Amin seized power in 1971, he suspended the constitution, declared him-
self president for life, and violently suppressed all political opposition. Be-
tween 100,000 and 500,000 people were estimated to have been killed un-
der the Amin regime, a regime which poisoned ethnic relations by alienat-
ing one ethnic group after the other and brought about social dislocation
and institutional decay.
When the dictator’s fall was imminent, a general sense arose in Dar es
Salaam that there was a need for opposition groups and organisations to
meet and agree on a strategy for the way forward. This led to the Moshi
‘Unity’ Conference of March 1979,36 followed by the Moshi Agreement
which acted as a constitution for Uganda after the fall of Idi Amin in 1979.
The December 1980 elections were held in a tense atmosphere of mistrust,
violence and threats of civil war. The UPC government that came to pow-
er thus faced a crisis of legitimacy, and in February 1981, Yoweri Musev-
34 Constitution, 1996, article 145.
35 Oloka-Onyango J Constitutionalism in Africa (2001) 265.




eni, who had threatened to ‘go to the bush’ and wage war if the elections
were rigged, launched a guerrilla war against it.
By the time his National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) came
to power in January 1986, the government had lost control of the country:
Uganda was in a shambles, violence was rampant, and the military had
disintegrated into armed gangs of looters. The NRA/M’s rise to power was
greeted as an optimistic sign that peace, democracy and stability would be
restored. The movement embarked on constitutional reform, seeking
through its Ten Point Programme to establish democratic governance,
constitutionalism and rule of law.37 In 1989 it appointed a commission to
draft a constitution and seek the views of the population, a draft which
formed the basis for a new constitution in 1995 and which has been re-
garded as the NRM’s greatest legacy to Uganda.38 The framers were cog-
nisant of the country’s history of political and constitutional instability,
and set to make a constitution that would stand the test of time, promote
unity and stability, and heal past wounds.39
However, although it has not been abolished yet as its predecessors
were, the much-hailed Constitution of 1995 has not stood the test of time
as it has been amended several times even before certain provisions could
be tested in practice. For example, the limit on presidential terms of office
was amended, with the constitution now allowing unlimited terms; Presi-
dent Museveni, under whose incumbency it was made, has not been suc-
ceeded. In less than six years after the 1995 Constitution was adopted, a
commission was formed to review it; and in less than two decades, more
than 120 amendments have been made or proposed to it.
From the preceding account it can be observed that while the indepen-
dence constitution laid the basis for constitutional instability, the immedi-
ate post-independence governments made little attempt to remedy this
with an acceptable constitutional order, preoccupying themselves instead
with regime-perpetuation and the fortification of executive power. These
actions have kept Uganda in prolonged constitutional instability, as evi-
denced by Obote’s abrogation of the independence constitution, Amin’s of
the 1967 constitution, and numerous amendments to the 1995 Constitu-
tion.
37 The Ten Point Programme.
38 Kanyeihamba GW Constitutional and Political History of Uganda (2002) 266.
39 See the Preamble to the Constitution of Uganda, 1995.
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Structure of society
The structure of a society should be a central consideration in the organi-
sation of its politics, administration and economy. Most African societies
are heterogeneous, comprising a diversity of tribal, ethnic, cultural and re-
ligious groups, traditions and people divided along urban and rural lines. It
would seem to follow that the states would manifest a healthy legal plura-
lism, but this is not necessarily so.40 As Welsh notes, ‘Establishing and
sustaining democratic institutions in ethnically divided societies is a diffi-
cult task’.41 Ethnic heterogeneity is likely to promote instability, inasmuch
as political competition often proceeds along ethnic lines. A large litera-
ture on ethnic conflict points to the difficulties of institutional design in
such environments. The combination of the dominance of ethnicity and
the centrality of the state to accumulation leads to intense competition for
the capture of the state, which leads in turn to abuse or subversion of de-
mocratic constitutional elements such as publicly financed political par-
ties, independent electoral systems, operationally independent policing,
freedom of expression and association, and judicial impartiality.
Uganda as a country is a mere geographical expression of British colo-
nial administration. The 64 formally recognised indigenous communities
that inhabit it were brought together under the colonial era, communities
with different languages, cultures and social systems; seen more widely,
Uganda is also divided along religious, regional and ethnic lines. These di-
visions have had a profound impact on the political framework: the more
fragmented a country, the greater the number of competing groups and the
smaller the chances of their reaching any lasting agreement about shared,
fundamental values that need constitutional protection – all of which
threatens constitutional stability.
After independence, most African leaders denounced these divisions,
outlawing opposition groups ‘based on particularistic, sectarian or ethnic
interests’42 and ushering in one-party states43. The early, broad-based
3.1.2
40 Adelman S ‘Constitutionalism, pluralism and democracy in Africa’ (1998) 42
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 73.
41 Welsh D ‘Domestic politics and ethnic conflict’ in Brown ME (ed) Ethnic Conflict
and International Security (1993) 55.
42 Chazen N, et al. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (1992) 50.
43 Okoth-Ogenda (1993) 75-76.
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NRM government sought to incorporate a spectrum of political, ethnic, re-
ligious and other interests. As Tripp puts it,
much as Museveni attempted to distinguish himself from the dictators that
had ruled Uganda before him, he espoused the same kind of anti-sectarianism
that Amin and Obote had adopted and was ultimately challenged by the same
dilemmas they faced in trying to create a workable ethnic matrix.44
In fact, Museveni’s opponents said his anti-sectarian stance was nothing
more than populist rhetoric and that he was playing the ethnic card just as
his predecessors had, only with more finesse. Eventually the objective of
inclusive governance came into conflict with the imperatives of remaining
in power, and he too banned political parties to secure his future. National
assemblies and parliaments packed with supporters of the ruling party
have increasingly become decree-sanctioning bodies instead of legisla-
tures.45
Curbing opposition and favouring cultural homogeneity in the context
of pluralistic societies has had a profound effect on participatory and rep-
resentative institutions. Current tensions around, and demands for, ethnic
recognition and pluralism are important factors driving the protracted con-
flict in new democracies. Among the problems are unitary conceptions of
the state, the preponderance of homogeneous majorities, and a lack of con-
stitutional co-authorship by national minorities. The tension between the
cultural homogeneity of powerful majorities and the diversity of the wider
society continues to fuel constitutional conflict, thus affecting constitutio-
nal stability.
Economic structure
Although its value has been in decline, the agricultural sector is the most
important aspect of the Ugandan economy and employs 80 per cent of the
labour force.46 Reliable statistics are hard to come by, but the deputy pri-
me minister has reported that unemployment among youth is more than 22
per cent and even higher among young people with university degrees and
3.1.3
44 Tripp AM Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime (2010)
39.
45 Chazen N, et al. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (1992) 48.
46 FAO as reported by World Resources Institute.
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those in urban areas.47 Levels of civic competence are still low. The num-
ber of university graduates is estimated to be below one million in a popu-
lation of more than 34 million.48 Illiterate and poor people do not normally
pursue abstract issues such as constitutionalism and human rights, a factor
which in turn has an effect on constitutional stability.
Moreover, as one of the world’s poorest countries, Uganda is heavily
reliant on foreign aid. Thirty per cent of the population lives in extreme
poverty, donors fund about 45 per cent of the national budget, and the
country has received about US$2 billion in debt relief. In Uganda, as else-
where in Africa, governmental efficacy hinges on the international com-
munity; put differently, because African countries are poor and depend on
foreign support, they have no choice but to allow Western powers to influ-
ence their policies.49
In this regard, Museveni’s neo-liberal agenda has inflicted heavy social
costs in exchange for economic growth, which has been concentrated in
the Bantu regions, where the NRM’s support is rooted, while the Nilotic
north has been neglected. Dire economic conditions promote the conditi-
ons for change, but paradoxically impede ones that favour the endurance
of constitutions. Economic crises are likely to threaten the stability of the
constitution.50 For example, they have led to popular and elite discontent-
ment as well as state dependence on external aid, dependence which donor
countries sometimes use to pressurise developing countries into carrying
out political and social reforms. Economic crisis may also cause splits
within the elite, creating opportunities for the opposition to mobilise and
claim new legitimacy for itself while weakening the bargaining power of
the incumbents.51 Rural poverty and unemployment continue to drive mig-
ration to urban areas, with the ever-increasing urban poor mobilising in
demonstrations and strikes; nevertheless, labour has been too weakly orga-
nised to be a force for positive and issue-based political change in Uganda.
47 World Bank ‘Uganda grapples with youth unemployment as WDR 2007 is laun-
ched’ (2007) available at http://go.worldbank.org/FTO3IRJZ30 (accessed 1 Au-
gust 2013).
48 The State of Uganda Population Report 2012.
49 Mbabazi P, Mugyenyi J & Shaw T ‘Uganda elections 2001: Lessons for/from de-
mocratic governance’ (2001).
50 Elkins Z, Ginsburg T & Melton J The Endurance of National Constitutions (2009)
119.




Certain aspects of constitutional design may also generate the type of
events that affect the durability of constitutions. Design factors are those
relating to the content and drafting process of the constitution. The design
of institutions that will meet the needs of a nation is of central concern to
constitutional stability. The 1995 Constitution’s provisions were based by
and large on the wishes of the people as expressed in their views to the
constitutional commission. In the Constituent Assembly, most of the pro-
visions in the constitution were adopted by delegates through consensus.
However, a few controversial provisions were resolved through majority
vote and some of them continue to attract controversy, debate, and chal-
lenge in courts of law.52 These include provisions relating to the suspensi-
on of political-party activities, separation of powers, federalism and tradi-
tional institutions.
Entrenched in the 1995 Constitution was the ‘no-party’ Movement sys-
tem of government, one based on personal merit rather than organised po-
litical action. Under the system, the NRM would serve as the big tent
within which all political competition would take place. This led to restric-
tion of political-party activities under article 269 of the Constitution, with
implications for human rights such as freedom of assembly, association
and expression. Due to pressure for democratisation, the nature of the fu-
ture dispensation was put to the vote in a referendum. Article 69 of the
Constitution provides that the people shall have a right to choose between
the Movement system, a multiparty system or any other democratically re-
presentative system.53 Although Museveni later conceded to pressure and
opened himself to competition through constitutional amendments in 2005
that replaced the Movement system with a multiparty one, he stifled it by
resorting to extra-constitutional and extra-legal tactics.
What should be noted is that democracy is unthinkable in the absence
of viable political parties, which serve ideally as a force for constitutional
stability and democratisation by articulating and aggregating public opini-
on and interests, engendering popular participation, and promoting politi-
cal education and national integration. Well-established parties function as
mediating institutions through which differences in ideas, interests and
3.1.4
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perceptions of political problems at a given time can be managed; without
them, constitutional stability and the general system run the risk of subver-
sion or outright collapse.
The principle of separation of powers involves placing checks on the
amount of power in the hands of any individual or group in order to avoid
its abuse. The resultant balance of power between the executive and legis-
lature is thought to have some effect on constitutional endurance;54 more-
over, an independent judiciary and the notion of the supremacy of law
work together to ensure that the letter and the spirit of the constitution are
honoured in the workings of government. However, the Constitution of
Uganda enables the executive to function without being checked at every
turn, and the office of the president combines a wide range of powers: he
is the head of state and head of government, commander in chief, a part of
the parliament, and bills passed in parliament cannot become law without
his consent. Many constitutions have come to an end thanks to power-
hungry executives, which suggests that constitutions with few constraints
on the executive are less able to survive than others.
A design feature that has also undermined the Constitution’s stability is
its winner-take-all electoral system and the ills associated with it, such as
election violence and vote-buying. Uganda’s majoritarianism has encoura-
ged a tyranny of the majority and, correspondingly, a perpetual exclusion
of minorities from government due to their inability to gain parliamentary
majorities in elections. As the UN Development Programme observed in
its 2004 report on multiculturalism,
states need to recognize cultural differences in their constitutions, their
laws and their institutions. They also need to formulate policies to ensure
that the interests of particular groups – whether minorities or historically
marginalized majorities – are not ignored or overridden by the majority or
by dominant groups. And they need to do so in ways that do not contract
other goals and strategies of human development, such as consolidating
democracy, building a capable state and ensuring equal opportunities to all
citizens. 55
The 1995 Constitution and the subsequent amendments in 2005 fell
short of bringing about genuine representation for all groups and parties in
Uganda. Although the choice of electoral system is foundational to a de-
54 Elkins Z, Ginsburg T & Melton J The Endurance of National Constitutions (2009)
106.
55 UN Development Programme (2004).
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mocracy, there is no clear explanation why the Constitution did not adopt
another kind of plurality/majority system, or even a proportional-represen-
tation or mixed one, given that scholars on constitutional design in fractu-
red societies have advised against majoritarian and first-past-the-post sys-
tems based on Anglo-American models.56 Uganda is divided on religious
and ethnic cleavages, but the drafters of the Constitution opted for the
most extreme form of the plurality electoral system, the first-past-the-post
one.
Moreover, in the framing of the Constitution, political lines were drawn
between federalism and decentralisation over concerns and developmental
aspirations to do with cultural identity. The NRM sought to pre-empt the
Constitutional Assembly (CA) debate on the subject of federalism by pas-
sing a traditional rulers statute in 1993 that allowed for the restoration of
traditional rulers as cultural leaders.57 In addition, fearing an alliance
among opposition parties and the Buganda leadership in Mengo, the NRM
met with the Mengo Kingdom government and agreed that Buganda
would form a regional government under the new constitution. Unfortuna-
tely, in the end, Mengo gambled and lost its bid for federalism.
Although Buganda had agreed to support NRM positions on anti-demo-
cratic aspects of the constitution in exchange for federalism, the NRM re-
neged on this perceived bargain. The majority of the CA delegates took
the view that federalism would undermine the unity of the country. They
agreed to recognize Buganda as a distinct entity, but opted not for federa-
lism, but decentralisation and devolution of power from the centre to the
district level, a policy that had been in place already before the CA was
convened.
The issue of federalism continued to dog Ugandan politics after the
Constitution’s enactment. Pressure from Buganda for a federal system led
to a government proposal for regional parliaments in a federal system for
Buganda, Busoga, Toro and Bunyoro. With political support waning nati-
onwide, Museveni was eager to shore up support among the kingdoms, es-
pecially Buganda, prior to the 2006 presidential elections. Having been
granted symbolic cultural recognition in the 1995 Constitution, the king-
doms persisted in their demands for greater political power and a more pu-
blic role. In 2005 a constitutional amendment was passed to create regio-
56 See, for example, Lewis A Politics of West Africa (1965) 71.
57 Mukholi D A Complete Guide to Uganda's 4th Constitution, History, Politics and
the Law (1995) 33.
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nal tiers throughout the country as a government-funded layer of adminis-
tration above the existing district system, but the Buganda leadership in
Mengo rejected this regional-tier arrangement, preferring its own version
of autonomy, commonly known as ‘federo’. Although Buganda’s domi-
nance is less pronounced today, the debate about the relative autonomy
granted to the Kingdom of Buganda and other traditional kingdoms within
the larger Ugandan state continues to be a bone of contention and the basis
for political mobilisation.
As such, the lack of clarity surrounding these traditional institutions has
been a further cause of constitutional instability. For centuries, the regio-
nal kingdoms of Buganda, Toro, Bunyoro and Ankole were apex powers,
with Buganda considered the strongest and most influential, but in mo-
dern-day Uganda their status remains a thorny issue. Their demands were
met to some extent in 1993 when the incumbent NRM government deci-
ded to restore traditional rulers and recognise other cultural institutions
under article 246 of the 1995 Constitution. The restored kingship, unlike
its political character in the past, was confined to cultural functions, im-
plying that it had changed from being a functioning state within Uganda to
an institution located outside the political sphere and the formal state
structure.58
However, despite the spirited denial of formal political roles to traditio-
nal rulers in the 1995 Constitution, these rulers continue to wield enor-
mous power and influence over the lives and well-being of Ugandans. Not
only is their role contested in the country’s political discourse, but dispu-
tes frequently erupt over traditional thrones and create socio-political cri-
ses in different corners of the land. Recent tribal clashes and tensions in
parts of the Kasese, Bundibugyo and Ntoroko districts have defeated the
spirit of the Constitution. Indeed, traditional rulership could be a powerful
instrument aiding Uganda’s search for constitutional stability, peace and
order. It is in the country’s best interests that this institution be acknow-
ledged and that clear provisions be made in the Constitution for its func-
tions. The present lack of clarity has caused a great deal of uncertainty and
undermined political and constitutional stability.
As will be apparent from this account, the 1995 Constitution faced nu-
merous challenges in its operationalisation. In 2001, mindful that the Con-
58 Kayunga S The No-Party System of Democracy and the Management of Ethnic
Conflicts in Uganda (2001).
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stitution had several inadequacies that needed to be addressed in service of
proper governance,59 the government established the Constitutional Re-
view Commission (CRC). Chaired by Professor Fredrick Ssempebwa, it
was mandated to examine, and make recommendations about, the consis-
tency and compatibility of constitutional provisions relating to popular
sovereignty and democratic political systems. While it is clear that certain
provisions called for reappraisal, it is highly doubtful that a wholesale re-
view was warranted.
However, before the CRC’s official report was released, the Monitor
newspaper published a document it claimed was the draft report of the
CRC, which among other things made recommendations opposed to lif-
ting term limits; appearing before a parliamentary committee, Professor
Ssempebwa basically admitted this was a genuine CRC document. Quite
evidently there was a problem. To address it, the government – well after
the closure of time for receipt of public submissions – presented its propo-
sals on constitutional reform to the Commission. Given that the commissi-
on was supposed to submit its report to cabinet, this was a strange step,
and of the many reasons supplied for it, the most compelling is that the
government wanted to ensure that the proposal for lifting term limits
(which was not in any earlier submissions) would become part of the CRC
report.60
It is little surprise, then, that the final report, submitted in 2003, was se-
en largely as a failure to address serious constitutional issues in ways that
would consolidate democracy, rule of law and constitutionalism;61 espe-
cially disappointing was the CRC’s lack of resolve when it came to the is-
sue of presidential term limits, notwithstanding that the Constitution itself
imposed such limits. To some observers, the CRC was a missed opportu-
nity for meaningful reform of the constitutional order, with the amend-
ments seen as manipulative, transitory and motivated at times by personal
agendas. The idea of lifting term limits was not widely accepted among
59 Republic of Uganda (2003) Government White Paper on the Report of the Com-
mission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review) & Government Proposals not Addres-
sed by the Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Constitutional Review).
60 The Cabinet Memo contained other issues that were alarming, such as the proposal
to give the president power to dissolve parliament in case of deadlock and to ex-
tend presidential powers to acquire land for investment or environmental protec-
tion; there were also several proposals for curbing the judiciary.
61 Olaka-Onyango J Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda (1993) 500.
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Ugandans, and a number of groups opposed the proposal; even the CRC
chair wrote a minority report objecting to them. Nevertheless, the provisi-
on on presidential term limits was duly amended.
The removal of term limits opened the possibility of a life presidency,
with all its attendant problems and far-reaching repercussions for constitu-
tional stability and observance of rights in Uganda. Museveni’s long tenu-
re of presidential office poses dangers to democracy: the longer rulers stay
in office, the more they take it for granted that the power they hold is
theirs and theirs alone and that no one else has a right to it. It could be
argued, moreover, that the post-1995 amendments were no different in na-
ture to the abrogation of the post-independence constitution: in the earlier
case, the premier was elevated to the presidency and powers concentrated
in the executive, while, post-1995, term limits were removed for the sole
benefit of a sitting president. None of these amendments has enjoyed the
support of the majority, and all failed to rally consensus across the politi-
cal aisle. They did not entrench constitutionalism but rather personal rule
through legalese.
The Public Order Management Bill, amended and signed into law by
Museveni in 2013, is yet another blow to constitution stability. The Act gi-
ves the police discretionary powers to prohibit gatherings of as few as
three people in a public place to discuss political issues; they can also
break up meetings of three or more people discussing political issues in
their own homes. These restrictions on the rights to speak, associate and
demonstrate amount to an overthrow of the foundation on which the 1995
Constitution was built, with critics calling the Act a measure to stifle op-
position to the government. Amnesty International has described it as
a ‘serious blow to open political debate’ and part of a pattern of repression
that includes the closure of two newspapers and radio stations in May
2013 for reporting an alleged government plot to assassinate opposition
MPs.62
As suggested earlier in this chapter, constitutional reforms are not in-
herently bad for they reflect a realisation that the aspirations of the people
have changed. Indeed, as long as correct procedure is observed, amend-
ment processes can contribute to the stability and durability of constituti-
62 Amnesty International ‘Public Management Order Bill is a serious blow to open
political debate’ (2013) available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/uganda-publ
ic-management-order-bill-serious-blow-open-political-debate-2013-08-05
(accessed 10 August 2013).
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ons. What commentators in Uganda often lament, however, is that the pri-
mary motive for the frequency of amendment is the incapacity of the go-
vernment and political class to govern in accordance with the Constitution.
Given that its article 3 prevents any unlawful amendment which has the
effect of suspending, overthrowing, or abrogating the Constitution, it may
be argued that in theory these high-frequency amendments are lawful; it is
their legitimacy, though, which is in question. Adhering to the rule of law
entails more than mechanical application of legal technicalities.63 It invol-
ves an evolutionary search for institutions and processes that facilitate au-
thentic stability through justice.
In practice, longer constitutions are more frequently amended than
shorter ones.64 Lutz predicts that longer constitutions will be amended
more because they are more likely to contain detailed provisions that risk
becoming obsolete over time. With 287 articles and seven schedules, the
1995 Constitution is one of the longest in the world, several times longer
than most European constitutions and ten times the length of the US con-
stitution.65 This, in part, reflects the fact that Uganda’s constitution ad-
dresses numerous policy issues which are ordinarily not included in con-
stitutions because they encumber legislators when dealing with new situa-
tions and contingencies.
Regime type
Since the end of colonial rule, several African states have been dominated
by authoritarian or military regimes, but most of them, like Uganda, are
hybrid regimes at a crossroads between democratisation and authoritaria-
nism, rarely if ever reverting to full-blown authoritarianism of the kind
witnessed under Idi Amin yet rarely transitioning fully to democracy eit-
her.66 Development in Uganda since Museveni took power reflect some of
the paradoxes of hybrid regimes: neither entirely autocratic nor democra-
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tic, they range from semi-democratic to semi-authoritarian along a spec-
trum of hybridity. The political scientist William Muhumuza sums up the
contradictions well:
Museveni’s government created an impression that it was on a steady path to
strengthen democratic institutions … . Nonetheless, these institutions have
ended up being used for propaganda purposes, they have not been enabled to
perform their duties independently. Therefore, Museveni’s motive to retain
power in a pseudo-democratic dispensation has significant implications for
Uganda’s political future … . Personalisation of power leads to authoritaria-
nism and corruption that may reverse Uganda’s current gains.67
The Ugandan state, in essence, is an authoritarian, patronage-based re-
gime. Increasing authoritarianism and NRM dominance in the country’s
politics clearly deviates from the pluralistic, democratic tone of the Con-
stitution. At the time of writing, the NRM leadership has been in power
for 27 years and only recently opened up political space after many years
of monolithic rule, a style of governance with serious implications for
constitutional stability.
As suggested above, Uganda is not only authoritarian but neo-patrimo-
nial as well. Neo-patrimonialism denotes a political system in which the
outer appearances of a legal-rational state are in place but where actual
power rests on a deeply-embedded patrimonial logic; power arrangements,
that is, are based informally on patron-client relationships, favouritism and
loyalty.68 Neo-patrimonialism and democratic institutionalisation are op-
posing logics, and Uganda’s slow or resistant response to democratisation
can be attributed to the countervailing strength of patrimonial logics such
as presidentialism and clientelism.
Global context
The constitution of any one country is often influenced by, and must be
interpreted and operationalised within, the broader external context. With
many countries in Africa becoming independent, the ‘great powers’ reali-
sed they could induce and govern, by various informal means, the formati-
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on of legal and political regimes in non-European countries that would
open resources, labour, and markets to free trade dominated by economic
competition among European powers without the need for the expensive
and increasingly unpopular old imperial system of formal colonies and
monopoly-trading companies.69 Neo-colonialism uses capitalism, busi-
ness, globalisation and cultural imperialism to influence a country.
This new, non-colonial ensemble of global institutions came together to
govern the persisting imperial network of relationships of dependency, in-
equality, and economic exploitation. Through this dependency, rich nati-
ons manage to influence poor countries through the different sectors of so-
ciety. Gallagher, Robinson, and Mommsen stress the importance of impe-
rially-imposed legal and political institutions in dispossessing non-Euro-
pean peoples of popular sovereignty over resources, labour and markets
and opening them to the informal paramountcy of the great powers and
their trading companies.70
African leaders who support a global market economy will always get
support or aid from these powers. The interests of donors, as well as their
inconsistency in promoting the rule of law, democracy and good
governance in Uganda, have been seen by all actor groups as the biggest
obstacle preventing development partners from becoming agents in the
process of democratisation.71 Donors talk democracy, but oftentimes their
economic and ideological interests are more important than political plura-
lism in the countries where they operate.
The global powers have been indifferent with regard to ensuring that
African leaders learn the democratic principles. Instead, they help them to
strengthen oppressive regimes, perhaps because the West still needs to ex-
ploit their resources. The influence of global powers (that is, development
partners) on Uganda’s policies is visible at both the governmental and
non-governmental levels. The funds provided to the state enable donors to
set the policy agenda. President Museveni sacrificed his left-orientated
ideology for this budgetary support and embraced liberal economic poli-
69 Tully J ‘Modern constitutional democracy and imperialism’ in Loughlin M and
Walker N (eds) The Paradox of Constitutionalism (2007) 462.
70 Tully J ‘Modern constitutional democracy and imperialism’ in Loughlin M and
Walker N (eds) The Paradox of Constitutionalism (2007) 462-3.
71 For the nature of interests of donors in Uganda, see also Hauser 1999; Okuku
2002; Barya, Opolot, Otim
2004; Kanyeihamba 2006.
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cies directed by the World Bank in order to legitimize his rule and prolong
his stay in power. Therefore, Western powers pay lip-service to democra-
tisation in Africa, normally playing it safe where their economic interests
take precedence over issues of democracy in Africa. What seems to in-
form Western relations with African regimes is not democracy but whe-
ther the regime in power serves their economic and strategic interests.
In addition, in Africa many new constitutions and provisions relating to
human rights and freedoms provisions have been shaped largely by pro-
gressive international norms and principles. As a result, these constitutions
are grounded not in the cultural mores of their societies but in internatio-
nal human-rights norms that are destined to fail and become irrelevant. A
good mix is needed between international normative standards and local
norms in shaping the design of constitutions in Africa. That this is lacking
explains why most post-colonial constitutions in sub-Saharan Africa have
succumbed to irrelevance and debacle. They failed, that is, because they
were not fine-tuned to the realities of society. In Uganda’s case, it has uni-
que features which should be reflected in its constitution-making; at the
same time, it should also observe certain internationally accepted demo-
cratic norms.
Global powers, furthermore, are also ready to support any country en-
dorsing the war on terror irrespective of whether or not it is democratic
and notwithstanding that anti-terrorism laws and human-rights protection
are among the most controversial issues in the contemporary international
legal and political environment. Terrorism is often an excuse for govern-
ments to pursue measures that violate human rights and thereby undermi-
ne the very foundations of democratic societies.
In Uganda, the NRM government takes advantage of the war against
terrorism to incriminate political opponents and limit their freedoms and
rights. For example, in the Buganda riots of 2009 some activists were ar-
rested and charged with terrorism; in the case of the Walk to Work pro-
tests, a campaign against food-price increases and declining health care,
criminal suits including terrorism charges have been brought against oppo-
sition leaders such as Dr Kiiza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic
Change (FDC) and his supporters, only for the courts later to release them.
In response to the Walk to Work demonstrations, Museveni has appealed
to parliament to change the law so as to deny bail to those charged with
terrorism, corruption, treason and defilement.
If the proposal becomes law, it will remove judges’ discretionary
powers to grant bail for certain categories of crime; and if the right of bail
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is removed, several other rights will be affected too, such as freedom of
movement and the right to life. As commentators have noted, a mandatory
six-months’ sentence without bail or trial merely for walking to work
amounts to a reintroduction of detention without trial and violates article
43(2)(b) of the Constitution. Such an amendment would also offend other
constitutional principles, chief among them the independence of the judi-
ciary; a second key principle is contained in article 126(3), which stipula-
tes that all state organs and agencies shall ‘accord to the courts such assis-
tance as may be required to ensure the effectiveness of the courts’. In ef-
fect, the proposed amendment would overturn the Constitution.
Agential factors
Political leadership
As the leader of the NRM government, President Museveni has undoub-
tedly influenced the constitution-making process. Though the 1995 Con-
stitution has provisions that curb the president, in practice he wields con-
siderable power over parliament. James Rwanyarare, the former UPC
chairman of the Presidential Policy Commission, observes the following:
President Museveni had a personal hand in the making of the constitution:
First of all, he wanted to continue entrenching his movement system of go-
vernment in power, thereby fighting with all his mechanics to influence the
constitutional debate proceedings. He was the architect of the whole thing of
the movement. He helped in the defeat of federalism in Uganda which UPC
and other political organisations supported. He personally met the then Sabal-
angira Besweli Mulondo who had a last card for the federal ticket to pass
through. This was after president Museveni discovering the Federo will pass
through with a nod of the UPC and other opposition parties.72
Museveni tends not to trust anyone but himself, and no decision of any re-
levance is taken without his consent. Building institutions and organisati-
ons requires delegating power, something which is foreign to Museveni’s
approach. The president notoriously prefers to dictate and micro-manage
all decisions, regardless of their institutional settings, norms and procedu-
res. Ministers and other officials who are nominally in charge of a policy
area are hardly consulted and often bypassed. This is notably the case in
3.2
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key sectors such as defence, foreign policy, the economy and finance. Mu-
seveni’s leadership style makes him a significant roadblock to democratic
transition and constitutional stability.
State agencies
State agencies, too, effect constitutional stability. The laws governing
Uganda's constitutional commission and constituent assembly provide key
roles for a minister of constitutional affairs, who is supported by the public
service department (the ministry of constitutional affairs). The Constitu-
tional Commission Statute of 1988 then gave the minister a number of sig-
nificant roles in relation to the commission. To make matters worse, there
was no provision guaranteeing the independence of these constitution-
making bodies. The difficulty with arrangements giving government au-
thorities key roles in establishing constitution-making bodies is that those
bodies then take centre-stage and interfere in the operations of the consti-
tution-making bodies.
Constitutional and electoral commissions play an important role in
democratisation but have also been influenced through ex officio govern-
ment representation. For example, the twenty-one-member constitutional
commission included two ex officio members both of whom were senior
officials, the one in the army, the other in the ruling-party secretariat.
Some members appointed by the minister for constitutional affairs were
not approved by the president, while others were appointed by the presi-
dent but without the minister’s approval, as required by the Constitutional
Commission Act of 1988. There was no nomination process allowing any-
one else to suggest names.73 The most obvious dangers that arise when
governmental interests are represented in constitution-making bodies con-
cern the likelihood of there being pressure to protect those interests gener-
ally or the interests of particular parts of the government.
The police and army have also played a prominent role in politics. Mili-
tarism has been employed as a means of capturing and maintaining power,
and no clear divide exists between the army and the political sphere. The
army is at the core of the political system and is represented in parliament;
3.2.2
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similarly, the police have been militarised in maintaining law and order.
These various tendencies have eroded democracy and pluralism.
Excessive accumulation of power by the executive has undermined the
role of parliament and the judiciary. Parliament exists to rubber-stamp de-
cisions predetermined by the NRM caucus. The Chief Justice’s protestati-
ons notwithstanding, President Museveni will not rest until only NRM
cadre judges grace the judicial benches of Uganda. In this regard, the re-
cent re-appointment of Chief Justice Benjamin Odoki, who is supposed to
be the custodian of 1995 Constitution, was unconstitutional in that he ex-
ceeded the retirement age limit of 70 stipulated by the Constitution. Whe-
reas the independence of the executive, legislature and judiciary is key to
constitutional stability, these three arms have been fused in Uganda. Civil
society has also remained fragmented and vulnerable to manipulation by
the state.
Ideational factors
Practices are informed by ideation. Museveni’s political and philosophical
thought and overall mentality is incompatible with Uganda’s supposedly
liberal constitution and can be best described as an instance of old wine
poured into new bottles. He came to power by violence, has retained
power through the abuse of it, and his militaristic ideology is steeped in
Fanon’s theories of violence. He does not believe in liberal democracy and
to him anybody with opposing political views is an enemy; even small
protests against his rule are usually put down through the use of force.
Moreover, he is steeped in non-pluralistic Marxian thought even though
he later adopted a capitalistic style of economic management, a shift
which at any rate was largely forced upon him by his bid to receive aid
from the International Monetary Fund. However, Museveni and NRM par-
ty-members run the state along the monolithic lines of the old communist
regimes. Prior to the multiparty dispensation in 2005, the NRM was a
quintessential communist party. Every Ugandan was deemed to be of the
NRM, and no legal differentiation was made between party and govern-
ment. It is these beliefs that underpinned the dubious case he made for
the ‘no-party’ Movement dispensation, the argument being that since
Uganda had not developed an industrial proletariat and no clear class
structure had emerged, it was not ready for multiparty politics. Using a
pseudo-Marxist model, he said that because people in peasant societies
3.3
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lack a class identity, they are prone to ethnic and religious polarisation and
easily exploited by politicians, who are ‘messengers’ of perpetual back-
wardness.74
Nevertheless, in spite of the reintroduction of multi-partyism in 2006,
pluralism has not been allowed to take root in Ugandan politics. The coun-
try is not at war and is formally a multiparty system, but Museveni runs a
militaristic, single-party government that uses violence to suppress opposi-
tion both directly, through actual force, and indirectly by creating a clima-
te of fear in which potential candidates think twice before challenging him
either in the ruling party’s internal structures or in opposition ranks. In re-
cent years, for example, the speaker of parliament, Rebecca Kadaga, has
been pushed to the wall by NRM stalwarts who wanted her to toe their
party line and therefore act in a partisan manner that contradicts the norms
of liberal politics enshrined in the Constitution. In another example, the
NRM secretary general requested that the speaker expel ‘rebel’ NRM MPs
who had been dismissed from the party following disciplinary procedures.
Although the speaker refused, there was, in this case as in so many others,
pressure on her to obey the party line.
Old wine in new bottles: the crisis facing Uganda’s constitutional order
is one in which a liberal constitution is managed by an illiberal mind. The-
re is, that is to say, a mismatch in the ruling class between illiberal theory
and the practice of constitutionalism; and when politics come into conflict
the Constitution, the executive is predisposed to suspend, amend, abrogate
or subvert the latter.
Conclusion
Uganda’s 1995 Constitution is a good case to explain why constitutions in
Africa do not stand the test of time. The context in which the constitution
is written and operates in Africa, and Uganda in particular, determines
why this is so. The contextual factors that were discussed include the
structure of society, the historical legacy, constitutional design, regime-
type, as well as the socioeconomic and international environments. This
4
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chapter has argued that Uganda’s constitutional instability has been condi-
tioned by these structural factors.
However, there has also been an interplay of other factors, such as the
values informing political behavior and the character of key political play-
ers. In other words, contingent issues such as political agents, state agen-
cies and ideational factors do matter in constitutional rule. Human agency
is critical in rearranging social structures to meet human needs in the
realm of politics and economy. Nevertheless, structure also imposes limits
on human agency. Structural factors, Linz and Stephen argue, ‘[c]onstitute
a series of opportunities and constraints for social and political actors’.75
Ideas are powerless unless they are fused with material forces and con-
nected to their social settings, institutions and social groups.
Context is fundamental in shaping constitutional outcomes, and at-
tempts to understand Africa’s constitutional instability start with the con-
textual conditions in which constitutions are made and operate. As Karl
Marx observed, ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just
as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by them-
selves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmit-
ted from the past’.76
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